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INTRODUCTION 
 
The pirate has declared war against all mankind; 
all mankind must declare war against him
1
 
 
This thesis examines the phenomena of contemporary maritime piracy in Southeast Asia 
and Northeast Africa during the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. This was 
not an exceptional occurrence. Maritime piracy had experienced regular periods of 
substantial growth and decline since the earliest days of transoceanic trading motivated 
frequently by political, economic and socio-cultural fluctuations ashore. Indeed, piracy 
emerged as a significant impediment to the consolidation of European colonial and 
mercantile ambition during the nineteenth-century predominantly also in the waterways 
of Southeast Asia and the southern Mediterranean Sea. By the late nineteenth-century, 
attacks on European merchant trade had been suppressed in these regions and in some 
cases eliminated entirely. 
 
For the majority of the twentieth century maritime piracy was a ‘micro-maritime’ 
concern for western governments, dwarfed by macro events such as the First and Second 
World Wars. It was not until the early 1980s that the International Maritime 
Organization’s (I.M.O.) Maritime Safety Committee (M.S.C.) highlighted that piratical 
attacks had once again escalated to such an extent that the situation was ‘alarming’.2 
Indeed, officials from the International Maritime Bureau (I.M.B.), a specialised division 
of the International Chamber of Commerce, noted that maritime piratical attacks were 
regularly reported during the late 1970s in West Africa and the Gulf of Thailand.
3
 
 
With this in mind, this thesis consists of three key areas of examination carried out 
under a broad theoretical framework that encompasses historical analysis combined with 
an examination of contemporary military practice and international maritime law. In the 
first instance, it investigates whether the escalation in maritime piratical activity in the 
late twentieth century constituted a ‘palingenesis’ by considering the modern historical 
                                                 
1
 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the laws of England (4 vols, Philadelphia, 1893), ii, p. 72. 
2
 International Maritime Organisation (I.M.O.), ‘Piracy and armed robbery at sea’ in Focus on I.M.O. (Jan. 
2000), p. 2. 
3
 Christian Science Monitor, 30 Apr. 1985. 
 -2- 
context of piracy, in particular the late nineteenth-century. This explores the maritime 
climate relative to piracy in the southern Mediterranean and Southeast Asia between 
1800 and 1900 focussing on escalation, manifestation and responses. Moreover, this 
analysis positions the latter case studies on contemporary piracy in chapters II-VI within 
a historical framework and illustrates how the escalation of piracy in the twentieth 
century was contextually diverse to piracy from previous eras. The term ‘palingenesis’ 
is used in this context to represent the regeneration or rebirth of a historical phenomenon 
in a contemporary form, which is contextually diverse from previous manifestations. 
 
In terms of historical context for the case studies on Northeast Africa in chapters IV-VI, 
the southern Mediterranean Sea/ North African coast is utilised as the nearest proximal 
waterway to experience manifestations of piracy during the nineteenth-century. Prior to 
the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, the waterways that bordered the Northeast coast 
of Africa were not established trading routes and therefore had not witnessed the 
profusion of piratical attacks as was the case in the southern Mediterranean. In addition, 
during the nineteenth-century the coastline of present day Somalia was securely under 
British control deterring potential maritime criminality and disorder in the region. From 
1869 to 1884, following the opening of the Suez Canal, coastal Somaliland was under 
the control of the Turkish viceroy of Egypt. Within three years, the region was under the 
direct administration of Italian, British and French colonial programmes that declared 
protectorates in 1887. This divided the country into British Somaliland to the east, 
Italian Somaliland to the south and Abyssinia and French Somaliland to the west. The 
resourceful colonial presence maintained tight control over maritime boundaries, which 
deterred illicit maritime activity such as piracy.  
 
The historical analysis establishes a foundation for an examination of the maritime 
climate between 1900 and 1914, the interwar period and post-Second World War when, 
it is argued, ‘micro-maritime’ threats such as piracy faded in terms of strategic 
importance. Merchant vessels were frequently targeted by belligerent navies during the 
First and Second World War. This was, however, a ‘guerre de course’ intent on the 
destruction and disruption of sea trade rather than the acquisition of merchandise for 
 -3- 
private gain.
4
 Due to a lack of reliable statistical information available to gauge levels of 
piratical ‘incidence’ between 1900 and 1979, a quantitative methodological approach is 
employed to gauge levels of ‘interest’. This approach collates and charts occurrences of 
piracy in the selected works of noted maritime theorists such as Alfred Thayer Mahan 
and Julian Corbett alongside contemporary journals and newspaper articles. What is 
particularly relevant is the maritime climate that emerged following the Second World 
War and how it was conducive to a resurgence of piracy in the late 1970s and early 
1980s. This initial section therefore addresses two central questions arising from this 
research. Firstly, can the re-emergence of piracy in the later part of the twentieth century 
be declared a ‘palingenesis’ or was it simply a materialisation of a enduring problem, 
and secondly, was it diverse or comparable to manifestations of piracy from previous 
eras? These questions are crucial in addressing a key argument in this research, that 
maritime piracy experienced a palingenesis in the late twentieth century that was 
distinctive to occurrences of piracy during previous historical periods. 
 
Next, this thesis traces the development and evolution of counter-piracy initiatives since 
this resurgence through comprehensive case studies of Southeast Asia and Northeast 
Africa. This represents the core qualitative research methodology in this work. 
Statistically, Southeast Asia accounted for the largest percentage of maritime piracy 
attacks worldwide between 1979 and 2005. In 1993 alone, incidents of piracy and armed 
robbery against ships in Southeast Asia accounted for over 73 percent of the global 
total.
5
 By 2005, this trend was reversed as attacks in the Gulf of Aden and in the Somali 
basin escalated considerably. In 2009, Somali pirates were responsible for around 80 
percent of all incidents of maritime piracy worldwide.
6
 These major case studies present 
a detailed exploration of how regional and extra-regional governments responded to 
these upsurges of piracy and how responses evolved over the course of the last forty 
years. This analysis attempts to reveal the effectiveness or otherwise of these efforts and 
what affect, if any, did suppressing piracy at sea have on tensions and instability ashore. 
 
                                                 
4
 ‘Guerre de course’ translates to ‘War of the chase’. 
5
 I.C.C. I.M.B., Piracy and armed robbery against ships annual report: 1998 (London, 1999), p. 5. 
6
 I.C.C. I.M.B., Piracy report 2010, p. 5. 
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Each region is examined initially in isolation under a thematic framework that critically 
incorporates landward and seaward initiatives alongside the progression and utility of 
international maritime law. This analysis also addresses a broader question: how did the 
international legal framework evolve and how effective or otherwise was it in 
suppressing contemporary piracy?   
 
Chapter II traces the initial resurgence and responses to piracy in Southeast Asia 
beginning with attacks on Vietnamese boat refugees in the Gulf of Thailand and South 
China Sea in the late 1970s and 1980s. This is followed by an analysis of alternative 
regional incidents up to the beginning of the Asian financial crisis in 1997. A more 
pervasive and organised form of piracy evolved after 1997 that peaked in 2000 with 259 
attacks reported in Southeast Asian waters, chiefly Indonesia.
7
 Chapter III highlights 
how piracy and armed robbery against ships manifested in the region during this period 
and how external events, such as the attacks on the United States in September 2001, 
influenced regional approaches to maritime security. This culminated in the signing of 
the first strategic regional counter-piracy framework, the Regional Cooperation 
Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) 
in 2006. This agreement alongside increased multilateral engagement by littoral states 
resulted in a steady decline in attacks from 105 in 2005 to 59 by 2008.
8
 
 
In terms of Northeast Africa, chapter IV examines the period from the foundation of the 
Somali Republic in 1960 to its collapse in 1969 and the subsequent rise and fall of Siad 
Barre’s military regime that lasted from 1969 to 1991. This analysis establishes the root 
causes of contemporary Somali piracy and frames it within the wider and disordered 
political, economic and social context ashore. Furthermore, it illustrates the direct 
connection between the collapse of the state structure in Somalia and the escalation in 
maritime piracy after 1991. 
 
                                                 
7
 I.C.C. I.M.B., Piracy report 2010, p. 5. 
8
 I.C.C. I.M.B., Piracy report 2009, p. 5. 
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By 2005, the Somali pirate infrastructure had evolved into organised criminal enterprise 
and a calculable threat to shipping transiting the Gulf of Aden and the Somali Basin. 
Chapter V illuminates this threat and focuses on chiefly non-military initiatives 
launched to counteract these pervasive acts of piracy between 2008 and 2013. This 
includes the formation of industry Best Management Practice (B.M.P.), the proliferation 
of Private Maritime Security Companies (P.M.S.C.) alongside legal and jurisdictional 
potencies and limitations. Chapter VI expands on the period between 2008 and 2013 by 
analysing the unprecedented international military and diplomatic response to Somali 
piracy through expeditionary naval operations, judicial enhancement and reform, 
maritime security capacity building alongside rehabilitation and reintegration initiatives. 
These multifaceted efforts combined to diminish the freedom of movement and 
activities of Somali pirates by 2013. 
 
The final section of this thesis constructs a multi-level comparative analytic framework 
to gauge the effectiveness and shortcomings of these counter-piracy initiatives in both 
Southeast Asia and Northeast Africa. This consists of comparatively analysing 
responses at the strategic, operational and tactical level, thereby offering a more 
comprehensive contribution to the literature. This comparative analysis addresses 
several central questions in this research such as what commonality, if any, do incidents 
of piracy possess across the geographic divide and, perhaps more importantly, can an in-
depth understanding of the evolution of contemporary counter piracy efforts lead to 
more effective and sophisticated anti-piracy efforts in the future? Furthermore, this 
section explores experiences of piracy in alternative geographic settings to deepen the 
efficacy of this study and illustrate how manifestations of piracy are unique to particular 
regions political, socio-economic or cultural intricacies at a particular period. 
 
Contemporary definitions 
According to article 101 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS), piracy consists of any of the following: 
 
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, 
committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or 
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a private aircraft, and directed: (i) on the high seas, against another ship or 
aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; (ii) 
against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the  
jurisdiction of any State; (b) any act of voluntary participation in the 
operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a 
pirate ship or aircraft; (c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an 
act described in subparagraph (a) or (b).
9
 
 
The UNCLOS determination limited acts of piracy to those committed outside the 
jurisdiction of a state’s maritime boundary. This was problematic as the majority of 
piratical attacks, particularly in Southeast Asian waters, occurred in anchorages, ports 
and littoral sea lanes. 
 
To compensate for this restriction, the I.M.B. created a second definition that grouped 
piracy and armed robbery together as:  
 
An act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with the apparent intent 
to commit theft or any other crime and with the apparent intent or capability 
to use force in the furtherance of that act.
10
 
 
After 2010, the I.M.B. adopted the I.M.O. definition of ‘armed robbery against ships’ 
and combined it with the UNCLOS definition for statistical purposes. I.M.O. Resolution 
A.1025 ‘Code of practice for the investigation of crimes of piracy and armed robbery 
against ships’ defined ‘armed robbery against ships’ as any of the following acts: 
 
(i) any illegal act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat 
thereof, other than an act of piracy, committed for private ends and directed 
against a ship or against persons or property on board such a ship, within a 
State’s internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial sea; (ii) any act of 
inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described above.
11
 
 
The existence of two separate definitions of what was essentially an identical crime 
perpetrated in a different area of water complicated counter-piracy efforts during the 
period of this research. Moreover, such distinctions were seemingly irrelevant to the 
                                                 
9
 ‘U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea’, 1982 (U.N., Treaty Series, mdcccxxxiii, no. 31363, pp 60-1). 
10
 I.C.C. I.M.B., Piracy report 2002. 
11
 ‘Code of practice for the investigation of crimes of piracy and armed robbery against ships’, 2010 
(I.M.O., Maritime Knowledge Centre (M.K.C.), A/RES/1025/26/2010, p. 4). 
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perpetrators in terms of targeting vessels and to the victims of piracy. Therefore, 
‘piracy’ in the context of this research, refers to both high seas piracy (UNCLOS article 
101) and armed robbery against ships in territorial waters (I.M.O. Resolution A.1025) 
unless explicitly stated otherwise. 
 
Literature Review 
Secondary source material 
The spectrum of publications pertaining to piracy is diverse. There are several noted 
academic publications such as Peter Lehr’s Violence at sea: piracy in the age of global 
terrorism alongside a multitude of additional secondary material such as journal articles, 
magazines and reports from civilian, military and academic think-tanks.
12
 Official 
Government documents or military funded publications on piracy have been inherently 
limited in the scope of their analysis. Both are typically compiled within a specific 
theoretical framework with a focus on internal policy making and related consequences 
for the national government in question. Peter Chalk’s The maritime dimension of 
international security: terrorism, piracy, and challenges for the United States, for 
example, provides a first-class analysis on international maritime security, but it is 
arguably limited in its scope and wider efficacy as it primarily focuses on challenges and 
policy relevance for the United States under RAND’s Project Air-Force Strategy and 
Doctrine Program.
13
 
 
Furthermore, researchers in the field of contemporary piracy have typically focussed on 
one geographic location in their analysis; referencing alternative regions principally for 
reasons of context. While this is a worthwhile academic undertaking mostly for regional 
specificities, it limits a more comprehensive analysis and understanding of piracy across 
the geographic divide. In this regard, Stefan Eklöf’s Pirates in paradise: a modern 
history of Southeast Asia’s maritime marauders, Carolin Liss’s Oceans of crime: 
maritime piracy and transnational security in Southeast Asia and Bangladesh and Derek 
Johnson et al.’s Piracy in Southeast Asia: status, issues, and responses provide helpful 
                                                 
12
 Peter Lehr (ed.), Violence at sea: piracy in the age of global terrorism (London, 2007). 
13
 Peter Chalk, The maritime dimension of international security: terrorism, piracy and challenges for the 
United States (California, 2008). 
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overviews of maritime crime specific to Southeast Asia.
14
 In terms of piracy off the 
coast of Somalia, there are fewer books published due to the contemporaneity of the 
issue. Jay Bahadur’s Deadly waters: inside the hidden world of Somalia’s pirates, Stuart 
Yikona et al.’s Pirate trails: tracking the illicit financial flows from pirate activities off 
the Horn of Africa, Christopher L. Daniel’s Somali piracy and terrorism in the Horn of 
Africa and Martin N. Murphy’s Somalia: the new Barbary?: piracy and Islam in the 
Horn of Africa are some examples of complete works specific to contemporary Somali 
piracy and are utilised in this research as such.
15
 
 
This thesis expands on these regional specific works by critically incorporating a 
detailed examination of counter-piracy initiatives in the two regions most exposed to 
maritime crime during the period, taking into consideration previous investigative 
and/or academic works throughout. This offers a more comprehensive analysis of how 
counter-piracy operations have evolved since the late 1970s. Seminal contemporary 
publications in the fields of naval, strategic and maritime security studies, such as 
Geoffrey Till’s Seapower: a guide for the twenty first century, Ian Speller’s 
Understanding naval warfare and David Slogget’s The anarchic sea: maritime security 
in the 21st century, offer more generalised examinations of maritime piracy within the 
framework of the broader international context of naval operations and strategy.
16
 While 
this is an important undertaking, it limits specific analysis of the piracy question itself, a 
gap that this thesis attempts to fill. 
 
There is an abundance of journal articles and papers published that deal directly with 
contemporary maritime piracy and the related issues, which are utilised throughout the 
                                                 
14
 Stefan Eklöf, Pirates in paradise: a modern history of Southeast Asia’s maritime marauders 
(Copenhagen, 2009); Carolin Liss, Oceans of crime: maritime piracy and transnational security in 
Southeast Asia and Bangladesh (Singapore, 2011); Derek Johnson & Mark Valencia (eds.), Piracy in 
Southeast Asia: status, issues and responses (Singapore, 2005). 
15
 Jay Bahadur, Deadly waters: inside the hidden world of Somali pirates (London, 2011); Stuart Yikona, 
Clement Gorrissen, George Kisaka, Kevin Stephenson, David Lamair & Francisca Fernando, Pirate 
trails: tracking the illicit financial flows from pirate activities off the Horn of Africa (Washington D.C., 
2013); Christopher L. Daniels, Somali piracy and terrorism in the Horn of Africa (Plymouth, 2012); 
Martin N. Murphy Somalia: the new Barbary?: piracy and Islam in the Horn of Africa (New York, 2011). 
16
 Geoffrey Till, Seapower: a guide for the twenty-first century (3
rd
 ed., Oxford, 2013); Ian Speller, 
Understanding naval warfare (London, 2015); David Sloggett, The anarchic sea: maritime security in the 
21
st
 century (London, 2013). 
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course of this work. These range from generalised military and strategic studies journals 
such as Survival, Journal of Strategic Studies and the RUSI Journal to regional specific 
journals such as Contemporary Southeast Asia and Journal of the Indian Ocean Region 
alongside historical, economic, security and defence journals such as the Naval War 
College Review, Jane’s Navy International and Jane’s Defence Weekly. Resources such 
as the International Institute of Strategic Studies annual Military Balance was useful in 
gauging naval strength relative to counter-piracy operations since the 1970s. In addition, 
copious monographs, reports and papers from university centres, think tanks, military 
and strategic institutes and international organisations, such as the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the International Chamber of Shipping (I.C.S.), 
International Shipping Federation (I.S.F.), Lloyds List, the Nautical Institute and the 
Oceans Beyond Piracy project have been published, largely following the upsurge in 
piracy in the Gulf of Aden and western Indian Ocean after 2008. This research attempts 
to synthesise these various historical and contemporary interdisciplinary studies and fuse 
them with original retrospective analysis. Given the fluidity of maritime crimes like 
piracy, this is something many contemporary works have been unable to do. This 
approach allows for a more holistic and substantive analysis of contemporary counter-
piracy, given the suppression of attacks in the Gulf of Aden and Somali Basin in 2013. 
 
In addition, this thesis outlines how maritime law has developed and evolved in 
response to contemporary piracy and how it has contributed or hampered the effective 
suppression of incidents bolstering the depth of this research. The works of selected 
experts in the field are utilised in this regard. Professor Robert Beckman, Director of the 
Centre for International Law has published several articles and edited chapters on 
international maritime law and Southeast Asia such as ‘The 1998 SUA Convention and 
2005 SUA Protocol: tools to combat piracy, armed robbery, and maritime terrorism’. 
Additional secondary legal materials utilised include Alfred P. Rubin’s The law of 
piracy, Douglas Guilfoyle’s Shipping interdiction and the law of the sea, Michael P. 
Scharf et al.’s Prosecuting maritime piracy: domestic solutions to international crimes, 
James Kraska’s Contemporary maritime piracy: international law, strategy, and 
diplomacy and Robin Geiβ’s and Anna Petrig’s Piracy and armed robbery at sea: the 
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legal framework for counter-piracy operations in Somalia and the Gulf of Aden.
17
 These 
books are complemented by various articles from several leading international law 
journals including The American Journal of International Law and The Ocean 
Development and International Law Journal alongside more geo-specific law reviews 
such as Boston College Third World Law Journal, Singapore Journal of International & 
Comparative Law and the British Journal of Criminology. This research amalgamates 
and expands on these findings within a broader, interdisciplinary analysis of counter-
piracy, thereby offering a more holistic contribution to the field. 
 
There are a multitude of authors that have published on piracy from antiquity to the 
twenty-first century. Many of these generalised histories lacked retrospective of the de-
escalation of piracy in Northeast Africa in 2013 and the various contemporary 
fluctuations in Southeast Asia and therefore lack completeness in this regard. Moreover, 
given the large swathes of historical periods covered in these narratives a detailed 
regional analysis was typically unfeasible. This research attempts to fill this particular 
gap in the literature between 1900 and 1979 and expand these general studies into the 
twenty-first century to illustrate how piracy, like other forms of criminality, was fluid 
and experienced periods of significant growth and decline proximal to socio-political, 
economic and cultural variances and events ashore. Key general histories utilised in this 
research include Ralph T. Ward’s 1974 publication, Pirates in history, Frank Sherry’s 
1986 publication, Raiders and rebels: the golden age of piracy, Peter Earle’s The pirate 
wars, Janice E. Thomson’s Mercenaries, pirates & sovereigns: state-building and 
extraterritorial violence in Early Modern Europe, Philip Gosse’s The history of piracy, 
G.O.W. Mueller and Freda Adler’s Outlaws of the ocean: the complete book of 
                                                 
17
 Alfred P. Rubin, The law of piracy (Rhode Island, 1988); Douglas Guilfoyle, Shipping interdiction and 
the law of the sea (Cambridge, 2009); Michael P. Scharf, Michael A. Newton & Milena Sterio (eds.) 
Prosecuting maritime piracy: domestic solutions to international crimes (Cambridge, 2015); James 
Kraska Contemporary maritime piracy: international law, strategy, and diplomacy (Oxford, 2011); Robin 
Geiβ & Anna Petrig, Piracy and armed robbery at sea: the legal framework for counter-piracy operations 
in Somalia and the Gulf of Aden (Oxford, 2011). 
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contemporary crime on the high seas and Angus Konstam’s Piracy: the complete 
history.
18
 
 
While there has been an abundance of research relating to contemporary piracy 
published in recent years, mainly since the upsurge of Somali piracy in 2008, no work 
has yet to effectively analyse the conditions for the resurgence of maritime piracy in the 
twentieth century while simultaneously tracing the evolution of this upsurge in the 
parallel development of counter-piracy initiatives in both Southeast Asia and Northeast 
Africa. Roger Villar’s Piracy today: robbery and violence at sea since 1980, Martin N. 
Murphy’s Small boats, weak states, dirty money: piracy and maritime terrorism in the 
modern world, John Burnett’s Dangerous waters: modern piracy and terror on the high 
seas and Jack A. Gottschalk and Brian Flanagan’s book Jolly Roger with an Uzi: the 
rise and threat of modern piracy have all tackled modern manifestations of maritime 
piracy and as such have contributed to framing this research within the wider 
historiography.
19
 
 
Primary source materials 
During the period of this research, maritime piracy was a multi-causative phenomenon. 
This thesis will illustrate how a combination of static factors (such as geography and 
proximity to major shipping lanes) and fluid factors (such as socio-political stability and 
naval presence) collectively facilitated contemporary upsurges of piratical activity. 
These upsurges affected a wide variety of stakeholders and required a concerted 
multifaceted response to address it. Taking this into consideration, a key investigative 
method utilised in this research is structured, unstructured and non-directive interviews 
                                                 
18
 Ralph T. Ward, Pirates in history (Baltimore, 1974); Frank Sherry, Raiders and rebels: the golden age 
of piracy (New York, 1986); Peter Earle, The pirate wars (London, 2003); Janice E. Thomson, 
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with a broad selection of these stakeholders at various locations in Dublin, London, 
Malaysia and Singapore. These included industry representatives from maritime 
professional bodies such as the Nautical Institute, shipping companies such as North-
South Maritime based in Singapore and leading ship-management agencies such as 
Thome and Intermanager. These consultations are positioned alongside meetings with 
various military personnel at the forefront of counter-piracy operations such as former 
Chiefs of Staff and naval intelligence officers at EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta at 
Northwood Headquarters in London and representatives of the Singaporean and Irish 
navies. 
 
As this thesis examines policy level responses to maritime piracy, regional 
governmental representatives have been consulted including the head of the Maritime 
Institute of Malaysia (MIMA) alongside personnel from the Policy Operations Branch 
of the Singapore Ministry of Defence. In addition, leading academics and 
representatives from non-governmental organisations have been consulted to generate a 
more comprehensive, multi-stakeholder representation of contemporary maritime piracy 
and efforts to address it. This includes interviews and meetings with the Assistant 
Director of the ReCAAP I.S.C. in Singapore, the head of the I.M.B. P.R.C. in Kuala 
Lumpur, the Executive Director of the International Institute of Strategic Studies and a 
Senior Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Legal experts and advisors, 
chiefly the Director of the Centre for International Law Professor Robert Beckman, have 
also been consulted for a perspective on the evolution of international law and its 
relationship to maritime crime. Knowledge acquired from these various interviews and 
consultations is assembled and assessed relative to an extensive range of statistical 
resources. 
 
Statistical analysis, 1900-79 
Central to exploring the evolution of contemporary counter-piracy efforts is analysing 
statistical data and flows to highlight successes and failures alongside various regional 
and global manifestations and trends. Reliable statistics on rates and occurrences for 
piracy before 1980 are inherently limited and as such present a degree of difficulty in 
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compiling an accurate picture of the scale of the problem for much of the twentieth 
century. The lack of statistics available prior to 1980 is in itself indicative of the 
strategic inconsequentiality of the issue during this period. According to Roger Villar in 
his 1985 publication Piracy today: robbery and violence at sea since 1980: ‘Prior to 
1980 records were either not kept or have not been retained on file in sufficient numbers 
to make it worth their inclusion’.20 Carolin Liss affirmed this in her work on maritime 
piracy in Southeast Asia and Bangladesh: ‘[...] comparatively little is known about 
pirate attacks on small craft and merchant vessels between the end of World War II and 
the early 1980s’.21 The quantitative framework created in chapter I is useful in bridging 
this gap and when utilised alongside archival records such as British Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office files helps generate a workable picture of manifestations of 
maritime criminality during this period. 
 
Statistical analysis, 1979-2013  
While reports on piracy escalated during the late 1970s and early 1980s, there exist only 
a limited number of statistical resources to gauge the level of piratical activity during 
this period. This changed somewhat following the establishment of the I.M.B. Piracy 
Reporting Centre (P.R.C.) in Kuala Lumpur in 1992.  Prior to this, the primary statistical 
sources utilised in this research consist of (a) the ‘I.M.B. chronology of pirate attacks on 
merchant vessels 1981-87’ located in I.M.B. founder Eric Ellen’s 1989 editorial Piracy 
at Sea (b) the I.M.O. Maritime Safety Committee statistical resources from 1982-92 (c) 
Captain Roger Villar’s log of attacks from 1979-84 in his 1988 publication Piracy 
Today (d) the U.S. National Geo-Spatial Intelligence Agencies’ Anti-Shipping Activity 
Messages (ASAM), United Nations (U.N.) Security Council reports and finally British 
government Admiralty files. 
 
Compiling a practicable statistical framework of piratical occurrences from 1992 
onward is comparatively uncomplicated compared with accessing figures a decade 
previous. The primary statistical resource utilised from this period onward is the I.M.B. 
                                                 
20
 Roger Villar, Piracy today: robbery and violence at sea since 1980 (London, 1985), p. 92. 
21
 Carolin Liss, Oceans of crime: maritime piracy and transnational security in Southeast Asia and 
Bangladesh (Singapore, 2011), p. 5. 
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quarterly and annual reports on piracy based on information received by the P.R.C. in 
Kuala Lumpur. As previously mentioned, I.M.B. reports combine ‘piracy’ and ‘armed 
robbery’ at sea alongside ‘actual’ and ‘attempted’ attacks, which allows for a broad 
overview of global fluctuations of maritime piracy. However, this method limits specific 
analysis of regional variations and modus operandi, particularly given the disparity 
between the formalised hostage for ransom situation that evolved in the Gulf of Aden 
and western Indian Ocean and the chiefly low-level opportunistic thefts in Southeast 
Asia during the period of this study. 
 
Despite this, the I.M.B. attempted to verify all reported acts of piracy or armed robbery 
against a vessel with the master of that vessel or the owners to enhance accuracy.
22
 To 
compensate for these deficiencies, I.M.B. reports are considered alongside several other 
statistical resources. The I.M.O. has released bi-annual reports on incidents of piracy 
worldwide since 1984. This information is combined with a synopsis of trends and 
regional observations, which combined with other sources, allows for a comprehensive 
assessment of global piratical activity since the 1980s to the present day. 
 
Regional-specific piracy reporting mechanisms such as the ReCAAP Information 
Sharing Centre (I.S.C.) in Singapore, dealt exclusively with reported incidents of piracy 
and armed robbery against ships in Asia. The ReCAAP I.S.C. evaluated the significance 
of incidents in terms of two factors. Firstly, the level of violence and secondly, the 
economic loss incurred.
23
 Incidents are then categorised under three headings according 
to severity: very significant, moderately significant and less significant. This 
methodology provides a useful perspective on regional specificities relating to maritime 
crime and when combined with international reports such as the I.M.B. and I.M.O. 
facilitates a more accurate portrayal of fluctuations of piracy. This approach is useful as 
according to one analyst: ‘very often you see a disparity between the I.M.B. and the 
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 Interview with Mr. Cyrus Moody, Deputy Director of the I.C.C. I.M.B. at the I.C.C. I.M.B headquarters, 
Cinnabar Wharf, London (22 Oct. 2013). 
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 ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre, Annual research report 2008 (Singapore, 2009), p. 5. 
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ReCAAP reports because after investigation they might deem a false report which 
would not make it into the final report’.24 
 
In addition, the U.S. National Geo-Spatial Intelligence Agency has published annual 
reports of anti-shipping activity since 1981 that included reports of actual and attempted 
incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships. These ASAM reports provided 
details of date of occurrence, geographical sub-region, aggressor, victim and a brief 
description of the incident and are a particularly useful tool in analysing attacks against 
shipping during the 1980s and early 1990s. The Nautical Institute created a confidential 
Mariners Alerting and Reporting Scheme (MARS) in 1992 primarily for the purpose of 
reporting accidents and near misses ‘without fear of identification or litigation’, but also 
received reports on incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships and as such is a 
useful supplementary resource.
25
 
 
The civil maritime analysis department of the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, has 
released a ‘Worldwide threat to shipping: mariner warning information’ report several 
times a month since May 1999 that contained a summary of piracy acts and hostile 
actions against commercial shipping worldwide alongside developments with regards to 
maritime law and counter-piracy operations.
26
 Supplementary to these resources are 
numerous eyewitness statements, victim correspondence, academic works, press 
releases and official governmental and law-enforcement publications. Despite this wide 
array of resources and reporting mechanisms, it is widely acknowledged that the actual 
rate of incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships was significantly higher than 
what was reported or recorded.   
 
 
 
                                                 
24
 Interview with Ms. Jane Chan Git Yin, Coordinator - Maritime Security Programme, Institute of 
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Problems with statistics 
According to one analyst: ‘The actual problem of piracy in global waters is undoubtedly 
far greater than [...] figures suggest, since a number of attacks - possibly as many as 50 
percent - are not reported’.27 There were a number of reasons for this under-reporting. In 
terms of initial attacks on Vietnamese boat refugees in the Gulf of Thailand and the 
South China Sea during the late 1970s and 1980s, establishing exact figures was 
inherently problematic given the transient nature of the victims. From the shipping 
industry side the reasons for underreporting were more apparent and included the 
potential loss of international reputation, fear of reprisal, costly investigations and 
impediments, cultural acceptability and governmental complicity. Roger Villar 
recognised this deficiency in his 1985 record of piratical attacks: ‘It is the authors 
opinion that this is the most complete and comprehensive record in existence’.28 He 
acknowledged, however, that ‘[...] it probably represents no more than about half the 
actual numbers of attacks which have taken place’.29 
 
This notion is reflected elsewhere. In 1998 the U.K. Defence Intelligence Service 
estimated that the annual number of actual piracy cases could be 2,000 percent higher 
than what was being reported whereas the Australian Intelligence Organisation 
estimated the rate of under-reporting by 1996 was somewhere in the region of 20 to 70 
percent.
30
 The inconsistencies with these figures reflect the difficulties in establishing 
accuracy when utilising modern piracy reports and data. Gauging the genuine 
effectiveness of counter-piracy initiatives before 1992 is therefore problematic. The 
available resources do, however, allow for a reasonable assessment of the fluctuation of 
incidents and therefore also a measure of how contemporary counter-piracy initiatives 
have evolved. 
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Legal materials 
Additional primary source material is derived from legal tracts, official governmental 
reports, archival and academic publications. The U.N. Dag Hammarskjöld Library is the 
primary repository for United Nations Assembly and Security Council resolutions 
alongside a number of general reports on tackling and defining piracy and the acceded 
legal parameters the international community operated in to combat it. The UNCLOS of 
10 December 1982, in particular articles 100, 101 and 105, sets out the legal framework 
applicable to combating piracy and armed robbery at sea alongside other ocean activities 
and stands as a key primary source document. Additional key legal agreements and 
conventions include the Geneva Convention on the High Seas of April 1958, the 
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (1974) (SOLAS), the International 
Convention against the Taking of Hostages (1979), and the Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (1988) (SUA). 
The U.N. produced over twenty resolutions directly pertaining to Somali piracy between 
2005 and 2013. These resolutions are central to examining the legal parameters of the 
international communities’ response to contemporary piracy. Supplementary 
repositories include the I.M.O. Maritime Knowledge Centre (M.K.C.) which archives 
official documents and publications, the U.S. Library of Congress for historical 
legislation and LexisNexis for contemporary case law.  
 
In addition, a key analytic method employed throughout this work is to investigate the 
prevailing opinions and actions of various regional and international governments in 
their response to piracy. The United States has been at the forefront of anti-piracy 
operations in the Gulf of Aden/ Somali Basin since the events of September 2001. The 
White House has released several official reports, department fact sheets, press 
statements and congressional hearings on the matter that are utilised. The European 
Union established its first naval force in response to the escalation of piracy off the Horn 
of Africa in 2008, which consisted of eight E.U. member states making a permanent 
operational contribution and several more participating in a support capacity. European 
governments, including the U.K. have released multiple reports and anti-piracy 
publications, which are also utilised. Littoral Southeast Asian states such as Indonesia, 
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Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam have all contributed, to 
regional counter-piracy efforts to different extents. This resulted in numerous bilateral 
and multilateral agreements throughout the 1990’s culminating in the signing of the 
ReCAAP agreement in 2006, which are utilised as examples of policy level engagement. 
 
While official governmental publications and reports provide a key investigative tool in 
this work, attempting to understand the motivations of maritime criminals themselves 
through the limited correspondence they have had with journalists and investigators is 
also utilised. Understanding these motivational factors is vital, not only for reasons of 
objectivity, but also for a more coherent and effective analysis to be presented. 
 
With the benefit of retrospection and a multitude of regional and international piracy 
studies and statistics, a more encompassing analysis is now presented, which is 
particularly pertinent in an increasingly constrained and interdependent globo-economic 
setting. While the intricacies of modern maritime crime are continually shifting and 
changing, the decrease in successful maritime hijackings in the Gulf of Aden and Somali 
Basin in 2013 was a significant milestone and, therefore, strengthens the timeliness and 
substance of this research. 
 
This thesis approaches the subject of contemporary maritime piracy objectively. Criteria 
for establishing objectivity includes engaging with a diverse range of stakeholders, from 
policy makers to counter-piracy practitioners, alongside a exhaustive range of sources 
including newspaper articles, national archival records, academic texts, industry 
guidelines, statistical data and legal tracts. Conclusions are based on an empirical 
methodology incorporating both a quantitative and qualitative analysis of collated 
material with no specific interest group or political agenda in mind, thereby offering a 
more authoritative and holistic contribution to the existing literature.  
 
It is envisioned, therefore, that this work will serve as an authoritative analysis of 
modern piracy, its manifestations and efforts to combat it that will appeal to academics 
undertaking naval or maritime security related research, policy makers, industry 
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professionals, legislators, military personnel and general interest readers. Moreover, it is 
hoped that elements of this research invoke further examination into the historical 
intricacies of maritime piracy during the twentieth century, its various manifestations 
and contemporary strategic, operational and tactical responses. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
Maritime piracy: a twentieth-century palingenesis? 
 
[…] piracy, with its harrowing gruesomeness, its boldness and daring, its romance and 
adventure, its plunder and murder, its conflicts and reprisals, is a spectre of the past […] It 
has lost the glamor and enchanting, romantic atmosphere which pervaded the career of 
Captain Kidd and made him the worshipped hero of every school-boy, or which inspired the 
pen of a Scott, of an Edgar Allan Poe or Frank R. Stockton, or put the charm to the tales of 
W. Clark Russell, for pirates and piracy are now dead, and live ingloriously only in the 
pages of chronicling history (1902).
1
 
 
Introduction 
Maritime piracy has existed as long as the oceans have been harnessed as a source of 
sustenance and as a conduit for the transportation of people and goods. In the ancient 
world, pirates were not simply common criminals. They often achieved high status and 
power positions through the acquisition of wealth at and from the sea. Indeed, the act of 
pirating vessels was closely associated with ancient forms of warfare in both aims and 
methods.
2
 In the twelfth century BC, for example, collections of maritime nomads 
known as ‘sea peoples’ were thought to be responsible for the fall of the Mycenaean 
Greek empire and the destruction of the Hittite empire in Asia Minor.
3
 
 
In more modern times, the endorsement of privateering under reign of Queen Elizabeth I 
of England resulted in widespread corsairing by English privateers and pirates during 
the sixteenth century which precipitated the so called ‘golden age’ of piracy. By the late 
seventeenth century, however, Britain had distanced itself from the sanctioning of 
maritime raiding and initiated an aggressive policy of pursuing pirates in domestic and 
foreign waters. Eventually, advances in naval technology and a resolute anti-piracy 
intervention by the nascent Royal Navy, following the wars of the Spanish succession, 
heralded an end to this ‘age’ of piracy, resulting in a sizeable reduction in incidents by 
1730. However, given the cyclical nature of the problem and the political and economic 
dependence of several nations on the proceeds, piracy was not suppressed entirely. 
Following a period of relative inactivity throughout the latter part of the eighteenth 
                                                 
1
 Oscar Herrmann, Pirates and piracy (New York, 1902), pp 45-6. 
2
 Philip De Souza, Piracy in the Graeco-Roman world (Cambridge, 1999), pp 17-18. 
3
 Angus Konstam, Piracy: the complete history (New York, 2008), p. 11. 
 -21- 
century, maritime piracy once again resurfaced as a significant problem in the 1800s, 
predominantly in the southern Mediterranean and in the waterways of Southeast Asia. 
 
This chapter will briefly explore early legal interpretations and the historical evolution 
of the term piracy alongside the maritime climate relative to piracy in both these regions 
during the nineteenth-century followed by an overview of the widespread suppression of 
incidents by 1900. This analysis focuses on escalation, manifestation and responses and 
does not attempt to engage in an exhaustive study of the cultural and political 
characteristics of nineteenth-century piracy. Understanding the fluctuation of piracy 
during the nineteenth-century establishes an important contextual framework for the 
analysis of the maritime climate in the pre-war, interwar and post-war period and in the 
contemporary case studies in subsequent chapters. 
 
During the First and Second World War traditional forms of maritime piracy essentially 
ceased, aside from cases of state sanctioned attacks on merchant vessels that were not 
acts of piracy under international law. While there are limited resources available to 
gauge the extent of non-traditional threats in the world’s oceans in the decades after the 
Second World War, the maritime climate that emerged was conducive for a resurgence 
of piratical activity by 1980. 
 
Analysing the statistical and empirical evidence available during the years 1900 to 1979 
addresses a fundamental question in this work: can the escalation of piracy in the late 
1970s and early 1980s be declared a ‘palingenesis’ or was it merely a continuation of an 
entrenched problem that never really went away? Maritime piracy, this thesis argues, 
resurged in the late twentieth century in a distinct manner to piratical predations of 
previous historical eras. This distinction related to the unique political, social and 
economic context of that particular period and as such was a ‘palingenesis’ of an ancient 
phenomenon. 
 
The imperial expansionism of the nineteenth-century established new maritime trading 
routes that were frequently beset by diverse and unchecked forms of piratical activity. 
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This was most prolific in the West Indies, along the North African coast, Southeast Asia 
and the northeastern Mediterranean. In 1826 during the War of Greek Independence, for 
example, it was estimated that up to one-quarter of the population of Greece was 
involved in some form of maritime predation due to a weakened naval fleet.
4
 Indeed, for 
almost three centuries the distinctions between piracy, privateering and legitimate 
trading were essentially indiscernible.
5
 Reflecting the contemporary situation in many 
ways, the problem had grown to such an extent that governments dependent on strategic 
Sea-Lines of Communication (SLOC) to support their colonial and economic aspirations 
were forced to respond. Prior to expanding on these responses, early legal 
characterisations and the historical evolution of the term ‘piracy’ and ‘privateering’ is 
explored and the distinction between the two noted. 
 
Early legal interpretations and historical evolution 
Localised interpretations and definitions of what constituted piracy at sea have existed 
for centuries. In ancient Rome, for example, according to Alfred P. Rubin, ‘The legal 
rationalisation found by the Roman Senate for suppressing the communities of "pirates" 
was not an asserted Roman right to police the seas [...] but the quite different assertion 
of a Roman right to territorial as well as maritime jurisdiction in the Eastern 
Mediterranean’.6 In England, the ‘Offences at sea act’ of 1536 transferred jurisdiction 
for the crime of piracy from the civil courts to the Court of Common Law for the first 
time and paved the way for modern admiralty law.
7
 Further notable pre-nineteenth-
century acts initiated by Britain included a series of ‘Acts for the more effectual 
suppressions of piracy’ in 1698, 1721 and 1744 respectively. The United States 
introduced its first piracy act in 1790. The ‘Act for the punishment of certain crimes 
against the United States’ stated: ‘[…] if any person or persons shall commit treason, 
murder, felony or robbery upon the high seas [...] or [...] out of the jurisdiction of any 
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particular state [...] every such offender shall be deemed, taken and adjudged to be a 
pirate’.8 
 
Prior to, and indeed after the introduction of customary maritime law, piracy fell under 
the concept of ‘universal jurisdiction’. This categorised piracy as a crime outside the 
jurisdiction of any one nation and therefore ‘hostis humani generis’, or literally 
translated - ‘the enemy of mankind’. This meant that pirates could be prosecuted by any 
nation that encountered them on the high seas. The expression ‘hostis humani generis’ 
was derived from the early seventeenth-century English jurist Edward Coke’s 
reinterpretation of a segment of Marcus Tullius Cicero’s influential essay ‘De Officiis’ 
written in 44BC. Cicero stated: ‘[...] nam pirata non est ex perduellium numero definitus, 
sed communis hostis omnium; cum hoc nec fides debet nec ius iurandum esse 
commune’, which translated to ‘[...] for a pirate is not included in the number of lawful 
enemies, but is the common foe of all the world, and with him there ought not to be any 
pledged word nor any oath mutually binding’.9 This illustrated a connection between 
antiquated Roman anti-piracy legal tracts and more modern legislative attempts. 
 
The idea of universal crime became commonplace in eighteenth and nineteenth-century 
legal discourse and criminal proceedings. The prominent 1820 case of the United States 
v. Smith utilised this notion: ‘and pirates being hostis humani generis are punishable in 
the tribunals of all nations’.10 There is an important distinction between municipal law 
(law governing individual states) and international law (law governing all states). Henry 
Wheaton’s seminal 1836 publication, Elements in international law, best tackled the 
division: 
 
Piracy under the law of nations may be tried and punished in the courts of 
justice of any nation, by whomsoever and wheresoever committed; but 
piracy created by 'municipal statute’ can only be tried by that State within 
                                                 
8
 ‘An act for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States 1790’, available at The Library of 
Congress, (http://memory.loc.gov/rbc/rbpe/rbpe21/rbpe213/2130140a/001dr.jpg) (13 June 2012).  
9
 Marcus Tullius Cicero, De Officiis, ed. T. E. Page (3 vols, London, 1928), iii, p. 384. 
10
 U.S. Supreme Court, ‘United States v. Smith’, xviii, no. 153, 1820, available at (https://supreme.justia. 
com/cases/federal/us/18/153/case.html) (16 June 2012). 
 -24- 
whose territorial jurisdiction, and on board of whose vessels, the offence 
thus created was committed.
11
 
 
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the ideas of the enlightenment thinkers 
and evolving international legal frameworks further solidified crimes such as piracy as 
jus cogens or a peremptory norm. This described certain crimes that ‘affect the interests 
of the world community as a whole because they threaten the peace and security of 
humankind and because they shock the conscience of humanity’.12 Such notions were 
influenced by the concept of universal jurisdiction and the ‘law of nations’ or ‘natural 
law’. This was reflected in the trial of the ‘United States v Smith’ in 1820: 
 
All nations are engaged in a league against them [pirates] for the mutual 
defence and safety of all. This renders it the more fit and proper that there 
should be a uniform rule as to the definition of the crime, which can only be 
drawn from the law of nations, as the only code universally known and 
recognized by the people of all countries.
13
 
 
Additional legal understandings of piracy grew from municipal acts such as ‘An act to 
amend certain acts relating to the crime of piracy’ of 1837, ‘An act to repeal an act of 
the sixth year of King George the fourth, for encouraging the capture or destruction of 
piratical ships and vessels’ of 1850 and the ‘Slave trade act’ of 1873.  
 
There were further legal strides taken to address the problem of piracy during the same 
period such as the 1854 report to the President of the British Board of Trade, Lord 
Clarendon. The report compiled by the British foreign secretary legal advisors to the 
crown defined ‘pirates’ and universally outlawed them. Such reports enhanced efforts to 
standardise maritime law and strengthen counter-piracy operations: 
 
[A]ll persons whatsoever Flag or Papers they may Sail, or to whomever their 
ship may legally belong will be pirates by the Law of Nations who are guilty 
of forcible robberies, or captures of Ships or Goods upon the High Seas 
without any lawful Commission or authority [...] They and their Vessels and 
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Cargoes may be captured by Officers and Men in the public Service of any 
Nation, and my be tried in the Courts of any Nation.
14
 
 
International accords such as the Paris Declaration of 1856 and the Hague Convention 
of 1899 also contributed to the legal discourse on maritime crime, chiefly in relation to 
privateering. There was, however, some trepidation on the part of Britain in particular 
that these international agreements were too restrictive: ‘this country should retain a free 
hand, and not subscribe to any further regulations, which might be prejudicial to its 
interests in any future wars’.15 The Paris Declaration, for example, stated that ‘Neutral 
goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under the 
enemy’s flag’. 16  Sir William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the laws of England 
summed up the legal stance of maritime piracy as understood during the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries well: ‘The offence of piracy, by common law, consists in 
committing those acts of robbery and depredation upon the high seas which, if 
committed upon land, would have amounted to felony there’.17  
 
Twentieth-century legal evolution 
It was not until after the First World War that any genuine attempt was made to codify 
and address the legal and definitional aspects of maritime piracy. In April 1926, the 
League of Nations committee of experts compiled a list of eighteen topics for 
consideration at the ‘First conference for the codification of international law’ held at 
The Hague in March and April 1930. Among the preliminary topics included on the 
agenda was legislating for territorial water limits. The conference ultimately failed to 
reach agreement but expedited further deliberations. Researchers in international law at 
Harvard Law School compiled several drafts on key issues discussed at the Hague 
conference. This resulted in publications on four key matters, which included a 
Collection of piracy laws of various countries, edited by Stanley Morrison. A more 
extensive volume of work was published in 1932 by the law school at Harvard. This was 
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the first tangible twentieth-century effort to define the legal parameters of maritime 
piracy. The Harvard ‘draft convention’ defined piracy as: 
 
Any act of violence or of depredation committed with intent to rob, rape, 
wound, enslave, imprison or kill a person or with intent to steal or destroy 
property, for private ends without bona fide purpose of asserting a claim of 
right, provided that the act is connected with an attack on or from the sea.
18
 
 
The inclusion of the ‘private ends’ clause was significant and would become 
commonplace in proceeding definitions, despite the ambiguity of the phrase. Douglas 
Guilfoyle identified that the term was first used by American lawyer Joel Prentiss 
Bishop in his New commentaries on the criminal law published in 1892.
19
 Guilfoyle 
concluded that ‘[...] all violence lacking state sanction (public violence) is violence for 
private ends [...] the ‘private ends’ requirement [therefore] only emphasises the point 
that states cannot commit piracy’.20 These deliberations coincided with several high 
profile criminal proceedings such as the case of the ‘SS Lotus’ in 1927, the ‘United 
States v Flores’ in 1933 and ‘In re Piracy Jure Gentium’ in 1934. The 1933 decision, for 
example, was significant as the judge ruled that the jurisdiction over maritime crime 
extended to attacks on U.S. vessels while in navigable waters within the territorial 
jurisdiction of foreign sovereigns.
21
  
 
After the Second World War, consolidation of natural maritime resources became an 
important issue, primarily in relation to seabed mining and fisheries jurisdiction. Then 
U.S. President Harry S. Truman issued a series of proclamations in 1945 that addressed 
U.S. claims to natural resources on the high seas. ‘Proclamation 2667’ of September 
1945 stated that ‘the Government of the United States regards the natural resources of 
the subsoil and sea bed of the continental shelf beneath the high seas but contiguous to 
the coasts of the United States as appertaining to the United States, subject to its 
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jurisdiction and control’.22 These proclamations encouraged other nations to follow suit 
and lay claim to contiguous seas along their coasts, which highlighted the need for 
further international codification on the law of the sea. 
 
Between 1949 and 1956, the U.N. International Law Commission was tasked with the 
problematic duty of planning for the codification of international law, surveying 
international law and selecting topics for codification. Among the matters selected were 
the regime of the high seas and the regime of territorial waters. This process resulted in 
a series of ‘Articles concerning the law of the sea’ in 1956. These articles underpinned 
the first United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I) which 
ultimately created four conventions, most notably, the ‘Geneva Convention on the High 
Seas’ of 1958. The Geneva Convention addressed the weaknesses in previous 
international definitions of piracy and attempted to ‘codify the rules of international law 
relating to the high seas’.23 Section 1 of article 15 of the convention defined piracy as: 
 
Any illegal acts of violence, detention or any act of depredation, committed 
for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private 
aircraft, and directed: (a) On the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, 
or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; (b) Against a 
ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any 
State [...].
24
 
 
The Geneva Convention was followed by a second, less dynamic U.N. Law of the Sea 
convention in 1960 (UNCLOS II) that highlighted the need to codify territorial sea and 
fishery limitations. The seminal United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS III), which ran from 1973 to 1982, eventually superseded both conventions.
25
 
The definition of piracy in the 1958 Geneva Convention remained unchanged in the text 
of 1982 convention. The enduring high-seas requirement paradoxically created a third 
‘category’ of maritime ‘armed robbery’ attacks within territorial waters, which added an 
additional layer of complexity to the law. According to an article in 1976: ‘The effect of 
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the 1958 Geneva Convention has been to confuse the law of piracy […] the danger is 
that the obsolescence of piracy will be marked by an increase in the commission of 
illegal acts of violence on the high seas’.26 Despite obvious shortcomings, the result of 
these legal discourses meant that ‘the “criminalisation” of piracy became complete [...] 
within an international system that encompassed the entire globe, including the non-
western world in the post-Second World War era’.27 The evolution and applicability of 
these international conventions and the legal framework for counter-piracy operations is 
addressed in subsequent chapters. 
 
Maritime piracy operated outside established legal frameworks and was therefore a 
crime ‘against all mankind’. Privateering on the other hand, although indistinguishable 
in practice, held a different legal position for much of the nineteenth-century. 
Privateering or ‘corsairing’ as it was commonly known in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, was the conferring of limited legal authority via a ‘letter of marque’ to 
privately owned and operated vessels to seize combative merchant vessels and/or cargo 
for recompense. More simply as one commentator noted: ‘privateers preyed on the 
seaborne communications of enemy nations’. 28  This method of antagonism closely 
reflected the sea-denial stratagem of a ‘guerre de course’ or an attack on enemy sea-
borne trade, however, the fundamental legal difference was that a ‘guerre de course’ was 
not initiated for private gain. It intended to destroy enemy commerce rather than 
appropriate it.  
 
From an early nineteenth-century legal standpoint, privateering did not constitute an act 
of piracy in its most elementary form. However, privateering was essentially state 
sponsored ‘legitimate piracy’ and therefore fashioned a maritime environment that 
blurred the legal distinction between the two. Nicholas Andrew Martin Rodger 
illustrated this close historic interrelationship between privateering and piracy: ‘English 
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piracy flourished in the northern colonies under the cover of privateering against France, 
and with the discreet encouragement of Whig political interests in London’.29 The act of 
privateering was eventually abolished under the ‘Paris Declaration respecting maritime 
law’ in April 1856, which is discussed later in this chapter. This reduced the ambiguity 
surrounding maritime law and solidified all forms of piracy as a criminal offence. 
Geoffrey Till described how privateering at times amounted to the condoning of piracy 
and that prior to the Congress, was a ‘practice open to abuse’.30 
 
The Declaration of Paris, therefore, clarified the uncertainties of previous centuries in 
relation to criminality at sea and strengthened counter-piracy resolve among 
industrialised maritime nations.
31
 It is evident that two fundamental differences existed 
between privateering and pirating within Western discourse - legality and legitimacy. 
Pirates operated outside the law, whereas privateers operated within a quasi-legal 
framework. Simply stated, pirates committed robbery at sea under no authority while 
privateers committed robbery at sea under the authority of a sovereign nation. This is an 
important distinction to note.  
 
This type of state-sponsored maritime raiding was particularly prevalent in the 
Mediterranean Sea throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Indeed, piracy 
had been an instrument of political and economic statecraft along the Barbary Coast of 
North Africa since the late fifteenth century with western merchant trade regularly 
pillaged. The Barbary States were, according to Herbert Richmond: ‘sea powers for 
reasons of plunder, not from necessities enforced upon them by the conditions of 
national life to use the sea for trade’.32 Similarly, in Southeast Asia a long history of 
raiding at and from the sea existed that extended beyond simple criminality to the 
consolidation of regional economic and political power bases. Indeed, the European 
understanding of what constituted ‘piracy’ was at variance from the indigenous 
maritime communities of Southeast Asia. Segments of these populations practiced 
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maritime raiding as a ‘legitimate political or commercial endeavour’. 33  Therefore, 
‘piracy’ from a western understanding only materialised in Southeast Asia in direct 
correlation with the expansion of European colonial enterprise. James Warren asserted 
that the term ‘piracy’ criminalised political or commercial activities that indigenous 
maritime populations had for centuries considered part of their ‘statecraft, cultural-
ecological adaption and social organisation’.34  
 
With this in mind, the maritime climate in the early decades of the nineteenth-century 
could be characterised by western perceptions and ambitions clashing with eastern 
economic and cultural traditions. This produced a situation conducive for maritime 
instability. Regardless of local interpretations and definitions of piracy, western powers 
recognised a significant rise in predations against their seaborne merchant assets. 
Evidence of this intensification is illustrated by the amount of media attention given to it. 
The Times newspaper, for example, included just three articles on maritime piracy in 
1818. This had risen to twelve in 1820 and twenty-eight in 1822.
35
 Indeed, highlighting 
a small selection of major nineteenth-century British newspapers from 1800 to 1860, it 
is apparent that piracy emerged as an issue of some significance (see fig. 1.1). 
 
Fig. 1.1 
Number of newspaper articles where ‘piracy’ was addressed explicitly, 1800-60 
 1800-20 1820-40 1840-60 
Freemans Journal 5 82 259 
Morning Chronicle 158 617 793 
Caledonian Mercury 76 199 238 
Belfast News-Letter 0 42 186 
TOTAL 239 940 1476 
 
Source(s): Freemans Journal, assorted issues 1800-1860; Morning Chronicle, assorted issues 1800-1860; 
Caledonian Mercury, assorted issues 1800-1860; Belfast News-Letter, assorted issues 1800-1860. 
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The French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars witnessed almost a quarter of a century 
of naval warfare and privateering. The anticipated respite in 1815 did not materialise 
and in one author’s opinion, ‘there was probably more piracy and maritime mayhem in 
the first fifteen years of what has been labelled Pax Britannica than there had ever been 
in the so called “golden age of piracy”’.36 The disorder that followed the end of the war 
undoubtedly fuelled the subsequent rise of piracy. Despite the emerging dominance of 
the Royal Navy, Britain struggled both economically and militarily after the conflict. 
The result was twofold. Firstly, the colonial and mercantile ambition of Britain and 
indeed other European powers had to be promoted and safeguarded as a matter of 
priority and secondly, many ships and crew were no longer needed for warfare and 
therefore sought employment elsewhere.  
 
Resurgence of maritime piracy in the nineteenth-century 
North Africa 
The Barbary corsairs emanated from the coastal regions of Algiers, Tripoli, Tunis and 
Morocco, (see figs 1.2) and shared several similarities with Southeast Asia with regard 
to manifestations of maritime piracy during the nineteenth-century. Both regions had a 
long history of state-supported maritime raiding that had been a distinctive feature of 
their respective political and economic climates. Both regions also benefitted 
economically from the slave trade, which featured as a principal form of maritime 
predation along the Barbary Coast in particular. One significant contrast was that piracy 
was suppressed along the north coast of Africa much sooner when compared with 
Southeast Asia owing chiefly to its proximity to continental Europe. 
 
During the eighteenth-century, relations between European states and the Barbary 
powers were relatively stable, maintained through a combination of treaties, agreements 
and tribute payments for the safe passage of merchant vessels. However, the expansion 
of maritime trade transiting the Mediterranean during the nineteenth-century directly 
contributed to the escalation of piratical attacks and seizures. Indeed, global maritime 
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trade increased by an estimated 400 percent from 1870 to 1913.
37
 Much like Southeast 
Asia, indigenous rulers viewed piratical attacks against foreign mercantile trade as 
legitimate economic and political action against belligerent nations or nations unwilling 
or unable to pay a tribute to transit or operate in their littoral waters. Potential new 
targets emerged in the form of the United States whose fledging naval force no longer 
enjoyed the relative protection of the British flag following the ratification of the Treaty 
of Paris in 1783. By 1790 an estimated 100 American ships sailed to the Mediterranean 
annually.
38
 
 
Religion also played a significant role in promoting piratical activity as the Muslim 
corsairs targeted ‘infidels’ thereby fuelling religious fervour while profiting from their 
actions. Indeed, reminiscent of Southeast Asia, this east-west historical and cultural 
dichotomy reinforced maritime piracy in both regions. J. E. G. de Montmorency stated 
in his 1918 publication on the legal aspects and implications of Barbary piracy that ‘the 
history of the international relationship of the European Christian powers with these 
Muhammedan powers of North Africa has never been worked out’.39 Much like the 
initial European response to piracy in Southeast Asia, there was no concerted effort to 
address attacks on merchant trade in the southern Mediterranean. This lack of continuity 
resulted in minimal external threats to corsairing operations along the Barbary Coast, 
which enabled the states to solidify regional maritime power bases and more importantly 
prestige. By the mid-nineteenth-century, the Barbary States had reached the pinnacle of 
their power in the Mediterranean facilitated by rivalry between England, France, and 
Turkey and the maritime weakness of Spain and Italy.
40
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Fig. 1.2 
Map of Mediterranean Sea/ North Africa (1885) 
 
Source: Historical Map of Africa 1885 [cropped], available at (www.nationsonline.org) (25 Nov. 2012). 
 
Southeast Asia  
The piratical situation along the North African coast mirrored that of Southeast Asia in 
several ways (see fig. 1.3). Like North Africa, maritime piracy expanded extensively in 
the region during the 1800s and directly threatened western naval and mercantile 
ambitions fuelled by an exponential growth in the volume of trade between Europe and 
Southeast Asia. It is estimated that from 1750 to 1800 spice imports from the Far East 
into Europe tripled.
41
 The fledging nation of the United States sent on average 39 
vessels per year to the Orient from 1815 to 1820.
42
 In 1832, the total figure for both 
                                                 
41
 Anthony Reid, ‘An “age of commerce” in Southeast Asian history’ in Modern Asian Studies, xxiv, no. 1 
(Feb. 1990), p. 7. 
42
 James A. Wombwell, ‘The long war against piracy: historical trends’ in Combat Studies Institute 
Occasional Paper, no. 32 (May 2010), p. 105. 
 -34- 
imported and exported trade between the United States and China, for example, 
amounted to almost US$7 million, which exceeded that of all nations except the United 
Kingdom.
43
 This influx of commercial maritime activity in Southeast Asia and the wider 
region resulted in an increase in piratical activity from indigenous coastal communities 
for whom maritime raiding was deeply interwoven into the economic and political fabric 
of society. 
 
Indeed, there were several ethnic pirate tribes operating in the area known as the Sulu 
Sultanate during the nineteenth-century. Most notable among these were the Iranun (or 
Illanun), the Balangingi Samal and the aristocratic Taosug hailing from the Sulu 
archipelago in the southern Philippines. The second significant group were from the 
Malay states situated in the Riau Archipelago at the southern end of the Strait of 
Malacca. The substantial growth in east-west trade meant that these regions ‘depended 
on systems of trading, raiding and slaving for the development and evolution of 
statecraft and societal structure’ with an estimated 68,000 men labouring each year 
alone in the Sulu Zone’s tripang fisheries, for example. 44  In the South China Sea, 
between 1802 and 1810, the organised and thriving pirate group the Guangdong 
Confederation reportedly exhibited more control in maritime regions than that of the 
government or the local elites.
45
 The federation reached the height of its power in 1809 
with 40-60,000 followers and hundreds of vessels at its disposal.
46
 Initially these 
maritime raiders of the Sulu Sultanate and the South China Sea avoided plundering the 
well-armed European merchant vessels, but with the evolving network of trade and 
abundance of potential high value targets, attacks on European vessels steadily increased 
in the early decades of the nineteenth-century. 
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Events such as the Opium War (1839-42), the Arrow War (1856-60) and the Taiping 
Rebellion (1850-64) contributed to a maritime climate conducive to an expansion of 
piratical activity, which reached its height in the decades following these conflicts. In 
1853 alone, there were 70 reported incidences of piracy in the waters near Hong Kong.
47
 
The Opium War ended with the signing of the Treaty of Nanking in 1842, which 
surrendered Hong Kong to Britain on a 99-year lease and opened four more regional 
ports to British trade. Similarly, the Arrow War and the Taiping Rebellion opened five 
more ports to trade. Grace Fox accurately articulated the maritime climate following the 
turmoil of the wars. She stated: ‘By 1854 the civil disturbances in China added rebels 
who were alternatively pirates to the usual supply of marauders in the waterway 
between Hong Kong and Canton [...] foreign ships were attacked and “trade was at a 
standstill”’.48 The problem was exacerbated by weak Chinese coastal governance and 
restrictive rules of engagement for Royal Navy anti-piracy operations at the insistence of 
Vice Admiral William Parker.
49
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Fig. 1.3 
Map of European settlements in Southeast Asia (1890) 
 
 
Source: Florence Caddy, To Siam and Malaya in the Duke of Sutherland's yacht 'Sans peur’ (London, 
1889), p. 12b. 
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Suppression of maritime piracy in the nineteenth-century 
Technological innovations 
Several factors contributed to the suppression of piracy in both the southern 
Mediterranean and Southeast Asia by the late nineteenth-century. At sea, the advent of 
steam power greatly enhanced western anti-piracy operations. The first steam engine 
was successfully tested in the eighteenth-century and steam was harnessed for ocean-
going vessels on an extensive basis by the mid-nineteenth-century. These vessels could 
sail without the restrictive reliance on wind and therefore at a greatly increased speed. 
Such innovations also resulted in a kind of ‘technological naval race’ between European 
sea powers to maintain superior naval capability, which contributed albeit indirectly to 
containing criminal disorder at sea. The first screw-driven ship successfully crossed the 
Atlantic Ocean in 1830 and quickly became the preferred method of propulsion. By 
1855, for example, 174 ships of the Royal Navy had been fitted with the new screw 
propulsion system.
50
 Aside from advancements in naval structural technology, 
innovation in naval armaments and armoury from wood hulls to iron clad hulls in the 
1850s and later steel also enhanced the ability of navies to engage pirate bases and 
vessels in North Africa and Southeast Asia.  
 
The evolution from ‘solid shot’ to exploding shells initiated by French gunner Colonel 
Henri-Joseph Paixhans became standard on almost all European Vessels by the 1850s 
(see fig. 1.4). This evolution significantly aided in both landward and seaward counter-
piracy operations. At sea, devastating damage could be inflicted on the traditional 
wooden vessels still utilised by most indigenous pirate groupings while ashore higher 
levels of damage could be inflicted against pirate bases and strongholds from the sea. 
The 1860s also saw the creation of revolving turret gun and the modern self-propelled 
torpedo. The combination of these technological advancements and innovations gave 
counter-piracy forces a significant advantage over the more traditionally equipped pirate, 
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many of whom still employed traditional muzzle-loading cannon into the early 
twentieth-century.
51
 
 
The nineteenth-century witnessed not only a revolution in naval and military technology 
but also in communications. A more interconnected and globalised system began to 
emerge that facilitated enhanced and timely communication on maritime threats and 
activities among western nations. Samuel Morse’s system of telegraph transmission, 
known as ‘Morse code’, was developed in 1835, which along with the invention of the 
first electromagnetic telegraph in 1837 greatly assisted in the exchange of information. 
These technological advances were augmented by the emergence of a worldwide 
information collection service headed by the marine insurer Lloyds of London that 
produced the shipping paper Lloyds List three times per week.
52
 The creation of a more 
fluid information-exchange system promoted a degree of reciprocity in terms of keeping 
trading routes free from pirate attacks and developing continuity in suppressing the 
threat. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.4 
Paixhans naval shell gun 
 
Source: Musée de la Marine, France.  
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Imperialist expansion and solidification 
The expansion and consolidation of European colonial interests was arguably the prime 
reason for the suppression of piracy in North Africa and Southeast Asia by 1900. Peter 
Earle described how ‘The expanding tentacles of European empires gradually eliminated 
more and more of the bases and havens on which pirates depended until, by the late 
nineteenth-century, there was hardly anywhere left on the globe which was safe from 
imperialist attention’. 53  Indigenous pirate groups no longer benefited from the safe 
havens that littoral waterways and land bases once offered. Events such as the Crimean 
War, for example, encouraged Britain to strengthen its maritime presence in Southeast 
Asia to maintain freedom of passage between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. 
This increased naval presence had a direct impact on the fluctuation of piracy in the 
region and illustrated how external imperialist concerns contributed to establishing 
constabulary order at sea. 
 
Britain’s need to suppress piratical attacks on its seaborne trade was expedited by the 
economic slump that followed the end of the Napoleonic Wars. According to one 
commentator: ‘[...] after Waterloo economic realities asserted themselves [...] the war-
ravaged continent of Europe was in no condition to make large purchases of foreign 
goods and the inflated British economy collapsed’.54 Despite the reduction in naval 
assets following the war, the Royal Navy possessed a substantial fleet unrivalled by any 
other at that time, which led to the conception of ‘Pax Britannica’. By January 1821, 
Britain held 143 serviceable naval vessels manned by over 20,000 personnel, which 
could be augmented at relatively short notice.
55
 Lessons learned during the Napoleonic 
Wars, such as the ability to deploy and sustain numerically inferior naval assets on a 
global scale, expanded the intellectual and strategic capabilities of the Royal Navy and 
enhanced its ability to counter piracy.
56
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The suppression of piracy was also used as justification for imperialist expansion. 
According to Stefan Eklöf: ‘it was easier to convince public opinion at home [...] of the 
need to suppress piracy and safeguard the oceans for British trade rather than of the 
justice in conquering and subjugating indigenous rulers and tribes’. 57  This 
rationalisation may have been particularly effectual given the prevailing economic 
circumstances. Captain Henry Keppel’s 1846 publication, for example, expanded on this 
and offered some insight into Britain’s colonial perspective during the nineteenth-
century. He stated: 
 
Piracy must be put down, slavery must be effaced, industry must be 
cherished and protected; and these objects [...] may be accomplished; and 
we may further learn [...] that from the experience even of “a little war”, an 
enlightened observer may deduce the most sound data on which to 
commence a mighty change, leading, probably, to the happiness of millions, 
and the foundation of colonial empire.
58
 
 
Abolition of the slave trade 
The Treaty of Paris in 1814 agreed to ‘induce all the powers of Christendom to decree 
the abolition of the Slave Trade, so that the said trade shall cease universally, It shall 
cease definitively, under any circumstances [...] in the course of five years; and that 
during the said period, no slave merchant shall import or sell slaves [...]’. 59  A 
supplementary act in 1824 explicitly described acts of slavery as piracy. It declared that 
any British subject was guilty of piracy ‘who upon the high seas [...] carries away any 
person as a slave’.60 Such initiatives harnessed continuity among European powers in 
suppressing the closely interwoven acts of slaving and piracy that existed in North 
Africa and Southeast Asia. As previously mentioned, the proliferation of slaves was 
intrinsic aspect of economic and political control in both Southeast Asia and along the 
Barbary Coast. The intensification of British, Dutch and Spanish anti-slavery operations 
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in Southeast Asia, for example, massively reduced the number of slaves transiting the 
region by the 1880s and consequently incidents of piracy.
61
 
 
Abolition of privateering  
Much like the abolition of slavery four decades previous, the outlawing of privateering 
did much to suppress the level of piratical activity worldwide. Following the end of the 
Crimean War and the subsequent Congress of Paris, seven nations (the United States a 
notable exception) signed the Paris Declaration in 1856. This included a declaration 
respecting maritime law that effectively outlawed privateering from the world’s oceans. 
The text of the declaration explicitly stated that the ‘Plenipotentiaries, being duly 
authorized, resolved to concert among themselves as to the means of attaining this 
object; and, having come to an agreement, have adopted the following solemn 
declaration (that) Privateering is, and remains, abolished’.62 By removing the suggestion 
of legality or legitimacy from piratical acts, the potential ambiguity in counteracting it 
was also removed. This led to more comprehensive anti-piracy legislation influenced by 
the law of nations and the idea of universal jurisdiction. 
 
North Africa 
By 1830, much of the Barbary Coast was under the direct administration of European 
colonial powers. This resulted in the near eradication of pirate bases and networks in 
that region. Unilateral counter-piracy operations began in 1801 with the First Barbary 
War or the Tripolitan War, which saw the fledging American navy launch a largely 
ineffectual campaign to suppress attacks on their merchant vessels off the North African 
coast. A U.S. Mediterranean naval squadron commanded by Commodore Richard Dale 
arrived off the Tripolitan coast in July 1801. The U.S. Fleet consisted of the 44-gun 
frigate President, the 36-gun Philadelphia and the 32-gun Essex alongside the 12-gun 
schooner Enterprise.
63
 The war ended in 1805 with the surrender by the Pasha of Tripoli 
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Yusuf Karamanli and an agreement to stop attacking American vessels. Despite initial 
successes and a protracted naval blockade of Tripoli, piratical attacks continued. 
 
Further predations against American and British vessels led to the Second Barbary War 
in 1815 alongside an acknowledgment by western nations of the need to suppress the 
Barbary corsairs entirely. The most significant engagement of the war and a turning 
point in the suppression of Barbary piracy was the assault upon Algiers in August 1816. 
The ‘bombardment of Algiers’ led by an Anglo-Dutch squadron, under the command of 
Lord Exmouth, destroyed all but two of the Algerian warships and reduced much of the 
city fortifications to rubble. The offensive severely hampered the Barbary States’ ability 
to launch maritime raids in the region; it did not, however, entirely suppress incidents of 
piracy. According to Peter Earle: ‘The Algerian and Tunisian Corsair fleets were both 
still active in the 1820s but by now the writing really was on the wall’.64 
 
The ‘writing’ came in the form of the French invasion of North Africa and conquest of 
Algiers in 1830 that ended over three centuries of autonomous Algerian rule. Following 
the failure of a French blockade, France dispatched a fleet from Toulon carrying 37,000 
infantry that landed in Algiers on 13 June 1830. An article in the contemporary British 
newspaper, Northern Star, commented: ‘Our own piracy committed on the Chinese has 
furnished a “precedent” for the destruction of Tangiers, and for the occupation of any 
portions of the coast of Africa that the French may desire’.65 Within weeks of the French 
invasion, the Dey of Algiers capitulated. According to Earle: ‘A month after the French 
conquest of Algiers, the Bey of Tunis renounced corsair activity “entirely and for-ever” 
and abolished the institution of Christian slavery [...] a few days later the pasha of 
Tripoli followed suit’.66 A further aggressive counter-piracy operation by the Spanish 
navy off the Moroccan coast in 1854-56 resulted in the capture of 44 Moroccan boats 
that paralysed coastal trade and forced local leaders to renounce piracy.
67
 This 
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effectively ended three centuries of maritime raiding in the proximal waters of European 
nations. Earle observed that ‘the holy war in the Mediterranean was over and so was 
piracy throughout the Western world’.68 
 
Southeast Asia 
As was the case in the southern Mediterranean Sea, initial disparity in anti-piracy efforts 
between Dutch, British and Spanish governments in Southeast Asia dissipated during 
the 1860s and a concerted multilateral approach was initiated. The consolidation of 
conflicting geographic boundary claims was the key enabler for the suppression of 
piracy in the region where, for example, the British colonial authorities recognised the 
Dutch claim over the Riau Archipelago and similarly the Dutch recognised the Spanish 
claim over the Sulu zone.
69
 The economic depression between 1830 and 1840 also 
motivated counter-piracy activity in the region as maintaining the regular, uninterrupted 
flow of merchant trade was crucial. Aside from European powers, the United States 
Navy was also actively involved in anti-piracy operations in the South China Sea 
between 1820 and 1840. 
 
Prior to consolidating any form of direct rule in the region, the principal colonial powers 
of Britain and Holland were firmly engaged in vigorous commercial competition and 
consequently offered little continuity in addressing the growing threat from pirates. 
Much like the situation along the North African coast, the piratical threat would need to 
be effaced in order to regularise, rationalise and stabilise regional merchant trade. By 
1846, the problem had grown to such an extent that a new and more aggressive 
multilateral response was initiated. 
 
The newfound continuity among western powers resulted in a number of mutually 
beneficial aggressive multilateral counter-piracy operations in Southeast Asia. Much 
like operations along the Barbary Coast, technological advances in naval weaponry and 
armaments amplified these efforts. The Battle of Bantung Maru of 31 July 1859 
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illustrated the effectiveness of the British and American strategy of targeting susceptible 
land bases and safe havens used by the pirates. This strategy was particularly effective 
given the archipelagic nature of the region and the difficulties this presented in engaging 
pirates at sea. The battle witnessed British forces decimate Dayak pirate strongholds 
from the sea, which resulted in an estimated 800 pirates killed and 60 pirate vessels 
destroyed.
70
 The decisive engagement meant that pirates operating in the Borneo region 
never recovered.
71
  
 
Both the British and U.S. Navy also launched joint operations a number of times against 
Chinese pirates. In 1849, for example, the U.S. sloop Preble supported British naval 
forces in the destruction of two pirate havens and the capture of 57 junks.
72
 Aggressive 
anti-piracy action continued unabated following the Opium War in 1853 and by 
November 1854 an anti-piracy coalition force was established which consisted of 
American, British, Chinese and Portuguese naval vessels with the addition of Dutch and 
Prussian vessels in the mid-1860s. This was bolstered by the signing of the Treaty of 
Tienstin in June 1858, which granted British and American warships access to Chinese 
waters in ‘hot pursuit’ of pirates.73 
 
In 1866, the British government introduced new laws, which enforced tighter 
restrictions on all junks entering and leaving Hong Kong harbour. This was according to 
one commentator: ‘[...] the final step in Britain’s fight against East Asian piracy’.74 
Britain also sought to provide Chinese authorities with the necessary tools to combat 
piracy themselves and presented them two gunboats to use in anti-piracy patrols in 1869. 
By 1870, Britain had scaled back anti-piracy operations in the South China Sea. This 
was a clear indication of the success and suppression of incidents in the region. By the 
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time Spain ceded the Philippines to the United States in 1898, piracy was essentially 
non-existent in Southeast Asian waters, particularly when compared to a century 
previous. Gosse described how the Malay archipelago of Southeast Asia was ‘the last 
stronghold of piracy’ and that ‘the breakup of its gangs finished, probably for ever, 
piracy as it had existed for many thousands of years’.75  
 
Pre-war period, 1900-14 
The suppression of piracy in North Africa and Southeast Asia by the end of the 
nineteenth-century was not exceptional. It was a materialisation of the spread of colonial 
influence and solidification spread across the globe. By 1900 therefore, piratical activity 
had significantly declined in these regions. This was to remain the status quo for almost 
the next eighty years. Limited statistical information on piracy exists between 1900 and 
1980, a reflection in itself of the dwindling relevance of the issue. Quantitative data is 
typically collated as a reactionary process, for example, to highlight an evolving threat 
to influence policy and the allocation of financial or military resources to address that 
threat. In the early 1980s, for example, the I.M.O. noted ‘with great concern’ the 
upsurge in incidents involving acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships and 
consequently began collating statistics to quantify the level of the threat. 
76
 Prior to this, 
the reports simply did not exist in sufficient number to merit a statistical record. 
 
While it might be reasonable to assume that the disorder generated by the First & 
Second World War encouraged crime like piracy to flourish, the opposite held true. 
Valuable maritime commerce was routinely either escorted by heavily armed naval 
vessels or travelled in convoy, which negated the prospect for piracy in any traditional 
sense. The existential threat to maritime commerce came in the form of a ‘guerre de 
course’ by belligerent navies bent on the destruction of this commerce rather than the 
acquisition of it.  
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During the early years of the twentieth-century, localised or ‘micro’ threats such as 
piracy dwindled in relevance to western governments and naval leaders. The emergence 
of large technologically advanced navies alongside rising political tensions shifted the 
focus to ‘macro’ concerns and the threat of a globalised conflict. Contemporary naval 
discourse during these years was heavily influenced by the work of maritime strategists 
such as Alfred Thayer Mahan and Julian Corbett who were concerned with wartime 
issues of grand strategy such as decisive battle and the command of the sea though naval 
superiority.  
 
The late nineteenth and early twentieth-century witnessed several naval engagements 
prior to the official outbreak of the First World War primarily in the Pacific arena. These 
included the Sino-Japanese War (1894-5), the Spanish-American War (1898) and the 
Russo-Japanese War (1904-5). Such engagements diverted attention from micro-
maritime or constabulary issues like piracy as they were superseded by more nefarious 
threats to economic security. That is not to say that piracy did not still exist in small 
isolated pockets or that it was entirely overlooked in contemporary pre-war deliberations. 
Indeed, Herman A. Heydt wrote in his introduction to Oscar Herrmann’s 1902 work 
Pirates and piracy that ‘Although it has passed the zenith of its perverse glory, and 
modern naval development has made it impracticable and impossible, vestiges of piracy 
remain in the Malay Archipelago and the China Sea’.77 
 
Fig. 1.5 
Relative strength of the British, French and Russian navies built and building 1893/4 
 Britain France Russia 
Battleships 45 34 15 
Coast defence vessels 17 9 14 
Cruisers 130 65 28 
Torpedo-boats/ destroyers 45 13 9 
Total 237 121 66 
 
Source: P.H. Colomb, ‘England in the Mediterranean’ in The North American Review, clviii, no. 450 
(May 1894), p. 589. 
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Newspapers, parliamentary debates & admiralty records 
Contemporary newspaper and parliamentary reports from the period suggested a small-
scale piracy problem on the West River route between Canton and Hong Kong between 
1900 and 1914. In 1905, it was reported that ‘China is probably the last of the nations 
with any claim to the rank of an important power which has not long since cleared its 
coasts and waters of these sea robbers’.78 Robert J. Anthony described how a localised 
resurgence of piracy occurred along the Southern coast of China following the 
revolution of 1911; however, he affirmed that ‘despite the disorder, there was still a 
flourishing sea trade out of Hong Kong, Shanghai and other Chinese ports’. 79 This 
appeared indicative of piracy during the pre-war period as a largely localised and 
reactive problem rather than a material threat to shipping. 
 
The issue of maritime piracy arose several times in House of Commons proceedings 
between 1900 and 1914. Concern was expressed that British vessels were coming under 
attack from the Chinese pirates on the Canton and West River and in the Persian Gulf. 
This resulted in the establishment of a counter-piracy patrol by the Commander-in-Chief 
on the China Station in November 1907. The British vessels were withdrawn shortly 
afterwards, however, following the initiation of an ‘effective preventive service’ by 
Chinese authorities.
80
 The Admiralty also set aside funds for the construction of two 
river gunboats for counter-piracy patrols along the Yangtze River in 1911 that were 
never commissioned. This reflected the relatively trivial scale of the problem during the 
pre-war period. 
 
The most significant act of piracy reported during this period appeared to be that on the 
British steamer Tai-On by Chinese pirates in 1913. This attack called into question 
Britain’s ability to protect its merchant assets in the region. Winston Churchill, then 
First Lord of the Admiralty, was questioned on the matter in May 1914. Sir Arthur Fell 
enquired: ‘if the absence of river gunboats in Chinese waters was the indirect cause of 
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the destruction of the British steamer “Tai On” by pirates?’ Churchill responded that 
‘the British patrol of the Canton Delta is believed to be sufficient for its purpose’.81  
 
Despite brief enquires in the Commons over relatively isolated incidents, it is apparent 
piracy was not an issue of material consequence for either the British government or 
Admiralty during this period. In 1914, according to the statement by the First Lord of 
the Admiralty: ‘The disturbed state of China made it necessary for a short time last 
summer to resume some of the naval precautions which were in force during the 
revolution […] with the exception, however, of a limited patrol of the West River by 
torpedo boats as a precaution against piracy, the dispositions of the station are now 
normal’.82 
 
Maritime writers 
To construct a more comprehensive representation of how maritime piracy manifested 
in the years prior to the First World War and in light of an absence of reliable statistical 
information; a selection of works from late-nineteenth and early twentieth-century 
maritime writers and theorists is analysed. The first writer selected is arguably the most 
influential naval theorist of the time - Alfred Thayer Mahan. Taking three of Mahan’s 
works: The influence of sea-power upon history 1660-1783 (1892); Naval 
administration and warfare (1908) and Naval strategy: compared and contrasted with 
the principles and practices of military operations on land (1911), it is apparent 
maritime piracy was an antecedent historical matter.
83
 At no time did Mahan highlight 
or suggest any contemporary analogous issue within these combined works. In his 
discussion on the ‘elements of sea power’, for example, Mahan described how ‘In the 
most active days of colonising there prevailed on the sea a lawlessness the very memory 
of which is now almost lost […]’.84  
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Similarly, maritime historian and geo-strategist Sir Julian Corbett addressed piracy in 
his major theoretical work, Some principles of maritime strategy (1911), in terms of its 
historical role as a tool of the state or as a substitute to state naval power describing it as 
‘a primitive and unscientific conception of war’.85 Corbett’s research into Sir Francis 
Drake, the renowned English privateer, provides an interesting source for attempting to 
gauge the level of piracy during this period. Corbett published three works on Drake, 
namely, Sir Francis Drake (1890), Drake and the Tudor Navy, with a history of the rise 
of England as a naval power (1899) and The successors of Drake (1900). Collectively, 
these works reveal little about pre-war contemporary piracy. Corbett did refer to the lack 
of an accepted definition of piracy in Drake’s time and stated: ‘[...] still at that time 
International Law had not so nicely ascertained the limits of piracy and irregular 
reprisal’.86 For Corbett, like Mahan, maritime piracy did not appear a topic worthy of 
consideration or a threat worthy of analysis, which indicated it was an issue of nominal 
relevance at that time. 
 
An analysis of John Colomb’s 1902 publication British dangers reaffirmed that piracy 
was a negligible threat to British ‘over sea business’ at the time of writing.87 Colomb, 
much like Mahan and Corbett, highlighted that the primary ‘macro’ threat to maritime 
commerce during the pre-war period was destruction by belligerent navies and not 
predation by maritime criminals. Sir Charles Edward Callwell 1902 publication Military 
operations and maritime preponderance: their relations and interdependence further 
supports this thesis. Callwell wrote in relation to the unchecked privateering and 
piratical activity prior to the Declaration of Paris: ‘It seems extremely doubtful if the 
experiences in those seas a century ago are altogether applicable to the present day’.88 
However, Callwell (accurately) prophesised that: ‘[...] occasions may yet arise in [the] 
future when the seizure of the base or bases will prove to be the best means of checking 
an undoubted evil’.89 
                                                 
85
 Julian S. Corbett, Some principles of maritime strategy (London, 1911), p. 92. 
86
 Julian S. Corbett, Sir Francis Drake (London, 1890), p. 48. 
87
 John Colomb, British dangers (London, 1902), p. 13. 
88
 Charles E. Callwell, Military operations and maritime preponderance: their relations and 
interdependence, ed. Colin S. Gray (Maryland, 1996), p. 102. 
89
 Callwell, Military operations and maritime preponderance, p. 102. 
 -50- 
Collectively these publications indicate, at least from the perspective of the authors, that 
maritime piracy was an issue of nominal relevance for western navies and governments 
in the early years of the twentieth-century. This is consistent with the widespread 
suppression of piracy on a global scale in the late nineteenth-century. It is clear that 
macro-naval concerns were at the forefront of western deliberation in the years prior to 
the First World War illustrated by, for example, the launch of the first Dreadnought 
battle ship in 1906. By the outbreak of hostilities in 1914 Britain had an estimated 609 
warships (built and building), which outnumbered that of the closest naval rivals of the 
United States, France, Japan and Germany (see fig. 1.6). With such large, expansive 
global naval presence, traditional forms of piracy were to remain inconsequential during 
the years of the First World War. 
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Fig. 1.6 
Naval strength, 1914 
 Britain Germany France 
Austria-
Hungary 
Italy Russia Japan 
United 
States 
Dreadnoughts 
(available & 
building) 
35 20 12 6 3 7 4 14 
Battlecruisers 
(available & 
building) 
10 7 0 0 0 4 4 0 
Semi and Pre-
dreadnoughts 
40 22 20 9 6-8 10 10 23 
Coastal 
defence ships 
0 8 1 3 0 1 4 0 
Armoured 
cruisers 
34 8 19 2 7 6 12 12 
Protected 
cruisers 
52 17 19 3 11 8 15 22 
Scout & Light 
cruisers 
35 16 0 3 3 0 6 0 
Destroyers 221 90 81 18 33 42 50 50 
Torpedo 
boats 
109 115 187 65 71-85 75 0 23 
Submarines 73 31 67-75 5 20-22 26 12 18 
Total 609 334 410 113 163 179 117 162 
 
Source: P. G. Halpern, A naval history of World War I, (London, 1994), pp 7-20. 
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Interwar period 1919-39 
Newspapers, Admiralty records, parliamentary debates 
In the years following the end of the First World War, there was a renewal of interest, 
particularly in academic and legal circles, in micro-maritime and peacetime issues such 
as piracy. However, from a strategic and naval perspective piracy remained a negligible 
issue, which is reflected in interwar naval and academic deliberations. By 1919 
according to a report in The Times: ‘Pirates used to be possible because of the 
immensity of the sea, but now men can talk over its distances as if over a dinner table, 
and the pirate has no more chance than a highway man in London’. 90  For Britain, 
securing economic and infrastructural recovery following the First World War meant 
maintaining and securing SLOC and suppressing threats to these interests such as piracy. 
In 1920, the British cabinet in its conclusions stated it was ‘determined to maintain the 
navy at a standard of strength which shall adequately secure the safety of the Empire 
and its maritime communications’.91 
 
In the South China Sea, for example, the British naval presence ‘kept piracy to a 
minimum’ reflecting the reach of British naval authority during these years.92 Indeed, 
the British government abolished the deployment of naval and military armed guards on 
their Far-East merchant ships in April 1930 as according to the then First Lord of the 
Admiralty: 
 
These pirates travel in a ship disguised as passengers […] responsibility for 
dealing with this form of piracy rests primarily with the shipping companies 
and with the civil authorities on shore. His Majesty's Navy assists in the 
suppression of piracy by patrolling the vicinity of such known bases as Bias 
Bay, in order to intercept pirated ships before they are brought in and 
abandoned.
93
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This also illustrated the relative sea-control exerted by the Royal Navy given that pirates 
typically disguised themselves as passengers before commandeering a ship, which 
indicted a likely reticence to approach from the sea.
94
 Given the proximity of passengers 
and crew to this type of piracy, fatalities were occasionally reported. A description in the 
Royal United Services Institution Journal dated 1930, for example, reported a pirate 
attack on the S.S. Hai Ching in December 1929 during which an estimated thirty 
passengers and crew were killed.
95
 Similarly, in Somalia and the Horn of Africa British 
colonial control maintained a significant air presence and naval control throughout the 
1920s.
96
  
 
An extract from The Times entitled ‘Modern Chinese pirates’ recounted the tale of a of a 
small opportunistic act of piracy ‘15 minutes out of the little West River port of Pekhai’ 
in December 1929. It stated that ‘the pirates were an amateur lot, several being members 
of a semi-Bolshevised crew sacked some weeks before for insubordination [...] a simple 
ruse finished their ebbing spirits’.97 This affirmed that piracy had not disappeared during 
the interwar years but instead, according to Phillip Gosse, threatened only ‘in an 
occasional and bastard form’ apparently as a derivative of the Chinese civil war of 1927 
to 1936.
98
 Gosse went so far as to (incorrectly) predict that maritime piracy was never 
likely to return: 
 
It is hard to conceive that even if our civilisation is overturned and 
lawlessness again becomes law, the pirate will ever emerge again [...] it 
seems fantastic to think of [...] peaceful steamer lanes haunted by 
buccaneers from little island republics of their own creation whiter the fleets 
of the nations dare not penetrate.
99
 
 
Such statements illustrated how maritime piracy had evolved into an issue of historical 
curiosity during the interwar years rather than an extant threat to shipping. 
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Beginnings of legislative reform 
However, not all interwar commentators agreed with this hypothesis. Reflecting the 
contention that piracy had been suppressed to the point of near elimination by the end of 
the nineteenth-century, Edwin D. Dickinson composed an article for the Harvard Law 
Review in 1925 that asked ‘Is the crime of piracy obsolete?’. For Dickinson the threat of 
maritime piracy was insignificant but prophetically, a tangible future concern: ‘While 
the occasions for invoking [“the law of piracy”] is less frequent now than formerly, it 
may still be made a potent factor in preventing lawlessness upon the seas […] It belongs 
emphatically to the law in reserve rather than to the law in history’.100 Indeed, it was at 
Harvard Law School that significant debates and elucidations took place on piracy 
during the interwar period, which culminated in the ‘Harvard draft convention on 
piracy’ in 1932. As previously mentioned, the Harvard draft was a prelude to the more 
comprehensive 1958 Geneva Convention on the high seas. Both treatises attempted to 
codify the rules of international law relating to the high seas and address the deficiencies 
and disorder of previous international piracy legislation.
101
 
 
The Harvard draft was inspired by previous interwar attempts at codifying international 
law in relation to piracy such as the ‘Roumanian draft for the Suppression of Piracy’ in 
1926 and ‘Matsuda's draft Provisions for the Suppression of Piracy’ that same year. 
Indeed, the complexities of codifying and legislating maritime piracy emerged as a 
central issue within legal circles during these years (see fig. 1.7). This was likely 
motivated by the legal ambiguity surrounding several high profile U.S. trials for piracy 
during the nineteenth-century and more immediately by the hijacking and pillaging of 
ships carrying illegal alcohol during prohibition and the potential applicability of piracy 
law.
102
 This illustrated that during periods of relative peace, persistent micro-issues such 
as maritime piracy, tended to receive a disproportionate amount of consideration. 
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Fig. 1.7 
Articles where ‘piracy’ was addressed explicitly in the American Journal of 
International Law 1907-90 
 
Source: The cumulative analytical index of the American Journal of International Law and supplements 
incorporating the proceedings of the American Society of International Law (84 vols, Washington, 1907-
90), i-lxxxiv. 
 
These efforts to address some of the more confounding legal aspects of piracy were not 
confined to the United States. ‘The report of the lords of the judicial committee of the 
privy council’ delivered on 26 July 1934 was asked whether actual robbery was an 
essential element of the crime of piracy. This followed the decision of the full court of 
Hong Kong to acquit two men on charges of piracy after it had concluded that robbery 
was necessary to support a conviction of piracy. The judicial committee concluded that 
actual robbery was not an essential element in the crime of piracy jure gentium and that 
a frustrated attempt to commit piratical robbery is equally piracy jure gentium.
103
 Such 
expositions on the international codification of maritime piracy during these ‘pre-
resurgence’ decades had significant implications for counter-piracy operations in the late 
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. The judicial committee in 1934 correctly 
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theorised that: ‘A careful examination of the subject shows a gradual widening of the 
earlier definition of piracy to bring it from time to time more in consonance with 
situations either not thought of or not in existence when the older jurisconsults were 
expressing their opinions’.104 
 
Maritime writers 
Following the First World War several naval leaders, most notably Admiral Herbert 
Richmond, campaigned that the protection of merchant trade against belligerent navies 
must be prioritised at policy level. This demonstrated how at the macro level, perceived 
potential threats to seaborne commerce came in the form of rival navies and not pirate 
groups. However, Richmond acknowledged that while piracy may have been 
strategically irrelevant, it had not disappeared entirely: ‘Duties of a navy in peace are of 
a police or a philanthropic character [...] Those, for example, which are performed by 
the naval forces of various nations in the China Seas and rivers, are for the common 
purpose of suppressing piracy and banditry’.105 
 
Richmond referred to piracy at various times in his work, primarily in relation to its 
historic associations and intricacies. However, he also highlighted the need for 
continuity in counter-piracy operations: ‘German trade developed in the Baltic and as 
elsewhere, pirates preyed upon it [...] the fighting forces, adequate though they were to 
deal with the individual pirate, lacked unity, even more than those of the Mediterranean 
city states’.106 Richmond recognised the influence that piracy had on naval thinking and 
the ideas of sea power. He associated the evolution of warships as a response to piratical 
aggression: ‘Both the trade and the colonies offered prizes to the pirates, and hence, as 
the cargo carrier could not be a match for the pirate, so ships specially adapted and 
furnished for fighting were found necessary for her protection’.107 Indeed, Richmond 
offered perhaps the most accurate insight in the piratical situation during the interwar 
years in his 1932 publication, Imperial defence and capture at sea in war. He stated: 
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At sea there are “frontier” or “external” defence services to be performed in 
peace. Where piracy still exists as in China, or where internal disturbances, 
uncontrollable by government, injure peaceful trade, defence to that trade 
must be afforded; precisely as in the early part of the last century protection 
had to be given in the Mediterranean, at all times, against attack by the 
piratical states of Tunis, Tripoli and Algiers. Today the waters and great 
rivers of China are the only remaining spots where this disease exists, and 
small craft, largely river gunboats, preserve order in the rivers, and vessels at 
sea, cruisers, destroyers and sloops, are available to give security in the 
coastal waters.
108
 
 
Admiral Raoul Castex of the French Navy published his distinguished work, Theories 
strategiques, in 1929 shortly before the publication of Herbert Richmond’s two works. 
Castex’s work as the title suggested, dealt almost exclusively with the strategic level of 
naval thought and operations. It did, however, offer a brief insight into continental 
interwar contemplation on piracy. Castex mentioned piracy in relation to its historical 
effect on maritime communications and the notion of freedom of the seas: ‘As practiced 
in earlier naval conflicts, commerce war was often simulated by greed and, degenerating 
into piracy, was accompanied by inhuman acts parallel to the ravaging, pillaging, and 
endless destruction characteristic of contemporary land warfare’.109 This suggested that 
naval encounters during the interwar period did not ‘degenerate into piracy’ which gave 
some indication that it was not an issue of concern. Castex implied there was a shift in 
the maritime climate from these ‘earlier naval conflicts [...] often degenerating into 
piracy’ to a ‘modified’ situation when Theories strategiques was written: ‘[...] the 
notions of seizure of private property, contraband and blockade must remain intact, 
though modified to meet contemporary sensibilities’. 110  Castex primarily addressed 
macro, wartime naval concerns in his work and therefore omitted constabulary concerns 
such as piracy.  
 
The respite of the interwar years afforded the opportunity to address chiefly peacetime 
maritime concerns such as piracy, which was reflected in the writings of interwar naval 
theorists, wider maritime literature and the deliberations of legal academia. The 
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outbreak of the Second World War, however, downgraded the prominence of micro-
maritime issues such as piracy once more. As previously mentioned the Second World 
War witnessed consistent raids and attacks on maritime commerce in the form of a 
‘guerre de course’. This was, however, state sanctioned wartime naval actions intended 
to cripple enemy SLOCs and not, as with piracy, the pillage of goods for private ends. 
What is relevant, therefore, to this research is the maritime climate that emerged in the 
decades after the Second World War and how this contributed to the eventual 
resurgence of piracy in the late 1970s and early 1980s in Southeast Asia and later, 
Northeast Africa. 
 
Post-war period 1945-79 
Geo-strategic ideas on the role of the military and national security shifted in the post-
war years resulting in a reduction in dependence on navies and sea power and an 
increase in the level of importance assigned to land power. N.A.M. Rodger wrote in 
relation to this ‘shift’ that ‘[...] the twentieth-century brought in the age of great land 
empires bound together by railways rather than shipping [...] their competition 
transformed a seaborne empire, and the navy which protected it, into a burden rather 
than a strength’.111 New political and territorial boundaries were drawn on land and at 
sea, which created new tensions over control of maritime natural resources and 
sovereignty alongside a dangerous ideological struggle between Soviet Russia and the 
United States. This international tension between the east and west culminated in a 
number of military engagements between 1945 and 1980. An article written in 1960 
about the ecology of future international politics correctly forecasted that ‘for several 
generations we have been living in an era of transition between great system changes [...] 
that era is now coming to a close, and a period of instability is ahead’.112 This instability 
directly facilitated the palingenesis of maritime piracy. Former colonies gained greater 
autonomy and eventually, in some cases, full independence and thus the ‘international 
machinery for suppressing piracy became largely impotent’.113 
                                                 
111
 Rodger, The command of the ocean […], p. 576. 
112
 Bruce M. Russett, ‘The ecology of future international politics’ in International Studies Quarterly, xi, 
no. 1 (Mar. 1967), p. 30. 
113
 Koburger Jr., ‘Selamat Datang, Kapitan […]’, p. 65. 
 -59- 
Southeast Asia & Northeast Africa (1945-79) 
Southeast Asia experienced an era of massive political, social and economic change in 
the decades following the end of the Second World War. This ultimately created the 
conditions for a resurgence of piratical activity at different stages during the late 
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. The waterways of Southeast Asia were the 
initial platform for this ‘palingenesis’ of piracy in the late 1970s and early 1980s and 
experienced the highest rates of piracy and armed robbery against ships on a global scale 
until piracy evolved into a material threat to shipping in the Gulf of Aden and western 
Indian Ocean after 2005. The upsurge in Somali piracy between 2005 and 2013 was 
contextually distinct from the palingenesis experienced in Southeast Asia after 1979 and 
for this reason is addressed independently in chapters IV-VII. 
 
Piracy is not a mono-causal issue. Several diverse factors can be attributed to its 
resurgence in Southeast Asia during the late twentieth-century. These included, but were 
not limited to, colonial regression, post-conflict inheritance, the growth of global 
seaborne trade, economic hardship and inefficient coastal security all facilitated by 
favourable geography. Indeed, comparable factors ultimately contributed to the 
escalation of maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia after 2005 indicating some 
universality in terms of causality as opposed to manifestation. This seems to indicate 
that certain general static conditions (such as geographic proximity to both shipping 
lanes and sanctuary ashore) combined with fluid conditions (such as post-conflict 
instability), exist in areas where maritime crime periodically emerges as problematic. 
However, unique contextual and regional specificities result in different manifestations 
of the crime. 
 
In Southeast Asia, the cultural and political history of the region also undoubtedly 
contributed to the rise of piracy given the entrenched acceptance of several indigenous 
communities on maritime raiding as a legitimate vocation. Pirates could not function 
successfully without the support of these local networks for resources, shelter and the 
concealment and movement of illicit goods. Indeed, as previously mentioned, piracy had 
never been totally eradicated from the region, only suppressed to manageable levels. In 
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the Southern Philippines and Northern Borneo, for example, piratical attacks continued 
throughout the 1950s and 1960s on a ‘smaller – but still frequent – scale’.114 Despite the 
inherent proclivity toward piracy that many of these regions displayed, there was a 
distinct difference between the politically motivated acts of piracy of the nineteenth-
century and the ‘systematic interdependent and interconnected [...] grey area activities’ 
of pirates operating in the late twentieth-century.
 115
 Therefore, contemporary 
manifestations of piracy must be analysed within a modern contextual framework as 
distinct from acts of piracy of previous historical eras.   
 
One of the underlying reasons as to why elements of these maritime communities began 
pirating in an extensive manner in the late 1970s was a substantial increase in poverty 
and economic hardship due to the commercial exploitation of fish stocks in the region.
 
116
 The availability of new technology developed in the 1950s enabled larger fisheries to 
procure catches at accelerated rates. Combined marine catches from Indonesia, Malaysia, 
the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam increased fourfold between 1960 and 
1980 from 1.5 million tonnes per year to 5.5 million tonnes per year.
117
 This growth was 
stimulated by destructive mass-fishing techniques such as trawling, fish-bombing and 
cyanide poisoning.
118
 This large-scale illegal fishing led to a significant depletion in fish 
stocks, which directly affected the smaller coastal communities for whom fishing was 
the single biggest source of income. The experience was more acute in parts of 
Indonesia, which was described as ‘the poorest of the poor’.119  A number of these 
fishermen turned to pirating vessels to supplement their loss of income. Indeed, it was 
primarily aggrieved ‘fishermen turned pirates’ who were responsible for the initial 
resurgence of piracy in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
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Over-fishing and increased pollution were by-products of the spread of the global 
market-driven system and globo-economic interdependency. This led to an exponential 
growth in maritime trade transiting Southeast Asia between 1970 and 1980 (see fig. 1.8). 
Indeed, the last four decades have witnessed a quadrupling of seaborne trade, from just 
over 8 thousand billion tonne-miles in 1968 to over 32 thousand billion tonne-miles in 
2008.
120
 Mismanagement of this rapid economic development widened the gap between 
rich and poor, isolated already disparate coastal communities and reinforced the 
conditions that ‘compel marginalised maritime-orientated communities to turn to 
piracy’.121 
 
The Indonesian island of Batam served as an example of the destructive and dissociative 
effect of this economic activity at a local level. Batam witnessed a huge growth in 
manufacturing industries during the 1980s, which transformed it from a small fishing 
community to a major industrial hub. Eklöf described how an influx of migrants came to 
the island in search of employment but ‘were unable to find work in line with their 
expectations and education (or) find any work at all’.122 The result was a rise in criminal 
activity such as piracy. The growth in maritime freight transiting the area also presented 
potential pirates with an abundance of high value targets transiting narrow and 
congested sea-lanes proximal to safe havens ashore. This new wave of piratical activity, 
facilitated by the rise of the consumerist system, was enhanced by the decline of the 
colonial system. Historically in the ‘clash between the policies of free trade and the 
policies of territorial assertion, that is where the roots of piracy can be found’.123 
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Fig. 1.8 
Total imports & exports: Southeast Asia 1970-80 
 
Source: Compiled from U.N. Department of economic and social development statistical office, 1992 
International trade statistics yearbook, i (New York, 1993), p. 1051. 
 
Southeast Asia experienced an era of rapid decolonisation and colonial regression in the 
decades following the Second World War. The progressive process of decolonisation 
essentially concluded when Britain announced its withdrawal from Singapore and 
Malaysia in January 1968, which was extended to 1971 as a concession to the 
Singaporean government. This was part of Britain’s wider strategic withdrawal ‘East of 
the Suez’ owing to the heavy economic and financial burden of maintaining foreign 
naval bases.
124
 Parliamentary papers at the time estimated that the naval base in 
Singapore consumed 15 percent of the British defence budget and 40 percent of defence 
costs overseas.
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During the colonial period, piratical incidents and disorder at sea were kept to a 
minimum owing chiefly to a large western naval presence. The decline of ‘Pax 
Britannica’ and colonial control meant that this stabilising naval presence receded. The 
resultant governments that emerged were fragile, under-resourced and struggled to 
establish effective national and regional security. This instability was predominantly 
evident in some of the more isolated coastal communities. The former British colony of 
Singapore was to some extent the exception to this. In the years after independence from 
Britain and later Malaysia, the newly formed government began actively seeking foreign 
direct investment, which eventually transformed the small state from a colonial trading 
outpost to a robust export economy. 
 
For most regional states, investment went into developing land forces in the years after 
decolonisation at the neglect of naval and maritime security capabilities. This 
compounded the inability of ex-colonies to supplant the naval presence that their former 
imperial rulers offered. Former deputy director of the International Maritime Bureau 
(I.M.B.), Jayant Abhyankar commented: 
 
The international community had hoped that those countries, geographically 
part of the region, would fill the gap left by the major powers [...] 
unfortunately these countries [had] insufficient finances to mount anything 
like a reasonable physical sea going presence that could act as a deterrent 
against the pirates.
126
  
 
This lax coastal security was exacerbated by little or no multilateral cooperation in 
attempting to counter regional piracy in the early years of the palingenesis. In Somalia, 
this instability was embedded throughout the fledging state. According to one 
commentator: ‘The colonial legacy of illegitimate boundaries took on enormous 
significance in a pastoral economy where family members were separated from each 
other and from critical grazing areas’.127 
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The haste in which Britain abandoned its naval presence, for example, left the 
waterways of the region unpatrolled and therefore vulnerable, compounded by the 
weakness of the Republic of China Navy in the South China Sea. This fragile new 
maritime security environment was acutely felt in the ex-colony and further afield. The 
former Prime Minister of Singapore Lee Kuan Yew commented: ‘I was completely 
incredulous that there could be such a rapid chop and change [...] All I am asking you is 
to show the flag so that no rapacious attack will take place’.128 The earlier American 
withdrawal from the Philippines in 1949 had provoked similar concerns and illustrated 
the vulnerability of the maritime environment without a commanding naval presence. 
The British legation in Manila wrote to the minister of state for foreign affairs 
describing the challenges facing the authorities following the withdrawal:  
 
[...] now the American officers are gone and the Philippine authorities have 
not hitherto shown themselves capable of maintaining the constabulary at its 
old standards [...] The result among the Moros is, I fear, that they are 
reverting to type and are again finding in piracy and smuggling an easy way 
of making a living.
129
 
 
Combined with endemic poverty, weak governance and the increase in regional 
commercial activity, the maritime climate was heavily conducive toward piracy. Much 
like Southeast Asia, Somalia experienced a similar post-colonial naval abandonment 
that left behind a vulnerable maritime environment that no longer benefited from the 
relative security and stability of colonial rule.  
 
The conditions outlined above were augmented by the availability of weaponry inherited 
from several regional conflicts during the post-war years. The accessibility of this 
weaponry did much to bolster the lethality and efficacy of pirate gangs. Indeed, since the 
end of the Second World War the proliferation of weapons, in particular automatic 
weaponry, has been widespread in the region. Shortly after the end of the Second World 
War, Southeast Asia witnessed a series of conflicts collectively known as the Indochina 
Wars. This resulted in large-scale conflict and devastation in Cambodia, Thailand and 
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129
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 -65- 
Vietnam alongside proximal internal conflict in Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines 
between 1946 and 1980. 
 
In the Southern Philippines, for example, Muslim separatists engaged in an armed 
insurgency against the government led by Ferdinand Marcos, a supporter of U.S. policy 
in Vietnam in 1969. The insurgency ended in 1972 but almost certainly increased the 
proliferation of arms in the region. The saturation of the region with military grade 
weaponry enhanced the capabilities of pirates and undoubtedly encouraged the spread of 
criminality on land and at sea. More worryingly for authorities the availability of this 
weaponry increased the levels of violence witnessed during piratical attacks in Southeast 
Asian waters mostly in the Gulf of Thailand and the Philippines throughout the 1980s. 
In 1981 alone, there were an estimated 454 deaths related to pirates targeting 
Vietnamese boat refugees in the Gulf of Thailand.
130
 The Conservative peer Lord Beloff 
commented in 1981: ‘Can one really say that that part of the world has too much in the 
way of force at its disposal, or that the decline in the power of the navies of the 
commercial states of the world has not brought with it severe human penalties?’.131 
 
Palingenesis? 
The conditions described above collectively created the conditions for a resurgence of 
maritime piracy in Southeast Asia in the late 1970s and early 1980s that evolved into a 
macro-maritime concern for international and regional navies. This revival reflected 
what Peter Earl described as ‘the maritime dangers of a post-imperial world in which the 
navies of the great powers can no longer patrol where and how they wish and former 
colonies have neither the naval power nor the resources and will to eradicate the 
problem’.132 This palingenesis was particularly evident in the extensive attacks on boat 
refugees fleeing Vietnam following the accession of the communist government after 
the Vietnam War in the late 1970s and early 1980s. These attacks constituted the initial 
upsurge of incidents in the early 1980s and are analysed in detail in Chapter II. It is 
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estimated that the number of attacks on Vietnamese boat refugees reached a high of 
1,122 in 1981.
133
 It is important to note that these attacks were not isolated incidents. 
They were a symptom of a regional wide re-emergence of maritime criminality. Roger 
Villar described how armed attacks on merchant ships and yachts reached epidemic 
proportions in early 1981 with up to twelve merchant vessels attacked each day.
134
 Liss 
described how violent attacks similar to those on the ‘boat people’ also occurred during 
the 1980s in the waters off the west coast of Thailand, in Malaysian waters, in the 
northern part of the Malacca Strait and in the waters off Bangladesh.
135
 
 
Just as Villar’s 1985 publication highlighted a resurgence of piracy, other contemporary 
literature also supported this notion such as Geoffrey Till’s 1982 Maritime strategy and 
the nuclear age. In a section entitled ‘new tasks for new navies’, Till stated: ‘Action will 
also continue against the ancient and dishonourable practice of piracy [...] a significant 
hazard in many of the world’s seas’.136 Indeed, according to a 1989 article in Jane’s 
Defence Weekly: ‘with few exceptions, merchant shipping sailed virtually without 
incident on the high seas from the end of the Second World War to the start of the 
'Tanker War' between Iran and Iraq’.137  
 
Analysis of a number of selected contemporary journals and periodicals offers further 
credibility to the thesis of a palingenesis of piracy during the late twentieth-century (see 
fig. 1.9). The majority of the literature selected focused on the macro naval, military and 
security issues of the day within a specific area of interest. The inclusion of 91 piracy 
related articles from 1980 to 1992 as opposed to just 19 from 1970 to 1979 is a 
significant indicator that it was, at least in these fields, considered a noteworthy issue. 
Isolating the U.K. Naval Review between 1913 and 1999, as one example, it is evident 
that piracy developed as a topic of relevance in British naval circles during the 1980s 
and 1990s compared to the period between 1913 and 1979 (see fig. 1.10). 
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Fig. 1.9 
Articles in selected journals/periodicals that addressed explicitly and/or related to 
maritime piracy, 1970-92 
Journals/Periodicals 1970-79 1980-92 
American Journal of International Law 9 30 
U.K. Naval Review 9 41 
International Journal Of Maritime History 0 5 
Survival Journal 0 7 
The Washington Quarterly 0 3 
Studies In Conflict & Terrorism 0 3 
The Strategic Survey Journal 1 1 
RUSI Journal  0 1 
Total 19 91 
Sources: American Journal of International Law, lxiv-lxxxvi (1970-92); U.K. Naval Review, lviii-lxxx 
(1970-92); International Journal Of Maritime History, i-iv (1989-92); Survival Journal, xii-xxxiv (1970-
92); The Washington Quarterly, i-xiv (1978-92); Studies In Conflict & Terrorism, i-xv (1977-92); The 
Strategic Survey Journal, lxxi-xciii (1970-92); RUSI Journal, cxv-cxxxvii (1970-92). 
 
 
Fig. 1.10 
Articles where piracy was mentioned explicitly in the U.K. Naval Review, 1913-99 
 
Source: Basil H. Tripp (ed.), The naval review index, i – lxiv (London, 1913-99). 
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Aside from the supporting literature presented, key events that occurred in the early 
1980s also stand as testament to a palingenesis of maritime piracy and the beginning of 
modern international attempts at countering the problem. These proceedings are 
addressed in detail in the subsequent chapters as examples of counter-piracy initiatives. 
The I.M.B. was established in 1981 under the auspices of the International Chamber of 
Commerce (I.C.C.) initially to address issues relating to maritime fraud. However, 
I.M.B. officials noted that maritime piratical attacks were reported as far back as 
1970.
138
 Despite this, the seminal Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) of 
1974 made no explicit reference to piracy or maritime crime.
139
 In 1983, the Swedish 
government submitted a paper to the I.M.O.s most senior technical body, the Maritime 
Safety Committee (M.S.C.), which stated that piratical attacks had grown to such an 
extent that the situation had become ‘alarming’.140 That same year I.M.O. Resolution 
543 noted ‘with great concern the increasing number of incidents involving piracy and 
armed robbery against ships including small craft at anchor and underway.
141
 
 
By April 1984, a report entitled ‘piracy and armed robbery against ships’ appeared as a 
separate issue on the agenda of the I.M.O. M.S.C. This marked the beginning of modern 
attempts at an international level to collate statistics on maritime piracy and ascertain the 
extent of the problem. The committee received a ‘summary of all reports on piracy and 
armed robbery against ships submitted by member governments and international 
organisations in ‘consultative status’.142 The international community was starting to 
take notice. By 1992, the increase in reported acts of piracy to the I.M.B. led to the 
establishment of the Regional Piracy Centre (P.R.C.) in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. 
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Conclusion 
During the late 1970s, maritime piracy experienced a palingenesis in the waters of 
Southeast Asia distinct from manifestations of piracy during the nineteenth-century. 
While enduring factors such as poverty and opportunity facilitated both upsurges, the 
unique political and socio-economic context of the late twentieth-century, such as the 
legacy of the Indochina Wars, for example, ultimately produced a contextually diverse 
wave of piracy. Indeed, it is evident that piracy has fluctuated several times in Southeast 
Asia since 1800. This suggests, as this thesis argues, that episodes of piracy are not only 
contextually unique across the geographic divide, but also regionally during different 
historical periods. 
 
Exploring the rise of piracy during the early nineteenth-century in the southern 
Mediterranean and Southeast Asia revealed several comparable factors to contemporary 
manifestations. However, the maritime security environment of the twentieth-century 
differed significantly from that of the nineteenth, which meant that any initiatives 
intended to counteract crimes like piracy would also need to evolve. The evolution of 
these initiatives is explored systematically in the next section of this work beginning 
with responses to the initial palingenesis and alternative manifestations of piracy in 
Southeast Asia between 1979 and 2006 and ending with the upsurge of piracy off the 
Horn of Africa after 2005. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
A regional response to a regional problem? 1979-97 
 
Ships that pass in the night, and speak each other in passing, 
Only a signal shown and a distant voice in the darkness[...]
1
 
 
Introduction 
Piracy as it had been traditionally experienced declined drastically by 1900. This 
condition endured for much of the twentieth-century aside from sporadic occurrences of 
opportunistic attacks chiefly in the South China Sea. This relative tranquillity did not 
last, as a new and more violent wave of piratical aggression beset the waters of 
Southeast Asia in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
2
 The series of conflicts that gripped 
the region in the decades after the Second World War significantly altered the geo-
political landscape and combined with the issues addressed in chapter I ultimately 
facilitated this palingenesis of piracy. The initial victims of this new wave of piracy 
were the hapless ‘boat people’ fleeing Vietnam in a maritime exodus across the Gulf of 
Thailand and the South China Sea.
3
 Indeed, it was this large migration of people and 
valuables that presented disparate elements of impoverished coastal communities an 
opportunity to recoup some of their material and financial losses. 
 
What began as opportunistic robberies on vulnerable targets by indigent local fishermen 
soon escalated into unprecedented violence and brutality evolving into organised 
criminality. Piracy was not confined to the Gulf of Thailand or the South China Sea. The 
waterways of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore also witnessed a 
notable rise in maritime predations during this period. By 1991, according to one analyst: 
                                                 
1 
Horace E. Scudder (ed.), The complete poetical works of Henry Wadsworth Longfellow: Cambridge 
edition (Cambridge, 1893), p. 274. 
2
 The geographic delineation of Southeast Asia for the purposes of this research consists of the extended 
maritime domains of Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar (Burma), the Philippines, South China 
(Hainan, Hong Kong and Macau), Singapore, Southern Taiwan, Thailand and Vietnam. 
3
 The ‘Gulf of Thailand’ is also referred to as the ‘Gulf of Siam’. 
 -71- 
‘these assaults have been of sufficient quantity to consistently designate Southeast Asia 
as by far, the most piracy-prone region of the world’.4 
 
As illustrated in chapter I, several diverse factors combined to create the conditions for 
this palingenesis of piracy in Southeast Asia during the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
These included the regression of colonial authority in the decades following the Second 
World War and the subsequent instability this caused, alongside the rapid growth in 
regional seaborne trade, which widened the gap between rich and poor. There is a 
common misperception, primarily from a western perspective, that the modern rise of 
piracy in Southeast Asia occurred in reaction to the Asian financial crisis that gripped 
the region in 1997. It did, however, materialise much sooner. This chapter examines 
regional and international efforts initiated to counteract this piratical activity, exploring 
some of the inherent difficulties that counter-piracy operations presented and how they 
were addressed. In addition, this chapter analyses the important consequences for 
counter-piracy operations following the ratification of the seminal United Nations 
convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1988.  
 
General obstacles to regional counter-piracy operations  
Prior to analysing any specific counter-piracy measures initiated by regional and 
international actors in response to the palingenesis of piracy in the late 1970s, it is 
important to examine some of the enduring difficulties that maritime security operations 
faced in the waters of Southeast Asia. Just as it facilitated piracy in previous centuries, 
the distinctive geographic features of the region hampered counter-piracy operations 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s. The Malay Archipelago, which incorporates Indonesia, 
Malaysia and the Philippines, is the largest in terms of surface area on earth, consisting 
of over 25,000 islands, many of which are uninhabited (see fig. 2.1). Indonesia alone is 
comprised of 13,667 of these islands resulting in approximately 93,000 square 
kilometres of inland seas.
5
 The Philippines possess one of the longest coastlines of any 
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 Peter Chalk, ‘Contemporary maritime piracy in Southeast Asia’ in Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, xxi, 
no. 1 (Sept. 1998), p. 89. 
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 U.S. Library of Congress, Federal research division, ‘Country studies (1988-98)’ 
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nation on earth due to its archipelagic configuration. Thailand also possesses a 
significant coastline of 2,420 kilometres on the Gulf of Thailand and the Andaman Sea 
whereas Singapore, despite a coastline of just 138 kilometres, was in terms of shipping 
tonnage the world’s busiest port in 1988. 6  What this meant in terms of sea-based 
counter-piracy action was that it made engaging pirates in any extensive way extremely 
difficult. As one commentator noted: ‘[...] you [would] need ten thousand patrol boats 
[...] there are thousands of islands for pirates and hijackers to hide’.7 They could evade 
capture by crossing into other maritime jurisdictions or sheltering among the many bays, 
estuaries, rivers, reefs and tree-lined inlets beyond the reach of their pursuers. 
 
Merchant vessels that approached the region from the west were funnelled into the 
narrow geographical chokepoint of the Malacca Strait; just 1.7 nautical miles at its 
narrowest point, as the most direct route to ports in Northeast Asia (see fig. 2.2). 
Similarly, the Singapore Strait and the Strait of Malacca constituted the main sea-lane 
between the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean. In 1982, an estimated 43,633 vessels 
transited the Malacca Strait. By 1993, this figure had risen to 91,826 vessels, an increase 
of 128.9 percent in a little over a decade.
8
 Less congested straits included the Lombok 
Strait, the Sunda Strait and the Makassar Strait (see fig. 2.3). These minor straits 
accounted for just 28 percent of commercial maritime traffic in 1997 compared to 72 
percent transiting the Malacca and Singapore Strait.
9
 
 
These shipping lanes presented pirates with an abundance of slow moving, vulnerable 
targets proximal to safe havens and sanctuaries ashore. The sheer scale of the maritime 
environment and coastline meant that any patrols initiated by the small regional navies 
were largely ineffective. Simply put, the geographic character of the region bolstered 
and encouraged illicit maritime activity while simultaneously hampering the ability to 
counteract it. This was also the case during the nineteenth-century. As Warren 
accurately observed: ‘they simply had to wait, sheltered behind a convenient island, 
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headland or bay overlooking strategic sea-routes, and sooner or later “coastwise” targets, 
never straying out of sight of land, would cross their path’.10 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.1 
The Malay Archipelago 
 
Source: ‘Southeast Asia’ (U.N. Department of Field Support, Cartographic Section, no. 4365, rev. 1, Mar. 
2012). 
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Paper Series, no. 2 (June 2003), p. 9. 
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Fig. 2.2 
Strait of Malacca 
 
Source: ‘Southeast Asia’ (U.N. map no. 4365, rev. 1). 
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Fig. 2.3 
Sunda, Lombok and Makassar Straits 
 
Source: ‘Southeast Asia’ (U.N. map no. 4365, rev. 1). 
 
Given this complex geographic setting, it is unsurprising that maritime territorial 
disputes arose. These disputes evolved primarily in response to the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1982, which solidified the legal limits 
of a nation’s territorial sea (12 nautical miles from shore baseline), contiguous zone (24 
nautical miles from baseline) and Exclusive Economic Zone (E.E.Z.) (200 nautical miles 
from baseline). In the congested and archipelagic waters of Southeast Asia these 
boundaries often overlapped resulting in a lack of clear jurisdiction, bitter legal disputes 
and as a result, a breakdown in regional maritime relations. The territorial dispute that 
emerged over ownership of the resource rich Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, for 
example, illustrated the problem in this regard. Following the introduction of the E.E.Z. 
under articles 55, 56 and 57 of UNCLOS, Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines and 
Makassar Strait 
Sunda Strait 
Lombok Strait 
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Vietnam claimed exclusive territorial rights to all or part of the islands. These opposing 
claims led to a number of political and military engagements during the 1980s and 
1990s that weakened regional relations and created instability in the maritime 
environment. Pirates operating in the region manipulated this instability to their 
advantage. The impact of UNCLOS on regional and international counter-piracy policy 
and approaches is explored in detail later in this chapter. 
 
Peter Chalk highlighted an incident from May 1992, which illustrated how this 
negatively affected unilateral counter-piracy operations. He described how a stolen 
trawler operated by pirates was stalking vessels near the disputed region of Sabah off the 
northeast coast of Borneo. The trawler was spotted by a Royal Malaysian Police Marine 
patrol that commenced pursuit. The Malaysian vessel was forced to call off its pursuit 
when the trawler entered into Philippine territorial water as ‘no agreement of posse 
comitatus had been reached between Manila and Kuala Lumpur’.11 The implications and 
relevance of UNCLOS in relation to counter-piracy operations are discussed in detail 
later in this chapter. The existence of this complex maritime environment meant that 
multilateralism and continuity, vital for effective counter-piracy operations, was not 
forthcoming.  
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Fig. 2.4 
Singapore Strait and the Phillip Channel 
 
Source: ‘Southeast Asia’ (U.N. map no. 4365, rev. 1). 
 
These issues were compounded by allegations of corruption and governmental 
complicity. Empirical data, chiefly eyewitness testimony reported by ships masters, 
suggested this was an issue in China, Indonesia and the Philippines at various times 
throughout this period. Some argued that this manifested itself in ‘official sanctioning 
and collaboration’ while others suggested, in the case of Indonesia, for example, that 
pirates were ‘either actual members of the [...] armed forces or at least benefit[ted] from 
close links with Indonesian military and customs units [...]’.12 Jon Vagg suggested ‘[...] 
it is possible that [armed forces] condoned, assisted and 'taxed' non-military pirates just 
as they would many other illegal enterprises’.13 
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This complicity was also evident in relation to attacks on boat refugees in the Gulf of 
Thailand. Numerous allegations of incompetence, abetment and collusion with pirates 
were directed at the Thai government in the 1980s. Pascal Dupont, who reported for the 
French news weeklies Actuel and L’Express during the 1980s, alleged that in the spring 
of 1981, nineteen Vietnamese refugees were captured by the Thai Navy and sentenced 
to death after they had killed several Thai pirates that had attacked them.
14
 Duong Phuc 
and Vu Thanh Thuy, a Vietnamese couple who were victims of a pirate attack, 
suggested that the Thai government simply ignored the crisis in an attempt to discourage 
‘new waves’ of refugees from seeking temporary refuge in Thailand.15  
 
The Vietnamese/American boat people SOS committee, founded in 1980, made its 
dissatisfaction with Thai anti-piracy efforts clear in a white paper published in 1981: 
 
Thai pirates, operating with virtual impunity in the Gulf of Siam, are 
subjecting thousands of refugees to ordeals of rape, robbery and murder. The 
unarmed refugees in their rickety fishing boats can neither escape nor defend 
themselves against the heavily armed pirates. The sickening tales told by 
survivors of these attacks should long ago have moved Thai officials to act. 
Instead, the Thais say only that they lack the resources to police a 2,000 mile 
coastline. While that is undoubtedly true, it is also apparent that Thai police 
and naval units are not even trying [...] It has been suggested that Bangkok's 
willingness to look the other way as Thai pirates plunder, rape, and kill is 
the government's way of discouraging new waves of refugees from seeking 
temporary haven in Thailand. If so, it is a vile tactic fully deserving of 
international condemnation.
16
 
 
Thai officials vehemently denied such allegations. The then Thai Secretary General to 
the Prime Minister, Chamlong Srimuang, responded to similar claims in April 1980: 
 
The pirate activities in the Gulf of Thailand do not take place in the Thai 
territorial waters only [...] Our Police Marine has to combat against those 
terrorists who, from time to time, attacked not only the Vietnamese boat 
people but also those of Thai nationality as well [...] Furthermore the long 
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eastern coast of Thailand does not facilitate our small marine force to 
accomplish such operation.
17
 
 
Regardless of whether the Thai government acted improperly or not, this response 
reflected the inherent difficulties small regional navies encountered in attempting to 
combat piracy in Southeast Asian waters. 
 
The situation was exacerbated further by the inadequacies of the coastal states’ naval 
resources in the late 1970s and 1980s. Investment in the years following decolonisation 
tended to focus on strengthening land forces at the neglect of maritime security 
capabilities. In the case of the Philippines, for example, this was due to internal threats 
from communist organisations such as the New People’s Army, the military wing of the 
communist party of the Philippines and later from Islamist separatist groups such as the 
Moro National Liberation Front and Abu Sayyaf in the South. Eventually attempts were 
made to modernise naval assets. However, these initially focussed on securing large 
patrol craft such as frigates, antisubmarine warfare corvettes, and missile-equipped 
surface combatants. Thailand, for example, entered into an agreement with China in 
1988 and 1989 to acquire four Jianghu class and two Naresuan class frigates.
18
 By 1997, 
Thailand had acquired a small aircraft carrier from Spain, a decision that reportedly 
‘perplexed’ adjacent states. 19  These uneconomical investments did little to benefit 
maritime security operations or promote regional cooperation. Instead, they illustrated 
that national prestige was favoured over utility - an indication of the insular nature of 
regional state policy at that time. 
 
Keeping these causative factors in mind two distinct, but not entirely unrelated episodes 
of piracy, can be identified in Southeast Asia between 1979 and 1997. These will be 
addressed separately. Beginning with an examination of efforts to counter the pervasive 
acts of piracy and armed robbery against Vietnamese refugees in the Gulf of Thailand 
and the South China Sea incorporating counter-piracy initiatives in alternative areas of 
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 ‘Letter from the office of the Prime Minister, government house, Bangkok to Dr. Ven Thich Man Ciac’ 
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Southeast Asia from 1979 to 1991, followed by an examination of initiatives from 1991 
to 1997 in the period following the decline in the flow of refugees until the beginning of 
the Asian financial crisis. 
 
Vietnamese boat refugees 1979-91 
Reports of pirate attacks on refugee boats transiting the Gulf of Thailand began to 
surface following communist victories in Vietnam in 1975, which resulted in large 
numbers of people fleeing the country, many of them by boat. However, the outbreak of 
hostilities between the People’s Republic of China and the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam in early 1979 intensified this exodus drastically, resulting in an estimated 2,000 
refugees arriving in Thailand each month of 1979.
20
 This figure had risen to 6,000 per 
month in 1980.
21
 In 1981, a total of 15,479 refugees in 452 boats arrived in Thailand.
22
 
It was estimated that a staggering 77 percent of these boats were attacked by pirates 
operating in the Gulf of Thailand - an average of 3.2 times per boat.
23
 This totalled a 
massive 1,112 attacks in 1981 alone (see fig. 2.5). Despite the high frequency of 
incidents, it was the manner in which this ‘particularly hideous form of piracy’ was 
committed that brought the issue to the attention of the international community.
24
 
Reports for 1981 suggested that 571 female refugees were raped, 228 refugees were 
abducted and 454 were murdered by pirates. TIME magazine described these events as a 
‘liquid Auschwitz’ in an article written in July 1979, the same month that the U.N. 
summoned a conference at Geneva to discuss the Indochinese refugee crisis. An article 
in the Sydney Morning Herald from 1985 illustrated a typical attack: 
 
[...] a fishing boat arrived from which 20 pirates, armed with knives and iron 
bars, boarded the Vietnamese boat and began searching the people for gold 
and valuables. All men above the age of 17 were thrown in the water. Most 
of them drowned [...] the women were raped.
25
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The same article estimated that between 1980 and 1985 Thai pirates killed 1,450 and 
raped in excess of 2,300 refugees.
26
 The unprecedented levels of violence and brutality 
resulted in widespread condemnation and mounting international pressure on the Royal 
Thai Government to suppress the pirates operating in their territorial waters. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.5 
Piracy statistics: Vietnamese boat refugees [based on refugee reports] 1981-88 
 
Source: ‘Piracy statistics (based on refugee reports)’ in Eric Ellen (ed.), Piracy at sea (London, 1989), p. 
282. 
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As early as June 1980 the Royal Thai Government publicly stated its intention to mount 
a more ‘active’ program against the pirates and requested international assistance in the 
endeavour.
27
 Thailand’s under-resourced and overstretched maritime capability meant it 
was unable to tackle the problem in isolation. In 1980, the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (U.N.H.C.R.), in what appeared to be a reactionary gesture, 
provided the Thai Navy with a high speed, unarmed surveillance vessel to support anti-
piracy patrols. However, the first tangible anti-piracy programme was not initiated until 
February 1981. This brief scheme was a bilateral endeavour between the United States 
and the Thai government facilitated by a US$2 million donation to subsidise operational 
expenses. The initiative lasted just seven months; dissolving in September due in part to 
disputes over financial maintenance. It had been suggested difficulties arose due to 
investment in expensive and largely ineffectual air-sea surveillance, chiefly two twin 
engine O-2 spotter aircraft and a Thai coastguard cutter.
28
 Despite this, the scheme had 
some limited success and paved the way for further cooperative initiatives. Twenty-five 
suspects were arrested and charged with piracy, five suspected pirate vessels were 
seized and an estimated 180 boat people were assisted while under attack.
29
 
 
Following a series of delays and negotiations, a more comprehensive and calculated 
counter-piracy initiative was launched on 23 June 1982. The Anti-Piracy Arrangement 
was convened under the auspices of the U.N.H.C.R. and subsidised by donations from 
twelve countries: Australia, Canada, Denmark, Germany, France, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States. A total of 
US$3,672,033 was donated including US$1.2 million directly from the United States 
government.
30
 The operation was headed by the Thai Navy anti-piracy unit from the 
coordination centre in the southern province of Songkhla with a nine-man team 
stationed on small offshore islands, such as the notorious Koh Kra. 
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Koh Kra Island had become synonymous with the worst of the violence and depredation 
witnessed in the piratical acts. Numerous graphic victim testimonies exist which relay 
the brutal conditions suffered by the refugees abducted and held there by pirates. One 
eyewitness described the ‘sad scene that all people brought to the island must suffer’. 
She stated: ‘The men were tortured and beaten to find out where valuables were hidden, 
the women were gang-raped by different bands of pirates, which at the high point came 
to fifty different fishing boats clustered around the entrance to the island’.31 
 
A number of seaward and landward counter-piracy initiatives were spearheaded under 
the Anti-Piracy Arrangement. An anti-piracy surface unit was established that consisted 
of three sixteen-metre fast patrol craft, six special operation task trawlers alongside 
several rubber patrol boats. The surface unit was complemented by an aircraft unit 
consisting of five surveillance aircraft including spotter planes that coordinated with the 
surface unit and land base to identify vulnerable vessels and patterns of piratical activity. 
Patrols were executed on a twenty-four hour rotating basis. The funds donated to the 
Anti-Piracy Arrangement were also used for the enhancement of post-incident 
investigations, the strengthening of land-based information gathering, upgrading of 
communications equipment and a harbour department registration and licensing 
programme.
32
 
 
Notwithstanding these improvements and investments, the extent of the Anti-Piracy 
Arrangement’s operational zone was limited. The available resources meant that only a 
limited section of the Gulf of Thailand could be monitored and patrolled (see fig. 2.6). 
Roger Villar remarked: ‘Even twice that force would have little chance of covering so 
large an area effectively’.33 Despite these limitations, the Anti-Piracy Arrangement did 
achieve some success. Reported incidents of piracy dropped from 373 in 1982 to 117 in 
1984, a decrease of over 50 percent.
34
 The number of reported deaths at the hands of 
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pirates also declined from 176 in 1982 to 59 in 1984.
35
 While it is evident that the 1982 
arrangement did contribute to a reduction in attacks, the reduction in the flow of 
refugees must also be recognised as a contributory factor. The total number of refugees 
recorded as arriving in Thailand in 1981 was 15,479. This had dropped to just 3,343 in 
1983 indicating a substantial decrease in refugee movement.
36
 
 
The U.N.H.C.R/ Royal Thai Government counter-piracy programme was extended in 
1984 and witnessed a progression from predominantly sea-based operations to land-
based initiatives, primarily on the recommendations of a U.S. interagency task force. 
Lessons learned from earlier operations meant that emphasis was placed on training, 
intelligence gathering and judicial development over acquiring expensive vessels and air 
assets. This appeared to be an acknowledgement that the root cause of piracy was ashore 
and illustrated an evolving proficiency in regional counter-piracy efforts. A number of 
substantial initiatives were launched under the 1984-87 programme, principally in 
relation to the apprehension and prosecution of suspected pirates. At the lowest level, 
this took the form of educative crime prevention, considered vital given the chiefly 
opportunistic nature of the acts of piracy.
37
At the highest level, this resulted in several 
prosecutions and convictions. 
 
From January 1982 to December 1985, just thirty suspects were arrested for offences 
against boat people, reflective of the emphasis placed on sea-based counter-piracy 
operations under the Anti-Piracy Arrangement.
38
 Under the new programme, sixty-six 
suspects were arrested in a little under two years between January 1986 and October 
1987.
39
 The sentences imposed ranged from two to fifty years’ imprisonment, with one 
pirate sentenced to death in December 1986. The harshness of the sentencing was 
undoubtedly designed to act as a deterrent to those considering committing piratical acts. 
These positive results were facilitated by the development of compulsory computerised 
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registration and a paid ‘informer’ system under the guidance of U.S. law enforcement 
professionals. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugee’s Poul Hartling commented in 
an address to the general assembly in 1985: 
 
[...] very encouraging has been the increasing efficiency with which the Thai 
authorities are implementing the Anti-Piracy Arrangement [...] the deterrent 
effect is definitely beginning to show up in the statistics [...] I believe this 
can be a source of satisfaction both for the Thai authorities and the donors 
who have steadfastly supported their efforts to combat this evil.
40
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Fig. 2.6 
Gulf of Thailand: limit of anti-piracy operational zone 
 
 
 
Source: Eric Ellen (ed.), Piracy at sea (London, 1989), p. 290; ‘Greater Mekong subregion’ (U.N. Dept. 
of Peacekeeping Operations, Cartographic section, Map no. 4112, rev. 2, Jan. 2004). 
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Aside from efforts at the policy and operational level, the U.N.H.C.R. also initiated 
programmes designed to encourage masters of commercial vessels transiting 
international waters to assist vulnerable refugees at sea. This request was initially met 
with some trepidation, principally due to potential financial implications. The first of 
these initiatives, the ‘Disembarkation Resettlement Offers’, was designed to encourage 
ships flying flags of states operating an open registry or ‘flags of convenience’ to aid in 
the rescue of refugees at sea by facilitating their disembarkation and resettlement in 
countries that contributed resettlement places. By 1985, eight countries offered 
resettlement places for refugees under the Disembarkation Resettlement Offers scheme. 
These were Australia, Canada, Germany, France, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland 
and the United States. This initial scheme offered little incentive to merchant shipping to 
delay operations to assist in the rescue of refugees and as such a second initiative was 
launched in May 1985, which offered to negate the financial burden through ‘Rescue at 
Sea Resettlement Offers’. One month later in June 1985, a companion programme, the 
‘Rescue at Sea Reimbursement Project’, was launched that allowed for costs directly 
related to the rescue of refugees to be directly reimbursed to ship-owners.  
 
The U.N.H.C.R. circulated a pamphlet in 1985 that explained the procedures and 
guidelines for the disembarkation of refugees and reimbursement procedures. It stated: 
‘On request, U.N.H.C.R. will reimburse shipowners for the subsistence of refugees on 
board ship [...] calculated at US$10 per refugee per day [...] The maximum amount 
reimbursed under any single claim should not normally exceed US$30,000’.41 These 
initiatives were bolstered by personal radio broadcasts from the high commissioner 
encouraging shipmasters in the South China Sea to aid refugees in distress. These 
humanitarian and civilian initiatives had an immediate effect by disrupting piratical 
activity on the high seas. Hartling commented in 1985 that ‘the appeals of U.N.H.C.R. 
and the I.M.O. have not fallen on deaf ears, and in the best traditions of the sea [...] ship-
masters and crewmen – often at their cost, inconvenience, and sometimes personal risk – 
are going out of their way to save lives’.42  
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The long-term impact of the rescue programmes should not be over-stated as the 
numbers rescued during the period 1985 to 1987 were generally lower than the numbers 
from previous years.
43
 Nonetheless, the figures, when expressed in relation to the total 
number of arrivals, reveal a five percent increase in rescues between 1984 and 1985.
44
 
By 1987, only eight percent of boats arriving in Thailand had reported an attack 
compared to 23 percent in 1985, a partial indication of the success of the land-based 
counter-piracy initiatives. However, between 1988 and 1989 an upsurge in attacks 
resulted in an estimated 1,250 refugees killed by pirates and a sharp increase in 
abductions and incidents of rape.
45
 The successful shore-based initiatives, in particular 
the severe prison sentences, almost certainly had the effect of deterring the more 
opportunistic ‘fishermen turned pirates’, which according to W. Courtland Robinson 
‘[left] behind a hard core of professional criminals [...] [who] were taking greater pains 
to leave no witnesses’.46 
 
Despite these setbacks the flow of refugees declined drastically by 1991. The collapse of 
the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War reduced the rigid economic limitations 
placed on Vietnam, which opened the door for small-scale private and foreign direct 
investment. This combined with the end of the repression of the Hoa people in the south 
resulted in substantial economic growth and stability in the country and as a 
consequence a sharp decline in the migration of refugees. This reduction predictably led 
to a decline in piratical attacks in the Gulf of Thailand. Elsewhere, however, attacks in 
the region escalated. In December 1991, the U.N.H.C.R. anti-piracy programme was 
terminated, not because the piracy problem had been eliminated but because according 
to the final assessment report, ‘[...] it [had] reached the stage where it [could] be 
effectively managed by local agencies’.47  
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Alternative regional piracy 1979-91 
As the violent acts of piracy on boat refugees in the Gulf of Thailand and the South 
China Sea garnered international news coverage, other regions of Southeast Asia also 
witnessed an escalation in piratical activity during the same period. The regions 
principally affected from 1979 to 1991 were the southern region of the Malacca Strait, 
the Phillip Channel, the Strait of Singapore, the Riau Archipelago and the Sulu 
Archipelago in the southern Philippines. One of the first reliable reported cases of piracy 
against a merchant vessel in the region occurred on 1 August 1980 in an anchorage west 
of Singapore port limits. The Hellespont Pride was boarded at night by two intruders 
armed with long knives, who stole US$10,584 in cash, two wristwatches and one gas 
lighter.
48
 The modus operandi of this attack was reflective of the chiefly low-level, 
opportunistic nature of robberies against merchant vessels at both anchorage and 
underway during this period. However, more serious high-level armed raids and 
hijackings were also reported. According to the I.M.O: ‘[...] reports of crews being 
kidnapped, ships being hi-jacked, deliberately run aground or blown up by explosives 
[and] passengers [being] threatened and sometimes killed grew during the early 
1980s’.49  
 
With the absence of any centralised regional piracy reporting mechanism prior to 1992, 
the numbers of reported incidents varied significantly. As fig. 2.7 illustrates, there was 
little consistency among the various organisations and individuals collecting and 
collating figures on piratical incidents during the 1980s. What is evident is that attacks 
were predominantly sporadic and opportunistic in nature before 1991. Despite this, there 
was also evidence of the emergence of a more organised type of piracy operated by 
trans-regional criminal syndicates during the 1980s that evolved into a more widespread 
problem in the late 1990s and early 2000s.  
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Fig. 2.7 
Reported piracy incidents [excluding attacks on Vietnamese boat refugees]: Southeast 
Asia 1979-91 
 
Source: See: ‘IMB chronology of pirate attacks 1981-87’ in Eric Ellen (ed.), Piracy at sea (London, 
1989), pp 241-71. ICC IMB, Piracy and armed robbery against ships: annual report 1992-2002 (London). 
IMO-MSC, ‘Statistical resources on piracy and armed robbery 1982-1992’. Roger Villar, Piracy today: 
robbery and violence at sea since 1980 (London, 1985), pp 92-153. U.S. National Geo-Spatial 
Intelligence Agency, ‘Anti-Shipping Activity Messages 1979-1991’. 
 
Opportunistic piracy  
Throughout the 1980s, opportunistic attacks increased on merchant vessels transiting the 
sea-lanes of Southeast Asia. These attacks were chiefly concentrated around the choke 
points at the southern end of the Malacca Strait and Phillip Channel into the Singapore 
Strait and elsewhere the Sulu Archipelago in the southern Philippines. The attacks 
ranged from unsophisticated low-level ‘hit and run’ robberies using knives, swords and 
parangs
50
 to, as was more common in the Philippines, serious assaults involving 
automatic weaponry. Between 1981 and 1984 a total of 179 piratical incidents were 
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reported to the Singapore authorities.
51
 According to these reports, incidents tended to 
follow a specific archetype, reflective of the majority of attacks during the decade. 
Pirates typically attacked under the cover of darkness in groups of three to five armed 
usually with parangs. There were no reports of firearms discharged, although they were 
sometimes carried.
52
 Vessels were typically approached by small high-speed outboard 
‘prahu’s’ and boarded using grappling hooks from the stern.53 The pirates preferred to 
avoid confrontation with the crew if possible and targeted cash and portable articles, 
neglecting bulky cargoes. As fig. 2.8 illustrates, this pattern of low-level theft continued 
throughout much of the decade with only thirty-three cases of cash sums over US$2,000 
reported stolen and zero attempts to steal container cargo. The sea-lanes eastward of 
Singapore heading toward the South China Sea appear to have been relatively pirate-free 
prior to 1991 or more likely ‘had not yet reached a level at which they could be of 
serious concern to the shipping community’.54 
 
Fig. 2.8 
Indication of pirate spoils: Malacca Strait area (including Singapore Strait and Phillip 
Channel) 
Year Container cargo Cash theft over US$2,000 Low-level theft55 
1981 0 3 12 
1982 0 8 24 
1983 0 9 34 
1984 0 1 6 
1985 0 6 18 
1986 0 4 14 
1987 0 2 21 
Total 0 33 129 
Source: Compiled from Eric Ellen (ed.), Piracy at sea, p. 280. 
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The relatively low level of violence witnessed in piratical attacks in the Malacca Strait 
and Singapore area was at odds with the incidents reported in Philippine waters, chiefly 
the Sulu and Celebes Seas, during the same period. Villar detailed 23 separate attacks in 
the ‘Philippines area’ between 1981 and 1984.56 A closer analysis of the report revealed 
that firearms were used in 13 of the 23 attacks. Even more revealing was the high-level 
of fatalities reported. There were an estimated 83 deaths resulting from pirate attacks in 
Philippine waters from 1981 to 1984. Revealingly, there were no deaths resulting from 
over 144 attacks during the same period in the Malacca Strait/ Phillip Channel/ 
Singapore Strait area and only negligible injuries reported. 
 
One report, dated 31 August 1981, described an attack on the 135-ton motor launch 
Nuria 500 miles south of Manila en-route to Sabah. Five pirates, aided by two 
accomplices aboard, intercepted the vessel in motor boats close to the island of Cagayan 
de Tawi Tawi in the Sulu Sea. The group raided the ship’s armoury and shot dead ten 
crewmembers before fleeing to a nearby island shelter with US$126,528 worth of goods 
and US$380,000 in cash.
57
 It was reported that a further 25 crewmembers drowned 
attempting to flee the shooting.
58
 
 
The distinctively high level of violence perpetrated by pirates operating in Philippine 
waters during the 1980s can perhaps be explained by the connection to Islamist 
separatist groups agitating for Muslim self-rule, alongside historical proclivity. 
Authorities claimed that separatist groups such as the Moro Liberation Front were 
financing their movement with kidnappings and piracy. These groups had been involved 
in a violent campaign, which had resulted in an estimated 60,000 deaths between 1975 
and 1981.
59
 Aside from this, a historical and cultural connection to maritime raiding had 
existed in the region for centuries. Villar described pirates operating in the region as 
‘full time predators’ who were ‘the heirs of [...] gentlemen described 1500 years ago by 
Fa Hsien in warning his compatriots of “many pirates who, come on you suddenly [and] 
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destroy everything”’. 60  Similarly, Warren illustrated nineteenth-century historical 
parallels: ‘[...] in both cases we are dealing with processes of engagement and 
disengagement from world commerce and economic growth, through which regional 
states are formed, stagnated or fragmented [...]’.61  
 
Organised piracy 
The majority of these violent acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships were 
chiefly opportunistic criminal occurrences. However, organised criminal syndicates 
were also actively involved in more sophisticated acts of piracy throughout the 1980s. 
Warren identified four Asian crime syndicates in Indonesia, the Philippines, Hong Kong 
and mainland China that ‘[...] had the right amount of transnational sophistication to 
make money from crime on the high seas during the 1980s and 1990s’.62 These differed 
from the previous piratical activity mentioned in that they usually involved a network of 
criminals and enablers with access to capital, technology and a supportive infrastructure 
ashore to move illicit goods and launder stolen money. 
 
These groups were typically involved in two types of operations. Firstly, at the lower 
level, they targeted and hijacked vessels carrying high value cargo and commodities 
such as diesel oil, kerosene, palm oil, rubber, steel copper and aluminium concentrates 
to sell on the Asian black market.
63
 Secondly, at the higher level, they seized merchant 
vessels to employ as so-called ‘phantom ships’. This involved re-registering a hijacked 
ship under a fraudulent name, altering its appearance and changing flag-state. 
Panamanian, Honduran, Belize and St. Vincent consulate officials were identified by the 
I.M.B. as featuring prominently in the issuing of phantom registrations. After re-
registration, the cargo was then delivered to an alternative port or a third party buyer. 
The process could be repeated several times under different names and registries. It was 
suggested, for example, that a pirate syndicate headed by a Philippine native Emilio 
Changco was involved in organising every major ship hijacking and ‘phantom ship’ 
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fraud in Philippine waters between 1980 and 1992.
64
 This type of piratical activity and 
the revenue it generated had a destabilising effect on the region and undermined already 
ineffectual local law enforcement. In one instance, a merchant vessel the M.V. Harpers 
was hijacked with a hold full of cargo worth an estimated US$4.5 million.
65
 According 
to the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, this type of organised piratical activity had the 
potential to ‘be more destabilising than the activities of revolutionary or terrorist 
groups’.66  
 
The case of the Liberian flagged vessel M.V. Silver Med served as an illustrative 
example of a phantom ship operation. The following information is derived from an 
ASAM report dated 15 September 1988.
67
 The Silver Med was hijacked on 5 September 
1988 in Manila harbour by eight heavily armed men, reported to be disaffected 
Philippine naval officers. The next sighting came on the 28 September when the vessel 
was spotted at an anchorage in Singapore territorial waters off Sultan Shoal. The vessel 
had been renamed Lambamba. The ship was then spotted off Kota-Kinabalu, Sabah on 5 
October 1988 now named Searex. The Indonesian port authority had deployed a police 
launch to intercept it, but it had sailed before any action could be taken. Between 10 and 
26 October 1988, the ‘phantom’ vessel loaded a consignment of plywood destined for 
Huangpu in China. Finally, in January 1989 Filipino military authorities recovered the 
Silver Med, now renamed Star Ace, off Poro Point on the north-western coast of Luzon. 
In the space of just five months, the Silver Med had undergone at least four name 
changes and visited several ports to load and offload illegal freight.  
 
Wider regional criminal organisations such as the Japanese Yakuza and Chinese triads 
were primarily linked to other forms of maritime criminality such as drug trafficking, 
human smuggling and arms running. However, given the high level of sophistication 
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and organisation needed to perform a successful phantom ship hijacking and fraud it is 
likely elements of these organisations were involved either as financiers or as 
directors.
68
 More worrying was the alleged involvement of ship’s crew in the hijackings. 
One estimate suggested that 75 percent of heisted cargoes were inside jobs involving the 
ship’s crew and even the captain. 69  This offered some explanation for the under-
reporting of incidents as ‘shipping companies [would] often write off these losses rather 
than suffer bad press and risk losing their insurance’.70 These issues compounded the 
ineffectiveness of regional counter-piracy initiatives before 1991. 
 
Counter-piracy 1979-91 
Counter-piracy in Southeast Asia was a complicated issue during the 1980s. This was 
primarily due to a lack of continuity and collaboration among regional states combined 
with a large and unregulated maritime domain. The corruption and complicity that was 
present in certain areas also significantly restricted progressive counter-piracy efforts. 
Elements of the shipping industry suggested that before 1992 up to 50 percent of local 
pirate attacks involved the Indonesian navy, marine police or customs units.
71
 This 
presented obvious difficulties for any cooperative maritime security efforts. 
 
Responses to opportunistic piracy 
As previously mentioned the two areas primarily affected by opportunistic piracy prior 
to 1991 were Singapore and Indonesia. Singapore initiated a rapid response to 
counteract these robberies in its territorial water owing to its dependence on foreign 
direct trade. The Singaporean port authority established a unique V.H.F. frequency to 
open communication with vessels transiting the Singapore Strait to report and share 
information on piratical incidents. Littoral patrols by the navy and Marine Police were 
intensified, predominantly during the hours of darkness, when the majority of the more 
opportunistic acts of piracy occurred. While there was little cooperation between 
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Singapore and Indonesia in maritime security operations during this period, there was a 
level of intra-agency continuity undertaken in Singaporean territorial waters. The 
Marine Department, the port authority, the navy, the Ministry of Defence and the 
Marine Police all began to coordinate their efforts in relation to anti-piracy operations.  
 
The success of these chiefly reactionary initiatives was limited. Sharon Tan, a former 
representative of the Singapore diplomatic service, highlighted some of the 
jurisdictional issues that hampered regional counter piracy initiates at that time. She 
stated: ‘Most of the incidents occur on passing ships, not calling into Singapore port […] 
nevertheless, all cases occurring within the jurisdiction of Singapore are exhaustively 
investigated’. 72  The response from Singapore reflected the unilateral and non-
cooperative maritime environment that existed in the late 1970s and 1980s. To launch 
any effective counter-piracy patrols authorities would have been required to enter 
Indonesian territorial waters in the Phillip Channel, which they were extremely reluctant 
to do.
73
 Indonesia in contrast, lacked both the naval and financial resources necessary to 
patrol its extensive coastline and island groupings. Despite increasing helicopter and 
boat patrols in 1982, pirates continued to operate almost uninterrupted in the Riau 
Archipelago throughout the decade.
74
   
 
Aside from these relatively ineffective efforts at a local level, several governmental and 
international organisations published a series of security recommendations and 
precautionary measures for vessels and shipmasters transiting Southeast Asian waters. 
This was in response to an I.M.O. resolution in 1983 that invited ‘Governments 
concerned and interested organisations to advise shipowners, ship operators, shipmasters 
and crews on measures to be taken to prevent acts of piracy and armed robbery and 
minimise the effects of such acts’. 75  These ranged from preventative and deterrent 
measures taken prior to transit to actions taken after pirates had boarded. The number of 
international organisations and stakeholders involved in this initiative reflected the 
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gravity of the issue within the maritime community. The U.S. Maritime Administration, 
the Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO), the International Shipping 
Federation, the Swedish Ship-owners Association and the I.C.C. I.M.B. all published 
recommendations as requested by the I.M.O. General precautions included enhanced 
watch-keeping, safety drills, use of searchlights, use of fire hoses and signalling 
equipment. The BIMCO recommendations went so far as to recommend the use of 
firearms and tear gas to repel a pirate attack: ‘In cases were pirates are unarmed, a 
shotgun fired in the air from the main deck would be an extremely effective deterrent’.76  
 
These recommendations were enhanced by the introduction of Anti-Shipping Activity 
Messages by the U.S. National Geo-Spatial Intelligence Agency in 1978. The ASAM 
provided details of geographic location of attack, sub-region, aggressor, victim and a 
descriptive account of the incident to alert shipmasters to areas of high risk. The creation 
of these publications and reports encouraging ship-owners to take almost total 
responsibility for countering a pirate attack and in particular the suggestion of using 
firearms, highlighted three points. Firstly, that vessel’s transiting Southeast Asian waters 
were extremely vulnerable to attack. Secondly, that the scale of the piracy problem was 
significant and finally that regional states had failed to address the issue. 
 
Responses to organised piracy 
Organised piracy was predominantly a localised affair during the 1980s with the 
majority of stolen cargo sold to buyers in China and occasionally the Philippines. The 
targets, however, were frequently international merchant vessels, which unsurprisingly 
prompted a response from international maritime bodies. In 1979, the I.M.B. was 
created as a specialised division of the I.C.C. initially to investigate incidences of 
maritime fraud and wider maritime malpractice. The focus of the I.M.B. soon shifted to 
piracy due to the escalation in ship hijackings and violent attacks in Southeast Asia. 
I.M.O. Resolution A.504 welcomed the ‘positive and constructive initiative’ to set up 
the I.M.B. and urged governments and organisations to ‘maintain and develop 
coordinated action in all relevant areas to combat maritime fraud, including the 
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exchange of information and all appropriate cooperation with the International Maritime 
Bureau’.77 Later, in 1983 the Maritime Safety Committee (M.S.C.), the I.M.O.’s most 
senior technical body, explicitly addressed the issue of piracy for the first time. It noted 
with concern ‘the increasing number of incidents of piracy and armed robbery against 
ships including small craft at anchor and underway’.78 By April 1984, the I.M.O.’s 
committee solicited reports on piracy based on submissions by member governments 
and international organisations on a consultative basis. The reports attempted to 
ascertain the names and descriptions of the ships attacked, their position and time of 
attack, consequences to the crew, ship or cargo and actions taken by the crew and 
coastal states to which the incidents were reported.
79
 The secretariat also forwarded 
relevant information to coastal authorities to encourage regional counter-piracy action 
and awareness. 
 
Prior to the establishment of the I.M.B. P.R.C. in 1992, the bureau launched a number of 
initiatives in an attempt to address the growing threat of organised piracy and maritime 
fraud. The I.M.B. began identifying patterns of criminal activity at sea, investigating 
incidences of maritime fraud and attempted to educate shipping companies and other 
interested parties on these threats. In addition to this, and supplemented by the creation 
of the Counterfeiting Intelligence Bureau in 1985, threats to shipping such as charter 
party fraud, cargo theft, ship deviation and ship finance fraud were investigated and 
reported on.
80
 
 
The marine insurance industry also initiated a response to the rising occurrences of fraud 
and piratical hijackings. Insurers from London, Singapore, Hong Kong and Malaysia 
established an investigative body known as the Far-East Regional Investigation Team in 
1979. The team published a report of its findings, which highlighted and identified the 
role of regional crime syndicates in serious maritime fraud in Southeast Asia. Despite 
this, no prosecutions were made based on the report. It did, however, result in a 
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considerable reduction of fraud and maritime hijackings in the early 1980s owing 
presumably to an increased awareness on the part of the marine industry. 
 
There was a considerable escalation and evolution in counter-piracy efforts between 
1979 and 1991 chiefly in relation to promoting awareness within the international 
community and shipping industry. Despite this, there was an upsurge of incidents in 
1991 resulting in 102 reported attacks in Southeast Asian waters. This illustrated the 
ineffectiveness of the chiefly reactionary and unilateral counter-piracy initiatives 
undertaken by regional states during this period. 
 
Legal initiatives, 1979-91: UNCLOS and SUA Convention 
As maritime piracy was escalating in the Gulf of Thailand and opportunistic attacks 
were mounting elsewhere in the region, significant milestones in international maritime 
law were reached. It is important point to note that the drafting of UNCLOS was not a 
response to the escalation of maritime piracy in either Southeast Asia or any other 
region. However, it had a disproportionate affect on responses to maritime crime, which 
is illustrated in this section. The seminal convention, which was convened in December 
1982 but not formally implemented until 1994, solidified the legal paradigm for the 
modern interpretation of maritime piracy and the legal constraints and freedoms 
available to counteract it. UNCLOS essentially completed a twentieth-century process to 
codify and legislate on maritime piracy that had originated with the ‘Harvard draft 
convention’ in 1932 and later the ‘Geneva Convention on the High Seas’ in 1958.  
 
UNCLOS was distinct from its predecessors due its international reach and global 
significance. The outlawing of privateering, for example, under the Declaration of Paris 
in 1856 was a euro-centric affair with minimal direct influence on the wider world. 
UNCLOS conversely, attracted an unprecedented 119 signatories; the United States was 
a notable exception. It should be noted that the suppression of maritime piracy was not 
the motivation behind the formulation of UNCLOS; however, it had a significant 
bearing on the issue in spite of this. Indeed, piracy was addressed explicitly in just seven 
articles (100-107) from a field of 320. In addition to this, the terminology of the 
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UNCLOS definition borrowed heavily from the Harvard draft convention of 1932 and as 
such did not take in to account contemporary geo-political sensibilities.
81
 This resulted 
in a lack of clarity in the wider applicability of the provisions in relation to the 
suppression of piracy.  
 
According to article 101 of UNCLOS, piracy consisted of any of the following: 
 
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, 
committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or 
a private aircraft, and directed: (i) on the high seas, against another ship or 
aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; (ii) 
against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the  
jurisdiction of any State; (b) any act of voluntary participation in the 
operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a 
pirate ship or aircraft; (c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an 
act described in subparagraph (a) or (b).
82
 
 
Supplementary to this definition, article 100 addressed the duty of all signatories to 
‘cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas or in 
any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State’.83 Article 105 provided recourse for 
every state to ‘seize a pirate ship [...] or a ship [...] taken by piracy and under the control 
of pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the property on board’.84 Article 102-107 
addressed associated issues such as the definition of a pirate ship and liability for seizure 
without adequate grounds. Significant also was article 111 that addressed the issue of 
‘hot pursuit’.  
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Limitations of UNCLOS as a counter-piracy mechanism  
The utility of UNCLOS as a counter-piracy mechanism was particularly limited. 
Piratical attacks continued and escalated throughout the decade it was convened and in 
the case of Southeast Asia, remained a significant problem throughout the 1980s and 
into the 2000s. Despite presenting a codified legal definition of maritime piracy and 
urging all nations to cooperate in the repression of piracy, UNCLOS it is argued, 
weakened and undermined potential and actual counter-piracy activities rather than 
enhanced them. The introduction of territorial sea limits [article 3 (ii)], a contiguous 
zone [article 33 (iv)] and an E.E.Z. [article 57 (v)] via a system of straight baselines 
paradoxically undermined the potential efficacy of article 101. 
 
By introducing these artificial boundaries at sea that had hitherto not existed, UNCLOS 
had limited piracy jure gentium to acts occurring outside the jurisdiction of any state. 
This was problematic given that only 7-15 percent of piratical incidents in Southeast 
Asian waters during the 1980s and 1990s occurred outside the jurisdiction of a state.
85
 
This territorial limitation meant that responsibility for addressing the majority of attacks 
fell under the domestic jurisdiction of the state within whose territorial waters the 
incidents occurred. As previously mentioned, states such as Indonesia, lacked the 
capacity, resources and political incentive to patrol their newly acquired archipelagic 
seas or to counter the threat from indigenous pirates. Furthermore, evidence of state 
complicity in piratical incidents in Indonesian territorial waters further undermined 
potential regional counter-piracy cooperation and exposed weaknesses in UNCLOS.  
 
The ambiguity of the E.E.Z. concept, evident in article 58 entitled ‘Rights and duties of 
other States in the exclusive economic zone’, created further uncertainty in relation to 
the suppression of piracy at sea. Article 58 (1) stated: ‘In the exclusive economic zone, 
all States [...] enjoy [...] the freedoms referred to in article 87 [freedom of the high seas] 
of navigation [...]’. However, 58 (3) appended: ‘[...] [in the E.E.Z.] States shall have due 
regard to the rights and duties of the coastal State and shall comply with the laws and 
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regulations adopted by the coastal State in accordance with the provisions of this 
Convention’. 
 
The provisions in article 111 on the right of ‘hot pursuit’ added further ambiguity on the 
legal implications of pursuing a vessel suspected of engaging in piratical acts. This 
provision significantly restricted unilateral seaward counter-piracy action in the 
constrained and contested zonal limits of Southeast Asia. Article 111 (1) stated: ‘The hot 
pursuit of a foreign ship may be undertaken when the competent authorities of the 
coastal State have good reason to believe that the ship has violated the laws and 
regulations of that State’. However, article 111 (3) enforced strict limitations of such 
pursuit: ‘The right of hot pursuit ceases as soon as the ship pursued enters the territorial 
sea of its own State or of a third State’. As previously noted, pirates operating in 
Southeast Asian waters exploited this weakness in the legislation. 
 
By limiting acts of piracy to those committed for ‘private ends’ in article 101 (a), 
UNCLOS could not be utilised to prosecute politically motivated acts of piracy or 
incidents of maritime terrorism, such as the hijacking of the Achille Lauro in October 
1985. Indeed, the designation of what constituted ‘private ends’ was not defined in 
UNCLOS and was therefore open to interpretation and contestation. Douglas Guilfoyle, 
for example, interpreted ‘private ends’ to mean ‘a lack of public sanction’.86 He stated: 
‘The test of piracy lies not in the pirate’s subjective motivation, but in the lack of public 
sanction for his or her acts’.87 However, others argued ‘private ends’ could be ‘theft or 
the desire for gain, but it could also translate in acts of personally motivated hatred or 
sheer vengeance’.88 In addition to this, article 101 (a) stipulated that two vessels must be 
involved for an incident to be piracy jure gentium. This did not take into account, for 
example, acts of violence detention or depredation committed for private ends by the 
crew or the passengers of a single vessel or robbery from the shore against a ship that is 
berthed. These limitations were partially rectified with the drafting of the Convention 
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for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA) 
in 1988. 
 
The limitations of UNCLOS as a counter-piracy instrument were further evident in its 
failure to impose a legal obligation on states to suppress piracy in their territorial waters 
or to cooperate in the suppression of piracy in these waters. Article 100 encouraged 
states to ‘cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy on the high 
seas […]’ which according to judge José Luis Jesus of the International Tribunal for the 
Law of the Sea ‘ceases to exist the moment the pirates move into a state’s territorial 
waters’. 89  Moreover, the absence of any international enforcement mechanism in 
UNCLOS was a significant shortcoming. It is plausible that states such as Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Singapore, all of which bordered internationally recognised straits, might 
have addressed piracy within their territorial waters under article 44 of UNCLOS as a 
‘danger to navigation’. Article 44 obliged these states to ‘give appropriate publicity to 
any danger to navigation or overflight within or over the strait of which they have 
knowledge’. Article 43 facilitated ‘States bordering straits [to] adopt laws and 
regulations relating to transit passage through straits, in respect of […] the safety of 
navigation and the regulation of maritime traffic’. However, as Christopher Cobb 
highlighted: ‘Piracy occurs because states refuse to adequately fund protective measures 
[…] often due to a paucity of resources’.90 
 
Incidents such as the hijacking of the Achille Lauro in October 1985 sparked debate and 
highlighted the ambiguity in international legal circles over what constituted an act of 
maritime piracy in relation to the UNCLOS definition.
91
 This confusion was reflected in 
a briefing by the then U.S. National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane: ‘I am told [...] 
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and please don't hold me to this [...] under a crime of piracy, with respect to the United 
States, the crime committed is one of hostage-taking’.92 The United States subsequently 
released a warrant for the arrest of the leader of the Achille Lauro hijackers Abu el-Abas 
on three separate charges: (i) hostage taking (18 U.S.C. section 1203) (ii) piracy under 
the law of nations (18 U.S.C. section 1651) and (iii) conspiracy (18 U.S.C. section 371). 
The legal basis for the charge of piracy was specified as section 1651 of U.S. Code 18 
that read: ‘Whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as described by the 
law of nations, and is afterwards brought into or found in the United States, shall be 
imprisoned for life’.93 In an affidavit attached to the criminal complaint form of one of 
the five accused hijackers Abu el-Abas, the charge of ‘piracy on the high seas’ was 
presented as follows: 
 
[The accused] did knowingly, wilfully and unlawfully commit and cause the 
commission of the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations, that is, 
did knowingly, wilfully and without legal authority from any sovereign 
power and for private ends seize control of the cruise ship Achille Lauro by 
force, violence and threat of force and violence.
94
 
 
However, the U.S. charge fell short of the requirements for piracy under UNCLOS in 
three ways: (i) the hijacking did not involve two vessels (ii) the hijacking most likely 
occurred within Egyptian territorial waters and therefore not outside the jurisdiction of 
any state (iii) there was uncertainty in defining a political hijacking as an act undertaken 
for ‘private ends’. Therefore, according to one commentator: ‘The problem with the 
United States' piracy claim [...] lies not with its jurisdictional basis, but [...] with the 
difficulty in fitting both the Achille Lauro hijackers and Abbas within the somewhat 
restrictive definition of piracy articulated in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention’.95 
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The Achille Lauro incident highlighted the ambiguity and limitations of UNCLOS as a 
judicial counter-piracy mechanism and the vulnerability of shipping not only on the high 
seas, but also within the jurisdiction of a state. In December 1985, just three months 
after the hijacking of the Achille Lauro, the U.N. general assembly adopted resolution 
40/61 in response to a draft submitted by the Austrian, Egyptian and Italian governments. 
The resolution requested the I.M.O. to ‘study the problem of terrorism aboard or against 
ships with a view to making recommendations on appropriate measures’.96 Essentially, 
the I.M.O. was invited to redress the inefficiencies of UNCLOS in relation to threats at 
sea. This request culminated in the drafting of the SUA Convention in Rome in 1988. 
 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation 1988 
The SUA Convention attempted to address some of the shortcomings that UNCLOS 
presented in relation to threats at sea including although not explicitly addressed, 
maritime terrorism and piracy. Article 3 of SUA offered a broader, more comprehensive 
definition of offences at sea. Unlike UNCLOS, this definition omitted a private or 
political motivational requirement, a high seas requirement or a two-vessel requirement. 
Under article 3 of the SUA, an individual could be prosecuted or extradited for 
prosecution if that individual unlawfully and intentionally: 
 
(a) seizes or exercises control over a ship by force or threat thereof or any 
other form of intimidation; or (b) performs an act of violence against a 
person on board a ship if that act is likely to endanger the safe navigation of 
that ship; or (c) destroys a ship or causes damage to a ship or to its cargo 
which is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship; or (d) places or 
causes to be placed on a ship, by any means whatsoever, a device or 
substance which is likely to destroy that ship, or cause damage to that ship 
or its cargo which endangers or is likely to endanger the safe navigation of 
that ship; or (e) destroys or seriously damages maritime navigational 
facilities or seriously interferes with their operation, if any such act is likely 
to endanger the safe navigation of a ship; or (f) communicates information 
which he knows to be false, thereby endangering the safe navigation of a 
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ship; or (g) injures or kills any person, in connection with the commission or 
the attempted commission of any of the offences set forth in subparagraphs 
(a) to (f).
97
  
 
The SUA Convention had evolved from UNCLOS in that offences such as piracy, could 
be committed within the territorial waters of a state, however, this did not extend to 
universal jurisdiction to counteract threats within these waters. It did, however, oblige 
signatory states to enact applicable domestic law to addresses these offences. Article 5 
stated: ‘Each State Party shall make the offences set forth in article 3 punishable by 
appropriate penalties which take into account the grave nature of those offences’.98 
 
Limitations of SUA 
The SUA Convention broadened the definition of maritime crime and encouraged 
prosecution and extradition but it had limited utility as an anti-piracy mechanism. 
Unlike UNCLOS, it was not requisite customary international law and therefore was 
only applicable to state parties who were signatories. Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore 
did not ratify the SUA Convention at this time and therefore were not party to its 
provisions. This significantly undermined the convention’s usefulness as a counter-
piracy mechanism in Southeast Asia given that the majority of piratical offences 
occurred in these waters prior to 1991. Despite this, it is doubtful whether ratification of 
SUA would have actually contributed to the prevention and suppression of regional 
piracy. Notwithstanding it facilitated the prosecution of an offender for offences 
committed in the jurisdiction of a signatory state, ‘there [was] no right-of-entry into 
territorial waters for nations capable of actual suppression’.99 
 
The effectiveness of the SUA Convention, like UNCLOS, was further restricted as a 
participant state was only obliged to hold a ‘preliminary inquiry’ into an offence but not 
actually prosecute and punish offenders. Article 13 required states to ‘cooperate in the 
prevention of the offences set forth in article 3’ by: 
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(i) taking all practicable measures to prevent preparations in their respective 
territories for the commission of those offences within or outside their 
territories [and] (ii) exchanging information in accordance with their 
national law, and co-ordinating administrative and other measures [...].
100
 
 
The practical application of the SUA Convention in Southeast Asia from 1988 to 1997 
was non-existent simply because no regional state had ratified the treaty. Taken as a 
broader counter-piracy mechanism, the SUA Convention attempted to address some of 
the definitional shortcomings of UNCLOS, however, it was not until 2008 that any 
individual was prosecuted under the SUA Convention, almost twenty years after its 
ratification.
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Alternative regional piracy 1991-97 
 
Fig. 2.9 
Reported piracy incidents: Southeast Asia 1991-97 (a) 
 
Source: I.C.C. I.M.B., Piracy and armed robbery against ships annual report: 1998 (London), p. 5. 
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Fig. 2.10 
Reported piracy incidents: Southeast Asia 1991-97 (b) 
 
Source: I.C.C. I.M.B., Piracy and armed robbery against ships annual report: 1998 (London, 1999), p. 5. 
 
Post-Cold War counter-piracy initiatives 1991-97 
The evolution in counter-piracy strategy and operations was apparent in the years 
following the decline in attacks on Vietnamese refugees. Most Southeast Asian nations 
acknowledged that at least limited cooperation and information sharing was necessary if 
maritime crimes such as piracy were to be effectively addressed. The formation of 
UNCLOS, the conclusion of the Cold War and the subsequent escalation in maritime 
crime likely reinforced this approach. 
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Fig. 2.11 
Total reported piracy incidents: Southeast Asia 1991-97 
 
Source: I.C.C. I.M.B., Piracy and armed robbery against ships annual report: 1998 (London, 1999), p. 5. 
 
The end of the Cold War in 1991 significantly altered the maritime environment of 
Southeast Asia and highlighted the need for regional cooperation at sea. The collapse of 
the Soviet Union resulted in a sharp decline in the number of Soviet naval vessels 
patrolling the region, which consequently led to a reduction in U.S. naval assets. In 1991, 
the U.S. closed Clark air base on Luzon Island in the Philippines. The following year 
saw the completion of the U.S. military withdrawal resulting in the closure of the naval 
base at Subic Bay - the largest U.S. overseas naval installation at that time. Reminiscent 
of the British withdrawal in the 1960s, the rapid contraction of a previously large and 
stabilising naval presence enhanced the vulnerability of the maritime domain. Regional 
navies were too small to achieve and maintain a similar presence unilaterally. It was 
estimated that after the Cold War, British and U.S. naval assets in the region were 
reduced by around 50 percent.
102
 This reduction in a military maritime presence 
corresponded with an increase in a civilian maritime presence, which according to Peter 
Lehr resulted in ‘lower security for licit forms of trade and higher security for illicit 
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activities’.103 The fact that most regional naval forces were still comparatively small in 
the early 1990s in contrast to the large maritime area meant that some form of strategic 
continuity was essential in any seaward anti-piracy operations. 
 
Problems with multilateralism 
Historically, multilateral cooperation in Southeast Asia had been complicated due to the 
geo-political character of the region and the challenges presented in implementing 
coordinated patrols in respective territorial seas. This was to some extent the result of 
the introduction of colonial boundaries in the nineteenth-century, which overlooked 
indigenous ethnic, religious, historical and cultural sensitivities and delineations. The 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established in 1967 by Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand to address the fragmented state of 
regional economies following decolonisation and to encourage multilateral political 
engagement.
104
 The 1967 ASEAN declaration established an annual meeting of foreign 
ministers combined with a standing committee, chaired by the Foreign Minister of the 
host country alongside various specialist ad-hoc committees.
105
 However, ASEAN was 
primarily concerned with the idea of nation building and socio-economic consolidation 
and as such did not result in enhanced security cooperation at sea before the formation 
of the Regional Forum in 1994. Indeed, issues surrounding regional cooperation were 
not confined to the maritime domain. The Chairman of the ASEAN Regional Forum 
commented in 1994 that ‘habits of cooperation are not deep-seated in some parts of the 
region’.106 An article written in 1992, for example, reflected the insular and jingoistic 
attitude of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore at that time: ‘Pride and patriotism runs 
high in each of the three nations, while mutual suspicions are always a factor in relations 
[...]’.107 
                                                 
103
 Peter Lehr, (ed.) Violence at sea: piracy in the age of global terrorism (London, 2007), p. viii. 
104
 See: Jamil Maidan Flores & Jun Abad, ‘ASEAN at 30’ (Aug. 1997), available at Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (http://www.asean.org/?static_post=asean-at-30) (12 Nov. 2015). 
105
 ‘1967 ASEAN declaration’, 08 Aug. 1967 (Centre for International Law (C.I.L.), ASEAN Constituent 
Documents, p. 2). 
106
 ‘Chairman's Statement of the 1st Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum, Bangkok’, 25 July 1994, 
available at ASEAN Regional Forum library, A.R.F. chairman’s statements and reports 
(http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/ library.html) (11 Mar. 2013). 
107
 South China Morning Post, 21 Sep. 1992. 
 -112- 
The problematic issue of multilateralism was partly solved by the implementation of 
bilateral initiatives after 1991. It was far easier to coordinate patrols with the navy of 
one country rather than multiple countries. Japan attempted to bridge this gap in the 
1990s by providing training and assistance to the littoral states in an attempt to stimulate 
a more cooperative maritime environment particularly in the repression of piracy. 
Events such as the collision of the Japanese tanker Nagasaki Spirit with the Ocean 
Blessing in September 1992 were influential in creating a proactive Japanese position on 
piracy. The containership Ocean Blessing was apparently a post-pirated ‘“rogue ship” 
zig-zagging across shipping lanes’ when it collided with Nagasaki Spirit in the northern 
Straits of Malacca.
108
 
 
Japan was heavily dependent on maritime trade for the majority of its domestic fuel and 
consumption needs and therefore had a vested interest freedom of navigation through 
connective Southeast Asian straits. This recognition of the strategic importance of 
maintaining and defending Southeast Asian sea-lanes was publicly declared in 1981. 
Then Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko stated in a press conference to the National Press 
Club: ‘We will strengthen our defence capability in order to defend several hundred 
miles of surrounding waters and the sea lanes to a distance of 1,000 nautical miles’.109 
Japan was aware of the enduring difficulties that impeded regional maritime cooperation. 
This was acknowledged in a presentation by the Japanese Maritime Self Defence Force 
(J.M.S.D.F.) Rear Admiral (rtd) Sumihiko Kawamura at the eighth international 
conference on the Sea Lanes of Communication in 1993: 
 
I have not included any comments on a key factor for success in 
international cooperation – inter-operability – which involves many 
problems such as naval control and protection of shipping [...], common 
operating procedures and tactics, compatible communications, the exchange 
of intelligence and joint training [...] these difficulties have been discussed at 
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this conference for a number of years and I will not add to these discussions 
here.
110
 
 
Such a degree of strategic ‘interoperability’ was not achieved in any genuine sense until 
the signing of the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed 
Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) in 2006. ReCAAP was the first authentic 
multilateral cooperative agreement convened on a governmental to governmental level 
to address regional piracy and reinforced how a ‘cooperative security’ framework could 
exist without eroding sovereignty. This interplay connoted what former Australian 
Foreign Minister Gareth Evans described as ‘consultation rather than confrontation, 
reassurance rather than deterrence, transparency rather than secrecy, prevention rather 
than correction, and interdependence rather than unilateralism’.111 
 
1992 initiatives 
In 1991, regional piracy had escalated dramatically shifting predominantly from the 
Gulf of Thailand to the busy shipping lanes of the Malacca Strait and Indonesia (see fig. 
2.9). There were 107 attacks reported worldwide in 1991 of which 102 occurred in 
Southeast Asian waters.
112
 This equated to approximately 82 percent of all reported 
incidents of piracy that year. The I.M.O. responded by pressuring regional states to: 
 
[...] increase their efforts as a matter of the highest priority to suppress and 
prevent acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships in or adjacent to their 
waters as well as to ensure that further and prompt action including 
strengthening of security measures is taken against pirates and armed robbers 
reportedly operating in their waters.
113
 
 
Incidents such as the violent attack on the Valiant Carrier in April 1992, in which a 
pirate had stabbed an infant girl during a botched raid, placed further pressure on littoral 
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states to initiate a resolute response to the problem. Indeed, the levels of violence 
witnessed in piratical attacks rose from 42 reported violent incidents in 1991 to 62 in 
1992.
114
 There was also a significant increase in the use of firearms from just one 
reported incident in 1991 to 18 in 1992.
115
 The violence was not only directed against 
civilian targets. In a case reported in July 1991, a Philippine naval patrol boat was 
reportedly attacked by a group of seven ‘heavily armed’ pirates 850km south of Manila, 
which resulted in the suspected deaths of seven Philippine naval personnel.
116
 
 
The I.M.O. recognised the benefit of a multilateral approach and invited neighbouring 
states to ‘co-ordinate their actions against pirates and armed robbers operating in areas 
within or adjacent to their waters’.117 Motivated partly by the mounting international 
pressure and the loss of national reputation, there were a number of counter-piracy 
initiatives launched in 1992. Indeed, resistance to external influence was explicitly 
referenced in the ASEAN declaration of 1967, which stated that the signatories were 
‘[…] determined to ensure their stability and security from external interference in any 
form or manifestation in order to preserve their national identities’. 118  This might 
explain to some extent the gradual evolution toward closer regional relations. 
 
Unilaterally Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia increased the frequency of littoral 
patrols to interdict the movements of pirate groups along their respective coasts. These 
states also actively began to prosecute those suspected of engaging in piracy. Indonesia, 
for example, launched ‘Operation Eroding the Pirates’ (Operasi Kikis Bajak) in June 
1992 which resulted in, according to the Far Eastern Economic Review, seventy arrests 
for piracy in a six-month period between June and November 1992.
119
 The Malaysian 
government created a special unit called the ‘Sabah Police Field Force brigade’ with the 
dual intention of curbing maritime piracy and the entry of illegal immigrants. The 
brigade deployed intelligence gathering techniques and placed brigade officers and staff 
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in strategic locations along the Sabah coast to deter and interdict piratical activity in the 
Sulu Sea.
120
 The brigade, which was based in Sandakan on the northeastern coast of 
Borneo, had up to forty patrol craft at its disposal.  
 
Littoral states along the Malacca Strait, chiefly Malaysia, wanted to introduce a toll or 
levy on merchant ships transiting through the passage to subsidise and bolster regional 
counter-piracy and maritime security measures. Under international law, however, this 
was prohibited as all vessels enjoyed the right of free passage through internationally 
recognised straits. Article 26 (1) of UNCLOS stated that: ‘No charge may be levied 
upon foreign ships by reason only of their passage through the territorial sea’.121 The 
Malaysian government asserted that the money would contribute to the creation of a 
maritime surveillance system, which would enable Malaysian authorities to ‘provide 
help to ships involved in accidents, pirate attacks and for controlling oil spills’.122 The 
financial burden of the clean-up operation following the collision of the Nagasaki Spirit 
and Ocean Blessing, for example, fell on the Malaysian government. Then Malaysian 
Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad commented: ‘When pirates board these big ships 
and tie up the crew the ships are left to sail on their own for miles [...] what happens 
when the direction is wrong and it lands on our shores?’.123 The difficulties presented 
with these unilateral counter-piracy efforts likely encouraged a number of bilateral 
initiatives, which were also instigated that same year. 
 
The neighbouring countries of Indonesia and Singapore signed a joint agreement in 
1992 that provided for information sharing on regional piratical activities and 
coordinated anti-piracy patrols in the Singapore Strait and the Phillip Channel. These 
patrols occurred at a rate of four times per year, with one warship and one marine police 
vessel from Indonesia and Singapore for sixty days per coordinated patrol.
124
 More 
importantly, this agreement opened up direct communication links between the navies of 
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each nation in relation to anti-piracy operations. That same year Indonesia and Malaysia 
agreed to form a joint unit known as the Maritime Operation Planning Team to conduct 
coordinated patrols along their common borders in the Strait of Malacca. The mission 
consisted of four joint patrols annually involving customs, search and rescue and 
police.
125
 Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore also concluded bilateral agreements 
between each pair of countries indicating their recognition that warships of either 
country may happen to enter territorial seas of other states in the course of controlling 
piratical activity.
126
   
 
There were, however, limits to these cooperation mechanisms. The then director of the 
Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Coordination Centre was quoted as saying: ‘Under no 
circumstances would we intrude into each other’s territory [...] if we chase a ship and it 
runs to the other side, we let the authorities there handle it’.127 This was reflective of the 
enduring geo-political difficulties counter-piracy operations confronted in the region. 
The introduction of UNCLOS as previously mentioned compounded these difficulties as 
it gave legal credence to territorial claims and disagreements.  
 
In support of littoral counter-piracy operations along the Malacca Strait, the I.M.O. 
formed a working group in 1992 under the direction of then I.M.O. Secretary-General 
William O’Neil. The initiative consisted of selected experts from ten member states 
including representatives from Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore with the intention of 
compiling a report on piracy in the Malacca Strait. The working groups report addressed 
issues such as navigation, search and rescue, radio communications alongside piracy and 
armed robbery in the Malacca Strait region.
128
 The findings of the report resulted in the 
issuing of two circulars by the I.M.O. in May 1993 on recommendations and guidance 
to governments, ship-owners, ship-operators, shipmasters and crews on preventing and 
suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships. 
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Aside from these efforts at the political and military level, there was also a noticeable 
increase in the promotion of similar preventative and deterrent measures by a number of 
civilian maritime associations such as the Nautical Institute, the International Shipping 
Federation and the I.M.B. The limitations of small regional navies were once again 
apparent given the responsibility ship-owners and masters were expected to take to 
prevent and deter a pirate attack. 
 
I.M.B. Piracy Reporting Centre 
An important chapter in the evolution of counter-piracy initiatives was reached in 1992 
with the establishment of the I.M.B. regional P.R.C. in Kuala Lumpur just six months 
after the violent attack on the Valiant Carrier. The P.R.C., despite providing the first 
centralised regional piracy reporting mechanism and coordination hub, was met with 
objections by some regional states. Both Malaysia and Indonesia, for example, rejected 
the idea, claiming that the problem could be tackled exclusively by local agencies. The 
then director of Malaysia's Maritime Enforcement Coordinating Centre, Commodore 
Hashim Mohamad, commented in 1992 that ‘they are not professional pirates [...] it is 
really petty thieving at sea’. 129  The director of operations of the Indonesian Navy 
Commodore Sutedjo reinforced this sentiment and claimed: ‘Unlike real piracy they 
don’t go after the cargo’.130 Both Indonesia and Malaysia maintained that localised 
bilateral initiatives were sufficient to address regional piracy and clearly suggested that 
it was a negligible issue. The I.M.B. disagreed and insisted that ‘local law enforcement 
[...] turned a deaf ear [and] chose to ignore that there was a serious problem in their 
waters’.131  
 
The P.R.C. was primarily interested in the safety of seafarers transiting piracy prone 
areas and acted as a first point of contact. During the early 1990s, the centre focussed on 
documenting and analysing patterns and trends of piracy in Southeast Asia and reporting 
on these potential threats on a twenty-four hour basis. The centre produced annual 
                                                 
129
 ‘Pirates “Petty Thieves”’, 02 Aug. 1992, available at Ohio university, ‘Apakabar’ database 
(http://www.library.ohiou.edu/indopubs/1992/08/01/0003.html) (19 Mar. 2013). 
130
 Ibid. 
131I.C.C. I.M.B., ‘Piracy Reporting Centre’ (http://www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre/) (08 Aug. 
2012). 
 -118- 
reports on piracy and armed robbery against ships to alert seafarers to high-risk areas 
and fluctuating patterns of piratical activity. Initially the centre was funded by voluntary 
contributions from regional and international shipping industry bodies such as the Hong 
Kong ship-owners Association. However, by 1997 donations from regional shipping 
associations diminished owing to an apparent reluctance to fund the P.R.C. despite an 
escalation in acts of piracy and armed robbery in the region.
132
 This could be explained 
in two ways. Firstly, due to regional states’ discontent at the centres ‘regional’ focus, 
and secondly, some shipping associations had written in their manual of procedures not 
to report a piracy attack to law enforcement or information gathering bodies such as the 
I.M.B. P.R.C.
133
 By 1997 the ‘Regional Piracy Reporting Centre’ was renamed the 
‘Piracy Reporting Centre’, an indication of its evolving global focus and a measure of 
appeasement to regional states who felt a disproportionate amount of negative attention 
was directed on maritime crime in Southeast Asia.  
 
1993-97 initiatives  
The intensification of counter-piracy initiatives launched in 1992 resulted in a short-
lived reduction in incidents. The I.M.O. at its eighteenth assembly session in 1993 
recognised ‘[...] the significant reduction in the number of incidents of piracy and armed 
robbery against ships in the Malacca Strait area since the implementation of 
countermeasures by the littoral states, including co-ordinated sea patrols’.134 In just two 
years reported attacks decreased from 55 in Indonesian waters to just 10 and from 32 in 
the Malacca Strait to just five.
135
 The bilateral initiatives that were undertaken marked a 
significant evolution in regional counter-piracy efforts and paved the way for future 
multi-state initiatives. 
 
The case of the M.V. Al Zahrah illustrated the effectiveness of this new cooperative 
approach. The vessel was boarded by pirates on 26 January 1992. The master relayed a 
distress call to the Singapore Coast Guard who in turn relayed the message to 
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Indonesian security authorities. This resulted in the successful apprehension of the 
pirates who previously might have evaded capture by crossing into the opposing 
maritime jurisdiction. While these bilateral initiatives were an important component in 
the evolution of counter-piracy initiatives in the region, they were still limited by what 
Peter Chalk described as ‘continuing regional sensitivity over the issue of territorial 
sovereignty’.136 
 
This success of these initiatives was short-lived. Despite the decline in incidents in the 
Malacca Strait and Singapore area, there was a substantial shift eastward toward the 
Philippines’ and into the South China Sea where attacks escalated significantly between 
1993 and 1997. The geographic areas principally affected were the territorial waters 
around Hong Kong and Macau, the Chinese island province of Hainan and the waters 
off the Philippine island of Luzon. Collectively these zones became known as the Hong 
Kong-Luzon-Hainan (H.L.H.) ‘terror triangle’ due to the frequency and scale of attacks 
(see fig. 2.12).
137
 Between 1993 and 1995 there were an estimated 122 separate piratical 
attacks reported in the ‘triangle’, representing over half of all reported incidents in 
Southeast Asia.
138
 Aside from officially collated reports, it was estimated that in 1993 
alone, upwards of 143 piracy attacks occurred in Philippine waters resulting in at least 
30 deaths; none of which were reported to the I.M.B. P.R.C.
139
 Former Executive 
Director of the I.M.B. Eric Ellen estimated that losses due to piracy amounted to 
US$200 million each year from 1990 to 1994.
140
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Fig. 2.12 
H.L.H. ‘terror triangle’ (est.) 
 
Source: U.N. Department of Field Support, Cartographic Section (Map No. 4365 Rev. 1, Mar. 2012) 
 
A number of regional meetings and agreements were initiated in response to the 
escalation of piracy in the South China Sea primarily due to the negative effect the 
upsurge was having on transiting maritime trade. Between 1985 and 1995, container 
volumes increased six-fold through the region, which by the end of the decade equated 
to approximately one-third of the Asian total.
141
 Hong Kong, for example, was the 
world’s busiest port from 1992 to 1997. The escalation of piracy resulted in a loss of 
international reputation and, in relation to Hong Kong, threats by maritime associations 
such as NUMAST and the Japan Shipowner’s Association to boycott port facilities and 
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reduce trade.
142
 More problematic was evidence of official Chinese sanctioning and 
collaboration in incidents of maritime piracy. A confidential position paper complied by 
the Hong Kong government in 1994 suggested that between September 1992 and May 
1993 Chinese customs, naval and police officials may have been directly involved in as 
many as 50 percent of incidents in the South China Sea.
143
 
 
Despite this, on 1 December 1993 a Memorandum of Understanding on port state 
control in the Asia-Pacific region was signed in Tokyo by sixteen nations; most notably 
China, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. Though 
not a legally binding contract, the Memorandum of Understanding bolstered cooperation 
in relation to the suppression of piracy by highlighting ‘the importance of the safety of 
life at sea and in ports and the growing urgency of protecting the marine environment 
and its resources’.144 It further affirmed the necessity of an ‘improved and harmonized 
system of port State control and of strengthening cooperation and the exchange of 
information’.145 The Memorandum of Understanding facilitated, for example, Malaysia 
and the Philippines in the commission of coordinated anti-piracy patrols along their 
common sea boundaries and in the exchange of information gathered from these patrols. 
 
A technical working group was also established in 1993 in response to the escalation of 
piracy and maritime disorder in the South China Sea. The Technical Working Group on 
Safety of Navigation, Shipping and Communication held its first meeting in 1995 where 
it discussed the need for cooperation to combat piracy, illicit drug trafficking and 
refugees at sea.
146
 In 1994, the ASEAN Regional Forum (A.R.F.) was established to 
‘forge a consensual approach to security issues’. The first meeting of the A.R.F. took 
place in Bangkok on 25 July 1994 and highlighted, amongst other issues, the need for a 
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multilateral approach toward regional maritime security. The initial meeting also 
highlighted the enduring difficulties of attaining an operational multilateral framework 
in the region. The chair stated that the A.R.F. should not move ‘too fast for those who 
want to go slow and not too slow for those who want to go fast’ and discussed the need 
for a ‘gradual evolutionary approach’.147 The forum was principally focussed on trust 
and confidence building measures as a foundation for any potential multilateral 
initiatives to ‘foster a regional environment conducive to maintaining the peace and 
prosperity of the region’ and as such was slow to implement concrete agreement on 
approaches to maritime security.
148
 
 
Despite the convening of these groups and the creation of a more cooperative maritime 
climate in relation to the suppression of piracy, by 1994 there were 64 reported incidents 
in Southeast Asia. By 1996, this figure had risen to 140.
149
 In 1994 alone, it was 
estimated up to 12 phantom ships were operating in Southeast Asian waters at any one 
time.
150
 Between 1994 and 1997, the I.M.B. reported nine ‘long-term’ ship seizures in 
the region.
151
 While the activity between 1993 and 1997 did little to suppress incidents 
of piracy in the South China Sea in particular, the opening of dialogue would eventually 
facilitate a more unified regional response to piracy in the decade following the Asian 
financial crisis of 1997.  
 
I.M.B. definition v. UNCLOS definition  
In an attempt to rectify some of the weaknesses of the UNCLOS definition, the I.M.B. 
initially proposed an alternative definition of maritime piracy. The I.M.B. attempted to 
define piracy in 1988 as ‘any violent attack (or depredation) on a vessel, or any attack 
which has the potential for violence’.152 By 1997, this definition had evolved to ‘An act 
of boarding any vessel with the intent to commit theft or any other crime and with the 
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intent or capability to use force in the furtherance of that act’.153 The definition was later 
modified to include attempted attacks: 
 
An act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with the apparent intent 
to commit theft or any other crime and with the apparent intent or capability 
to use force in the furtherance of that act.
154
 
 
The I.M.B.’s broad and simplistic definition applied to a wide variety of potential attack 
locations including vessels at anchor, berthed and at sea. The I.M.B.’s definition 
removed the two-vessel requirement, the high-seas requirement and the private ends 
requirement, thus affording the definition far wider applicability. Captain Jayant 
Abhyankar, former deputy director of the I.M.B., offered some insight into the 
formation of the I.M.B.’s alternative definition: 
 
[...] it makes little difference to the seafarer to know that the man who shot 
him is a robber rather than a pirate [...] in a similar way, the owner of a ship 
forced to stay in port until stolen equipment is replaced is more interested in 
avoiding the cost he incurs, rather than whether the criminals are thieves or 
pirates.
155
 
 
In any event, the shipping industry and most maritime institutions favoured the broader 
I.M.B. definition. The I.M.B.’s annual piracy reports became the chief statistical 
resource for investigation and analysing piratical incidents worldwide. 
 
Conclusion 
Between 1979 and 1997, Southeast Asia witnessed an unprecedented upsurge in 
maritime piracy that stimulated a fundamental evolution in regional relations. Indeed, 
this upsurge was the first of its kind during the twentieth-century and therefore, as this 
argues, constituted a palingenesis of piracy or a modern manifestation of a periodic 
historical problem. The violent piratical attacks inflicted on the Vietnamese boat 
refugees in the Gulf of Thailand and the South China Sea highlighted the vulnerability 
of boats at sea and placed the issue of piracy firmly on the international agenda. The 
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maritime climate that emerged in Southeast Asia in the decades after the Second World 
War was heavily conducive toward disorder. Piracy was the manifestation of this 
disorder. The response to this maritime crime wave was chiefly reactionary and 
superficial and as such had a limited utility. The cessation of attacks against boat 
refugees, for example, had as much to do with the decline in the flow of refugees as it 
did with any counter-piracy initiatives. 
 
The problematic issue of multilateralism significantly limited the potential efficacy of 
counter-piracy initiatives during this period. Despite some temporary reductions in the 
fluctuation of incidents, by 1996 attacks had increased to 140 from just 64 in 1994.
156
 
Indonesia, the Malacca Strait and the Philippines once again emerged as the most piracy 
beleaguered regions of Southeast Asia and indeed the world. In 1996, attacks in 
Indonesia and the Philippines accounted for over 68 percent of all piratical incidents in 
Southeast Asia. In 1997, Southeast Asia was plunged into a financial crisis, which 
resulted in the emergence of a more sophisticated, more brutal and more organised breed 
of pirate. This marked the beginning of new era of piracy in Southeast Asia. Within just 
nine years, however, the evolutionary progression towards multilateralism would 
essentially be complete and with it, the effective suppression of regional piracy by 2006. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
Towards multilateralism, 1997-2006 
 
[…] even pirates and privateers, though following the sea as highwaymen the road, they 
but plunder other ships, other fragments of the land like themselves, without seeking to 
draw their living from the bottomless deep itself.
1
 
 
Introduction 
The period from 1979 to 1997 witnessed the first major upsurge of piracy in Southeast 
Asia since the late nineteenth-century. The efforts initiated to combat and control it, 
aside from brief periodic successes, ultimately failed. This failure resulted from a 
shortage of resources, expertise and political motivation combined with a rigid and 
insular intergovernmental system. These reactionary and relatively superficial counter-
piracy efforts resulted in a brief decline in attacks by 1994. This decline did not endure. 
By 1997, there were 109 reported piratical attacks in Southeast Asian waters equating to 
44 percent of all reported incidents worldwide.
2
 Aggravated by the fallout of the Asian 
financial crisis of 1997-99, and hampered by continuing issues over territorial 
sovereignty, piracy peaked in 2000 with an estimated 259 reported incidents in 
Southeast Asian waters. This equated to over 55 percent of all reported piracy incidents 
worldwide.
3
  
 
Critical international events such as the attacks in New York and Washington D.C. on 
11 September 2001 had a circuitous impact on the security environment in Southeast 
Asia. International pressure mounted on littoral states to secure essential sea-lanes 
against all forms of predation from low-level opportunistic robberies to high-level 
organised criminal and terrorist acts. Indirectly this heightened global focus ushered in a 
new era of regionalism and cooperation in Southeast Asia, particularly in relation to the 
suppression of piracy. Despite enduring territorial and political tensions such as the 
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prioritisation of sovereignty over security, intra-regional cooperation was favoured over 
allowing foreign powers, chiefly the United States, to take the lead in domestic security 
issues. This emergent multilateral approach to maritime security resulted in the first 
government to government anti-piracy agreement in 2006 and consequently, to a 
significant, albeit it temporary, decrease in reported acts of piracy and armed robbery 
against ships in the region. 
 
This chapter examines this evolution in counter-piracy initiatives in the decade after the 
Asian financial crisis of 1997 to the signing of the Regional Cooperation Agreement on 
Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) agreement in 
2006. While the majority of piratical incidents were still chiefly opportunistic affairs 
during this period, there was a noticeable increase in the levels of violence and 
organisation in attacks. There was also concern expressed over the apparent emergent 
nexus between maritime piracy and terrorism and the rise of transnational organised 
crime.  
 
Changing perceptions of global security threats resulted in an increase of external state 
interest in the internal security affairs of Southeast Asia, particularly in the wake of 11 
September 2001 and exemplified by the United States’ ‘war on terror’. Aside from the 
United States, countries such as China, India and Japan had a stake in the unimpeded 
movement of maritime trade and in this regard contributed to the establishment of 
counter-piracy frameworks and dialogue throughout the period. To explore the evolution 
and utility of these various regional, international and legal counter-piracy initiatives, a 
detailed examination of tactical and operational responses to specific incidents of piracy 
and armed robbery is presented alongside a substantive and comprehensive statistical 
analysis. 
 
Compiling a pragmatic statistical picture of piratical occurrences from 1997 to 2006 is 
comparatively uncomplicated when compared to accessing figures a decade previous. 
By 1997, the International Maritime Bureau’s Piracy Reporting Centre (I.M.B. P.R.C.) 
had been compiling and collating reports on piracy for over five years and had 
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developed improved methods of statistical analysis due to an increasing industry 
awareness of the problem. This included verifying all reported acts of piracy or armed 
robbery against a vessel with the master of that vessel or the owners alongside more 
rapid collation of this data for timely dissemination.
4
 However, under-reporting was still 
a serious issue and must be considered when utilising I.M.B. and other piracy reports. 
 
The International Maritime Organization’s (I.M.O.) Maritime Safety Committee 
(M.S.C.) estimated that in 2002, 34 incidents of piracy occurred in the Malacca Strait 
while I.M.B. figures placed this much lower at 16.
5
 The disparity between local agencies 
estimations and I.M.B. figures was also apparent. It was reported that the Malaysian 
Maritime Enforcement Coordination Centre documented 78 piracy incidents in the 
Indonesian region of Sabah between 1997 and 2002, while the I.M.B. recorded just 35 
attacks during the same period.
6
 The disparity in the I.M.B. figures can be explained in 
number of ways, most obviously that the I.M.B. predominantly received reports of 
attacks against commercial vessels, which according to its own estimates, were still 
underreported by around 50 percent.
7
 Piratical attacks against smaller indigenous vessels 
were far less likely to be reported to the I.M.B. Despite this, the I.M.B. figures were the 
most authoritative representation of piratical attacks against commercial vessels 
worldwide.  
 
Causes and context 
The period from 1997 to 2006 witnessed a significant evolution in regional counter-
piracy successes. In just six years incidents of piracy decreased from a high of 259 
attacks in 2000 to just 88 recorded attacks in 2006, a drop of almost 66 percent.
8
 While 
the causal factors remained much the same, the character of Southeast Asian piracy 
                                                 
4
 Interview with Mr. Cyrus Moody, Deputy Director of the I.C.C. I.M.B. at the I.C.C. I.M.B headquarters, 
Cinnabar Wharf, London (22 Oct. 2013). 
5
 See: ‘Reports on acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships: annual report 2002’, 17 Apr. 2003 
(I.M.O., Maritime Safety Committee (M.S.C.), Circ.32/4/Anx.2). 
6
 J.N. Mak, ‘Incidents at sea: shipjacking, maritime muggings, thefts and illegal migration in Southeast 
Asia’, 23 Mar. 2011, p. 35 (http://community.middlebury.edu/~scs/docs/JMMak-piracy.pdf) (02 Oct. 
2013). 
7
 See; Carolin Liss, ‘Maritime dimension of energy security’ in Benjamin K. Sovacool (ed.), The 
Routledge handbook of energy security (New York, 2011), p. 115. 
8
 I.C.C. I.M.B., Piracy report 2006, p. 5. 
 -128- 
changed after 1997 due to a combination of internal and external events. The expansion 
of the globalised system, enhanced by the availability of new technologies and 
communication mediums, facilitated the spread of transnational organised crime. In 
practice, this meant criminals could exploit and profit from increasingly porous borders, 
ease of international travel, telecommunications and the internet, a large ungoverned 
sea-space and more interconnected financial markets. According to a U.N. Office on 
Drug and Crime (U.N.O.D.C.) report, globalisation meant that ‘Human and commercial 
flows are too intense to easily distinguish the licit from the illicit’.9 
 
The sea was a natural medium for illicit transnational activity given Southeast Asia’s 
position as a key global trade artery. Aside from piracy, several transnational crimes had 
a distinct maritime dimension such as the illegal trafficking of weaponry, drugs, human 
beings and counterfeit goods. In 2008, for example, it was estimated that 81 percent of 
all counterfeit products from South Asia to Europe were transported by sea.
10
 The ‘rapid 
mass movement of goods’ due to containerisation facilitated this activity and meant only 
a minute percentage of freight could be readily inspected.
11
 The rise of ‘transnationality’ 
also meant that pirates, who previously engaged largely in localised operations, 
developed extra-regional networks for the exchange of illicit goods, capital and 
information. 
 
Similarly, a number of indigenous Islamist groups agitating for autonomous rule began 
to identify with extended global terrorism networks such as Al-Qaeda through enhanced 
mediums of communication. After 2001, and owing chiefly to the heightened awareness 
of threats from such militants, there was growing concern over the apparent link 
between piracy and regional terrorist organisations. This was particularly evident in the 
northern Indonesian region of Aceh and in the Southern Philippines where groups such 
as Gerakan Aceh Merdeka and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front were reputably 
utilising maritime hijackings and robberies to fund acts of terrorism and disrupt 
                                                 
9
 U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (U.N.O.D.C.), The globalisation of crime: a transnational organized 
crime threat assessment (Vienna, 2010), p. 29. 
10
 U.N.O.D.C., The globalisation of crime [...], p. 179. 
11
 Ibid. pp 29-31. 
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international trade transiting the region.
12
 The connection between terrorism and piracy 
is discussed later in the chapter 
 
 
Fig. 3.1 
Reported incidents of piracy in Southeast Asia: 1997-2006 (a) 
 
Source: I.C.C. I.M.B., Piracy report 2000 & 2007. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12
 Gerakan Aceh Merdeka translates to ‘Free Aceh Movement’. 
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Fig. 3.2 
Reported incidents of piracy in Southeast Asia: 1997-2006 (b) 
 
Source: I.C.C. I.M.B., Piracy report 2000 & 2007. 
 
 
Fig. 3.3 
Total reported incidents of piracy: Southeast Asia v. worldwide 1997-2007 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Worldwide 248 202 300 469 335 370 445 329 276 239 263 
Southeast Asia 109 99 166 259 168 167 189 173 122 88 79 
Source: I.C.C. I.M.B., Piracy reports 1997-2007. 
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Fig. 3.4 
Total reported incidents of piracy in Southeast Asia as percentage of world total 1997-
2007 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
44% 49% 55% 55% 50% 45% 42% 52% 44% 37% 30% 
Source: Percentages calculated from I.C.C. I.M.B., Piracy reports 1997-2007. 
 
Asian financial crisis 
The Asian financial crisis of 1997 coupled with the relinquishment of the British naval 
base on Hong Kong Island to China and the subsequent departure of over 500 Royal 
Navy and Royal Air Force personnel likely had an impact on the fluctuation of piracy in 
Southeast Asia.
13
 Between 1965 and 1995 Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and the three 
newly industrialised economies of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand enjoyed a period 
of rapid and sustained economic expansion. These economies developed faster than the 
economies of all other regions achieving what was described as ‘miraculous growth’.14  
 
However, in 1997 a severe and widespread financial and currency collapse occurred. 
Multiple explanations have been offered on the reasons for the crash. Aseem Prakash 
identified five contributory factors that summarised the different theories well. These 
were the accumulation of short-term debt, regulatory oversight, balance of payments 
woes, contagion effect, imprudent investments and the reversal of capital flows.
15
 The 
scale of the crash was illustrated by the immense bailout instituted by the International 
Monetary Fund (I.M.F.), the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. Indonesia 
received US$40 billion, Thailand received US$17.2 billion and the Philippines received 
a bailout fund of US$1 billion.
16
  The financial crisis therefore, increased unemployment 
and impoverishment in coastal regions and decreased capital available for investment in 
                                                 
13
 Peter Howard, ‘U.K. forces poised for Hong Kong handover as deadline looms’ in I.H.S. Jane’s 
Defence Weekly (Oct. 1996). 
14
 John Page, ‘The East Asian miracle: four lessons for development policy’ in NBER Macroeconomics 
Annual 1994, ix (Jan. 1994), p. 219. 
15
 Aseem Prakash, ‘The East Asian crisis and the globalization discourse’ in Review of International 
Political Economy, viii, no. 1 (Spring 2001), pp 122-5. 
16
 See: Paul Bowles, ‘Asia's post-crisis regionalism: bringing the state back in, keeping the (United) States 
out’ in Review of International Political Economy, ix, no. 2 (May 2002), p. 235. 
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maritime security programmes. This combined with widespread political and social 
unrest, particularly in Indonesia, resulted in an increase in acts of piracy and armed 
robbery. 
 
Indonesia 
Indonesia was hardest hit by the crisis in relation to piracy. The economic fallout of the 
collapse resulted in a sizeable reduction in the availability of capital for military and 
naval expansion and modernisation projects at the behest of the I.M.F. This resulted in 
the curtailment of plans to acquire new weapons systems and expansion of its two-boat 
submarine flotilla.
17
 Reports indicated that in 1993 there were just 10 incidents of piracy 
in Indonesian waters. By 1999, just two years after the financial crisis, this figure had 
increased to 115, accounting for over 97 percent of all reported incidents in Southeast 
Asia that year.
18
 This equated to over 50 percent of all reports worldwide. 
 
The association between the financial crisis and the upsurge could be explained in two 
ways. Firstly, the crisis inevitably resulted in increased unemployment and 
impoverishment in coastal regions already struggling with these issues and consequently 
a rise in criminal activity such as piracy. According to one study, Thailand and 
Indonesia were hardest hit by the crisis with ‘tens of millions’ pushed back into 
poverty.
19
 An article from the Modern Economy journal illustrated a poverty rate 
increase in Indonesia from 15.1 percent in 1996 to 24.2 percent in 1998 as a direct result 
of the crisis.
20
 Secondly, the crisis led to widespread political and social unrest, which 
ultimately led to the downfall of Indonesian President Suharto in May 1998.
21
 This 
contributed to general levels of lawlessness, communal violence, food shortages and 
corruption and therefore a more permissive environment for illicit activities such as 
piracy. 
                                                 
17
 Richard Scott, ‘Southeast Asian navies: slowly surfacing’, 21 Mar. 2002 in I.H.S. Jane’s Defence 
Weekly (Mar. 2002). 
18
 I.C.C. I.M.B., Piracy report 2000. 
19
 Gregory W. Noble & John Ravenhill (eds), The Asian financial crisis and the architecture of global 
finance (Cambridge, 2000), p. 23. 
20
 Tulus T. H. Tambunan, ‘The Indonesian experience with two big economic crises’ in Modern Economy, 
no. 1 (Nov. 2010), p. 160. 
21
 See for example: Jakarta Post, 02 Mar. 1998; New York Times, 21 May 1998. 
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Following the fall of Suharto, Indonesia’s navy fell into a state of significant disrepair 
due to inadequate financial investment, which consequently limited maritime security 
operations along its vast coastline. A Mariners' Alerting and Reporting Scheme (MARS) 
report from August 2000 described the effect in the southern Malacca Strait: ‘Warships, 
naval vessels, patrol craft, coast guard cutters or other military, quasi military or police 
vessels were conspicuous by their absence. The message is clear. You are on your own. 
Expect no help from anyone’. 22  By 2001, only eight of Indonesia’s 30 Air Force 
helicopters were operational and according to former Indonesian President 
Abdurrahman Wahid, the ‘ancient vessels’ used by the Indonesian Maritime Police were 
in urgent need of replacement.
23
 
 
Philippines, Malaysia & Singapore 
Not all regional economies suffered to the same degree as Indonesia as a result of the 
financial crisis. The Philippines, for example, managed to escape the worst of the fallout 
in relation to incidences of maritime piracy due to its ‘Latin American-style populist 
regime’. 24  This was reflected in piracy reports, which were significantly lower in 
Philippine waters than elsewhere. There were just 15 reported incidents of piracy in the 
Philippines in 1998 compared to 60 in Indonesia.
25
 This indicated a direct correlation 
between the financial crisis and the fluctuation of piracy in the region as Indonesia, 
which was hardest hit by the crash, witnessed the greatest increase in attacks. Malaysia 
avoided the socio-economic damage witnessed in Indonesia due to its comparatively 
low-level of foreign debt, which nullified the need for an I.M.F. bailout.
26
 In the case of 
Singapore, there was actually an increase in the growth rate of its exports due to the 
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 Mariners' Alerting and Reporting Scheme (MARS), Report no. 200056 (Aug. 2000), available at The 
Nautical Institute, Knowledge Library (http://www.nautinst.org/en/forums/mars/index.cfm) (01 July 
2015). 
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 I.C.C. I.M.B., Piracy report 2000. 
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crisis. This was primarily due to increases in petroleum product and clothing sector 
exports, which grew by 15.7 percent in the three-year post-crisis period.
27
  
 
Significantly, in relation to counter-piracy operations, the financial crisis inadvertently 
stimulated a new period of regional cooperation and economic partnership probably due 
to external political and market pressures rather than any genuine desire to collaborate. 
According to Paul Bowles: ‘The contours of post-financial crisis regionalism are, by 
state design, aimed at restoring to Asia a greater degree of political power and autonomy 
vis-a-vis the rest of the world’.28 
 
Increase in trade despite financial crisis 
In spite of the economic difficulties of 1997-99, Southeast Asia experienced an average 
growth rate of merchandise exports and imports of around eight percent per annum 
between 1995 and 2005.
29
 In 1998, the figure for exports and imports of goods and 
services stood at a low of US$397 million as a direct result of the monetary crisis. By 
2006, however, this figure had increased over 128 percent to US$908 million.
30
 This 
growth was encouraged by the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves and the 
implementation of an export-led development strategy.
31
 Commercial maritime traffic 
transiting the region also increased. The data from 1999 to 2004 indicated that traffic in 
the Malacca Straits, for example, rose by 45 percent.
32
 At a local level, this economic 
progress did little to benefit poorer maritime communities mainly in parts of Indonesia. 
Instead, the transitory trade provided criminals and indigent fishermen ample sources of 
potential revenue. Once again, an increase in maritime freight contributed to an increase 
in predations against ships. 
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 Dosse Toulaboe & Zafar U. Ahmed, ‘Impact of the Asian crisis on Singapore's export competitiveness’ 
in The Journal of Developing Areas, xxxvii, no.2 (Spring 2004), p. 129. 
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 Bowles, ‘Asia's post-crisis regionalism’, p. 231. 
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Increased levels of violence 
Notwithstanding the violent character of piratical attacks on Vietnamese boat refugees 
in the late 1970s and 1980s, acts of piracy carried out before 1997 were generally less 
violent than acts perpetrated in the period after the financial crisis (see figs 3.5 & 3.6). 
There was also a notable increase in the use of firearms and other potentially lethal 
weaponry in attacks (see figs 3.7 & 3.8), with some estimates that 95 percent of pirates 
were armed.
33
 The hijacking of the M.V. Cheung Son in November 1998 served as an 
extreme but illustrative example of this increased violence. The Cheung Son was en-
route from Shanghai to Port Kelang, Malaysia, with a cargo of furnace slag. It was 
reported that a gang of thirteen, including one Indonesian, intercepted the vessel by 
masquerading as Chinese custom officials off the southern coast of China.
34
 The 23 
crewmembers were then reportedly executed with machine guns or thrown overboard.
35
 
Chinese authorities later identified three of six bodies caught in fishermen's nets off 
Shantou, China as being those of the Cheung Son crew. The bodies had reportedly been 
bound, gagged and weighted.
36
 During an unrelated investigation, Chinese officials 
allegedly found a suspect in possession of photographs, which depicted hijackers on 
board the Cheung Son celebrating among dead crewmembers. This ultimately led to the 
capture of thirteen pirates whom were subsequently tried, sentenced to death and 
executed in January 2000. The remaining crewmembers and the vessel itself remained 
unaccounted for.  
 
Aside from high-level organised hijackings it was also evident that pirates ‘[...] kill[ed] 
even for paltry rewards such as mooring ropes or petty cash’.37 In 1996 there were 25 
reported fatalities transpiring from incidents of piracy. Just one year after the financial 
crisis this figure rose to 78.
38
 It is reasonable to assume that professional criminals 
utilised more extreme measures to obtain a vessel or cargo and to leave no witnesses. 
                                                 
33
 New York Times, 20 Aug. 2000. 
34
 Peoples Daily, 29 Jan. 2000. 
35
 Newsweek, 04 July 1999. 
36
 Anti-Shipping Activity Message 1988-68, available at U.S. National Intelligence Agency (N.G.A.), 
Maritime safety office (http://msi.nga.mil/NGAPortal/MSI.portal?_nfpb=true&_pageLabel=msi_portal 
_page_65) (04 Dec. 2012) (henceforth cited as ‘N.G.A. ASAM [date], [ref.]’). 
37
 The Economist, 16 Dec. 1999. 
38
 I.C.C. I.M.B., Piracy report 1998. 
 -136- 
Noel Choong of the I.M.B. commented in 2000 in relation to the Cheung Son, that ‘The 
head pirate wanted everyone on his team implicated, so he systematically forced each 
pirate to kill one crewman’.39 
 
Fig. 3.5 
Types of violence to crew: Jan. – Dec. 1991-96 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Total 
Taken hostage 33 18 6 11 320 193 581 
Threatened 3 9 1 8 59 56 136 
Assaulted 2 12 4 0 2 9 29 
Injured 4 16 3 10 3 9 45 
Killed 0 3 0 0 26 26 55 
Missing 0 4 0 0 0 0 4 
Total 42 62 14 29 410 293 850 
Source: I.C.C. I.M.B., Piracy and armed robbery against ships, annual report 1998 (London, 1999). 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.6 
Types of violence to crew: Jan. – Dec. 1997-2006 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total 
Taken hostage 419 244 402 202 210 191 359 148 440 188 2803 
Threatened 119 68 21 72 45 55 65 34 14 17 510 
Assaulted 23 58 22 9 16 9 40 12 6 2 197 
Injured 31 37 24 99 39 38 88 59 24 15 454 
Killed 51 78 3 72 21 10 21 32 0 15 303 
Missing 0 0 1 26 0 24 71 30 12 3 167 
Total 643 485 473 480 331 327 644 315 496 240 4434 
Source: I.C.C. I.M.B., Piracy and armed robbery against ships, annual report 2000 & 2007 (London). 
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Fig. 3.7 
Types of weapons utilised by pirates: Jan. – Dec. 1991-96 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Total 
Firearms 1 18 29 17 39 32 136 
Knives 3 0 7 13 9 23 55 
Other weapons 42 29 2 6 33 54 166 
Unknown 2 4 37 54 106 119 322 
Total 48 51 75 90 187 228 679 
Source: I.C.C. I.M.B., Piracy and armed robbery against ships, annual report 1998 (London, 1999). 
 
 
Fig. 3.8 
Types of weapons utilised by pirates: Jan. – Dec. 1997-2006 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total 
Firearms 71 48 54 51 73 68 100 89 80 53 687 
Knives 31 40 85 132 105 136 143 95 80 76 923 
Other weapons 24 18 24 40 39 49 34 15 13 10 266 
Unknown 12 96 137 246 118 117 168 130 103 100 1227 
Total 138 202 300 469 335 370 445 329 276 239 3103 
Source: I.C.C. I.M.B., Piracy and armed robbery against ships, annual report 2000 & 2007 (London). 
 
11 September 2001 and maritime security in Southeast Asia 
The events of 11 September 2001 illustrated the vulnerability of the global 
transportation system to attack and increased pressure on Southeast Asian states to 
improve security and responsiveness, particularly in the region’s critical sea-lanes. This 
pressure emanated primarily from the United States government, which in the aftermath 
of the attacks of 11 September 2001, viewed Southeast Asia as a possible ‘second front’ 
in its ‘war on terror’ due to the existence of several indigenous Islamist groups 
apparently linked to the wider Al-Qaeda network.
40
 The arrest of 21 suspected Al-Qaeda 
operatives in Singapore in 2002 and further arrests in Malaysia and the Philippines 
seemed to justify the connection although, some analysts claim Washington 
                                                 
40
 See: John Gershman, ‘Is Southeast Asia the second front?’ in Foreign Affairs, lxxxi, no. 4 (July/Aug. 
2002), pp 60-74. 
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overestimated the link.
41
 Indeed, Norwegian and U.S. intelligence services identified a 
suspected ‘terrorist fleet’ of at least twenty vessels linked to Al-Qaeda in 2001, which 
highlighted the vulnerability of coastal targets and inadequate security regulation within 
the shipping industry.
42
 
 
In response, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) issued a ‘Declaration 
on joint action to counter-terrorism’ in November 2001, which became the foundation 
for ASEAN’s international counter-terror strategy. This declaration led to a number of 
subsequent counter-terrorism pacts with regional and extra-regional actors. Agreements 
were convened with Australia, Canada, China, the European Union, India, Japan, New 
Zealand, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Russia and the United States between 2001 and 
2006. Non-traditional security threats such as piracy frequently featured throughout 
these declarations alongside terrorism, weapons smuggling, money-laundering, 
international economic crime and cyber crime.
43
 
 
The attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001 heightened global 
awareness of non-traditional security threats and, more meaningfully, transformed 
traditional perceptions and approaches toward them. It is important to note that acts of 
international terrorism were widespread in the period before 2001 (see fig. 3.9). Indeed, 
between 1996 and 2001, acts of international terrorism against U.S. interests averaged at 
about 139 attacks per annum.
44
 The events of 11 September 2001 therefore, simply 
refocused the threat and precipitated a move toward more proactive counter measures 
over traditional reactive responses, exemplified by the U.S. ‘war on terror’ and the 
invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan in 2003. This new strategic approach also exposed a 
latent connection between maritime piracy and terrorism in Southeast Asia, which is 
discussed in more detail later in this chapter. 
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Fig. 3.9 
Patterns of international terrorism 1996-2001 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Acts of international terrorism 296 304 273 392 423 346 
Fatalities 311 221 741 233 405 3,547 
U.S. interests/ citizens targeted 73 100 111 169 200 179 
Source: U.S. Department of State, Patterns of global terrorism 1996, [...] 1997, [...] 1998, [...] 1999, [...] 
2000, [...] 2001 (Washington D.C., 1997-2002). 
 
Categories of piracy 
Opportunistic piracy 
Between 1997 and 2006, there was a significant increase in incidents of violent 
organised piracy and cases of maritime kidnap-for-ransom involving transnational 
criminal syndicates and, allegedly, terrorist organisations in Southeast Asia. However, 
the majority of piratical incidents were still categorised as low-level opportunistic 
robberies from ships either berthed, at anchor or steaming. These opportunistic pirates 
usually boarded a vessel under the cover of darkness in search of currency, personal 
belongings, miscellaneous shipping equipment, non-containerised cargo and other 
manifest items. 
 
In 1999, for example, there were 31 ASAM reports issued for the geographical sub-
region of northern Indonesia, the Malacca Strait and Malaysia. From these reports, 25 
incidents could be described as low-level opportunistic attacks. On closer examination, 
the incidents typically involved the theft of items including cash sums up to US$18,700, 
miscellaneous crew valuables, paint, walkie-talkies, binoculars, mooring rope, engine 
spares and general vessel equipment.
45
 In many cases, attacks were abandoned when the 
crew became alerted. The case of the Ayia Markella typified this type of arbitrary 
opportunistic piracy. It was reported that three small boats containing pirates armed with 
knives and firearms boarded the vessel while anchored off Belawan, Indonesia, on 6 
August 1999. The thieves accosted the deck watchman and stole his watch, cigarettes 
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and lighter.
46
 They then made several unsuccessful attempts at breaking into the ship’s 
forecastle before fleeing empty handed.  
 
These attacks were relatively unsophisticated and designed to obtain quick plunder from 
susceptible vessels. Little organisation or capital investment was evident aside from the 
procurement of small boats and an aptitude to manoeuvre them toward a steaming or 
anchored vessel. This was a relatively uncomplicated enterprise given that many 
opportunistic pirates were most likely former fishermen. The lack of pre-planning in 
these attacks was apparent in the case of the Ayia Markella were the perpetrators came 
ill equipped to infiltrate the ship’s forecastle. 
 
Organised and transnational piracy 
While the majority of incidents involved low-level piracy likely carried out by former 
fishermen and petty criminals, it was suggested that those ultimately responsible for the 
network of pirates operating in Southeast Asia were ‘shadowy figures with ready capital 
and well-oiled organisations [...]’.47 Indeed, after 1997 a more sophisticated form of 
maritime crime emerged. Organised criminal syndicates with international links began 
hijacking ships and cargoes with increased frequency. In 1999, for example, it was 
suggested that new cases of phantom ship fraud were reported every three weeks.
48
 An 
article written in The Economist estimated that phantom ships earned between US$40 
million and US$50 million for Southeast Asian criminal syndicates.
49
 Other analysts 
suggested this figure could have been as high as US$200 million.
50
 I.M.B. figures 
indicated that in 1992, the first year piracy reports were officially tabulated; there was 
just one incident of ship hijacking. In 2002, this had increased to 25 reports of ship 
hijacking (see fig. 3.10). In 2004, for example, all reported ship hijackings occurred in 
Southeast Asian waters.  
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These well organised piratical operations were enhanced by the availability of 
sophisticated modern technologies such as high-powered speedboats, Global Positioning 
Systems (G.P.S.), radar, satellite phones, V.H.F. radios, night vision devices and 
automatic weaponry. Moreover, the expertise and capital available from extended 
transnational criminal networks together with corrupt local officials allowed for more 
sophistication and organisation in attacks. According to Martin N. Murphy: ‘Organised 
criminal pirates can enjoy the support from those in power [...] because frauds like 
phantom ship scams are big business, they bring organised criminals together with 
corrupt officials and politicians’.51 Dr Pino Arlacchi, former Director-General of the 
United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, commented in 2001 that 
‘Organised crime [...] used to be a largely local and later national affair […] today it is a 
truly transnational phenomenon and is a subject of international concern [...] the risk to 
regional and even global stability is a very real one’.52 
 
Fig. 3.10 
Reported incidents of ship hijacking worldwide 1992-2006
53
 
 
Source: I.C.C. I.M.B., Piracy reports 1997-2006. 
                                                 
51
 Martin N. Murphy, Contemporary piracy and maritime terrorism: the threat to international security 
(London, 2007), p. 41. 
52
 Pino Arlacchi, ‘Scope of, and responses to, transnational crime keynote address’, 21 June 2001 
(Presentation given at the Australian Institute of Criminology's fourth  National Outlook Symposium on 
Crime, Canberra, Australia, June 2011). 
53
 The noticeable drop in incidents of hijacking in 2004/05 can likely be attributed to the impact of the 
Indian Ocean tsunami. The drop in 2006 can be attributed to increased multilateral engagement. 
 -142- 
M.V. Petro Ranger 
The hijacking of the M.V. Petro Ranger in April 1998 served as an illustrative example 
of the high-level of organisation and sophistication evident in piratical hijackings in the 
period after the Asian financial crisis. The vessel was hijacked in the South China Sea 
while en-route from Singapore to Vietnam. While underway, it was repainted and given 
the name ‘Wilby’. The vessel was eventually stopped and searched by Chinese Marine 
Police on suspicion of smuggling and the pirates were arrested. They were subsequently 
deported to Indonesia without charge. Aside from evidence of corruption and complicity 
among Chinese officials, the Petro Ranger case highlighted the proficiency and 
transnational character of the criminal syndicate involved in the hijacking. In an 
interview with the captain of the Petro Ranger in 2000, the extent of the complexity of 
the phantom ship operation was revealed. 
 
The article in the New York Times uncovered that individuals from China, Hong Kong, 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore were involved in the operation and had ‘inside 
access’ to the shipping company Petroships.54 The Captain further revealed that the 
pirates knew the Petro Ranger would be sailing with a cargo of high valued jet fuel, 
which was easily transferred on the black market. The pirates were also aware of the 
date of embarkation and the details of the captain and crew. The pirate leader, an 
Indonesian referred to as ‘Herman’, possessed documentation for registration of the 
‘Wilby’ and papers that identified him as the legitimate captain along with his crew 
including bills of lading
55
 identifying the cargo on board as part of a legitimate charter.
56
 
 
M.V. Tenyu 
In September 1998, just five months after the hijacking of the Petro Ranger, a Japanese 
owned vessel the Tenyu was hijacked en-route from Sumatra to South Korea with a 
cargo of aluminium ingots worth an estimated US$3 million.
57
 In December, the vessel 
materialised in Zhangjiagang, a port on China's Yangzi River. It had allegedly 
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undergone four different name changes in just three months.
58
 The fourteen original 
crewmembers were unaccounted for and presumed dead. The original cargo had been 
unloaded in Burma destined for buyers in China.
59
 The case of the Tenyu highlighted 
once again the organised nature and high levels of violence in such hijackings. The 
ASAM for the attack stated: ‘[...] the renaming of the ship and its apparent ability to 
trade undetected since October [...] leads to conclusion that the hijack is the work of a 
highly organised gang’. 60  Aside from the obvious preparation and organisation, the 
hijacking also suggested the work of an extended transnational criminal network. John 
Burnett highlighted the involvement of criminal elements from several countries: ‘Three 
South Koreans were arrested and charged with acquiring stolen cargo from the Tenyu [...] 
those arrested admitted buying the ship and aluminium from two Chinese Indonesians 
and selling them to a Chinese company in Myanmar via another company in 
Singapore’.61  
 
Organised kidnap-for-ransom 
Aside from low-level opportunistic attacks and high-level organised hijackings, a new 
and more troublesome form of piracy materialised in Southeast Asia between 2001 and 
2002. Incidents of maritime kidnap-for-ransom emerged as a significant issue 
particularly along the northern Malacca Strait near the contested Indonesian region of 
Aceh. In 2004, the I.M.B. expressed particular concern over the escalation of kidnap-
for-ransom incidents and estimated that 36 crewmembers were kidnapped in the 
Malacca Straits that year.
62
 These attacks typically involved a large group of heavily 
armed pirates commandeering a vessel, which was then forced to navigate off course. 
Senior crewmembers were then typically abducted and held while ransom negotiations 
were initiated. Ransom demands reportedly ranged from US$100,000 to US$200,000; 
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however, the amount actually relinquished was usually much lower, estimated between 
US$10,000-US$20,000.
63
 
 
While it is apparent that in the majority of cases, ransoms were paid and the hostages 
released unharmed, this was not always the case. In February 2004, for example, it was 
reported that four crewmembers were shot dead by Indonesian pirates and dumped into 
the sea after a shipping company refused to pay a US$12,000 ransom.
64
 The attack on 
the tanker Penrider in August 2003 typified the modus operandi of a kidnap-for-ransom 
piracy. It was reported that fourteen pirates boarded the vessel armed with AK-47 and 
M-16 assault rifles. The ship's captain was forced to sail into Indonesian waters, where 
three of the crew were taken hostage. Following ‘protracted ransom negotiations’ they 
were eventually released.
65
 
 
Terrorism & piracy 
The rise in organised maritime kidnap-for-ransom attacks, and the high-level of violence 
displayed, prompted some analysts to suggest the involvement of terrorist organisations. 
However, given the lack of any substantive evidence, it is uncertain whether there 
existed any genuine association between maritime piracy and terrorism. The chiefly 
anecdotal speculation likely resulted from a heightened awareness and vigilance in the 
wake of the attacks of 11 September 2001. Moreover, direct attacks by Al-Qaeda against 
western economic interests, such as that on the French oil tanker M.V. Limburg in 
October 2002, combined with threats of further attacks, heightened anxiety of more a 
pervasive maritime terrorist threat.
66
 The same year as the attack on the Limburg, the 
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I.M.B. recorded 169 reports of piracy and armed robbery at sea in Southeast Asia. The 
fact that both pirates and those committing terrorist acts within the maritime domain 
used the sea as a platform for their various deeds likely blurred distinctions between the 
two and heightened fears of crossover. 
 
The United States government recognised the difficulty in distinguishing between 
political and criminal motivations in what it described as ‘terrorist-related activities’ 
regarding cases of kidnap-for-ransom in the Southern Philippines in 1999.
67
 The United 
Nations also highlighted the link between transnational organised crimes such as piracy 
and terrorism in the U.N. global counter-terrorism strategy in 2006. Indeed, the severity 
of the situation was illustrated when in June 2005 Lloyd’s marine insurers Joint War 
Committee included the Malacca Strait in its ‘war, strikes, terrorism and related perils’ 
risk list. This essentially re-designated the Malacca Strait as a ‘war-zone’ or an area that 
suffered from ‘warlike occurrences or events, including acts of terrorism, or arising from 
the use of weapons of war’.68 Littoral states strongly disagreed with this assertion and 
denied links between piracy and terrorist groups. Former Malaysian Transportation 
Minister commented that the ‘war risk’ designation had been made on an ‘insufficient 
basis’ and sent the ‘wrong message to the international community’.69 
 
There is an important distinction to be noted here. Individuals committing piratical acts 
to obtain revenue to commit, for example, acts of terrorism ashore are essentially 
indistinguishable from ‘regular’ pirates. They both seek to gain capital from acts of 
piracy. How this capital is distributed after the attack is irrelevant in this regard. These 
acts are distinct from those whose objective is to commit actual terrorist acts within the 
maritime domain, such as the bombing of a cruise ship or the intentional disruption of 
trade. There was also an important legal distinction between maritime terrorism and 
maritime piracy. Piracy related to acts committed for ‘private’ ends as defined in 
UNCLOS, whereas terrorism was generally considered acts committed for political or 
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ideological ends, despite no customary legal definition.
70
 Regardless of the ambiguous 
motivations, the modus operandi often overlapped which, in relation to counter-piracy, 
was arguably more important at least from the victim’s perspective. The Flag Officer 
commanding of the Eastern Command of the Indian Navy, Vice-Admiral O.P. Bansal 
commented in 2003: ‘[...] there is a piracy of a different angle. If someone is to hijack a 
super tanker which has only up to ten crew and some 300,000 tonnes of fuel on board, 
you can do a lot with it, terrorism basically’.71 
 
To analyse this apparent nexus between piracy and terrorism in Southeast Asia, specific 
incidents and the activities of documented regional terrorist organisations are discussed. 
There were several internationally recognised terrorist cells operating in Southeast Asia 
between 1997 and 2006 (see fig. 3.11) most notably MILF and the Abu Sayyaf Group 
(A.S.G.) in the Southern Philippines, Gerakan Aceh Merdeka in the northern Indonesian 
Island of Sumatra and Jemaah Islamiyah with cells in Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, 
Malaysia and the Philippines. Two groups, GAM and A.S.G., were suspected of being 
directly involved in incidents of maritime piracy and maritime terrorism.  
 
Gerakan Aceh Merdeka  
GAM were a separatist group agitating for independent rule in the northern Indonesian 
region of Aceh until a peace agreement with the Indonesian government in 2005. It was 
believed that GAM used piratical hijackings as a source of revenue for its armed 
insurgency. The hijacking of the Penrider, as previously mentioned, was suspected to be 
the work of GAM rebels.
72
 GAM was also implicated by the Indonesian government in 
the hijacking of the Ocean Silver in August 2000 that resulted in six of the twelve 
crewmembers taken hostage and held for US$34,000 ransom.
73
 There was concern 
expressed that some of these hijackings may also have served as ‘practice runs’ for more 
serious acts of terrorism, much like the flight schooling the hijackers received before 
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launching their attack on 11 September 2001. The hijacking of the Dewi Madrim off the 
coast of Sumatra in March 2003 seemingly supported this theory. 
 
The Dewi Madrim was boarded by ten armed pirates in a high-speed boat. Instead of 
steering the ship to a secure location and beginning ransom negotiations or simply 
pillaging the vessel, the hijackers disabled the ship’s communication system and 
reportedly took turns in navigating the ship along the Malacca Strait for about one 
hour.
74
 They then abandoned the vessel. It was suggested that the hijacking was a means 
of ‘acquiring expertise’ and ‘learning to drive a ship’ to launch a maritime terrorist 
attack.
75
 This was, however, speculative. It must be noted that GAM denied any 
involvement in piratical acts despite issuing threats to the contrary, namely to disrupt 
shipping along the Malacca Strait.
76
 The United States Pacific Command commented in 
2003: ‘These were no ordinary pirates and more cases of this nature are being reported 
[...] The suspicion is that the pirates are either Aceh rebels, or even rogue Navy 
personnel or worse, Islamic militants’.77 
 
Abu Sayyaf Group  
Aside from GAM, the A.S.G. were also active in the maritime domain, not surprising 
given that they were agitating for an independent Islamic state in western Mindanao and 
in the Sulu Archipelago in the southern Philippines. The A.S.G. were not only suspected 
of engaging in piratical acts to raise revenue for their campaign but also actual acts of 
maritime terrorism in including the bombing of the Super-ferry 14 outside Manila in 
February 2004 which resulted in the loss of 116 lives. Abu Sayyaf chieftain Khaddafy 
Janjalani and alleged bomber Habil Dellosa were later charged with the attack in 2005.
78
 
In August that same year the A.S.G. were suspected of carrying out a bomb attack on 
the passenger ferry Dona Ramona docked at Basilan Island in the southern Philippines, 
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which wounded at least thirty people.
79
 It was believed that following the execution of 
A.S.G. leader Ustadz Abdurajak Janjalani in 1998, the organisation suffered a 
breakdown in organisational structure and discipline. The lack of central leadership 
reportedly led to a rise in maritime piracy and incidents of kidnap-for-ransom among its 
members.
80
 
 
A number of piratical kidnap-for-ransom incidents were reportedly linked to the A.S.G. 
including the hijacking of the tug-boat SM 88 in June 2002. The vessel was attacked by 
eleven armed pirates in military-style uniform off the A.S.G. stronghold of Jolo Island in 
the Southern Philippines.
81
 Four members of the crew, including the Captain, were taken 
hostage and transported to the island. Shortly afterward one of the crew escaped and 
claimed his captors were from the A.S.G.
82
 Nine months later another crewmember 
escaped from Jolo Island and reaffirmed that the A.S.G. were responsible for the 
attack.
83
 In April 2004, a Malaysian tug East Ocean II and a barge Sarinto I were 
attacked near Taganak Island by between eight and ten suspected A.S.G. 
members/pirates armed with M-16 rifles and grenade launchers.
84
 Almost one year later 
in March 2005, the tugboat Bonggaya 91 was attacked east of Mataking Island by five 
pirates armed with M-16 and AK-47 rifles. Once again, several crewmembers were 
taken hostage. The ASAM report dated 30 March 2005 speculated that the gunmen may 
have been linked to the A.S.G. but highlighted the absence of ‘hard evidence’.85 Despite 
the chiefly anecdotal nature of the evidence, chiefly eye-witness and victim testimonials, 
it is likely the A.S.G. was to some extent involved in piratical attacks to raise revenue 
for their military campaign. 
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Fig. 3.11 
Terrorist groups operating in Southeast Asia 
Country Terrorism cells 
Indonesia 
Majilis Mujahidin Indonesia, Laskar Jihad, Laskar Jundulla, GAM, FPI, DI, Jammah 
NIII, Laskar Mujahidin, Mujahidin KOMPAK, ABB, AMIN, and RP11 
Malaysia Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia, Al-Muanah 
Myanmar Arakan Rohingya National Organisation 
Philippines 
Abu Sayyaf Group, Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), Misuari Breakaway 
Group (MBG), Balik Islam/Rajah Solaiman Islamic Movement (BI/RSIM) 
Thailand Gerakan Mujahidin Pattani Islam 
Source:  Bilveer Singh, The Talibanization of Southeast Asia: losing the war on terror to Islamist 
extremists (London, 2007), p. 86. 
 
Counter-piracy 1997-2006 
General context 
Former I.M.O. Secretary General Efthimios Mitropoulos correctly asserted that ‘[...] 
unlawful acts, such as attacks by terrorists, pirates and armed robbers, is a problem that 
does not recognize national boundaries and which, therefore, cannot be completely 
solved by any one country acting alone’.86 As previously mentioned, enduring issues 
relating to sovereignty and territorial integrity initially hampered multistate counter-
piracy cooperation. Ultimately, a combination of external pressure and internal 
compromise resulted in the establishment of a multilateral anti-piracy framework by 
2006. The limited cooperation and information sharing that began in the 1990s evolved 
significantly after 2001. Assisted by the development of new navigational and satellite 
technologies, several national, bilateral and multilateral counter-piracy initiatives were 
undertaken. There was also a significant contribution from extra-regional states such as 
Australia, China, Japan, India and the United States in bolstering regional maritime 
security initiatives and dialogue. International maritime law also continued to expand 
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and evolve in reaction to the continuing criminal threat posed by pirates and ‘sea-
robbers’. 
 
Unanticipated events also had a significant impact on suppressing maritime crime in the 
region. The Indian Ocean tsunami of December 2004 had a direct bearing on the 
fluctuation of piracy along the Malacca Strait where reported attacks decreased from 38 
in 2004 to just 12 in 2005.
87
 The tsunami resulted in widespread devastation and loss of 
life in coastal areas, predominantly the northern Indonesian island of Sumatra and the 
province of Aceh. There were an estimated 160,000 fatalities in Indonesia alone, with 
fatality rates as high as 75 percent in some parts of Aceh.
88
 The tsunami suppressed 
piracy in two ways. Firstly, large numbers of pirates were likely killed and, secondly, 
the supporting infrastructure needed to commit piratical acts such as boats, harbours and 
safe havens were either damaged or destroyed. The devastation in Aceh also precipitated 
ceasefire negotiations between GAM and the Indonesian government that ultimately led 
to cessation of the conflict.
89
 This likely contributed to the drop in piracy in the region 
and in particular incidences of kidnap-for-ransom hijackings. 
 
Technological initiatives 
New advances in global maritime communication and navigational technology 
significantly enhanced maritime security and counter-piracy capabilities during this 
period. Equally, several of these advances enhanced the ability of organised pirate 
groups to track and hijack vessels in Southeast Asia. In the late 1990s, the I.M.O., in 
conjunction with the International Hydrographic Organization, created the Electronic 
Chart Display and Information System (E.C.D.I.S.) as the performance standard for the 
use of Electronic Chart Systems (E.C.S.). Since then several technological initiatives 
were launched that aided in the suppression of piracy in Southeast Asia and further 
afield. On 1 February 1999 the Global Maritime Distress and Safety System 
(G.M.D.S.S.) was fully implemented by the I.M.O. This marked a significant evolution 
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in marine radio-communications technology as it utilised an integrated satellite and 
terrestrial radio-communication system.
90
 Implementation of the G.M.D.S.S. meant that 
all vessels of 300 gross tonnage and above transiting international waters had to be 
equipped with specialised radio-communications equipment for sending and receiving 
distress alerts and maritime safety information. The system allowed for ease of 
communication on occurrences of piracy and areas of high risk. 
 
Systems such as G.M.D.S.S. facilitated the adoption of Standard Marine 
Communication Phrases by the I.M.O. in November 2001, which attempted to 
streamline and standardise the exchange of information at sea to avoid navigational 
hazards and enhance communication on security risks such as piracy. I.M.O. Resolution 
A.918 listed the standard communicative procedure for transmitting a pirate attack and 
for abandoning a vessel due to a pirate attack.
91
 In July 2002, all newly constructed 
vessels of 3,000 gross tonnage and above were legally required to carry a Voyage Data 
Recorder. This newly developed data recorder was essentially the equivalent of the 
‘black box’ recorder on an aircraft. The Voyage Data Recorder was primarily utilised to 
investigate accidents at sea. However, given that it documented background bridge 
conversation and radio communications, it also had utility as a post-piracy intelligence 
gathering implement or tracing the voyage of a pirated vessel following recovery.  
 
The introduction of a mandatory Automatic Identification System (A.I.S.) in 2004 for 
vessels over 300 gross tonnage and upwards was arguably the foremost anti-piracy 
technological innovation during this period, particularly in the suppression of phantom 
ship fraud. A.I.S. provided for the exchange of information on vessel identity, position, 
course, speed and navigational status to maritime authorities ashore and other similarly 
equipped vessels and aircraft. Such information enhanced regional counter-piracy 
capability by facilitating the analysis of shipping traffic to identify areas of high risk, 
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post-pirated vessel tracking and convoy management.
92
 However, open access to this 
information also invariably benefited maritime criminals. The A.I.S. was further limited 
due to its relatively short-range of effectiveness. To compensate for this deficit, the 
I.M.O. adopted a resolution to establish a Long-Range Identification and Tracking of 
ships technology (LRIT) in May 2006. 
 
Alternative counter-piracy satellite technologies introduced during this period included 
the ‘ShipLoc’ system, which was compliant with I.M.O. regulations and endorsed by the 
I.C.C. I.M.B. Similarly to A.I.S., though not a legal requisite, the ShipLoc system 
utilised satellite technology that allowed for accurate monitoring of a vessels’ location 
by vessel traffic services and also the monitoring and recovery of hijacked vessels. 
Critically, the system also incorporated a direct ship-to-shore alert system in the event of, 
for example, a pirate attack. This message could be delivered discreetly and therefore 
remain undetected by any potential aggressors on board or by other ships in the vicinity. 
The hijacking of the tanker Selayang and the subsequent liberation by Indonesian 
security forces in 2001 was the first publically declared recovery utilising the ShipLoc 
system and illustrated its effectiveness in counter-piracy operations.
93
 
 
The advances in E.C.S. resulted in initiatives such at the Marine Electronic Highway, 
which was conceived in the late 1990s and implemented as a demonstration project in 
June 2006. The concept of the Marine Electronic Highway was to enhance navigational 
security and promote marine environmental protection in the Malacca Straits and 
Singapore by combining E.C.D.I.S. and environmental management tools in an 
integrated platform.
 94
 This would allow for maximum exchange of information between 
vessels transiting the strait and shore-based authorities. The creation and continued 
development of these maritime security technologies illustrated a growing international 
awareness of the need to maintain and enhance security and awareness of movements in 
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and from the maritime domain. Former head of the U.S. Navy, Adm. Michael G. Mullen, 
highlighted that the ability of states to monitor small boats would be key to international 
efforts to boost maritime security in the future.
95
 
 
National initiatives 
Indonesia 
Mounting international pressure was partially responsible for initiating a number of 
counter-piracy measures at a national level in Southeast Asia after 2001. Indonesia felt 
this pressure more than neighbouring states given the pervasive piracy problem in its 
territorial waters. In 2003, there were 121 reported piratical incidents in Indonesian 
waters.
96
 This represented approximately 64 percent of all incidents in Southeast Asia 
that year. Enduring issues such as allegations of corruption among law enforcement 
agencies, a deficiency of financial resources and disagreement over the prioritisation of 
piracy within broader maritime security threats continued to hamper Indonesian counter-
piracy efforts. Former Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri acknowledged these 
shortcomings and emphasised the need for a strong navy to counter the alarming 
increase in illegal activities in Indonesian waters, chiefly piracy and illegal fishing.
97
   
 
The Indonesian special advisor to the Minister for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries 
claimed that it would take in excess of 300 vessels to defend Indonesian maritime space 
and resources adequately.
98
 It was suggested in 2004 that only about 25 Indonesian 
naval vessels were operating at sea at any given moment. Notwithstanding these 
shortcomings, Indonesia had one of the lowest expenditure rates on defence in the 
region. In 1999, Indonesia spent just US$1.5 billion or 0.8 percent of G.D.P. on defence 
compared with the vastly smaller Singapore, which spent US$4.2 billion on defence in 
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1999.
99
 This may have been one of the reasons for the separation of Indonesia’s military 
and national police into two distinct bodies that same year.  
 
Despite the financial impediments and capability restrictions faced by Indonesia in the 
years after the financial crisis, there was a small, if largely ineffectual, effort at a 
national level to initiate counter-piracy measures. In December 2001, the Indonesian 
navy established a new anti-piracy operation centre in Bangka on Sumatra Island to join 
with two earlier bases, one near the Sumatran city of Medan and the other on Batam 
Island. Due to the escalation of piracy in Indonesian waters between 2000 and 2004, a 
new programme for coordinating security operations at sea was proposed. Previously the 
navy was responsible for coordinating maritime security and law enforcement at sea in 
collaboration with the Marine Police, the Directorate of Guard and Rescue and the 
Customs Office. 
 
In December 2005, a presidential regulation established a new maritime coordination 
mechanism called ‘Bakorkamla’ to standardise and coordinate and the work of the 
various government institutions on matters of maritime security. Bakorkamla consisted 
of twelve government member agencies including the army, navy, police, intelligence 
agency and ministries of defence and foreign affairs. Indonesia also launched Operation 
Gurita in June 2005, which intensified anti-piracy air and sea patrols along the Malacca 
Strait; however, rising fuel prices hampered the effectiveness of the initiative. Despite 
this, the operation yielded a reduction in attacks and several arrests.
100
 This, according to 
former I.M.B. Director Pottengal Mukundan, was a ‘simple strategy based around a 
concentrated show of force in areas where there had been coordinated attacks’. 101 
Despite these efforts and increased rhetoric from President Yudhoyono, who ordered 
more patrols along the Malacca Strait and increased intelligence gathering in coastal 
communities in 2005, unilateral efforts in Indonesia had a minimal effect on rates of 
piracy. Indonesia still lacked a functioning independent coast guard in 2006, which 
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hampered its effectiveness in littoral waters. This relative ineffectiveness further 
illustrated the need for cooperative regional action.  
 
Malaysia 
Malaysia, in contrast to Indonesia, utilised resources more efficiently in relation to 
maritime security operations and was better equipped in regards to its navy in the years 
after the financial crisis. In 2000, the government intensified anti-piracy patrols and 
announced the construction of a new naval base at Semporna in Sabah to increase 
maritime security in the northeast of the state following a period of increased insurgent 
activity.
102
 That same year witnessed the highest number of reported incidents of piracy 
in Malaysian waters, with 21 attacks.
103
 Despite the relatively low number of incidents 
compared to Indonesia, the Malaysian government invested considerably in new 
equipment and personnel. 
 
Under the ‘Eighth Malaysia plan: 2001-2005’, MR10.8 billion or 9.8 percent of the total 
fund was allocated for strengthening the security sector.
104
 This included the purchase of 
additional enforcement vessels, navigational aids and implementation of the Marine 
Electronic Highway. Critically, for domestic counter-piracy capabilities, the plan paved 
the way for the introduction of A.I.S. and ‘Differential Global Positioning’ systems to 
strengthen maritime security in the Straits of Malacca. In addition, training programmes 
were enhanced to meet international standards, which included watch-keeping 
instruction for seafarers.
105
 This investment enabled the Malaysian navy to offer escorts 
for vulnerable commercial vessels transiting its territorial waters in 2004.  
 
In 2005, the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (M.M.E.A.) was established to 
coordinate the activities of Malaysia’s seven primary maritime security agencies and 
allow for the more fluid exchange of information on maritime security threats. That 
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same year a serious of radar stations were installed along the Malaysian side of the 
Malacca Strait to monitor passing traffic. By 2006, Malaysia had intensified domestic 
counter-piracy operations by purchasing new police boats and increasing joint anti-
piracy maritime exercises. Despite this, there were issues with Malaysia’s maritime 
security structure. The Royal Malaysian Police Marine and the Royal Malaysian Navy 
were the agencies primarily responsible for counter-piracy patrols and operations. 
However, up to 22 separate authorities had some role in the wider applicability of 
maritime security operations, which complicated coordination and hindered the 
effectiveness of unilateral action.  
 
Philippines 
Other states, such as the Philippines, also initiated a number of unilateral counter-piracy 
initiatives with limited success. Much like Indonesia, this action was hampered by a 
paucity of resources and equipment alongside allegations of corruption among elements 
of the navy. The Philippine navy was small compared to other regional navies and 
lacked the capability to patrol its vast archipelagic waters independently. The former 
national security adviser to the Philippine government, Norberto Gonzales, suggested 
that it was impossible to monitor every vessel that ‘travelled between Indonesia and 
Mindanao’ owing to the government’s ‘meagre resources’.106 
 
The Philippine government recognised the necessity of monitoring illicit activity at sea 
as highlighted in their 1998 Defence Policy Paper: ‘[The] Department of National 
Defence must be able to monitor activities, both legal and illegal, [...] and respond to 
unauthorized incursions and criminal activities like piracy and smuggling’.107 Initiatives 
included the provision of an additional thirty vessels to the Philippine Coast Guard for 
counter-piracy patrolling in 2002 and the creation of a new naval detachment to 
strengthen maritime security in along the south coast of the country in 2005. The 
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detachment complemented a naval coast watch station that had previously been 
established in Tinaka Point.
108
  
 
Singapore  
Singapore, unlike most other regional states, was particularly effective at controlling 
piracy unilaterally in its limited territorial waters, given the comparatively sophisticated 
state of its navy and coast guard.
109
 Moreover, Singapore’s economic prosperity 
depended almost entirely on maritime trade. Koh Swee Lean Collin highlighted that 
Singapore’s geo-strategic context meant that seaward defence against external maritime 
aggression and safeguarding of SLOC security were fundamental aspects of its maritime 
security.
110
 Singapore instituted several unilateral maritime security measures such as a 
Harbour Craft Transponder System, which obliged all Singapore-registered small craft 
below 300 tonnes to install a tracking system.
111
 In 2003, Singapore created an 
interagency Maritime and Port Security Working Group that incorporated the navy, 
police coast guard, and the maritime and port authority. The Singapore Navy in 
conjunction with the Police Coast Guard subsequently initiated a sea marshal 
programme called ‘Accompanying Sea Security Teams’. The sea security teams 
deployed specialised naval personnel on board certain merchant vessels transiting 
Singapore waters to deter, in the first instance, acts of terrorism.
112
 
 
These efforts were amplified by the creation of an integrated surveillance and 
information network for tracking and investigating suspicious movements, intensified 
navy and coast guard patrols and the re-designation of shipping routes to minimise the 
                                                 
108
 United Press International (U.P.I.), ‘Philippine navy cracks down on terror’, 08 Nov. 2005, 
(http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2005/11/08/Philippine-navy-cracks-down-on-
terror/UPI-96871131510322/) (03 Oct. 2013). 
109
 See for example: I.I.S.S., The military balance 2002 (London, 2003), pp 162-63. 
110
 Koh Swee Lean Collin, ‘Seeking balance: force projection, confidence building and the Republic of 
Singapore navy’ in Geoffrey Till & Jane Chan (eds.), Naval modernisation in Southeast Asia: nature, 
causes and consequences (Oxford, 2014), p. 227. 
111
 ‘RADM Chew Men Leong, ‘Navies and maritime security - a Republic of Singapore Navy 
perspective’ in Pointer: Journal of the Singapore Armed Services, xxxiii, no. 3 (Autumn 2007). 
112
 Lin Yuankai, ‘COSCOM muscles up for challenges ahead’ in Navy News: A Publication of the 
Republic of Singapore Navy, no. 2 (2005), p. 9. 
 -158- 
convergence of small craft with high-risk merchant vessels.
113
 Collectively, these 
operational measures helped not only to deter potential acts of terrorism but also to 
suppress piracy, sea robberies and smuggling activities.
114
 In addition, Singapore 
bolstered these deterrent efforts with the acquisition of more appropriate assets for 
security operations in the littoral including the purchase of remote-controlled Israeli 
Rafael Armament Development Authority Protector Unmanned Surface Vessels in 2005 
for counter-piracy and counter-terrorism operations at sea.
115
  
 
Bilateral and trilateral initiatives 
National efforts were inherently limited in tackling transnational maritime crimes such 
as piracy, which meant a multinational, collaborative response was required. Generally, 
bilateral counter-piracy cooperation was favoured as it was easier to manage territorial 
and political sensitivities with one government than with multiple ones. Bilateral anti-
piracy exercises and agreements that had begun in the early 1990s were strengthened 
and expanded between 1997 and 2006 to include, in some cases, trilateral collaboration. 
This cooperation was most evident along the Malacca Strait, where several bilateral and 
trilateral counter-piracy initiatives and exercises were undertaken. These generally 
centred on the gathering and sharing of intelligence and surveillance, cooperative anti-
piracy frameworks and coordinated maritime surface patrolling. 
 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines engaged in several bilateral counter-
piracy initiatives during this period. Malaysia and the Philippines established a Border 
Patrol Coordination Group, which conducted maritime security manoeuvres such as the 
ten-day ‘Malphi-Laut’ naval exercise northwest of Manila in October 2001. These 
exercises were designed to enhance and strengthen existing bilateral defence 
cooperation agreements, such as that signed in 1994, against common maritime threats 
like piracy. The Philippines and Indonesia also established a similar joint border patrol 
mechanism to deter piracy and terrorism at sea. 
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Singapore and Malaysia had been actively engaged in bilateral coordinated anti-piracy 
patrols and exercises since the resurgence of piracy in the 1980s. In November 2005, for 
example, the navies of Malaysia and Singapore began a nine-day counter-piracy 
exercise consisting of six ships from each nation. This was the seventeenth such bilateral 
naval exercise undertaken by the two states. Similarly, Indonesia and Singapore 
expanded the ‘Indon-Sin’ Coordinated Patrol that had been created in 1992 by launching 
a joint marine surveillance system entitled Project SURPIC in May 2005.
 116
 Project 
SURPIC enabled the instantaneous exchange of information between both navies on 
piratical threats in the Singapore Strait via a synchronised visual relay. The navies of 
Malaysia and Thailand also conducted joint patrols in the Gulf of Thailand and the 
Andaman Sea to deter and prevent piracy and arms trafficking in the area. 
 
A number of these initiatives evolved into tripartite agreement such as the 2002 
‘Agreement on Information Exchange and Establishment of Communication 
Procedures’ signed by the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia. This was a cooperative 
security pact intended to enhance existing bilateral defence, border and security 
cooperation arrangements between the three nations. Specific counter-piracy initiatives 
included conducting joint training and exercises, establishment of ‘hot lines’, 
harmonising legislation, designated entry and exit points and sea-lanes, exchanging 
information and enhancing the penalties for transnational crimes.
117
 These agreements 
facilitated more evolved and sophisticated cooperative counter-piracy applications such 
as the ‘Coast Watch South’ initiative conceptualised by the Philippines, Indonesia, and 
Malaysia in November 2005. Expert groups on maritime security issues evolved 
considerably during this period such as the Tripartite Technical Experts Group initiated 
by Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore in the late 1970s. 
 
Despite a steady decline in the number of pirate attacks in Southeast Asia after 2003 and 
the strengthening of political relations, these initiatives were limited in reach, duration 
and effectiveness without wider regional multilateral engagement. The majority of the 
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patrols were coordinated and occurred intermittently in narrow designated sea zones, 
which limited their effectiveness. There was also limited provision for ‘hot-pursuit’ into 
opposing territorial waters. Indeed, there was not regional-wide consensus that piracy 
was the foremost maritime security threat, which meant participation in these 
agreements was to some extent conciliatory rather than substantive. This apathetic 
approach eventually evolved into a more meaningful multilateral engagement owing 
chiefly to external pressure from extra-regional user states. 
 
Multilateral initiatives 
Regional Maritime Security Initiative 
The Jakarta Post ran a headline in December 2005 that read: ‘Territory no longer an 
issue in Malacca Strait security’.118 Although oversimplifying the issue, this headline 
reflected the progress made in multilateral consensus between littoral states on the issue 
of counter-piracy since 1997. The various national, bilateral and trilateral counter-piracy 
arrangements created after the financial crisis provided the foundation for regional wide 
engagement, which was more likely driven by external pressure over any genuine desire 
for multilateral collaboration. The United States in particular was keen to participate 
directly in helping monitor and secure strategic sea lanes in Southeast Asia. In 2004, a 
conceptual framework labelled the Regional Maritime Security Initiative (R.M.S.I.) was 
proposed by the United States as a joint patrol and intelligence gathering agreement to 
help secure the Malacca Straits against transnational threats such as piracy and terrorism. 
On 31 March 2004 Admiral Thomas Fargo, then officer commanding of U.S. Pacific 
Command, testified before the House Armed Services Committee on U.S. Pacific 
command posture. In his statement he outlined the aims of the R.M.S.I. as: ‘Working 
first with other navies of the region, our approach is to assess and then provide detailed 
plans to build and synchronize interagency and international capacity to fight threats that 
use the maritime space to facilitate their illicit activity’.119 Fargo also suggested that 
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special U.S. expeditionary forces could carry out maritime security operations ‘when the 
decision has been made to do so’.120  
 
A degree of misinterpretation and misinformation followed Fargo’s statement, which 
resulted in a hostile reaction mostly from Indonesia and Malaysia. While there was a 
willingness to share intelligence and information with the U.S. to enhance regional 
maritime security, any direct U.S. involvement was seen as an infringement of 
sovereignty. The former Malaysian deputy prime minister commented: ‘we recognise 
there is a need to increase the capacity of the littoral states to increase our capabilities 
[...] but the actual interdiction will be done by littoral states’.121 There were further 
concerns that any direct U.S. military involvement in the region would heighten political 
tensions and encourage the spread of Islamic fundamentalism.
122
  
 
Despite attempts by senior U.S. officials, including Donald Rumsfeld, to allay fears of 
U.S. basing or standing patrol forces, the R.M.S.I. was untenable in spite of support 
from Singapore and Thailand. In September that same year, Admiral Fargo 
acknowledged that employment of forces in the region required cognisance of territorial 
sensitivities. He stated: ‘Optimising these immediately employable forces requires an 
appropriate footprint with more reach back, less infrastructure, and less burden on 
hosts’. 123  However, Indonesia was vehemently opposed to any foreign military 
involvement in what it perceived as internal security issues as such intervention would 
run contrary to its policy of non-alignment.
124
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Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
ASEAN emerged as a key facilitator in the development of maritime security 
cooperation after 2001 principally through the workings of the ASEAN Regional Forum 
(A.R.F.) Prior to the attacks of 11 September 2001, Southeast Asian nations tended to 
view threats such as terrorism and piracy as internal security matters. Acts of terrorism 
had traditionally been committed by domestic separatist movements such as GAM, 
A.S.G. and Jemaah Islamiyah, which were akin to groups such as the Palestine 
Liberation Organisation or the Irish Republican Army. Terrorism was therefore typically 
viewed as a matter of national security rather than an issue of regional collaboration. 
The events of 11 September 2001 changed this and exposed the complex transnational 
networks in which a number of Islamist groups operated. External pressure, chiefly from 
the United States, accumulated on Southeast Asian governments to address these 
transnational threats owing to the geo-strategic importance of Southeast Asian SLOCs. 
The threat of piracy and maritime terrorism directly threatened the security and viability 
of these critically important waterways. 
 
Notwithstanding the lack of a specific counter-piracy framework, ASEAN convened a 
number of conferences, agreements and initiatives intended to address piracy and other 
maritime security issues on a regional wide level. Prior to September 2001, ASEAN 
issued a ‘Declaration on transnational crime’ in 1997 that recognised the ‘pernicious 
effects’ of piracy and endeavoured to strengthen and enhance the commitment of 
regional countries in combating it.
125
 By 1999 a ‘plan of action’ had been convened in 
Myanmar which, alongside other objectives, hoped to foster regional cooperation at the 
investigative, prosecutorial, and judicial level when tackling crimes such as piracy.
126
 
The association established a special projects division on transnational crime in 2001 
followed by a meeting of senior officials in 2002. That same year a declaration was 
signed between ASEAN member states and China on the conduct of parties in the South 
China Sea, which tentatively recommended multilateral cooperation in combating piracy 
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and armed robbery at sea ‘pending a comprehensive and durable settlement of the 
disputes’.127  
 
Despite the apparent obstacles to a complete multilateral framework, the A.R.F. 
recognised the importance of cooperative maritime security, which was officially added 
to agenda in 2003. In June that year, the A.R.F. published a ‘Statement on cooperation 
against piracy and other threats to maritime security’ that committed participants to 
enhance multilateral maritime security in the form of information exchange and anti-
piracy exercises. The statement was explicit, much like other ASEAN statements on 
cooperative initiatives, that all activities must be respectful of territorial integrity, 
sovereignty, jurisdiction and applicable international conventions.
128
  
 
By 2004, there were some general signs of a shift in regional attitudes toward 
multilateral engagement and some flexibility in relation to issues of sovereignty and 
territorial integrity. According to one analyst: ‘[...] despite intra-mural differences, 
[ASEAN] has been able to assume a prerogative role of a kind in an intermittent process 
of negotiations about establishing rules of the game’.129 In October 2004, a conference 
was held on building a comprehensive security regime in the Straits of Malacca, which 
was co-organised by the Maritime Institute of Malaysia (MIMA). One month later a 
more integrated regional programme was adopted known as the Vientiane Action 
Programme (VAP). 
 
VAP illustrated how littoral states were beginning to recognise the benefit of regional 
consolidation and how this was a more palatable option than allowing foreign powers to 
influence and direct Southeast Asian security policy. The VAP called for the promotion 
of an ‘ASEAN identity’ and declared a desire to pursue a ‘comprehensive integration of 
                                                 
127
 ASEAN, ‘Declaration on the conduct of parties in the South China Sea’ 04 Nov. 2002, 
(http://www.asean.org/asean/external-relations/china/item/declaration-on-the-conduct-of-parties-in-the-
south-china-sea) (07 Nov. 2013). 
128
 ASEAN Regional Forum (A.R.F.), ‘Statement on cooperation against piracy and other threats to 
maritime security’, 17 June 2003 (http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/library/arf-chairmans-statements-
and-reports/172.html) (08 Nov. 2013). 
129
 See: Amitav Acharya, ‘Do norms and identity matter? Community and power in Southeast Asia’s 
regional order’ in The Pacific Review, xviii, no. 1 (Mar. 2005), p. 98. 
 -164- 
ASEAN’ in socio-cultural, economic and security matters. 130  There was a clear 
evolution toward multilateralism within ASEAN in relation to combating piracy; 
however, no tangible multilateral counter-piracy framework had been created despite 
calls for a ‘Maritime Forum’ in the VAP. According to Jane Chan: ‘If you look at 
ASEAN, sovereignty is right up there [...] don’t mess with each other’s internal 
problems [...] it is not only targeted at external powers even amongst neighbours’.131 
 
Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific 
Aside from ASEAN, other multistate regional forums such as the Council for Security 
Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (C.S.C.A.P.) were actively attempting to address the 
piracy problem in Southeast Asian waters. C.S.C.A.P. published a number of 
memoranda on maritime security and other transnational crimes, which were submitted 
for consideration at policy level. These publications examined and identified 
weaknesses in current maritime legislation and consistently emphasised the need for 
regional cooperation to overcome these weaknesses. The council also highlighted the 
need for a specific regional anti-piracy agreement as early as 2001.
132
 C.S.C.A.P. 
produced several memorandums relating to counter-piracy, which included ‘Guidelines 
for regional maritime cooperation’ in December 1997, ‘Cooperation for law and order at 
sea’ in February 2001 and ‘The practice of the law of the sea in the Asia Pacific’ in 
December 2002. 
 
Malacca Straits Security Initiative  
As previously discussed, external pressure, in particular the proposed R.M.S.I., 
accelerated the creation of a regionally based multilateral maritime security regime. In 
July 2004 Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore formed a tri-partite maritime security 
programme called MALSINDO or the Malacca Straits Coordinated Patrols (M.S.C.P.) 
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under the banner of the Malacca Straits Security Initiative.
133
 This initially consisted of 
coordinated, not joint, anti-piracy surface patrols of the Malacca Strait by the navies of 
Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore and was essentially a regional alternative to the 
R.M.S.I. The MALSINDO patrols partially addressed the issue of ‘hot pursuit’ that had 
hampered counter-piracy operations in the past. Navies were given limited permission to 
enter into the sovereign maritime jurisdiction of participating countries while in ‘hot 
pursuit’ of a pirate vessel provided it was communicated to the host country in advance. 
A hotline was also established to facilitate this exchange and, while it did not ultimately 
resolve the problem of hot pursuit, it did illustrate an evolution in regional counter-
piracy efforts.  
 
Eyes in the Sky  
In September 2005, the M.S.C.P. was enhanced by the introduction of the ‘Eyes in the 
Sky’ (E.i.S.) programme. The E.i.S. concept was first proposed during the 2005 
‘Shangri-La dialogue’ by then Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of 
Defence Dato’ Sri Mohd Najib Tun Haji Abdul Razak.134  Operationally, E.i.S. was 
divided between designated bi-weekly aerial patrols and state specific ground assets 
called Monitoring and Action Agencies. The air-surveillance observed and reported on 
suspected piratical activity and strengthened regional maritime domain awareness while 
the Monitoring and Action Agencies responded to reports of threats. E.i.S. also 
permitted patrolling aircraft to cross into participating states’ airspace up to three 
nautical miles from shore. 
 
The E.i.S. programme was significant as it illustrated littoral states’ willingness to ease 
restrictions on entering sovereign jurisdiction during counter-piracy operations. This 
reflected a general regional shift toward multilateralism. At the inaugural EiS air patrol 
at Subang Air Base in September 2005, the Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister 
commented: ‘This initiative highlights the sense of togetherness among ASEAN 
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countries’.135 Such initiatives, while a useful deterrent, were arguably more symbolic 
and demonstrated to external powers that littoral states were proactively addressing 
piracy and other maritime security concerns. Some observers questioned the 
effectiveness of the E.i.S. programme given the relatively low number of sorties, limited 
technological capability of the aircraft and large expanse of ocean to be monitored.
136
 
 
In April 2006, MALSINDO and E.i.S. were amalgamated and renamed the Malacca 
Straits Patrol (M.S.P.). The M.S.P. was divided into three distinct divisions: the Malacca 
Straits Sea Patrol (M.S.S.P.), the E.i.S. and the Intelligence Exchange Group. While the 
surface patrols were coordinated, the E.i.S. element was a joint initiative as the air-crew 
consisted of members from each participating state. The deterrent effect of the M.S.P. 
combined with the devastation wrought by the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami resulted in a 
sharp decline in incidents of piracy along the Malacca Strait from 38 in 2004 to just 12 
in 2005.
137
  
 
Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against 
Ships in Asia 
The ReCAAP agreement was the most significant of all the various national, bilateral 
and multilateral initiatives undertaken to combat piracy in Southeast Asia. ReCAAP was 
the first genuine multilateral agreement in Southeast Asia convened at government to 
government level that focused exclusively on maritime piracy and armed robbery at sea. 
The concept was initially discussed at the regional conference on combating piracy and 
armed robbery against ships held in Tokyo in April 2000 known then as the ‘Tokyo 
Model Action Plan’. One year later Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi 
formally presented the ReCAAP proposal, which was essentially a modified and more 
conservative version of the 1997 Japanese Ocean Peace Keeping concept.
138
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The agreement was finalised in Tokyo on 11 November 2004 and entered into force on 
4 September 2006. That same year an Information Sharing Centre (I.S.C.) was 
established in Singapore to act as a focal point for contracting governments to exchange 
information and intelligence and report on incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea. 
The I.S.C. also published quarterly reports on piracy, convened anti-piracy seminars and 
generally raised regional-wide awareness of the problem. By 2007 Bangladesh, Brunei 
Darussalam, Cambodia, China, India, Japan, South Korea, Laos, Myanmar, the 
Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Vietnam had all ratified the agreement. 
 
In relation to specific counter-piracy conduct and operations at sea, article 3 of ReCAAP 
obliged contracting parties to:  
 
(a) to prevent and suppress piracy and armed robbery against ships; (b) to 
arrest pirates or persons who have committed armed robbery against ships; 
(c) to seize ships or aircraft used for committing piracy or armed robbery 
against ships, to seize ships taken by and under the control of pirates or 
persons who have committed armed robbery against ships, and to seize the 
property on board such ships; and (d) to rescue victim ships and victims of 
piracy or armed robbery against ships.
139
 
 
Aside from counter-piracy operations at sea, contracting states were also free to follow 
up investigations ashore distinct to the agreement. Any physical enforcement was left to 
the discretion of individual states. The relative success of the ReCAAP model may be 
explained in several ways. Firstly, reports were verified and investigated which built 
stakeholder trust. Secondly, by distinguishing piracy and armed robbery, a more realistic 
picture of regional incidents was generated. This qualitative analysis was bolstered by 
secondments by representatives from contracting parties to the I.S.C. Finally, ReCAAP 
classified attacks by severity and location, which allowed contracting governments to 
disperse maritime enforcement assets more economically in areas of heightened activity. 
International shipping could also contact ReCAAP for the latest report on piratical 
activity and plan a route accordingly.
140
 
 
                                                 
139
 ‘Regional Cooperation Agreement on combating Piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia’ in 
International Legal Materials, xliv, no. 4 (July 2005), p. 830. [henceforth cited as ReCAAP]. 
140
 Interview with Ms. Lee Yin Mui (24 Mar. 2014). 
 -168- 
The agreement also attempted to address the habituated concerns of regional states in 
relation to sovereignty and territorial integrity. Article 2 (4) stated: ‘Nothing in this 
agreement, nor any act or activity carried out under this agreement shall prejudice the 
position of any contracting party with regard to any dispute concerning territorial 
sovereignty or any issues related to the law of the sea’.141 Despite these assurances, 
Malaysia and Indonesia were the only two ASEAN states not to become signatories. 
Malaysia primarily objected to the placement of the I.S.C. in Singapore arguing that the 
I.M.B. P.R.C. in Kuala Lumpur was an appropriate location for the centre.
142
 Indonesia, 
once again, cited concerns relating to sovereignty and territorial integrity and argued 
that the M.S.P. were a sufficient counter piracy mechanism along the Strait.
143
 
 
Despite this, both Malaysia and Indonesia cooperated with ReCAAP at an operational 
and reporting level through the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency and 
Indonesia’s maritime coordination apparatus ‘Bakorkamla’. The existence of several 
intergovernmental maritime agencies initially complicated ReCAAP’s efforts to compile 
an accurate picture on piracy and armed robbery incidents. According to Assistant 
Director of Research at the ReCAAP I.S.C., Ms. Lee Yin Mui: ‘some of them are the 
navy, some the coast guard, some are the Department of Shipping, some are port 
authority and some are Marine Rescue Coordination Centres [...] so it’s a mix and it 
varies from country to country’.144 
 
Despite these challenges, the agreement combined with the various other counter-piracy 
efforts and initiatives at a national and bilateral level resulted in a drastic reduction in 
the number of incidents of piracy in Southeast Asia (see fig. 3.12). By 2007, there were 
just seven reported piratical incidents in the Malacca Strait.
145
 In Indonesian waters the 
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number of piratical incidents also fell considerably, to just 47 reported attacks in 
2007.
146
 The success of ReCAAP and other regional multilateral counter-piracy 
initiatives was exemplified in August 2006, when Lloyd’s insurers removed the Malacca 
Strait from the war risk category.  
 
Fig. 3.12 
Decline in incidents of maritime piracy in Southeast Asia 2003-09 
 
Source: I.C.C. I.M.B., Piracy report 2003-10 
 
Extra-regional initiatives  
Maritime security efforts in Southeast Asia were bolstered and enhanced by extra-
regional user states owing chiefly to the strategic importance of the regions sea-lanes. 
Indeed, this external concern as previously discussed, was partly responsible for the 
implementation of successful multilateral anti-piracy frameworks such as ReCAAP. 
Enduring sensitivity over territorial sovereignty meant that littoral states were hesitant to 
permit any foreign naval force to conduct maritime security operations in sovereign 
waters without explicit regional management. The rejection of the U.S-led R.M.S.I. by 
Malaysia and Indonesia was a clear example of this. However, several nations directly 
assisted Southeast Asian states in counter-piracy capacity building through, but not 
limited to, multinational naval exercises, training programmes and funding for maritime 
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law enforcement in a ‘spirit of burden sharing by beneficiaries’ without unilateral 
foreign naval patrols.
147
 
 
Multinational frameworks such as the Five Power Defence Arrangement that comprised 
Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and the U.K. and the Western Pacific 
Naval Symposium provided a platform for extra-regional states to contribute to wider 
maritime security in the region.
148
 In May 2007, for example, eighteen Western Pacific 
Naval Symposium member navies conducted a security exercise in Singaporean waters 
that incorporated tactical scenarios and information sharing on maritime terrorism and 
piracy that utilised for the first time a common operating picture via the Singapore 
Navy’s Regional Maritime Information System.149 
 
Japan 
In 2001, Hiroshi Terashima, executive director of Japan's Nippon Foundation, 
recognised that cooperation among Southeast Asian states was ‘not necessarily in the 
most ideal state’ and that regional cooperation was the ‘key issue’ in establishing order 
at sea and countering threats such as piracy.
150
 In 2004, 70 percent of Japanese food 
imports arrived by sea and 99 percent of exports by volume were shipped.
151
 
Considering, that approximately 80 percent of Japan’s petroleum imports transited 
through the Strait of Malacca, keeping these sea-lanes secure was a priority for the 
Japanese government.
152
 High-profile pirate attacks on Japanese vessels, such as the 
Alondra Rainbow in 1999, raised public awareness of the issue in Japan, which 
facilitated significant investment in counter-piracy initiatives by both the private and 
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public sector. Shortly after the Alondra Rainbow hijacking, then Prime Minister Keizo 
Obuchi proposed a counter-piracy initiative at the ASEAN+3 Summit in Manila. The 
‘Obuchi initiative’ called for a multilateral ‘regional coast guard body’ to perform joint 
maritime security patrols with littoral states. Despite some initial enthusiasm for the 
scheme, it was ultimately rejected by Indonesia and China.  
 
However, a number of less invasive recommendations were adopted resulting from the 
failed initiative including the ‘Model Action Plan’ and ‘Asian anti-piracy challenges 
2000’. Despite the relative failure of these more radical proposals, Japan had been quite 
successful at the bilateral level successfully implementing joint anti-piracy training 
exercises with Brunei (2002), Indonesia (2002), Malaysia (2000), the Philippines (2003), 
Singapore (2003) Thailand (2004) and Vietnam (2002). Aside from conducting joint 
exercises, attempts were made to enhance to capabilities of regional coast guard services 
by offering instruction at the Japan Coast Guard academy and training school. These 
efforts were complemented by a series of maritime security conferences, seminars and 
education programmes. 
 
In 2006, Japan initiated a grant aid program for cooperation on counter-terrorism and 
security enhancement. This initiative provided investment for the construction of three 
high-speed vessels for deployment by the Marine Police of the provinces of Riau, North 
Sumatra and the Indonesian National Police in Jakarta at a cost of JPY1.9 million. The 
new vessels extended the patrol area of each base from a 170-mile radius to 250 
miles.
153
 Japan’s financial investment in Southeast Asian counter-piracy capability was 
significant. Aside from government investment, the private sector in Japan had donated 
an estimated JPY15 million toward enhancing maritime security since the late 1960s.
154
 
Japan also created an assistance package of US$70 million for ASEAN integration’ and 
announced the establishment of the Japan-ASEAN Integration Fund in March 2006. 
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Arguably, the most significant contribution from Japan in strengthening regional 
counter-piracy capacity was its leading role in the formation of the ReCAAP agreement, 
which, as previously mentioned, was the first multilateral government to government 
agreement that dealt exclusively with piracy and armed robbery at sea. 
 
United States 
In contrast to Japan, the United States was relatively inexperienced as regards 
addressing non-traditional security threats, such as piracy, in Southeast Asia. Following 
the events of 11 September 2001, the United States began to focus attention on securing 
the region owing to the existence of Al-Qaeda affiliated groups such as Jemaah 
Islamiyah and the vulnerability of maritime trade to pirates. Indeed, maritime piracy was 
frequently mentioned alongside terrorism in a large number of post-September 11 U.S. 
news and security reports. According to Jeremy Engels: ‘Following 9/11, piracy enters 
into the United States’ social imaginary [...] as “terrorism,” thereby rhetorically masking 
piracy’s statelessness or a pirate’s intention to plunder for private gains’.155 Similarly, 
foreign relations correspondence emanating from Washington D.C. regularly equated 
piracy and terrorism in Southeast Asia as parallel threats: ‘Working with the United 
States, Indonesia is vastly improving its ability to protect vital sea lanes from terrorists 
and piracy’.156 
 
U.S. interest in Southeast Asia extended beyond piracy and terrorism, however, to wider 
geo-political concerns such as relations with China and tensions over Taiwan. This was 
reflected in a statement before the U.S. ‘House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and the global environment’ in 2007: ‘We [...] 
remain deeply concerned about the growing arsenal of missiles and other military 
systems arrayed against Taiwan, as well as Beijing’s refusal to renounce the use of force 
                                                 
155
 Jeremy Engels, ‘Floating bombs encircling our shores: post-9/11 rhetoric’s of piracy and terrorism’ in 
Cultural Studies  Critical Methodologies, vii, no. 3 (Aug. 2007), p. 330. 
156
 Cameron Hume, Ambassador-Designate to Indonesia, ‘Statement to the U.S. Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations’, 27 May 2007, available at U.S. Dept. of State Archive 2001-09 (http://2001-2009. 
state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2007/85749.htm) (19 Nov. 2013). 
 -173- 
against Taiwan’. 157  The United States also negotiated a ‘Maritime cooperation 
framework’ with India in March 2006 to enhance maritime security and prevent piracy 
and other transnational crimes at sea. 
 
The United States was keen to develop Indonesia’s capacity to address maritime security 
threats as the vast majority of piratical incidents occurred in Indonesian territorial waters 
along the Malacca Strait. The restoration of military ties between the two governments 
in 2005 went some way to enhancing maritime security cooperation and information 
exchange. Despite these progressive steps, the former Indonesian defence minister 
Juwono Sudarsono warned U.S. Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld that the U.S. 
should not interfere excessively in regional security efforts: ‘The primary responsibility 
for security and anti-terrorism measures should lie with national governments, rather 
than the U.S. forcing its will on other countries [...]’.158 However, this public posturing 
did not reflect the true extent of Indonesian-U.S. relations. The U.S. was instrumental in 
funding the Indonesian Integrated Maritime Surveillance System and developed eight 
additional coastal surveillance stations to improve communications capabilities at the 
Indonesian headquarters command centre including an upgrade of X-Band radars on 
seven Indonesian ships in 2006.
159
  
 
The United States, along with other extra-regional parties, was duly aware of the 
complexities surrounding the issue of sovereignty. The U.S. Naval Forces 2007 
‘Commanders handbook on the law of naval operations’ explicitly stated [in relation to 
the pursuit of pirates into foreign territorial seas or archipelagic waters] that:  
 
If a pirate vessel [...] fleeing from pursuit by a warship [...] proceeds from 
international waters [...] into the territorial sea [or] archipelagic waters [...] 
of another country, every effort should be made to obtain the consent of the 
nation having sovereignty over the territorial sea [or] archipelagic waters 
[...] to continue pursuit [...] The inviolability of the territorial integrity of 
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sovereign nations makes the decision of a warship or military aircraft to 
continue pursuit into these areas without such consent a serious matter.
160
 
 
The United States government also provided significant financial support toward 
enhancing regional capabilities. In 2002, President George W. Bush pledged US$130 
million in bilateral assistance for Indonesia with a special focus on assisting efforts with 
legal and judicial reform.
161
 This included US$47 million to strengthen the capacity of 
the police and US$16 million in technical assistance to combat the financing of 
terrorism and money laundering.
162
 This was followed by Humanitarian Assistance/ 
Disaster Relief (H.A.D.R.) in the form of a US$900 million post-tsunami assistance 
fund in 2005.
163
  
 
The period after 2001 also witnessed the development of closer ties between the U.S. 
administration and ASEAN on transnational security issues. This closeness resulted in 
several security agreements and declarations including the ‘Joint declaration for 
cooperation to combat international terrorism’ in 2002, the ‘Joint vision statement on the 
ASEAN-U.S. enhanced partnership’ and a ‘Memorandum of understanding concerning 
cooperation on trade-related standards and conformance issues’ both in 2001. In July 
2005, a joint U.S.-Singaporean strategic framework was drafted which recognised the 
‘excellent’ relations between the two nations and controversially affirmed that a ‘strong 
United States military presence is vital for regional peace and stability’.164 
 
By 2006, the United States had developed a comprehensive National Strategy for 
Maritime Security. In areas like the Malacca Strait, this consisted of planning, capacity 
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building, information sharing, International Ship and Port-facility Security Code 
(I.S.P.S.) implementation, technical assistance, training and exercises, private sector 
outreach, maritime environmental stewardship and counterterrorism.
165
 Unsuccessful 
initiatives like the R.M.S.I., enduring issues surrounding sovereignty and terse relations 
with adjacent nations like China, meant that U.S. counter-piracy efforts were 
predominantly limited to financial assistance, information and intelligence exchange and 
capacity building. 
 
China 
Aside from Japan and the United States, several other nations also contributed to 
maritime security efforts in Southeast Asia between 1997 and 2006 including Australia, 
China and India. The South China Sea witnessed a surge of piratical activity during the 
early 1990s, which resulted in widespread allegations of corruption among Chinese 
maritime officials. This external pressure and the threat of economic boycott prompted 
Chinese authorities to crackdown on piracy and corruption within its territorial waters. 
This concentrated effort resulted in several high profile prosecutions of persons for 
piracy, which are discussed in more detail later. By 2000, incidents of piracy had 
dropped to manageable levels within Chinese waters with just eleven incidents reported 
to the I.M.B. P.R.C.
166
 Outside of sovereign waters, China was traditionally less willing 
to engage in multilateral initiatives due, in part, to concern over Japanese naval 
expansion. This was evident in 2002 with the rejection of Japan’s proposal for joint 
naval patrols in the Malacca strait with India, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia and South 
Korea. In 2003, India proposed a joint anti-piracy exercise in the Malacca Strait with 
China, similar to those conducted with Indonesian and U.S. warships. China rejected the 
offer stating that counter-piracy operations were the task of the coast guard.
167  
 
The Chinese government did, however, convene a number of declarations and 
memorandums of understanding with ASEAN in relation to the suppression of piracy 
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and other transnational threats. The ‘Declaration on the conduct of parties in the South 
China Sea’ signed of 4 November 2002 illustrated China’s emergent willingness to 
engage in a multilateral framework to combat piracy and armed robbery at sea. At the 
2004 ‘Conference on the Straits of Malacca: building a comprehensive security 
environment’, Deputy Director General Zhao Njianhua of China’s Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs demonstrated for the first time a shift in China’s view on cooperative maritime 
security in Southeast Asia. He stated: ‘China stands ready to cooperate with other 
countries in the region to combat maritime security threats and build an enduring and 
stable regional maritime security environment’.168 This strategic shift facilitated China’s 
participation in the ReCAAP agreement in 2006. 
 
India, Australia and Britain 
Other major user states such as India also contributed to regional counter-piracy efforts 
at sea through confidence-building measures, information exchange and naval exercises 
with littoral states including China. India initiated a multilateral naval exercise known as 
MILAN off the Andaman Islands in 2003 that involved naval assets from Australia, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. Similar exercises had 
been taking place since the mid-1990s. The Indian navy, the largest in the region, also 
conducted bilateral patrols with Indonesia along the Malacca Strait in 2004 after which 
the Indonesian President sought to ‘institutionalise the arrangement’.169 
 
Aside from seaward operations, India worked closely with ASEAN during this period 
resulting in several agreements, declarations and summit meetings. In 2002, the first 
ASEAN-India summit was held in Phnom Penh, where the linkages between sea-piracy 
and other transnational threats were discussed. This summit resulted in six more 
meetings by 2007. During the same period, India strengthened its domestic counter-
piracy capabilities following an escalation of armed robberies in its territorial waters and 
around the anchorages and approaches to Chittagong port in Bangladesh between 2000 
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and 2003. A combination of successful prosecutions, increased surveillance, coast guard 
enhancement and multilateral engagement resulted in a drop in incidents of piracy in the 
Indian sub-continent from 85 in 2003 to just 32 in 2004.
170
 The publication of the first 
Indian maritime doctrine in June 2004 and the establishment of the National Maritime 
Foundation of India in 2005 illustrated the importance of maritime security.
171
 
 
Given its geographical proximity to Southeast Asia and its dependence on regional sea-
lanes, Australia also had a strategic interest in supporting counter-piracy efforts. In 2000, 
the former Australian defence minister pressed the idea of Australian forces undertaking 
‘cooperative endeavours’ with Indonesian forces, such as ‘trying to combat the growing 
problem of piracy at sea’.172 However, no joint patrols were instigated between the two 
nations until an illegal fisheries surveillance patrol in November 2007.
173
 Aside from 
Indonesia, Australia forged closer maritime security links with the Philippines during 
this period that included the signing of an agreement in July 2003 on combating 
transnational crime including maritime piracy, smuggling and terrorism.
174
 Three major 
bilateral maritime security initiatives were created between Australia and the Philippines 
during this period. These were the Philippines Port Security Capacity Building project, 
the Army Watercraft project and the Coast Watch South project.
175
 These efforts were 
supported by the Royal Australian Navy Sea Power Centre, which was established in 
2000 to foster and encourage maritime security and strategic thought. The Sea Power 
Centre, for example, commissioned a ‘maritime needs analysis’ for the Philippines in 
2005 to facilitate more tailored maritime security support to the Philippines.
176
 The 
Australian government also negotiated a number of economic agreements with ASEAN 
and in 2004 committed to undertake ‘urgent steps’ to prevent and combat the ‘menace’ 
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of transnational crimes such as maritime piracy.
177
 These commitments resulted in 
Australia signing the ReCAAP agreement in 2006. 
 
The British government was noticeably absent as a direct participant in bolstering 
Southeast Asian maritime security during this period aside from generalised counter-
piracy guidance and contribution to the formation of international agreements. This was 
not surprising perhaps given just 32 attacks occurred on British registered vessels 
between 1993 and 2004 or two-three attacks on average per year.
178
 The House of 
Commons Transport Committee stated in a report on piracy in 2006 that the ‘U.K. 
Government and the international community generally, ought to be ashamed that they 
have failed to put effective measures in place to prevent the present high level of 
piratical attacks on seamen and women’.179 The government responded to such claims: 
 
Whereas every state has jurisdiction to intervene or investigate acts of piracy 
in international waters, such extraordinary powers cannot or should not be 
extended to territorial waters [...] nearly all of the recorded violent attacks 
have taken place in a handful of overseas locations with most occurring in 
territorial waters where [...] the government is limited in the direct action it 
can take.
180
 
 
At a non-governmental level, British N.G.O.s were involved in the donation of body 
armour to the Indonesian navy for counter-piracy patrols in 1999.
181
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Legal initiatives 
International 
The period from 1979 to 1997 witnessed a number of significant developments in the 
field of maritime law pertaining to piracy and armed robbery at sea. This chiefly 
reactionary process continued after 1997 resulting in several important legal initiatives 
that attempted to address the problem of criminality at sea. The I.M.O. came under 
increased pressure to produce effective legal remedies given the growing awareness of 
the dual threat of maritime piracy and terrorism after 11 September 2001. Following 
proposals by Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, the I.M.O. adopted the ‘Mandatory 
ship reporting system in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore’ or ‘STRAITREP’ in 
1998. This system provided littoral maritime authorities with information on vessel 
name, call sign, I.M.O. identification number, position, type of cargo, assessment of 
structure, cargo or equipment and/or any other circumstances that might affect normal 
navigation.
182
 
 
In June 1999, the I.M.O. published two comprehensive sets of recommendations for 
preventing and suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships. The first 
document was directed at ship owners, ship operators, shipmasters, and crews and the 
second toward governments. These documents were particularly significant as they 
provided information on the legal recourse available to governments when dealing with 
incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea. A revised addition in 2000 highlighted 
appropriate legislation, training of investigators, investigative strategy, preservation of 
evidence and crime scenes, proportionality, forensic examination, dealing with 
witnesses and finally the distribution of information and intelligence to appropriate 
agencies.
183
 
 
The phenomenon of ‘phantom ship’ fraud, which had grown significantly in Southeast 
Asian waters during the 1980s and 1990s, was addressed formally by the I.M.O. in 2001. 
I.M.O. Resolution A.923 called on governments to review their ship registration 
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procedures to ensure that safeguards were enacted to prevent the registration of 
‘phantom’ ships.184 To address this, the I.M.O. ‘identification number scheme’, which 
had become mandatory for all ships in 1996, evolved in 2002 to include a permanent 
identification number in a visible place on either the ship’s hull or superstructure. 
Phantom ship fraud was essentially eradicated by the introduction of these ship 
identification numbers alongside the Continuous Synopsis Record, which was 
introduced as an amendment to the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) convention in 2002. 
The Continuous Synopsis Record was a statutory instrument that obliged vessels to 
maintain a contemporaneous record of information including flag state, registered owner, 
company and administrative body responsible for issuing document of compliance, 
safety management certificate and international ship security certificate.
185
 
 
In November 2001, the I.M.O. formally adopted a ‘Code of practice for the investigation 
of the crimes of piracy and armed robbery against ships’. Aside from the I.M.O., other 
international organisations, such as the United Nations, recognised the threat from 
criminal activity such as piracy. In 2000, the U.N. ‘Convention against transnational 
organised crime’ addressed several complex legal concerns in relation to transnational 
threats. This included the protection of sovereignty, criminalisation of participation in an 
organised crime group, prosecution, adjudication, sanctions, confiscation seizure, 
extradition and jurisdiction.
186
 
 
International Ship and Port-facility Security Code 
The International Ship and Port-facility Security Code (I.S.P.S.) was the first 
internationally agreed regulatory framework addressing the issue of maritime security 
and provided a standardised system of assessing threats against ships and port facilities. 
The Code amended Chapters V and XI of the SOLAS convention and was divided 
between mandatory and recommendatory requirements. Key legally binding regulations 
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included the completion of a ship/port security assessment followed by the creation of a 
ship/port security plan and designation of a ship/port security officer. The I.S.P.S. Code 
was created against a backdrop of concern over the vulnerability of ships to attack after 
the events of 11 September 2001 but ultimately contributed to strengthening oceangoing 
vessels against acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea through enhanced onboard 
security measures. Vessels were also required to be fitted with a ‘ship security alert 
system’, that transmitted a noiseless alarm signal to designated authorities ashore 
identifying the ship, its location and indicating that the security of the ship was under 
threat from, for example, a piratical attack. 
 
The code established a three-tier threat assessment, which facilitated a link between the 
ship and port-facility and the appropriate security responses.
187
 By 1 July 2004, an 
estimated 90 percent of ships and declared port facilities subject to the security regime 
had adopted the I.S.P.S. Code measures.
188
 Despite the high level of compliance, there 
was not a corresponding decline in incidents of piracy. The former director of the I.M.B. 
commented that ‘the code alone cannot defeat the challenges facing maritime 
security’.189  This irregularity might be explained in several ways. According to the 
Company Security Officer for Thome Ship Management Benny Low: ‘Ports or 
governments certify their own facility, do their own audits and hire their own security 
officer - there is no third party to actually come and scrutinise their certification or 
procedures [...] that’s why there are still a lot of ports where ships are very prone and 
there is a high risk of robbery, pilferage, stowaways and contraband despite I.S.P.S, 
Code compliance’.190 
 
Domestic 
The I.M.O. also worked directly with littoral states in Southeast Asia to enhance 
regional maritime security, largely along the Malacca Strait under the ‘Protection of 
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vital shipping lanes initiative’. In 2005, a meeting was convened in Jakarta in 
cooperation with Malaysia and Singapore on enhancing safety, security and 
environmental protection in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. The two-day event 
resulted in the ‘Jakarta statement’, which was released on 8 September 2005. The three 
littoral states agreed to establish a cooperative mechanism, to conduct coordinated 
maritime patrols, maritime security training programmes and to strengthen capacity 
building to address security threats to shipping.
191
 The relative success of the Jakarta 
meeting resulted in a second meeting convened in Kuala Lumpur in 2006. The ‘Kuala 
Lumpur statement’ that followed commended the anti-piracy successes in the region 
since the Jakarta meeting and expressed the desire of littoral states to work closely with 
the I.M.O. and user-states to identify areas of mutual cooperation and assistance. This 
included the provision of resources, capacity-building, training, technical support, to 
promote further co-operative measures and significantly possible options for burden 
sharing.
192
 
 
Prosecutions  
Aside from these ‘soft-law’ agreements and frameworks, there were several successful 
prosecutions for the crime of piracy in domestic courts. In Malaysia, for example, the 
arrest of several high-profile pirates in 2000 coincided with a steady reduction in the 
number of attacks in Malaysian waters from 21 in 2000 to just five in 2003.
193
 Malaysia 
also strengthened its domestic counter-piracy legal framework with the initiation of the 
‘Malaysian maritime enforcement agency act’ in 2004. Section seven (2) of the act 
established the powers of the agency in relation to countering crimes such as piracy. It 
included provision for the boarding of any vessel, the right to demand production of any 
documentation or certification, the power to exercise hot pursuit and the power to expel 
any vessel in the Malaysian Maritime Zone.
194
 Similarly, under Indonesian criminal law 
the crime of piracy on the high seas or armed robbery in coastal waters was considered a 
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serious criminal offence. The Indonesian criminal code categorised maritime piracy into 
sea-piracy, coast-piracy, beach-piracy and river-piracy with each act punishable by the 
maximum sentence of fifteen years imprisonment.
195
 The code also made provision for a 
lesser sentence of between 10 and 12 years for those who knowingly aided or abetted an 
act of piracy. In 2000, for example, Indonesian authorities successfully arrested four 
pirate leaders in South Sumatra, which resulted in a significant decrease in incidents in 
that area.
196
 
 
China emerged as the regional leader for piratical prosecutions during this period, 
primarily due to a number of high-profile cases following a Chinese government 
crackdown on corruption and maritime crime in the late 1990s. The Chinese authorities 
were involved in several criminal prosecutions for piracy in relation to attacks on the 
Cheung Son (1998), Louisa (1998), Tenyu (1998), Master of Ocean (1999), Mary 
Master (1999), Siam Xanxai (1999) and Global Mars (2000). A Chinese court also 
sentenced ten Indonesians to between 10 and 15 years imprisonment for the crime of 
piracy following an attack on a Thai tanker in February 2003.
197
 The most high profile 
criminal proceeding relating to maritime piracy was the trail of the hijackers of the 
Cheung Son. In December 1999, a Chinese court convicted thirty-eight men of hijacking 
the vessel. Thirteen members of the pirate gang were sentenced to death and executed in 
January 2000. The executions and the lengthy prison sentences likely had a significant 
deterrent effect and therefore a significant bearing on reducing incidents of piracy in the 
South China Sea. 
 
Case of the Alondra Rainbow 
While the prosecution and imprisonment of pirates or maritime armed robbers under 
domestic legislation tended to be a relatively straightforward process; prosecuting 
suspected pirates apprehended outside the jurisdiction of a state was a more challenging 
prospect. The trial of the Alondra Rainbow suspects, which began in 2001, illustrated 
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the difficulty and ambiguity in the practical application of international maritime law in 
relation to the crime of piracy. Ten armed pirates hijacked the Alondra Rainbow on 22 
October 1999 near Kuala Tanjong, Indonesia on route to Japan with a cargo of 7,000 
tons of aluminium ingots. The crew were set adrift and the ship was repainted and 
renamed Global Venture. The vessel underwent two more name changes before the 
valuable cargo was fully offloaded. The hijacking was characteristic of several phantom 
ship operations carried out by organised pirate groupings in Southeast Asia at that time. 
The I.M.B. P.R.C. in Kuala Lumpur issued an alert identifying the vessel as a victim of 
a pirate hijacking. On 14 November, an Indian patrol plane spotted a vessel matching 
the description of the Alondra Rainbow, now renamed Mega Rama, around 430 
kilometres off India's southern coast and dispatched two coast guard vessels to intercept 
the ship. However, the hijackers successfully evaded the coast guard vessels, only 
capitulating when an Indian Navy missile-armed corvette opened fire.
198
 
 
The capture of the hijackers of the Alondra Rainbow was seen as a clear example of how 
inter-agency cooperation could yield positive counter-piracy results. The fifteen 
hijackers were arrested for the crime of piracy on the high seas under article 105 of 
UNCLOS. India’s decision to assume jurisdiction and prosecute the hijackers under 
article 105 was commended as ‘courageous’ by the director of the I.M.B. at the time due 
to the obvious difficulties in initiating legal action in a case that involved a ‘foreign ship, 
carrying a foreign cargo, hijacked by foreign nationals in the waters of another 
country’. 199  The case was further complicated by a lack of relevant counter-piracy 
legislation under Indian domestic criminal code. Eventually the pirates were convicted 
under section 307 of the Indian penal code for the crime of attempted murder, among 
several lesser offences, and sentenced to seven years of ‘rigorous imprisonment’ in 
2003.
200
 
 
In March 2005, the Mumbai High Court overturned the decision of the lower court and 
acquitted the pirates on all charges. The conviction had been ruled unsafe due to a lack 
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of eyewitness testimony during the trial. It was suggested that the master and engineer 
of the Alondra Rainbow feared possible reprisals if they identified the hijackers in open 
court.
201
 Indeed, it was reported that both crewmembers did not go to sea again due to 
the trauma of the hijacking.
202
 The case of the Alondra Rainbow illustrated the 
difficulties in the practical application of UNCLOS and demonstrated that apprehending 
suspected pirates was far easier than prosecuting them. Indeed, the number of 
prosecutions achieved using universal jurisdiction jurisprudence was negligible. 
Between 1998 and 2007, it is estimated that just four prosecutions were secured using 
universal jurisdiction for the crime of piracy.
203
 Considering an estimated 754 incidents 
of piracy were reported during this period, this amounted to a prosecution rate of just 
0.53 percent. 
 
Conclusion 
By 2006, incidents of piracy had significantly decreased in maritime Southeast Asia. 
There was a 70 percent decline in reported incidents between 2000 and 2007 from 259 
reported attacks to just 79 in 2007.
204
 Parallels can be drawn with the situation at the end 
of the nineteenth-century when piracy had escalated to a point where extra-regional 
colonial forces had to cooperate to counter the threat for reasons of mutual benefit. 
Similarly, after the palingenesis of piracy in the twentieth-century, regional forces 
eventually established a multilateral framework to counter the threat once again born out 
of necessity rather than desire. Indeed, the unique archipelagic maritime geography of 
Southeast Asia meant that on every occasion discussed here, some form of cooperative 
engagement was necessary to effectively counter and suppress piracy to a manageable 
level. 
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Prior to the events of 11 September 2001, most Southeast Asian states tended to 
consider coastal security as an internal matter extending occasionally to bilateral 
cooperation, such as coordinated patrols, with a neighbouring state. A blinkered 
governmental system combined with opposing territorial claims and fears of erosion of 
sovereignty excluded any multilateral counter piracy efforts. The global security climate 
that emerged after September 2001, lead by the United States, significantly influenced a 
move toward maritime security multilateralism in Southeast Asia.  
 
Between 1997 and 2006 when incidents of maritime piracy were beginning to decline in 
Southeast Asia, the Gulf of Aden and along the Somali coast witnessed a steady rise in 
attacks. By 2007, Southeast Asia no longer held the title as the most pirate infested 
waterway in the world. The shipping industry and international community turned its 
attention to the Horn of Africa where a diverse and far more dangerous form of 
maritime predation was taking root. 
 
 
Fig. 3.13 
Fluctuation of reported incidents of piracy: Southeast Asia & Africa 2003-08 
 
Source: I.C.C. I.M.B., Piracy report 2009.
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CHAPTER IV 
 
The seeds of disorder at sea are sown ashore, 1960-2005 
 
To be Somali is to be a people united by one language and divided by maps 
- Salman Rushdie 
1
 
 
Introduction 
In 1960, following over fifty years of colonial occupation and protectorship, the first 
Republic of Somalia was declared. Within just nine years, the fledging liberal 
democratic state, based on the Italian system, collapsed by way of a bloodless coup 
initiated by army General Mohamed Siad Barre. The newly formed Somali state was 
insufficiently prepared for the political and security challenges of self-governance in 
what had traditionally been a clan-based, heterogeneous system. Barre’s regime initially 
brought an era of superficial prosperity to Somalia and enhanced security on land and at 
sea.  
 
Piratical incidents along the Somali coast were essentially non-existent during the rule 
of Barre’s Supreme Revolutionary Council and the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party 
(S.R.S.P.). The presence of a functioning naval force and strong army supported by the 
Soviet Union and later, the United States, maintained law and order. However, the 
Ogaden War of July 1977 significantly weakened Barre’s position and eventually 
contributed to the collapse of central government in 1991. The fall of Barre’s 
administration initiated a devastating civil war, lawlessness and widespread famine. This 
disorder was the primary catalyst for the outbreak of piracy off the Horn of Africa, 
which coincided almost directly with the collapse of the state structure.
2
 
 
This chapter firstly examines the period from the foundation of the Somali Republic in 
1960 to its subsequent collapse in 1969 followed by an examination of Siad Barre’s 
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regime from 1969 to 1991. This analysis illuminates the root causes of contemporary 
Somali piracy and attempts to frame it within the wider and disordered political, 
economic and social context ashore. Prior to the collapse of Barre’s authoritarian regime, 
maritime piracy had not been an obstacle to shipping transiting the Gulf of Aden or the 
eastern Somali seaboard. The reasons for this are examined alongside the causative 
factors that contributed to the escalation of piracy after 1991. These include the legacy 
of colonial rule, the fall of Siad Barre’s government and the subsequent civil war, 
statelessness and lawlessness ashore, population growth coupled with a humanitarian 
crisis, extreme poverty and unemployment and finally decimation of the indigenous 
fishing industry. 
 
To analyse the evolution of counter-piracy activity in the region effectively it is 
important to establish why piracy and armed robbery at sea did not emerge as a security 
concern before 1991. Between 1991 and 2005, piracy escalated synchronously with the 
debilitating political and economic situation ashore. The direct and indirect efforts to 
address the emerging threat are analysed, focussing on regional, international and legal 
initiatives. While the Southern territories of Somalia disintegrated into statelessness and 
lawlessness after the collapse of central authority, the former British protectorate of 
Somaliland to the north declared unilateral autonomy in 1991. Seven years later the 
neighbouring territory of Puntland declared itself a semi-autonomous Somali state as 
opposed to an independent nation (see fig. 4.1). Whereas Somaliland managed to 
contain maritime criminality along its coastline after independence, attacks off Puntland 
escalated and eventually evolved into an organised maritime criminal network. 
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Fig. 4.1 
Territorial claims by Somaliland and Puntland 
 
 
Source: University of Texas, Perry-Castañeda Library map collection (2012) 
(http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/africa/txu-pclmaps-oclc-795784383-
somalia_2012_somaliland_and_puntland.jpg) (03 Feb. 2014). 
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Fig. 4.2 
Principal Somali clans and sub-clans 
 
 
Source: Ted Dagne, ‘Somalia: current conditions and prospects for a lasting peace’ in CRS Report for 
Congress (Oct. 2009), p. 24. 
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General context 
Maritime criminality, including piracy, smuggling and hostage-for-ransom kidnappings
3
, 
had been a feature along the Somali coast and in the Gulf of Aden since at least the early 
eighteenth-century.
4
 By the early nineteenth-century, piracy was predominantly a 
localised affair that periodically affected dhows and merchant ships that transited 
between ports in Northeast India and the Gulf of Aden.
5
 During the European imperial 
expansion in the late nineteenth-century, the Horn of Africa region, which was at that 
time inhabited by several nomadic ethnic Somali clans, was sub-divided between British, 
Italian, French and Ethiopian colonial administrations (see fig. 4.3). This process 
introduced for the first time arbitrary boundaries that neglected traditional pastoral 
migration routes. By 1900, the region was subdivided into French Somaliland and 
British Somaliland to the north, Italian Somaliland to the south and the Ethiopian 
Ogaden region to the west. These delineations were significant as they facilitated 
divisions in the later civil war and therefore ultimately contributed to the escalation of 
criminal disorder such as piracy.  
 
During this period, from approximately 1899 to 1920, British and Ethiopian colonial 
forces encountered fierce resistance to their colonial programmes from the ‘Somali 
dervish resistance movement’ led by Mohammad Abdille Hasan. The conflict, combined 
with a severe famine, resulted in the deaths of an estimated one-third of the population 
of British Somaliland in the north of the country.
6
 In comparison to the Italian 
settlement to the south, the British appeared to have had little interest in developing the 
territory, which was essentially a ‘feeding ground for Aden’.7 Indeed, several different 
government agencies were encumbered with the administration of Somaliland with 
minimal investment yet the territory still exhausted an estimated 70 percent of the 
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protectorate’s budget on the maintenance of law and order.8 This reflected the inherent 
disaffection of Somalis to the imposition of a centralised colonial system on a 
traditionally nomadic existence. 
 
The Italian conquest of Ethiopia in 1936 merged Italian Somaliland, Italian Eritrea and 
the former Ethiopian Empire into Italian East Africa. In August 1940, almost one year 
after the outbreak of the Second World War, Italy annexed British Somaliland and 
incorporated it into the larger Italian East Africa territory. However, by November the 
following year Italy surrendered the province following several defeats in a series of 
military engagements with British Commonwealth forces during the Allied East Africa 
campaign. Britain assumed control of both British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland 
and administered the territories as a single military protectorate until 1948. Significantly, 
Britain conceded the Ogaden region to Ethiopia, which provided a catalyst for future 
conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia. 
 
During this period, a number of Somali factions emerged to agitate for independence, 
such as the Somali Youth League and the Somali National League. In 1950, the United 
Nations agreed to place Italian Somaliland under an international trusteeship system 
with Italy as the administrating authority. The trusteeship was essentially a transitory 
mechanism for the formation of a sovereign Somali state ten years from the date of 
approval by the General Assembly.
9
 Despite the political disorder ashore, incidents of 
piracy and robbery along the coast were negligible, aside from occasional reports of 
opportunistic attacks on tourist yachts and attempted kidnap for ransom incidents.
10
 By 
1956, Italian Somaliland trust territory was renamed Somalia and granted internal 
autonomy for the first time. This was followed by a formal declaration of independence 
in 1960.  
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Fig. 4.3 
Somali colonial boundaries, 1891-1960 
 
 
Source: Helen Chapin Metz (ed.), Somalia: a country study (Washington D.C., 1993), p. 12. 
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Colonial legacy and independence, 1960-69 
For some contemporaries, the nascent independent Somali Republic was predisposed to 
fail. In 1955 Gregorio Consiglio, former editor of the International African Institute 
journal Africa, commented that ‘Somalia has not now and it will not have in the next 
few years an infrastructure and economic productivity able to support even the poorest 
state balance’.11 This was an accurate appraisal given the heavy reliance on foreign 
financial aid and development investment in the years following independence (see figs 
4.4 & 4.5). The legacy of colonial rule and administration resulted in a variance between 
traditional decentralised pastoral structures and the centralised character of the post-
colonial state.
12
 The withdrawal of British and Italian forces, therefore, resulted in a 
fragile security situation that the independent Somali government was ill equipped to 
address. This created widespread uncertainty and unrest in more isolated parts of the 
state. Mohamed Aden Sheikh, a former member of the S.R.S.P., described this as ‘[...] 
the outcome of a neo-colonial domination of the western world all over Africa’.13  
 
Mogadishu had no functioning port in the initial period after independence and little or 
no national maritime security capability. Despite this, the presence of extra-regional 
naval forces in the Gulf and western Indian Ocean likely contained threats to maritime 
order such as piracy during these years. Britain, for example, maintained a substantial 
naval presence in Aden, which played host to the Royal Navy’s Gulf headquarters in 
1963. This was augmented by the Royal East African Navy base in Mombasa, Kenya up 
until 1963. For the Royal Navy ‘the emphasis was entirely on projecting power ashore, 
rather than engaging in traditional naval operations’.14 This suggested a high-degree of 
sea-control maintained by a large naval presence, which would make it difficult for acts 
of maritime criminality to go unnoticed or unchecked. 
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Indeed, the Royal Navy was engaged in more generalised maritime security operations 
in the Gulf in response to a violent uprising in Aden. The 1966 ‘Statement on the 
defence estimates’ detailed: ‘In the Persian Gulf and in the Aden area, naval frigates, 
minesweepers and amphibious warfare ships with Royal Air Force maritime-
reconnaissance aircraft patrolled to prevent the smuggling of arms and the infiltration of 
rebels into the Gulf states and the South Arabian federation’.15 Furthermore, the Royal 
Navy had engaged in traditional counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden/Horn of 
Africa region previously. In 1953, for example, the H.M.S. Flamingo was ordered to 
search the southern Arabian Gulf for an Indian Dhow that had been attacked and 
hijacked by pirates.
16
 The dhow was subsequently retaken and towed back to Aden. 
Such encounters appeared to be rare in the Gulf of Aden/ western Indian Ocean between 
1950 and 1980. Despite earlier aspirations, Britain withdrew all of its naval assets from 
Aden by 29 November 1967 following a violent uprising against pro-western forces in 
the region, a move that mirrored in some ways the earlier evacuation of the naval base in 
Kenya and the later withdrawal from Singapore and Malaysia in 1970. 
 
Despite the British withdrawal from the Gulf in 1971, a Soviet naval contingent of at 
least a dozen warships was stationed on a semi-permanent basis in the region during the 
early 1970s.
17
 Similarly, France maintained a substantial naval task force that 
intermittently included two carriers off Djibouti between 1975 and 1978.
18
 The 
relatively stable and secure maritime environment, in terms of criminality, was 
illustrated by the productivity and functionality of the port of Aden. According to 
newspaper reports, 554 ships and 143 dhows visited the port during November 1962 
with an estimated UK£2 million worth of oil shipped out.
19
 The omission of any 
reported robberies or acts of piracy against such a high frequency of potential valuable 
targets suggested a relatively secure and unobstructed maritime environment under 
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British colonial control. The notion of a naval presence acting as a deterrent to illicit 
maritime activity like piracy was nothing new. The Royal Navy, for example, seemed to 
be of the opinion that a presence was enough to exert a palliative effect ashore that 
presumably extended along the coast. Following an escalation of piracy around Brunei 
in 1962, for example, a Royal Navy frigate alongside two minesweepers ‘showed 
themselves off the coast’; this immediately brought ‘a renewal of confidence and 
improvement in morale among the local population’.20 
 
Fig. 4.4  
Sources of development finance: domestic vs. foreign 1963-69 
 Total in Somali Shillings (So. Sh.)21 Percentage of total 
Domestic revenue 283,531 14.9 
Foreign revenue  1,691,528 85.1 
Total revenue 1,903,059 100 
Source: See: Ozay Mehmet, ‘Effectiveness of foreign aid: the case of Somalia’ in The Journal of Modern 
African Studies, ix, no. 1 (May 1971), p. 37. 
 
By 1962, Somalia had established closer relations with the Soviet Union, which was 
instrumental in facilitating the growth of Somali military capability and in this regard 
maritime security. After independence, a National Somali Army was created from the 
existing ‘Army of Somalia’ and the ‘Somali Scouts’. By 1963, the force consisted of 
between 4,000 and 5,000 personnel.
22
 Between 1963 and 1967, Somalia’s defence 
budget roughly doubled from c.UK£1.5 million to UK£3.2 million.
23
 This enabled the 
formation of Somalia’s first naval force in 1965. 
 
By 1970, after the fall of the Republic, it was estimated that armed forces totalled 
around 20,000 personnel.
24
 It is likely that the presence of an operational military force 
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ashore combined with a strong international naval presence at sea, had the effect of 
deterring any potential criminal or subversive maritime activity. Indeed, constabulary 
security capability was also enhanced during the short period of the Republic. In 1965, 
for example, Germany invested DM7.5 million in a Somali police-training programme 
that equipped the force with small arms, signalling apparatus and vehicles.
25
 Despite this, 
less conspicuous maritime crimes such as smuggling were still regularly reported along 
the coast.
26
 Another possible explanation for the low percentage of attacks on 
commercial shipping was the lack of targets attributable to the closure of the Suez Canal 
from 1967 to 1975, which resulted in merchant vessels detouring via the Cape of Good 
Hope at an estimated cost to the global economy of US$12 billion.
27
 
 
By March 1963, Somalia had formally severed diplomatic relations with Britain, which 
cost an estimated UK£1.25 million in economic aid.
28
 British parliamentary debates at 
the time reflected the emergent security dilemma: 
 
 [...] we have a very dangerous build-up in the country. We have a 
determination to create an army of 20,000 men. We have the granting of 
military aid of 11 million to Somalia by the Soviet bloc [...] A dangerous 
situation is, therefore, being created in this area with the building up of 
opposing blocs which could lead far more probably to war than to the 
Federation which has been talked about today.
29
  
 
Internally, these ‘opposing blocs’ consisted of the military and security forces that felt 
most aggrieved and marginalised by central government. The resignation of the Chief of 
Police just prior to the 1969 election was evidence of this agitation.
30
 Geographic 
divisions, roughly along clan lines, between the former British colony to the north and 
the Italian territory in the south created further instability. The execution of then 
president Abdirashid Ali Shermaarke by a policeman on 15 October 1969 and the 
dissention among the armed forces facilitated a passive coup d’état five days later and 
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the beginning of an autocracy under the leadership of the military and the banner of 
‘scientific socialism’. 
 
Fig. 4.5 
Breakdown of foreign financial support to Somalia 1963-69 
 Total in Somali Shillings (So. Sh.) Percentage of total 
U.S.S.R. 388,928 20.4 
U.S.A. 326,489 17.2 
E.E.C. 245,108 12.9 
World Bank 219,427 11.5 
U.N. 143,567 7.5 
Federal Republic of Germany 122,951 6.5 
Italy 71,339 3.7 
China 39,220 2.1 
Saudi Arabia 14,561 0.8 
Others 47,938 2.5 
Total 1,619,528 85.1 
Source: See: Mehmet, ‘Effectiveness of foreign aid [...]’, p. 37. 
 
 
Fig. 4.6 
Breakdown of financial development funds: domestic vs. foreign 1963-86 
 Domestic revenue Foreign revenue 
 So. Sh. (millions) 
Percentage of 
total 
So. Sh. 
(millions) 
Percentage of 
total 
1963-69 28.3 14.9 169.1 85.1 
1971-73 118.9 16.2 615.0 83.8 
1974-78 1,260.3 32.6 2,602.9 67.4 
1982-86 3,119.0 20.0 13,050.0 80.0 
Source: Abdi Ismail Samatar, The state and rural transformation in Northern Somalia, 1884-1986 
(London, 1989), p. 121. 
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Siad Barre military coup and regime, 1969-91 
The brief democratic experiment that was the first Somali Republic collapsed following 
a passive takeover initiated by Somali Army General Mohamed Siad Barre and his 
troops on 20 October 1969. The parliamentary institutions of the former republic were 
dissolved and replaced by a twenty-four-man Supreme Revolutionary Council with 
Barre as President. The new ‘Somali Democratic Republic’ was administered under a 
system of scientific socialism, borrowing from Marxist ideology, which denounced 
tribalism and appeared, initially at least, beneficial for Somalia. Between 1970 and 1975, 
the new government initiated a number of domestic reforms including improvements to 
the health care and education system by way of a literacy campaign, legal reform, 
construction of roads and economic reform through increased exports. Indeed, in 
relation to domestic security, one commentator described the new Somali Republic as 
‘[...] unquestionably one of the safest places in Africa’.31 However, these improvements 
were heavily dependent on foreign financial support and the majority of the 
reconstruction projects were confined to the capital Mogadishu. This served to further 
isolate and alienate clans in the north of the country.  
 
For the vast majority of Barre’s rule, micro-maritime threats like piracy were dwarfed 
by large-scale conflict ashore and as such were rarely, if ever, highlighted. However, as 
early as 1975 hypothetical ‘seeds were being sown’ for the eventual upsurge of maritime 
piracy as 20,000 disenfranchised Somali nomads were relocated to established 
settlements along the coast to become fishermen following a severe and widespread 
drought. This newly developed coastal ‘community’ initially struggled to develop the 
expertise to effectively fish and procure powerboats and other related equipment. It is 
possible that elements of these ‘fisher-folk’ communities later turned to piracy during 
similar times of economic and humanitarian hardship.
32
 By 1976, the Supreme 
Revolutionary Council disbanded and transferred political administration to the 
oligarchic S.R.S.P. under the direction of a ‘Supreme Council’. 
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Ogaden War, 1977-8 
Somalia’s defeat in the Ethio-Somali War or the Ogaden War of 1977-78 marked a 
decisive turning point in Barre’s regime. The Ogaden campaign initially engendered 
widespread domestic support as an opportunity to create a unified Somali state. 
However, the retreat of Somali forces from the region in March 1978 significantly 
undermined Barre’s authority and the stability of his regime, which created, for the first 
time, a formal armed internal opposition to his rule. Just one month after the capitulation, 
the newly formed Somali Democratic Salvation Front, which contained dissident 
elements from the Somali Army, attempted a coup but was quickly defeated by 
government forces. The conflict also had a devastating impact on Somalia’s fragile 
economy, in particular manufactured goods for export, which became almost non-
existent following the war.
33
 
 
Aside from domestic instability, Somalia’s international relations significantly shifted 
because of the Ogaden War. Ethiopia, a former ally of the United States, formed an 
alliance with the Soviet Union and Somalia, formerly supported by Soviet Union, now 
developed closer ties with the United States. This was a considerable shift in allegiance 
and illustrated the geo-strategic relevance of the region to the global ‘superpowers’.34 
Both countries were anxious to retain a foothold in the Horn of Africa primarily as the 
Gulf was a major conduit for the shipment of oil supplies from the Middle East.   
 
Cold War: Soviet relations 
The foundation of the Somali Democratic Republic was positioned against the backdrop 
of the Cold War in which the Somali state essentially became a willing pawn in the geo-
strategic aspirations of the Soviet Union and the United States. According to one 
contemporary: ‘The situation in the Horn is uncertain [...] neither war nor peace is 
allowed unless it is to the advantage of the superpowers’. 35  The friendly relations 
between the Soviet Union and Somalia continued to develop during the early years of 
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Barre’s government alongside Soviet military expansion. By 1970, it was reported that 
Soviet naval assets in the Indian Ocean amounted to 24 warships, at least 13 submarines 
and 24 auxiliaries.
36
 A previously confidential C.I.A. document from 1970 highlighted 
the increased Soviet naval activity along the Somali Coast as a threat to U.S. interests in 
the region.
37
 Such apprehension was justified given the Soviet Union’s agreement with 
Somalia that facilitated the establishment of a naval base at the port of Berbera in 1972. 
By 1974, the naval installation at Berbera hosted an estimated 2,500 Soviet advisors and 
technicians alongside a naval missile storage facility, a long-range radio station to 
control ship movement from the shore and an airfield capable of handling large 
bombers.
38
 Aside from the base at Berbera, the Soviet Union maintained control of the 
Port of Aden and had planned for a further naval base at Socotra Island in the Gulf of 
Aden. 
 
The strategic intention of the Soviet navy appeared to be power projection while 
simultaneously utilising the forward presence capability of the navy to facilitate the 
global spread of communism. As Admiral Sergei Gorskhov, then Commander in Chief 
of the Soviet fleet, stated: ‘[...] Soviet mariners, from rating to admiral bring to the 
people of other countries the truth about our socialist country, our Soviet ideology and 
culture and our Soviet way of life’.39 While these macro-concerns dominated strategic 
and security policy, micro-security threats such as maintaining constabulary order along 
the Somali coast was not an objective. Indirectly, however, the presence of such a strong 
naval contingent negated the opportunity for illicit maritime crimes such as piracy. 
Despite this, there were still localised reports of low-level goods and contraband 
smuggling operations along the coast in the mid-1970s.
40
 The Ogaden War dramatically 
altered Somali political relations with the Soviet Union, which resulted in the expulsion 
of Soviet personnel from Berbera in November 1977. Despite this, the Soviet Union still 
maintained a naval presence in the Red Sea in the Dahlek Islands. 
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Cold War: U.S. relations 
In 1980, Barre agreed to provide naval facilities to the United States on the proviso of 
American military and financial support. In January 1981, the U.S. subsequently 
acquired control of the naval base at Berbera following the clearance of a US$42 million 
defensive military aid package, which significantly increased the size of the Somali 
military (see fig. 4.7). Between 1981 and 1982, U.S. military aid included three 
AN/TPS-43 air search radar, 448 anti-tank missiles, 15 Commando V-150 and 23 M-
113 Armoured Personnel Carriers alongside 300 FIM-43C Redeye portable Surface to 
Air Missiles.
41
 Notably, there was no provision for the acquisition of naval assets, which 
suggested a relatively secure and functional maritime environment. In 1983, a U.S. 
Rapid Deployment Force established a forward headquarters on the U.S.S. La Salle in 
the Indian Ocean, adding to the naval presence in the region and further deterring illicit 
maritime activity such as piracy.  
 
Indeed, both the Soviet Union and the U.S had been reinforcing naval assets in the 
region since the late 1960s, illustrated by the United Nations ‘Indian Ocean Peace Zone’ 
initiative in 1971, which attempted to facilitate dialogue between the two nations to 
reduce their massive military footprint in the region. The declaration called upon the 
superpowers to eliminate naval bases, logistical supply facilities, weapons of mass 
destruction and any manifestation of great power military presence in the Indian Ocean 
conceived in the context of great power rivalry.
42
 By 1986, the U.N. Department for 
Disarmament Affairs published a report entitled ‘The naval arms race’, that examined 
the nature and role of naval forces in the nuclear age, including counter-piracy, and the 
impact and importance of the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea for 
international cooperation.
43
 The expert group described how the development of naval 
capabilities since the Second World War had become a ‘competitive accumulation and 
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qualitative refinement of arms with a momentum of its own’.44  The document also 
testified to the large naval build-up in the Indian Ocean and attempted to establish 
diplomatic mechanisms for disarmament and disengagement. It highlighted the so-called 
‘gunboat diplomacy’, which the United States and the Soviet Union were undertaking in 
the Indian Ocean: 
 
By maintaining strong fleets in various parts of the world, capable of taking 
offensive or intervention action, the naval forces of certain States are able to 
play a deterrent role in many circumstances, thereby bringing the threat or 
use of military force to bear on the course of situations far from their own 
shores.
45
 
 
Such a pervasive military presence in the region, on land and at sea, mitigated the 
conditions that allow crimes like piracy to take root and grow. In the long term, however, 
the financial and military support offered by the Soviet Union and the United States did 
little to benefit the security situation in Somalia. Instead, it saturated the country with 
weaponry, fuelled corruption and violence and helped create a lawless environment that 
precipitated the escalation of piracy. 
 
 
Fig. 4.7 
Estimated Somali armed forces personnel numbers, 1970-1991 
Year No. of personnel 
1970 -75 
(S.R.C. consolidates rule) 
15,000 - 20,000 
1977-78 
(Ogaden War) 
23,000 – 37,000 
1979 
(Post-war) 
12,000 – 20,000 
1981 
(U.S. military aid package) 
50,000 
1991 
(Collapse of regime) 
65,000 
Source: see: Metz (ed.), Somalia: a country study, p. 181; Ruth L. Sivard, World military and social 
expenditures, 1978 (Virginia, 1978), p. 15; The Times, 19 May 1972 & 03 Mar. 1975. 
 
                                                 
44
 U.N.D.D.A., The naval arms race, p. 82. 
45
 U.N.D.D.A., The naval arms race, p. 40. 
 -204- 
Fig. 4.8 
Value of United States military assistance to Somalia, 1981-89 
Year Amount in US$ 
1981 40 million 
1982 14.3 million 
1983 21.2 million 
1984 24.3 million 
1985 80 million 
1986 40 million 
1987 37.1 million 
1988 1.4 million 
Source: Figures extrapolated from Metz (ed.), Somalia: a country study, p. 212. 
 
Somali Navy 1965-91 
Somalia’s somewhat obsequious relationship with the Soviet Union and later the United 
States allowed for significant investment in maritime assets. By 1980, Somalia’s 
merchant fleet consisted of 74 vessels including, 15 oil tankers and 53 general cargo 
ships.
46
 Comparatively, this was one of the largest merchant fleets in eastern Africa at 
that time. Prior to the outbreak of the Ogaden War and the fracture in relations with the 
Soviet Union, Somalia’s small navy was also one of the best equipped in the region. 
This was due, almost entirely, to Soviet military donations. The Somali Navy, headed by 
Admiral Mohammed Omar Osman, maintained bases at Berbera, Mogadishu and 
Chisimayu, including a single radar site at Merca. In the late 1980s, before the fall of 
Siad Barre’s regime, Pentagon reports suggested that the Somali navy consisted of two 
ex-Soviet Osa II missile craft (see fig. 4.9), four ex-Soviet Mol class torpedo craft, two 
ex-Soviet Poluchat class patrol craft, one ex-Soviet Polnochny class amphibious craft 
and four smaller mechanised landing craft.
47
 These craft were not optimised for 
maritime security operations, which indicated that non-traditional threats, such as 
piracy, were not driving policy. 
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The small naval force participated in joint exercises with the U.S. Navy in 1983 code-
named ‘Eastern Wind 1983’. Exercise ‘Eastern Wind 1983’ involved an estimated 2,800 
U.S. service members and included an amphibious landing deployment near Berbera 
and naval training exercises by the U.S. Navy aircraft carrier Carl Vinson. The U.S. held 
additional exercises with other regional states such as Egypt (code-named ‘Bright-Star’) 
and Sudan (code-named ‘Natural-Bond’) beginning in the 1980s. These exercises 
supplemented the abundant naval activity in the region and likely contributed to creating 
a maritime environment not favourable to criminal activity such as piracy and armed 
robbery. Despite possessing a relatively large maritime security capability, the capacity 
to employ and maintain this capability diminished considerably following the cessation 
of Soviet military assistance in 1977. By 1991, Somalia’s small naval force was 
inoperable. The merchant fleet dwindled to just 14 semi-operational vessels, which after 
1991, also ceased to function.
48
 
 
Causes of civil war 
A combination of clan-based discrimination, alienation from the central political process 
(chiefly in the north of the country) and disillusionment with Barre’s leadership after the 
Ogaden War ultimately led to the collapse of central authority and a subsequent civil 
war. On June 7 1982, Barre ordered the arrest of seventeen high-ranking politicians, all 
of whom were prominent figures in the Isaaq, Majeerteen and Hawiye Clans. These 
arrests were the primary catalyst in the formation of armed oppositional groups loosely 
based along clan lines. These groups briefly set aside traditional inter-clan rivalries to 
fight a common enemy in Barre. A coalition of these clans constituted the primary 
armed opposition groups that eventually toppled Barre’s regime in 1991.49 The first of 
these groups, the Somali National Movement (S.N.M.), launched a campaign against 
Barre’s loyalist troops in 1988 and was quickly joined by the United Somali Congress 
and the Somali Patriotic Front in a joint military committee to oppose the Mogadishu 
government. 
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It was during this period of conflict that the S.N.M. issued a warning to all shipping 
agencies transiting the coast of Somalia not to cooperate with the ‘dying regime of 
Mogadishu’. 50  The self-appointed ‘S.N.M. Coast Guard’ subsequently seized a 
Panamanian flagged ship en-route to the government controlled port of Berbera on 5 
December 1989.
51
 By the end of December, the S.N.M. had seized four vessels all of 
which were later released after the payment of a ransom. These early attacks illustrated 
an awareness of the importance of the sea as leverage in conflict ashore and more 
importantly the abundance, vulnerability and potential value of merchant shipping 
transiting in the Gulf of Aden. It is important to note that the escalation of piracy at sea 
must always be considered within the context of events ashore. It is perhaps 
unsurprising then that these political acts of seizure evolved into organised acts of armed 
robbery and hostage for ransom kidnappings against shipping. 
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Fig. 4.9 
Somali Navy fast attack craft (red rectangle) are visible as equipment was offloaded 
during the amphibious landing phase of U.S. Marine Corp exercise ‘Bright Star’ 
(Berbera, Somalia, 1983). 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: DM-ST-85-10394, 17 Aug. 1983 (http://www.defenseimagery.mil). 
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Fall of regime, civil war and the growth of piracy, 1991-2004 
Despite attempted diplomatic intervention by Italy and Egypt, Barre fled Mogadishu 
following intense fighting on 20 January 1991. This ended indefinitely the last 
semblance of centralised governance in greater Somalia and initiated a return to the 
traditional clan-based societal structure throughout much of the country. After Barre was 
ousted, the two principal oppositional leaders, Ali Mahdi Mohammed and General 
Mohammed Farah Aideed, became embroiled in a bitter struggle to fill the power 
vacuum left by the exit. In August 1991, the two factions reached agreement resulting in 
Ali Mahdi’s appointment as President of the third Somali Republic on the proviso that 
United Somali Congress doctrine would be strictly adhered to and Aideed would 
approve the appointment of any high-ranking officers.
52
 However, this conformity did 
not last and within one-month disagreement escalated into violent conflict between the 
two opposing factions. The outbreak of hostilities and the breakdown of law and order 
coincided with the first formal reports of sporadic maritime piracy along the coast. 
According to one commentator: ‘[...] many of the other armed men were little more than 
bandits [...] Barre’s men had increasingly looted and their example was continued in the 
vacuum left behind’.53  
 
Early incidents 
The violent hijacking of the M.V. Naviluck in January 1991 is generally considered the 
first modern incident of piracy Somalia.
54
 However, the hijacking of the M.V. Kwanda 
in December 1989 by S.N.M. members was likely the first actual occurrence of piracy. 
Despite being executed by militia members, the incident was essentially a hijacking and 
an armed robbery, mirroring in some ways the later business model employed by Somali 
pirates after 2005. The Kwanda was held for 27 days and according to a U.S. Geospatial 
Intelligence Agency’s Anti-Shipping Activity Message (ASAM) report was illegally 
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relieved of 350 tons of fuel oil, food reserves, tools, money, the crew’s clothes and 
‘everything else that could be removed and sold’.55 Self-appointed armed groups styling 
themselves the ‘Somali coast guard’ or the ‘Somali army’, for example, were 
responsible for many of these early incidents. This appeared to be an attempt to justify 
the attacks by claiming legitimacy as a constabulary force interdicting illegal fishing 
vessels in sovereign waters. However, a closer analysis of the early incident reports 
suggested that the motivation was likely financial gain, given that in almost all cases 
were vessels were successfully boarded, property and/or valuables were stolen.
56
 Jay 
Bahadur recounted an interview with a small lobster fishing company owner in Puntland 
who recruited thirty men to serve as ‘marines’ in a ‘coast guard’. The group claimed to 
have stopped nine Pakistani dhows and ransomed three of them back to the Pakistani 
government, which indicated that financial acquisition was a significant feature of the 
operation.
57
 
 
In 1992, the International Maritime Organization (I.M.O.) included for the first time a 
report of piracy in the Somali region in its quarterly piracy and armed robbery against 
ships report. The report stated that five armed men boarded the L.P.G.C. Pauline while 
anchored off the coast of Djibouti and stole various ship’s equipment, cash and personal 
effects.
58
 That same year, the U.N. also highlighted the deteriorating maritime security 
situation in the context of attacks on ships delivering humanitarian aid supplies.
59
 These 
early maritime security incidents were dwarfed by major events ashore such as the 
Battle of Mogadishu in 1993 in which eighteen U.S. special forces servicemen were 
killed during what became known as the ‘black hawk down’ incident. This landward 
focus likely contributed to the escalation in piracy and armed robbery incidents at sea 
during the 1990s. The impact of these international efforts is covered in more detail later 
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in the chapter. The departure of U.N. forces in 1995 corresponded with a noticeable 
increase in reports of maritime piracy from just two reports in 1993, to eight in 1994 and 
15 in 1995 (see figs 4.10 & 4.11). This escalation was not surprising given that the 
United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I & II) ‘significantly influenced’ the 
appointment of Somali police and judges, contributed upwards of 28,000 military and 
police personnel and enhanced port security for the delivery of humanitarian aid.
60
 
 
The full withdrawal of the international contingent in 1995 was followed by the first 
reported use of a ‘mother ship’ as a platform for launching piratical raids at a greater 
distance from the shore. The M.V. Bonsella was hijacked off the coast of Puntland by a 
group of up to twenty-six individuals styling themselves the ‘Somali Coast Guard – 
northeast region’ in September 1994.61 The hijackers indicted that they would use the 
Bonsella to capture unlicensed fishing vessels until a faster vessel could be taken.
62
 Four 
days after the hijacking, the Bonsella, along with a dhow, sailed for high seas to wait for 
passing vessels to assault. Once again, despite claims of legitimacy, the attack on the 
Bonsella degenerated into armed robbery. The master was forced at gunpoint to empty 
the ships safe and the cargo of aid supplies, stores and equipment were stolen.
63
 
 
This incident illustrated the evolving proficiency of Somali pirates’ capability and 
operational awareness. Aside from piracy and armed robbery incidents, the disorder 
ashore resulted in over 50,000 Somalis being smuggled by sea to neighbouring 
Yemen.
64
 Reflecting to some extent the exodus of Vietnamese boat refugees two 
decades previously, the crossing, conducted by former fishermen turned smugglers, 
frequently resulted in loss of life and contributed to the anarchic maritime environment. 
In 1998, for example, the U.S.S. Saturn recovered 180 bodies from a smuggling ship 
                                                 
60
 See: U.N. Security Council ‘Resolution 814’, 26 Mar. 1993 (U.N., D.H.L., S/RES/814/1993, p. 4); U.N. 
Security Council, ‘Report of the commission of enquiry established pursuant to Security Council 
Resolution 885 (1993) to investigate armed attacks on UNOSOM II personnel which led to casualties 
among them’, 01 June 1994 (New York, 1994), p. 19.  
61
 ‘Report on acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships, 1995’ (I.M.O., M.S.C., Circ.698/1995, p. 3). 
62
 N.G.A. ASAM 1995, Ref. 1995-8. 
63
 Ibid. 
64
 Peter Kessler, ‘Somalia: a new wave of boat people’ in Refugees Magazine, no. 112 (June 1998).  
 -211- 
that had sunk.
65
 Seven years later an estimated 10,000 refugees a year made the crossing 
from Somalia to Yemen in overcrowded, unseaworthy boats with insufficient provisions 
that often resulted in a high number of fatalities.
66
 
 
Fig. 4.10 
Early reported incidents of maritime piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia, 
1989-94 
 
Source: Information extrapolated from: N.G.A. ASAM 1989-94, Geographical region 61 & 62; I.M.O, 
statistical resources, Piracy reports 1982-95 (http://www.imo.org/KnowledgeCentre/ShipsAnd 
ShippingFactsAndFigures/Statisticalresources/Piracy/Pages/default.aspx) (14 Apr. 2014); I.C.C. I.M.B., 
Piracy & armed robbery against ships: annual report 1991-94 (London, 1992-95); Blank map image © 
Google maps. 
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Somaliland & Puntland 
In 1991, the former British protectorate of Somaliland recognised opportunity in the 
disorder and formally declared unilateral independence. In comparison to Puntland to 
the east and greater Somalia to the South, Somaliland managed to create a relatively 
stable system of governance, which brought with it increased security and lawfulness in 
the period after declaring autonomy. This was illustrated by the minimal number of 
piracy incidents in its waters especially in comparison to neighbouring Puntland. One 
study estimated that pirate attacks in Somaliland’s maritime zone equated to just one 
incident every two years between 1999 and 2005.
67
 
 
The relative success of Somaliland’s security situation at sea originated ashore. Local 
clan leaders launched a ‘bottom up’ peace initiative in the period after independence that 
utilised conventional mechanisms of arbitration between hostile clans.
68
 This approach 
led to the Borama Conference in 1993, which established a civil administration and 
institutionalised the role of the clan elders by creating an upper house in the parliament 
known as the ‘Guurti’; loosely based on the British system.69 Despite these political 
advances, the international community did not formally recognise Somaliland as a 
sovereign state. This meant Somaliland had no legal claim to territorial seas or any 
international funding apparatus to bolster maritime security capacity and capability, 
which limited its ability to contribute to maritime defence beyond its immediate coastal 
waters. 
 
Despite varying degrees of internal conflict, a constitution for the Republic of 
Somaliland was created at a conference in the capital Hargeisa in 1997, which paved the 
way for increased security, stability and growth. Under the new constitution, a 
decentralised system of regions and districts was adopted, in which legislative council’s 
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enforced internal security within communities.
70
 This allowed for a relatively stable and 
efficient system of local and national law enforcement. Despite a negligible maritime 
enforcement capability, stabilising security efforts ashore negated criminal activity at 
sea, despite the abundance of high-value cargo transiting the Gulf of Aden. It was 
estimated that over 70 percent of Somaliland’s national budget of about US$20 million 
supported the maintenance of security forces, chiefly the army and police.
 71
 By 1998, 
then Somaliland Minister of Defence Yusus Ali Aynab Museh claimed that the self‐
proclaimed state had a military strength of 12,840, with a further 1,726 in reserve 
including a small rudimentary coast guard capacity.
72
 Including constabulary forces, this 
number amounted to over 20,000 security personnel.
73
 The presence of a strong, but 
more importantly, operational security force ashore likely helped deter and negate 
criminality at sea. 
 
The neighbouring de facto region of Puntland declared autonomy in 1998 and appointed 
Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed as President. Unlike Somaliland to the west, Puntland 
wished to remain part of a greater federalised Somalia. In contrast to its neighbour, 
maritime crime escalated progressively off the coast of Puntland following the demise of 
centralised control (see fig. 4.11). Indeed, the majority of piratical attacks between 1991 
and 2004 were primarily a ‘Puntland phenomenon’ dominated by the Majeerteen clan.74  
 
Several reasons likely accounted for this variance. Firstly, the relative stability in 
Puntland was infused with poverty and corruption that allowed criminal enterprises, like 
piracy, to thrive. Secondly, the geo-strategic position of Puntland, at an intersection 
between the busy shipping channels in the Gulf of Aden and the western Indian Ocean, 
presented an abundance of targets and therefore was a likely driver of indigent groups 
toward piracy. Finally, in 1999, efforts were made to establish and train a ‘fisheries 
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protection agency’ to perform coast guard and other maritime security duties. It was 
reported by the Aljazeera news agency that a London based company, the HART Group, 
headed by Richard Bethell
75
, was responsible for the operation.
76
 The venture ultimately 
failed but the group had passed on specialist knowledge on weapons handling, 
navigation and vessel boarding to ‘hundreds of Somali men’.77 However, evidence of 
the correlation between this programme and incidents of piracy in Puntland was 
predominantly anecdotal.
78
 A study by the International Crisis Group in 2005, identified 
endemic governmental corruption and crime, poverty and hyper-inflation alongside the 
unregulated licensing of offshore resources as issues that created a maritime 
environment in Puntland ideal for criminal syndicates involved in arms smuggling, 
piracy, human trafficking, kidnapping and counterfeiting.
79
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Fig. 4.11 
Reported incidents of maritime piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somaliland & 
Puntland, 1989-94 
  
 
 
Source: Information extrapolated from: N.G.A. ASAM 1989-94, Geographical region 61 & 62; I.M.O, 
statistical resources, Piracy reports 1982-95 (http://www.imo.org/KnowledgeCentre/ShipsAnd 
ShippingFactsAndFigures/Statisticalresources/Piracy/Pages/default.aspx) (14 Apr. 2014); I.C.C. I.M.B., 
Piracy & armed robbery against ships: annual report 1991-94 (London, 1992-95); Blank map image © 
Google maps. 
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Fig. 4.12 
Reports of actual and attempted pirate attacks: Northeast Africa region, 1995-2005 
 
Source: I.M.O, Piracy reports 1982-95; N.G.A. ASAM 1994-2005, Geographical region 61 & 62; I.C.C. 
I.M.B., Piracy reports 1995-2005. 
 
Transitional National Government, 2000-04 
Following the events of 11 September 2001, most regional and international 
governments believed that a centralised administration in Mogadishu and a unified 
Somalia were needed to increase security in the Horn of Africa. Significantly, this 
political direction did not take into account Somaliland’s functioning independence to 
the northwest and Puntland’s semi-autonomous state in the northeast. In early 2000, a 
series of meetings were held at Arta, in Djibouti, initiated by then Djiboutian President 
Ismael Omar Guelleh. The intention was to promote reconciliation by directly engaging 
the Somali clan leadership. By the end of August, the 2,500 Somali delegates who had 
gathered at Arta adopted a ‘Transitional Charter’, which was essentially a provisional 
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constitution, and elected a 225 member Transitional National Assembly. The charter 
provided for a transitional government based on a federal system, a transitional national 
assembly elected based on clan affiliation and finally the establishment of a provisional 
capital in Baidoa until Mogadishu had been secured.
80
 In 2001, the interim Somali 
President, Abdiqasim Salad Hasan, issued a decree re-establishing the national army, 
which had disintegrated in 1991.  
 
 
 
Fig. 4.13 
Average number of reported piratical incidents: Northeast Africa region, 1995-2005 
 
Source: I.M.O, Piracy reports 1982-95; N.G.A. ASAM 1994-2005, Geographical region 61 & 62; I.C.C. 
I.M.B., Piracy reports 1995-2005. 
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Despite these attempts at addressing the security threat ashore, maritime crime 
continued to escalate. Piratical incidents during the short reign of the Transitional 
National Government (T.N.G.) averaged around 25 attacks per year between 2000 and 
2004.
81
 In relation to piracy, international attention was still focussed primarily on the 
threat to shipping transiting Southeast Asian sea-lanes. In 2004, for example, almost 47 
percent of all incidents of piracy still occurred in the Southeast Asian waters while less 
than five percent of the global total occurred in Somali waters.
82
 Despite this, a 2003 
U.N. Security Council report on Somalia recognised that ‘continuing lawlessness in 
Somalia, particularly where it prevails in the coastal areas, is a threat not only to 
Somalis but also to the international community’. 83  The I.C.C. I.M.B. also 
recommended, in 2004 that vessels should ‘keep well clear of the Somali coast’.84 
 
Illicit criminal activities in the Gulf of Aden and Somali Basin were not limited to 
piracy and smuggling. Al-Qaeda affiliated militants targeted and attacked the U.S.S. 
Cole as it was refuelling in the Port of Aden in October 2000. Two suicide bombers 
detonated an explosive laden skiff alongside the hull, which resulted in the deaths of 
seventeen U.S. naval personnel and over US$250 million in structural damage.
85
 The 
threat of terrorism extended to commercial maritime targets also. In 2002, the French 
tanker M.V. Limburg was attacked, while steaming in the Gulf of Aden, by a speedboat 
loaded with explosives, resulting in the death of one crewmember and the loss of over 
90,000 barrels of crude oil.
86
 The attack on the Limburg raised fears in some quarters of 
a possible emerging nexus between piracy and terrorism.
87
 In reality, it was more likely 
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that both groups were simply exploiting a weak and anarchic maritime environment 
toward different ends. The T.N.G. lasted just four years having never achieved any 
effective operational stability. Former Deputy Prime Minister of the T.N.G. Ahmed 
Abdisalam Adan stated that it was the leadership’s failure to continue the reconciliation 
process and bring the armed opposition into the transitional process that hastened the 
downfall of the T.N.G.
88
 
 
Parallel causal factors 
While historical, political and socio-economic factors were the primary drivers behind 
the upsurge of Somali piracy after 2005; other, less obvious factors, also had an effect 
on the fluctuation of piracy off the Northeast coast of Africa. These include population 
growth coupled with severe drought; Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (I.U.U.) 
fishing; the discarding of toxic waste along off the northeastern seaboard, and, to a 
lesser extent, the aftermath of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. Despite an estimated 
exodus of over 800,000 refugees and a further 450,000 to 1.5 million deaths resulting 
from the civil war, the population of Somalia steadily increased, almost uninterruptedly, 
from 1960 to 2005 (see fig. 4.14).
89
 The escalation in population after 2005 coincided 
with a severe drought and devastating famine, which resulted in a higher demand and 
competition for basic resources such as food, shelter and water. The resultant 
humanitarian crisis, along with the depletion of fish stock, was a likely driver of coastal 
populations toward subsistence criminal activity such as piracy.  
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Fig. 4.14 
Population growth in Somalia, 1960-2005 
 
Source: World Bank, ‘Trading Economics’, Excel data analysis, Somalia population 1960-2013 
(http://www.tradingeconomics.com/somalia/population) (01 Feb. 2014). 
 
Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (I.U.U.) fishing had existed in Somali waters long 
before the collapse of central government in 1991. However, incidents of maritime 
piracy only began to escalate as direct result of the political disorder and division ashore 
after the collapse. As early as 1970, owing chiefly to Somalia’s submissive relationship 
with the Soviet Union and a weak maritime enforcement capability, the indigenous fish 
stock was heavily exploited. According to a report in The Times in 1970: ‘penetration by 
means of the Soviet fishing fleet ha[d] already become remarkably widespread’.90 I.U.U. 
fishing continued in this manner despite the U.N. ‘Code of conduct for responsible 
fisheries’ that came into force in 1995. In 2005, a study by the U.K. Department for 
International Development found that that Somalia lost an estimated US$100 million to 
illegal tuna and shrimp fishing between 2003 and 2004 alone.
91
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Interviews with Somali pirates, such as those carried out by Stig Jarle Hansen in 2009, 
indicated that many pirates claimed to be operating in a ‘coast guard’ capacity 
protecting Somali waters from I.U.U. fishing and levying offenders for such acts.
92
 
Some groups, such as self-styled ‘National Volunteer Coast Guard’ that operated from 
the southern port of Kismayo appeared to concentrate on interdicting fishing vessels 
between 1998 and 2001 in particular.
93
 However, recreational and commercial vessels 
were also frequently targeted and pillaged which indicated that financial gain and not 
constabulary policing was likely the primary motivation. 
 
The likelihood that I.U.U. fishing and illegal dumping exclusively motivated fishermen 
toward piracy is questionable. However, it does appear that fishermen were involved in 
piratical activity. In 1997, for example, the M.V. Helena was approached by two fishing 
vessels while transiting off the coast of Somalia.
94
 One of the fishing vessels reportedly 
fired a grenade and indicated that they wanted the tanker to stop. The tanker increased 
speed and the fishing vessels eventually stopped. One month earlier in a similar attack, 
eight Somali gunmen seized a Kenyan registered vessel near Mogadishu and demanded 
a ransom payment of US$1 million for its release.
95
 The use of fishing vessels in pirate 
attacks and the seafaring knowledge required to carry out such attacks suggested that 
fishermen were likely perpetrating armed robberies and piracy alongside militiamen 
during this period.  
 
According to Abdiwahid Mahamed Hersi, a former pirate and Director General of the 
Puntland Ministry of Fisheries between 2004 and 2013, illegal fishing vessels were 
operating under the protection of Southern warlords during the 1990s.
96
 This illustrated 
the disparity between piratical attacks in different parts of a divided Somalia. According 
to Hansen: ‘[Somali pirates] are heterogeneous and [...] motivations [...] vary from pirate 
to pirate, group to group and geographical location to geographical location’.97 After the 
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collapse of the T.N.G. in 2004, these relatively opportunistic attacks evolved into more 
organised hostage-for-ransom operations that extended, in some cases, up to 400 
nautical miles from the coast by the end of 2005.
98
 
 
This unlawful fishing persisted alongside the illegal discarding of hazardous materials in 
Somali waters. This resulted in a regional ‘Action plan for the conservation of the 
marine environment and coastal areas in the red Sea and Gulf of Aden’ in 1982, which 
was revised in 1995 and again in 2005. The agreement highlighted and calculated the 
scale of pollutants affecting human health and marine ecosystems in the region from 
municipal, industrial and oil pollutants.
99
 Despite the 1992 Basel ‘Convention on the 
control of transboundary movements of hazardous waste’, illegal dumping continued in 
Somali waters by nations exploiting the political disorder ashore and lack of a maritime 
security capability at sea. In 1992, for example, a loophole in the Basel convention 
allowed Italian and Swiss companies to secure a US$80 million contract for dumping of 
toxic waste in Somali waters. The contract was allegedly signed by the Somali ‘Minister 
of Health’, despite the lack of a functioning administration in Somalia at that time.100  
 
To a lesser extent than in Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean tsunami of December 2004 
played a role in suppressing piracy and armed robbery along the coast of Somalia. There 
was a notable drop in reported attacks from an average of 26 attacks in 2003 to just 17 in 
2004.
101
 However, this was very much a temporary phenomenon. The impact of the 
tsunami simply exacerbated an already severe humanitarian and economic situation by 
destroying an estimated 600 fishing boats and 75 percent of fishing equipment along the 
northeast coast of Somalia.
102
 This, combined with continued trawling operations by 
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foreign fishing vessels, decimated the local fishing industry and severely depleted fish 
stocks. Given the high dependence on fishing for coastal populations sustenance and 
livelihoods, it is likely that this was driver of these impoverished inhabitants towards 
piracy, which at least partly accounts for the sharp escalation of reported attacks in 2005 
(see fig. 4.15). 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.15 
Average reported piracy attacks off the coast of Somalia, 2003-05 
 
Source: I.M.O, Piracy reports 2003, 2004 & 2005; N.G.A. ASAM 2003-2005, Geographical region 61 & 
62; I.C.C. I.M.B., Piracy reports 2003, 2004 & 2005. 
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Counter-piracy, 1991-2005 
 
General context 
Extreme instability ashore in Somalia after the collapse of centralised authority allowed 
maritime crime to escalate unchecked off the coast from 1989 onward. Indeed, it was 
not until after 2000, and particularly 2001, that international governments and the 
shipping industry began to identify piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia as 
a significant threat to trade and the safety of mariners. As attacks on shipping grew 
throughout the 1990s, international and regional focus was fixed on the security and 
humanitarian crisis ashore. This allowed the piracy threat at sea to deteriorate and 
evolve into an organised criminal venture. The British government recognised this in 
2002 and highlighted the growth of maritime piracy as ‘a new dimension to organised 
crime, which will merit further attention [...]’.103 
 
A number of measures, both direct and indirect, were initiated in reaction to Somalia’s 
unique security situation to address threats such as maritime piracy. Indeed, non–
traditional or asymmetric threats, both on land and at sea, emerged as a priority for 
western governments in the post-11 September 2001 security environment. Aside from 
the Middle East and Southeast Asia, Somalia emerged as a new focus for the U.S. ‘war 
on terror’. There were several reasons for this; most notably the speculation that Somalia 
might be a likely place of refuge for Osama Bin Laden
104
 given the lack of state 
structure and a noted connection with Al-Qaeda.
105
  
 
In terms of enhancing maritime security, the situation differed considerably in Somalia 
compared to Southeast Asia during the same period. The lack of a functioning 
government or a security force ashore in Somalia severely hampered the operational 
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potential. To counteract this lack of access ashore, U.S-led coalition forces committed 
maritime assets to the region to increase surveillance and aid in intelligence gathering. 
In March 2002, for example, the German Navy deployed a task group to Djibouti to 
monitor and intercept ships heading towards Somalia under the mandate of the global 
‘war on terror’. The naval force consisted of three frigates, five patrol boats, four 
support vessels and a land-based helicopter contingent supported by three Breguet 
Atlantic maritime patrol aircraft and 160 personnel based in Mombasa, Kenya.
106
 While 
the global ‘war on terror’ was not a counter-piracy mission, the increased naval presence 
likely minimised incidents between 2002 and 2005.  
 
Private Military Companies 
The idea of privatising security at sea had long existed given the inherent vulnerability 
of merchant vessels. It was reported in 1984, for example, that some Soviet and Israeli 
merchant vessels carried sharpshooters and that some companies had hired armed 
guards to protect against cargo theft in the Mediterranean and in Southeast Asia.
107
 In 
1993, the issue arose in the British parliament, primarily in reaction to increased reports 
of ship hijacking, the murdering of crews and the declining utility of the Royal Navy as 
a counter-piracy force. Sir Hugh Bonsor M.P. proposed: ‘It might be worth considering 
arming merchantmen, as we did during the war, as a possible way to see off the pirates 
and safeguard the security of trade and individuals’.108  The suggestion of merchant 
mariners carrying and utilising firearms onboard a commercial vessel was ‘strongly 
discouraged’ by the I.M.O. and other maritime bodies at that time. 
 
In 1999, the I.M.O. issued a circular that contained recommendations for preventing and 
suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships. Section 45 of the document 
stated that ‘carriage of arms on board ship may encourage attackers to carry firearms 
thereby escalating an already dangerous situation [...] the use of firearms requires 
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special training and aptitudes and the risk of accidents with firearms carried on board 
ship is great’.109 
 
The decline in global naval assets after the end of the Cold War meant fewer ships to 
police the world’s oceans. In the period after the attacks of 11 September 2001 and the 
so-called ‘global war on terror’, the deployment of P.M.C.s or security companies in 
high-risk maritime security zones such as Somalia became a viable alternative. The 
British House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee published a detailed report on 
the matter in 2002 and called for legislation in line with the United States’ International 
Traffic in Arms Regulation and the European Union ‘Code of conduct for arms 
exports’.110 Indeed, British private security companies, such as the HART Group, had 
been actively involved in counter-piracy activities such as hostage negotiation in the 
Gulf of Aden since 2001.
111
 
 
In December 2005, exiled transitional Somali government officials reportedly awarded a 
US$55 million contract to an American company Topcat Marine Security to undertake 
counter-piracy patrols along the Somali coastline.
112
 However, conflicting reports exist 
about the ultimate fate of the deal including that the U.S. Government issued a ‘cease 
and desist’ order against Topcat Marine Security in December 2005 or that a French 
company Scopex negotiated a deal to replace Topcat following allegations of 
impropriety surrounding the company’s CEO Peter Casini in 2006.113 While maritime 
organisations and governments still officially recommended against the use of privately 
contracted armed guards aboard merchant vessels, the practice had become increasingly 
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commonplace.
114
 This development illustrated the increased threat to shipping and 
seafarers by pirates off the Horn of Africa by the end of 2005 and the need for a more 
robust regional and international response. 
 
International efforts, 1991-2005 
U.N. operations in Somalia, 1992-95  
In response to the deteriorating humanitarian and security environment in Somalia after 
the collapse of centralised government and the abundant media attention it attracted, the 
United Nations Security Council adopted six resolutions concerning Somalia in 1992 
alone (see fig. 4.16). While countering the growing levels of piracy and armed robbery 
off the coast was not the primary reason for the deployment of U.N. forces, piratical 
attacks on ships transporting humanitarian aid relief supplies from the sea was 
highlighted as a concern.
115
 
 
In April 1992, U.N. Security Council Resolution 751 created the first United Nations 
Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) in response to the magnitude of human suffering 
and the threat to international security by the situation in Somalia.
116
 However, despite a 
mandate for increasing numbers of security personnel, in the absence of law and order, 
relief organisations experienced increased hijacking of vehicles, looting of convoys and 
detention of expatriate staff.
117
 This combined with the continued pillaging of relief 
supplies along the coast, predominantly around the port of Mogadishu, hastened the 
adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 794 and the creation of the Unified Task 
Force (UNITAF) in December 1992.
118
  
 
The United States assumed leadership of the UNITAF under Operation ‘Restore Hope’ 
that same month, to establish a secure environment for the humanitarian relief operation 
by ‘all necessary means’ in accordance with Chapter VII of the United Nations 
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charter.
119
 The so called ‘Bush plan’ consisted of a U.S. led multinational force of 
30,000 troops to secure vital seaports, airports, roads and aid distribution centres in 
central and southern Somalia.
120
 Two U.S. Navy task forces in the Indian Ocean
121
 were 
deployed to transport troops and logistical supplies to Somalia for the mission. The 
relative sea-control and power projection exerted by these offshore assets was likely a 
factor in deterring attacks against vessels transporting merchant goods and humanitarian 
aid. According to one study: ‘throughout the operation, the ships remained in that 
general vicinity - sometimes within view of the land and sometimes over the horizon - 
exerting a calming effect on events ashore’.122  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.16 
United Nations Security Council Resolutions concerning Somalia, 1992 
Source: U.N. Security Council Resolution 733 (1992); 746 (1992); 751 (1992); 767 (1992); 775 (1992); 
794 (1992). 
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U.N.S.C. Date Principal measure 
Resolution 733 23 January 1992 Imposition of arms embargo 
Resolution 746 17 March 1992 Humanitarian relief and ceasefire 
Resolution 751 21 April 1992 
Established first United Nations Operation in 
Somalia (UNOSOM) 
Resolution 767 27 July 1992 Humanitarian airlift operation 
Resolution 775 28 August 1992 Strengthened UNOSOM deployment 
Resolution 794 03 December 1992 
Authorised creation of Unified Task Force 
(UNITAF) 
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By March 1993, a new mandate was needed to facilitate the transition from the UNITAF 
to the expanded UNOSOM II owing primarily to the continued violence, notably 
increased attacks against civilians engaged in humanitarian work on behalf of the U.N. 
and non-governmental organisations.
123
 On 26 March, U.N. Security Council Resolution 
814 was adopted which transferred operational control from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. 
The ambitious UNOSOM II lasted just two years having ultimately failed in its mission 
to advance political reconciliation and to restore the rule of law.
124
 Despite this, the U.N. 
noted the relative success of its humanitarian operation having saved ‘hundreds of 
thousands of human lives from famine’.125 
 
The U.N. operation was openly criticised in some quarters. According to former Labour 
party M.P. Tony Worthington, ‘there is an utter lack of purpose there [...] the staff have 
no idea what they are supposed to be doing’.126 What began as a humanitarian mission 
evolved into a peace enforcement and military operation epitomised by the disastrous 
Battle of Mogadishu in October 1993 in which eighteen U.S. Army Rangers and 
between 500 and 1,000 Somali militiamen and civilians were killed.
127
 It was reported 
that the Italian government threatened to withdraw 2,600 troops from Somalia out of 
concern that the relief mission had turned into a combat operation that was taking sides 
in a civil war.
128
 Indeed, Ireland, the Vatican, World Vision and the Organisation of 
African Unity called for a review of U.N. policy in Somalia.
129
 According to Ken 
Menkhaus, Somalia itself had to accept the majority of the blame, as it ‘proved 
impervious to the one of the most ambitious nation building efforts in the post-Cold War 
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era [...]’.130 Indeed, the U.N. acknowledged that the lack of cooperation from the Somali 
parties over security issues fundamentally undermined the operation.
131
  
 
In the short term, the U.N. and U.S. operation had a positive impact on the maritime 
security situation in Somalia. Between 1992 and 1994, there were just six reports of 
piracy and armed robbery off the Northeast African coast.
132
 The international 
deployment helped secure ports, ensured safe passage for humanitarian relief supplies 
from the sea and, combined with the large troop contingent ashore and naval presence, 
helped deter criminality such as piracy and armed robbery. On 28 February 1995, a U.S. 
led combined task force, codenamed ‘United Shield’, conducted an amphibious landing 
at Mogadishu and established a protected enclave for the removal of remaining U.N. 
forces.
133
 This illustrated that a significant level of sea control had been achieved and 
maintained before the exit. However, the withdrawal of U.N. personnel in March 1995 
under U.N. Security Council Resolution 954 left behind a precarious security situation 
that was ideal for crimes such as piracy to take root and flourish. This was reflected in 
piracy reports. In 1995 alone, reports of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast 
increased to 15, from just three reported incidents in 1994.
134
  
 
I.C.C. International Maritime Bureau 
Non-governmental organisations such as the I.C.C. I.M.B. recognised the threat to 
seafarers transiting off the coast of Somalia since the establishment of the P.R.C. in 
1992. Between 1992 and 2005, the I.M.B. played an important counter-piracy role in 
advising shipping on the practicalities and best practice to prevent and deter a piracy 
attack. Aside from this, they raised industry awareness of the problem and helped 
influenced owner-states to address maritime security threats, mostly in Southeast Asia. 
In 1995, the I.M.B. received 15 reports of piratical attacks against merchant ships 
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transiting off the coast of Somalia including three armed hijackings.
135
 Given the 
instability ashore and the decline in attacks between 1996 and 1997, it was suggested 
that piracy in Somalia might be ‘the exception rather than the rule’.136 The I.M.B. and 
other interested parties were still primarily focussed on the proliferation of maritime 
piracy attacks in Southeast Asia during this period. 
 
Despite this, a number of general preventative counter-piracy measures were proposed 
for ships transiting high-risk areas such as the Gulf of Aden and the Somali coast in the 
late 1990s. These included contingency planning, enhanced surveillance and watch 
keeping, C.C.T.V., use of lighting and fire hoses as a deterrent and monitoring radio 
broadcasts.
137
 The I.M.B. also endorsed and promoted the I.M.O.’s counter-piracy 
guidelines for ship-owners and governments that were published in 1999. By 2000, 
following an upward trend in hijackings and ransom demands, the I.M.B. warned 
shipping transiting the region to keep at least 50 miles from the Somali coast (see fig. 
4.17).
138
  
 
The 2001 I.M.B. piracy report highlighted the Bab el Mandeb, Gulf of Aden and 
Somalia as high-risk areas for hijackings and advised ships to transit 100 nautical miles 
from the Somali coast ‘if possible’.139 Due to the evolving technological capability of 
Somali pirates, the I.M.B. also advised shipping to keep radio communications, 
including V.H.F., to a minimum to counter the possibility of being intercepted by 
patrolling pirates.
140
 By 2003, the probability of an attack along the Somali coastline 
increased from ‘one of possibility to a certainty’.141 In 2005, there was a sharp escalation 
in reported piracy incidents off the Horn of Africa. This amounted to 52 actual and 
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attempted attacks compared to just 12 in 2004 according to I.M.B. figures.
142
 In 
response, the I.M.B. increased its recommended ‘safe range’ from 100 nautical miles 
from the shore to 200 nautical miles and promoted the use of more elaborate defensive 
measures such as the ‘ShipLoc’ satellite tracking system and the ‘Secure-ship’ electric 
fence system.
143
  
 
 
 
Fig. 4.17 
Reported number of hijackings worldwide, 1991-2005 
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United States 
In the aftermath of the collapse of centralised authority in Somalia and the ensuing 
humanitarian crisis and civil war, the United Sates initially focussed its efforts on 
establishing security and stability ashore. This landward approach ultimately failed 
following the withdrawal of UNOSOM II in 1995. This failure combined with the attack 
on the U.S.S. Cole in Aden in 2000 and the subsequent events of 11 September 2001 
ushered a renewed focus on the importance of securing the maritime domain against 
threats such as terrorism and piracy. Indeed, the United States was aware that ‘hardening 
of land and aviation targets [would] shift the threat to sea targets particularly to 
commercial maritime targets’.144 
 
This culminated in the creation of the ‘Maritime Security Act’ of 2002 and the decisive 
International Ship and Port-facility Security Code (I.S.P.S.) in 2004, which as discussed 
in chapter II, was a formative initiative in bolstering global maritime security. Indeed, 
post-11 September 2001 initiatives must be viewed as part of the United States wider 
strategic objective of the maintaining a military presence in the Horn of Africa, securing 
future oil supplies and its global ‘war on terror’. In the case of Somalia, strengthening 
the naval presence and exerting sea control would not only increase maritime security, 
but influence events ashore where no functioning government existed. The attack on the 
Cole and the Limburg just two years later, illustrated the inherent vulnerability of 
maritime assets to attack by ‘non-traditional’ forces. Piratical attacks on merchant 
vessels also persisted in the region at an average rate of 25 attacks per year between 
2000 and 2004.
145
 However, these incidents were likely overshadowed by the 
heightened awareness of the terrorism threat post-11 September 2001. 
 
Following the events of 11 September 2001, Task Force 150, initially a navy formation 
attached to the United States Naval Forces Central Command, was re-established as a 
multinational Combined Maritime Force named Combined Task Force 150 (C.T.F. 150). 
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C.T.F. 150 was mandated to undertake maritime counter-terrorism and security 
operations around the Horn of Africa including assist and approach visits, ‘visit, board, 
search and seizure’ and interdiction patrols. 146  In 2003, the U.S. expanded on this 
approach and proposed the Proliferation Security Initiative, which concerned the 
interdiction of vessels suspected of transporting Weapons of Mass Destruction on the 
high seas. The initiative had implications for counter-piracy operations, as it required the 
interdiction of shipping on the high seas for reasons other than those stipulated in article 
110 of UNCLOS.
147
 More directly, a US$100 million East African Counter-Terrorism 
Initiative was announced in June 2003 to strengthen regional security forces. 
 
The U.S. bolstered its own regional maritime security capability in March 2004 with the 
creation of C.T.F. 152 in the Arabian Gulf. This ancillary naval force was tasked with 
conducting maritime security operations in conjunction with regional partners. Royal 
Navy Commodore Keith Winstanley commented: ‘The innocent who sail the waters, 
people who live in the region and citizens of the world rely on coalition patrols to 
provide security at sea’. 148  By 2004, the United States recognised the strategic 
importance of enhancing the capabilities and professionalism of African maritime and 
naval forces in conjunction with ground forces.
149
 Escalating reports of piracy and 
armed robbery were a contributory factor in the re-launching of the U.S. led ‘African 
coastal security programme’ in 2004, which aimed to improve the capability of 
inadequate, and in the case of Somalia, non-existent regional navies and coastguards to 
conduct better maritime surveillance operations.
150
 More practically, several small 
coastal patrol craft were donated to assist regional navies in counter-piracy and maritime 
security patrols. This included two 55-metre WLB Balsam-class seagoing buoy tenders 
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to Ghana in 2001 and Nigeria in 2002/03 alongside smaller craft to Djibouti, 
Madagascar, Nigeria, the Seychelles, Tunisia and Yemen.
151
 
 
The shift from predominantly land centric initiatives to a more maritime focused 
approach was illustrated by the publication of the first U.S. ‘National strategy for 
maritime security’ in 2005. The white paper identified ‘well organised’, ‘well equipped’ 
pirates and transnational criminals as a distinct threat to maritime security.
152
 More 
generally, the strategy highlighted the importance of the unhindered movement of 
maritime trade to American economic prosperity and the need for international 
coordination, cooperation and intelligence sharing among public and private entities to 
secure the maritime domain against threats such as piracy.
153
 
 
Britain 
In 1993, the U.K. Department of Transport published advice on maritime piracy for the 
shipping industry for the first time. Merchant Shipping Notice M-1517 urged ship 
owners and operators to report actual and attempted attacks to the coastal state within 
whose waters the incident occurred. Two years later on 5 April 1995, the first U.K. 
registered ocean going yacht the Longo Barda, was attacked by pirates armed with 
mortars off the northern coast of Somalia.
154
 Indeed, the U.K. government catalogued 32 
reports of piracy and armed robbery against U.K. flagged vessels between 1993 and 
2004.
155
 The escalation in attacks off the Somali coast presented an obvious problem for 
the approach outlined in M-1517 as no functioning government or maritime law 
enforcement mechanism existed. Merchant Shipping Notice M-1517 was subsequently 
updated and replaced in 1998 by Marine Guidance Note (M.G.N.) 75. M.G.N. 75 was 
made available on the internet for the first time to encourage wider circulation. It 
focused on self-defence and deterrent measures that could be employed by vessels 
transiting high-risk areas, where no assistance or support was available from shore. 
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The escalation of piracy and maritime robbery in Northeast Africa and Southeast Asia in 
the 1990s raised questions in the British parliament about the role of the Royal Navy in 
contemporary counter-piracy operations. It was evident that the Royal Navy no longer 
possessed the capacity or capability to operate as a solitary global constabulary force. As 
Sir Nicholas Bonsor M.P. highlighted: 
 
[If] the Royal Navy should be made responsible for putting down piracy in 
the Indian and Pacific oceans [...] we shall need a navy that is very much 
bigger than the one that we have now [...] to make the Royal Navy 
responsible for piracy would be a large commitment, which would make 
almost everything else that it does pale into insignificance.
156
  
 
Domestically, the House of Lords debated a proposal for the abolition of the death 
penalty for the crime of piracy under U.K domestic law in 1998.
157
 The British 
government favoured a more holistic approach to maritime security strategy that 
emphasised multilateral cooperation over unilateral action in relation to counter-piracy 
operations.
158
 For example, Britain attempted to strengthen Somaliland’s judicial and 
legal sector within the framework of UNOSOM’s wider programme in 1994, but the 
effort was constrained by poor security and problems with local support.
159
  
 
By 2002, M.G.N. 75 was replaced by M.G.N. 241, which recognised the ‘notable’ 
increase in piracy and armed robbery attacks, the severity of these attacks and the risk of 
hijack and kidnap-for-ransom off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. The 
document set out a comprehensive set of guidelines to deter and manage piratical attacks 
including recommended practices, an anti-piracy plan, evasive manoeuvring and use of 
hoses, criminal jurisdiction, naval intervention and role of the coastal state.
160
 That same 
year British army and naval units were involved in reconnaissance and surveillance 
operations in and around Somalia as part of the global ‘war on terror’. This included the 
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deployment of the Royal Navy type 22 frigate H.M.S. Campbeltown to track suspect 
vessels in the Horn of Africa.
161
 
 
Royal Navy policy at that time held that if an incident of piracy was encountered while 
conducting other operations or tasks on the high seas, the Royal Navy would counter the 
incident accordingly and arrest those responsible in accordance with the appropriate 
rules of engagement.
162
 Indeed, Royal Navy Commanders were given specific counter-
piracy guidance and training. In a more general sense, the British government 
recognised the benefit of engaging with international defence intelligence and maritime 
security communities alongside the commercial shipping industry in relation to 
countering piracy.
163
 The British Government highlighted, what the Transport Select 
Committee called, a ‘disturbing increase’ in incidents of piracy in Somali waters and the 
Gulf of Aden in 2005 and subsequently published a revised version of the Marine 
Guidance Note.
 164
 The updated M.G.N. 298 took into account the latest counter-piracy 
and terrorism initiatives including the I.S.P.S. Code of 2004, the Ship Security Alert 
System and the Automatic Identification System (A.I.S.) as discussed in chapter III.  
 
Italy, Russia & European Union 
Aside from the United States and Britain, the former colonial power of Italy and Cold 
War ally the Soviet Union contributed less in terms of maritime security and counter-
piracy support in Northeast Africa between 1991 and 2005. Italian troops were deployed 
as part of the UNOSOM II, despite apprehension from the United States over Italy’s 
colonial legacy in Somalia and close relationship with Siad Barre.
165
 For this reason, 
Italian troops were chiefly involved in humanitarian operations including convoy 
escorts, food and drug distribution and health-care organisation.
166
 Almost five years 
after the withdrawal of U.N. forces, Italy provided ships as part of the U.S. led maritime 
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security initiative C.T.F. 150 off the Horn of Africa alongside the U.K., France, 
Germany, The Netherlands and Pakistan. The Italian navy also maintained a coastal 
patrol unit as part of the Multinational Force Observers at Sharm-el Sheik in the Red 
Sea between 2001 and 2005, but were not active in maritime security operations in the 
Gulf of Aden or off the Somali coast.
167
 
 
Following the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the former Soviet Union, 
Russia’s naval capability and capacity diminished, as did its influence in the Indian 
Ocean. By 1996, funding for the maintenance of the fleet stood at around 10 percent of 
that required by the navy, which rendered many vessels inoperative or in need of major 
refits and repairs.
168
 The 2001 Russian Federation ‘Marine doctrine 2020’ set out, 
among other objectives, Russia’s long-term strategic maritime policy in the Indian 
Ocean. This consisted of three aims. Firstly, the expansion of Russian transport, 
shipping and fishing in the region; secondly, protection of these assets from piracy in 
conjunction with the international community and finally to maintain a Russian naval 
presence in the region on a periodic basis.
169
 This strategy illustrated Russia’s awareness 
of the evolving nature of the piracy problem in the region as early as 2001. 
 
However, in 2003 Russia's naval strength was reduced by a further 20 percent due to the 
decommissioning of a substantial number of reserve ships and submarines.
170
 Despite 
ambitions to undertake counter-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean, the Russian 
Defence Ministry prepared a blueprint for strengthening the navy in early 2004, which 
de-prioritised blue-water operations in favour of securing small class vessels capable of 
operating within a 500km zone of territorial waters.
171
 Economic realities dictated that 
Russian national maritime policy had to give precedence to mineral exploitation, 
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maritime transport and pipeline security over long-range maritime security operations 
before 2005.
172
 
 
Aside from these individual nations, European Union (E.U.) member states contributed 
to the creation of the I.S.P.S. Code and submitted proposals on maritime security issues 
to the I.M.O. in April 2002. In March 2004, the E.U. issued a comprehensive regulation 
on enhancing ship and port facility security. The regulation highlighted the threat to the 
European shipping community from international criminal activity, namely maritime 
terrorism and piracy.
173
 The directive also aimed to facilitate the implementation and 
monitoring of the special measures to enhance maritime security adopted by the I.M.O. 
in December 2002 and the I.S.P.S. Code. In terms of contributing to counter-piracy, the 
regulation took its lead from the I.S.P.S. Code and made mandatory such provisions as 
protection of the confidentiality of security plans and assessments, application of 
security measures recommended by the state in whose territorial waters they are sailing 
and frequency of security drills and exercises.
174
 Individual European states such as 
Germany and Sweden, for example, also contributed financially to the African Union’s 
(A.U.) stabilisation efforts in Somalia in 2003.
175
 
 
Regional efforts 
African Union 
There were a number of African led peace and reconciliation initiatives launched in 
response to the deteriorating security situation in Somalia after the outbreak of the civil 
war. However, addressing the declining maritime security environment was rarely 
prioritised given the scale of the crisis ashore. The Organisation of African Unity did, 
however, recognise the importance of fostering maritime trade to develop the nation 
economically. The ‘African maritime transport charter’ of 1994 was created to facilitate 
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cooperation among African countries to address issues impeding the development of the 
maritime transport sector. Given that just eight incidents of maritime piracy and armed 
robbery were reported in African waters in 1994, it is not surprising perhaps, that piracy 
was not mentioned in the charter as an impediment to developing maritime trade in 
Africa.
176
 It should also be noted that several other African states struggled with internal 
conflict and economic privation during this period. In 1996 alone, it was estimated that 
fourteen African nations were afflicted by armed conflict, which accounted for almost 
half of all war related deaths worldwide that year and a further 8 million persons 
displaced.
177
 This, according to a U.N. report, ‘seriously undermined Africa’s efforts to 
ensure long-term stability, prosperity and peace for its peoples’.178  
 
The Organisation of African Unity held a conference on national reconciliation in 1993, 
which attempted to provide a platform to negotiate an end to the conflict in Somalia. 
This effort appeared successful initially and resulted in the ‘Addis Ababa disarmament 
treaty’ in March 1993, which was the first tangible regional attempt to address the 
security situation in Somalia after the collapse of central government. Significantly, the 
treaty identified banditry and criminality as the chief obstacle to building peace, stability 
and security in Somalia.
179
  
 
The 1993 treaty also highlighted the need for international assistance in securing 
Somalia’s territorial waters from threats to shipping such as piracy.180 Despite consensus 
from fifteen representatives of different warring factions to the principles set out in the 
disarmament treaty, continued violence combined with the withdrawal of the U.N. 
mission in 1995, eventually dissolved the agreement. Several more attempts to facilitate 
the cessation of hostilities among opposing Somali factions at the regional level 
                                                 
176
 I.C.C. I.M.B., Piracy report 2004, p. 4. 
177
 ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organisation: the causes of conflict and the 
promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa’, 13 Apr. 1998 (U.N. Security Council, 
O.D.S., A/52/871/1998, p. 3). 
178
 Ibid. 
179
 U.N., ‘Addis Ababa Agreement concluded at the first session of the Conference on National 
Reconciliation in Somalia’, 27 Mar. 1993 in The United Nations and Somalia 1992-1996, the United 
Nations Blue Books Series, viii (New York, 1996), p. 264. 
180
 Ibid. p. 264. 
 -241- 
occurred after 1993, culminating in the Arta conference in May 2000. The Arta 
conference, much like the Addis Ababa treaty, enjoyed only limited success as the 
T.N.G. administration lasted just four years. 
 
There was renewed focus on addressing emerging and existing security threats after the 
events of 11 September 2001. The A.U. protocol ‘Convention on the prevention and 
combating of terrorism’ was adopted in 2002 and highlighted the union’s commitment 
to countering security threats in observance of international norms. By 2003, maritime 
piracy and armed robbery attacks had escalated considerably in African waters, 
particularly off the coast of Somalia where 21 incidents were reported in 2003 compared 
to just nine during the same period in 1998.
181
 Some African states began to recognise 
the need to address the deteriorating security situation at sea. Ghana, for example, 
recommended that a new agenda item on maritime security be included in the 
programme of the A.U. in 2003. The Ghanaian proposal highlighted the escalation of 
maritime crimes such as piracy and stressed the need for African states to implement the 
I.S.P.S. Code to ‘enhance maximum maritime security for international trade’.182 
 
The Chairperson of the A.U. commission included in his report in 2003 that local clans 
were engaged in skirmishes to gain control of seaports around the towns of Marka and 
Kismayo in Southern Somalia.
183
 This was likely a reflection of the evolving awareness 
of the revenue that could be generated from pirating vessels off the coast given that 
Kismayo emerged as a key pirate stronghold. That same year, the A.U. proposed more 
ambitious initiatives for enhancing regional security, such as a Continental Early 
Warning System. The early warning system intended to provide a direct linkage 
between regional mechanisms to anticipate security threats like piracy and armed 
robbery.
184
 By 2004, negotiations were underway for the establishment of an African 
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standby force and a Common African Defence and Security Policy.
185
 In February, the 
policy was initiated, however, inexperience combined with a lack of capacity and 
diversity of military cultures and administrative tradition limited its effectiveness.
186
 
Despite these restraints, the A.U. sent a fact-finding and reconnaissance mission to 
Somalia in 2005 in anticipation of a peace support mission at the request of the newly 
appointed Transitional Federal Government (T.F.G.). 
 
Individually, the majority of coastal African states lacked the capacity to enforce 
maritime security in their own territorial waters let alone patrol or assist in enforcement 
further afield. This was due, in part, to a traditional reliance on land-based forces. In 
2005, U.S. European Command Major General Jonathon Gration commented: ‘it's 
almost impossible right now for most African states to respond to a crisis off their 
shores’.187 Somalia’s largest neighbour Ethiopia, for example, lost its naval bases and 
access to the Red Sea when Eritrea became an independent state in 1993. Indeed, apart 
from South Africa, only Gabon, Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal had a navy with more than 
a limited inshore capability while Kenya was the only east African nation that possessed 
a navy capable of patrolling beyond its territorial waters.
188
 Aside from Kenya, Tanzania 
possessed a minute naval contingent of just six small patrol vessels and a small air force 
with no patrol aircraft.
189
 Several wider regional navies including Bahrain, Oman, the 
United Arab Emirates and Yemen conducted naval exercises with the U.S. led C.T.F. 
150 while Eritrea, Ethiopia and Kenya were hosted aboard C.T.F. 150 ships, which 
illustrated a basic level of regional maritime security engagement and awareness.
190
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In general, there was a significant lack of supportive infrastructure from African states 
in terms of capacity building in Somalia. Regional efforts to enhance stability and 
security ashore during this period continually failed. In August 1998, for example, an 
Egyptian and Libyan backed coalition of Mogadishu warlords created an administration. 
However, the same administration was opposed by an Ethiopian backed grouping of 
similar leaders in Mogadishu.
191
 This illustrated the complexity of national and regional 
political interrelationships and the difficulty in establishing any functioning state 
structure. Several neighbouring states did, however, assist in hosting large numbers of 
Somali refugees during the civil war despite the difficulties this presented.
192
 
 
Somaliland & Puntland 
Somalia’s de facto neighbour Somaliland, declared independence in 1991 and struggled 
initially to create a stable government. This meant that maritime security was not an 
early priority for the Somaliland administration. However, in 2003 a marine college was 
established in Berbera in response to escalating incidences of piracy and illegal fishing 
in the Gulf of Aden. One report suggested as many as 100 naval officers graduated each 
year from 2003-05 to serve in the Somaliland navy.
193
 However, this was in 
juxtaposition to derisory naval assets. The small navy also reportedly conducted 
counter-piracy exercises with littoral states such as Djibouti. According to one local 
report: ‘[...] Somaliland [was] undeniably the most staple bulwark against all forms of 
extremism in the Horn’.194 However, despite effectively deterring piracy in its territorial 
waters between 1991 and 2005, Somaliland’s capacity as a regional maritime security 
force was significantly undermined without international recognition for its claim to 
statehood. 
 
Puntland, which declared semi-autonomy in 1998, was far less successful in addressing 
maritime piracy compared to its neighbour (see fig. 4.18). Indeed, despite escalating 
levels of armed robbery and piracy off the coast in 2005, the Puntland government 
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initiated a ‘disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration’ programme to reduce the 
size of security forces due to budgetary constraints.
195
 According to one commentator, 
the increased incidences of piracy off Puntland was due in part to ‘the inability of non-
state actors to control political entrepreneurs’ access to resources [which] undermine[d] 
the ability of any single authority to concentrate and control the exercise of coercion’.196 
In contrast to Puntland, Yemen, for example, invested significantly in increasing its 
maritime security capability after 2001. The Yemeni Navy secured the delivery of ten 
fast patrol boats from the Australian military contractor ‘Austal’ in 2003 to aid in 
constabulary maritime security patrols in its territorial waters.
197
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Fig. 4.18 
Distribution of actual [red] and attempted [purple] pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia, 2005 
 
 
Source: Image: Food Security Analysis Unit (F.S.A.U.) - Somalia (http://www.fsausomali.org); 
Distribution of piracy incidents: I.C.C. I.M.B. Piracy report 2005. 
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Ethiopia & Kenya 
Somalia’s two largest neighbours, Ethiopia and Kenya, played host to a large population 
of ethnic Somali’s within their borders. It was alleged that the restoration of a central 
Somali state heightened fears of a resurgent Somali irredentism, which threatened 
Ethiopia and Kenya’s already unsteady ethnic balance.198 This led to speculation that 
both Ethiopia and Kenya benefited from the instability and insecurity in Somalia and 
therefore actively pursued polices to maintain the status-quo. Indeed, it appeared 
Ethiopia’s interference in Somali affairs actually damaged relations with the T.N.G.199 
Kenya also allegedly benefited from the disorder, particularly from the cross border 
trade in arms and the narcotic ‘Khat’. The situation was further complicated by the 
involvement of Somali’s in the Kenyan administration where, for example, the Chief of 
Staff was a Somali with active clan links.
200
 
 
However, this alleged policy of preserving an unstable Somalia did not extend to the 
maritime domain. Indeed, most African states recognised the mutual benefit of 
promoting and maintaining a secure and functional maritime environment. Daniel D. 
Kendie, for example, highlighted several mutually advantageous maritime transportation 
projects linking Ethiopia and Somalia. This included facilitating Ethiopian access to the 
ports of Kismayo and Mogadishu, which might have stimulated regional employment 
and maritime trade.
201
 Such an approach may have also bolstered regional maritime 
security cooperation. However, the Ethiopian government stated in its 2002 ‘Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia’s foreign policy, security policy and strategy’ that such 
an approach was, at that time, ‘unrealistic’ given the security situation in Somalia.202 
Despite having identified ‘no less than seven’ potentially useful Somali ports, the report 
concluded that the security situation in Somalia had ‘contributed to the uncertainty about 
regional peace and the lack of economic linkages between the two countries’. 203 
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Ethiopia did, however, develop closer diplomatic and maritime ties with Somaliland. In 
2005, for example, Ethiopia secured an agreement to divert a percentage of its maritime 
import-export operations through the Red Sea port of Berbera.
204
  
 
Somalia’s largest adjacent maritime force, the Kenyan Navy, was actively involved in 
bolstering regional maritime security and counter-piracy capability both at a national 
and multilateral level. In 1999, the Kenyan Navy participated in a joint naval exercise 
with the U.S. Navy off Mombasa code-named 'Noble Piper'. This involved mission 
planning, small boat operations, underwater demolition projects and a naval scenario to 
secure areas of the coast from pirate raids.
205
 By 2001, the navy consisted of four missile 
craft, four patrol and coastal combatants, one amphibious craft and a single support 
vessel.
206
 The Kenyan navy celebrated its fortieth anniversary in 2004 and with it the 
acquisition of two more training vessels. Then President Mwai Kibaki emphasised the 
importance of the navy in patrolling and securing Kenya’s maritime boundaries against 
all forms of illicit activity.
207
 Following the upsurge of piracy and armed robbery attacks 
in Somali waters in late 2005, the Kenyan Navy began to escort merchant vessels 
operating north of Mombasa and instructed all international ships transiting Kenyan 
waters to notify the navy of their presence.
208
 
 
South Africa 
Farther afield, South Africa emerged as a regional leader in counter-piracy and maritime 
security promotion during this period. South Africa possessed a comparatively large and 
functional naval fleet compared to other African states and enjoyed relatively crime free 
territorial waters. By the mid-1990s, South Africa’s fleet consisted of three Daphne-
class submarines, nine Minister-class missile craft, four river-class mine hunters, four 
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ton-class minesweepers and various coastal and logistical craft.
209
 In 1992, the S.A.S. 
Tafelberg transported over 650 tons of relief to Somali refugees in Northern Kenya 
during ‘Operation Flush/Big Tree’.210 Aside from the obvious humanitarian aspect, the 
operation facilitated closer cooperation on maritime security affairs between the Kenyan 
and South African navies. 
 
By 1995, South Africa had established a Maritime Standing Committee and hosted a 
conference for regional navy chiefs with the aim of increasing naval and maritime 
policy cooperation. This evolving regional maritime consciousness culminated in the 
first ‘Seapower for Africa symposium’ held in Cape Town by the South African Navy in 
August 2005. In his opening address, the South African Minister for Intelligence 
Services, Ronnie Kasrils stated that ‘Africa must also move swiftly to deal with the 
problem of piracy, before it reaches levels that make Africa’s ports unattractive 
destinations [...] while this used to be a problem restricted to the Gulf of Guinea, pirate 
attacks are now common off Somalia’.211 Indeed, combating maritime crime and piracy 
emerged as a key strategic priority of the meeting, which stressed the need to empower 
national navies to perform coast guard functions.
212
 Despite this emergent continental 
maritime cooperation and recognition of the threat posed by piracy, by the end of 2005 
there were 80 reported incidents in African waters.
213
 In excess of 50 percent of these 
attacks were perpetrated by Somali pirates, which according to the I.M.B., placed 
Somalia second in terms of worldwide reported incidents of piracy and armed robbery 
against ships that year.
214
 However, after 2005 South Africa was hesitant to support 
internationally led counter-piracy efforts in any meaningful way. 
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Legal initiatives 
International Maritime Organization 
The introduction of the I.S.P.S. Code as a legal requirement in July 2004 was a critical 
event in the evolution of contemporary maritime security. However, many of the 
international legal maritime security mechanisms that were introduced since 1991 could 
not be applied or enforced in Somalia due to a lack of a functioning administration 
ashore. Indeed, the lack of statehood essentially meant that Somalia operated outside of 
international legal norms. According to Michael Bahar: ‘the fact that an entity named 
Somalia became a party to UNCLOS on 24 July 1989, and that that entity laid claim to 
an excessive 200 nautical mile territorial seas in 1972, is of no moment because that 
entity has legally ceased to exist’.215  In an attempt to rectify this issue, the I.M.O. 
published M.S.C. 623 (Rev.3) in 1999 that provided practical guidance to shipowners, 
shipmasters and crews on preventing and suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery 
against ships. However, this document advised that the ship master report the incident to 
the authorities of the coastal State in whose waters the attack occurred or, if on the high 
seas, to the authorities of the nearest coastal State.
216
 In the case of Somalia, this was 
unfeasible and there was no regional reporting mechanism similar to the I.M.B. P.R.C. 
in Kuala Lumpur to act as a proxy. 
 
The I.M.O. attempted to redress this imbalance somewhat with the adoption of the 
I.S.P.S. Code in 2002 and its enactment as a statutory regulation in 2004. This obliged 
both passenger ships and cargo ships to create and maintain a minimum level of security 
compliance that included the creation of a Ship Security Plan and a Ship Security 
Officer.
217
 These measures significantly enhanced on board security and therefore 
lowered the risk of a successful pirate attack. This was imperative in high-risk areas like 
Somalia were no constabulary support was forthcoming from the shore. This transferred 
the responsibility for deterring an attack entirely on the shipmaster and crew, hence the 
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importance of a legal mechanism to enforce security measures. Aside from initiating the 
I.S.P.S. Code, the I.M.O. attempted to strengthen sub-regional legal mechanisms to 
address piracy and armed robbery off the Horn of Africa. In April 2005, in response to 
the rise in reported incidents of piracy in the Gulf of Aden, the I.M.O. facilitated the first 
regional conference at Sana’a in Yemen to increase cooperation in curtailing the rise in 
incidents of maritime piracy and armed robbery. Ten participant states agreed to 
improve communication, cooperation and coordination in the field of regional maritime 
security following the meeting.
218
  
 
By November 2005, in the wake of increased piratical activity, the I.M.O. Assembly 
adopted its first resolution directly addressing maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia. 
Reported attacks in the region had increased from just ten in 2004 to 45 by December 
2005.
219
 I.M.O. Resolution 979 noted ‘with great concern’ the escalation in serious 
incidents of piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia and the protracted 
distance from shore in which several attacks occurred. Furthermore, the strategic 
importance of the Gulf of Aden/ Indian Ocean sea-lanes and the danger to life meant 
that an ‘exceptional response’ was required to counter piracy and armed robbery in the 
region.
220
 The Resolution also highlighted how the proceeds from piratical hostage-for-
ransom kidnappings was fuelling instability ashore, primarily in relation to the purchase 
of arms in violation of the arms embargo imposed by U.N. Security Council Resolution 
733 in 1992.
221
 
 
Resolution 979 had evolved from previous, more generalised, maritime piracy 
legislation. Despite stating that the jurisdiction and territorial integrity of Somalia under 
the relevant provisions of international law must be respected, the resolution strongly 
urged governments to increase efforts to prevent and suppress acts of piracy and armed 
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robbery against ships ‘irrespective of where such acts occur’.222 The I.M.O. also stressed 
the importance of adopting national legislation, in accordance with international law, to 
prosecute those engaged in maritime criminal activities.  
 
United Nations 
The U.N. also recognised the need to enhance regional legal mechanisms to address the 
escalating incidences of maritime piracy and armed robbery as part of their strategy of 
strengthening the rule of law and criminal justice system in Africa. In 1998, the U.N. 
General Assembly’s report of the African Regional Preparatory Meeting on the 
prevention of crime and the treatment of offenders highlighted four areas were concerted 
action was needed. These were (i) promoting the rule of law and strengthening the 
criminal justice system (ii) international cooperation in combating transnational crime 
(iii) effective crime prevention and (iv) accountability and fairness in the justice 
process.
223
 
 
The 2004 report for the eleventh U.N. Congress on crime prevention and criminal 
justice in Africa had evolved to include terrorism, corruption and economic/financial 
crime as substantive areas in need of strengthening to create efficient judicial systems 
throughout Africa.
224
 However, the U.N. report noted that not all the existing 
international standards and norms could be applied throughout the African continent 
because of the lack of adequate resources, as well as insufficient knowledge about the 
modalities of application.
225
 In wider legal circles, particularly after 2001, the 
applicability of piracy legislation, namely universal jurisdiction, to terrorist offences was 
widely debated. It was suggested during a sitting of the U.K. House of Lords in 
December 2001 that serious terrorist offences should be treated as offences against the 
                                                 
222
 I.M.O., A/RES/979/24/2005, p. 4. 
223
 ‘Report of the African Regional Preparatory Meeting for the tenth United Nations Congress on the 
prevention of crime and the treatment of offenders’, 23 Dec. 1998 (U.N., O.D.S., 
A/Conf.187/RPM.3/1/1998, pp 3-5). 
224
 ‘Report of the African Regional Preparatory Meeting for the eleventh United Nations Congress on 
crime prevention and criminal justice’, 16 Mar. 2004 (U.N., O.D.S., A/Conf.203/RPM.3/1/2004, pp 3-11). 
225
 U.N., A/Conf.203/RPM.3/1/2004, p. 12. 
 -252- 
human race or the modern equivalent of piracy and therefore the United Kingdom courts 
should accept universal jurisdiction in such cases.
226
 
 
Conclusion 
By the end of 2005, reported incidents of piracy and armed robbery had escalated 
significantly off the Somali coast and in the Gulf of Aden, accounting for over 50 
percent of all reported incidents on the African continent that year.
227
 More alarming 
was the proliferation of hostage-for-ransom kidnappings at sea, especially when 
compared to other piracy prone regions worldwide. According to the I.M.B., there were 
248 crewmembers taken hostage by Somali pirates in 2005 compared to just 31 in 
2004.
228
 This figure far exceeded similar incidents in Indonesia, despite a far higher 
number of actual pirate attacks reported there (see fig. 4.19). 
 
Somalia experienced a complete breakdown of law and order following the collapse of 
central government in 1991. The resulting humanitarian and political crisis ashore 
dwarfed the degenerating security situation at sea. This regional and international apathy 
likely contributed to the escalation of maritime piracy in the ungoverned waters off the 
coast of Somalia between 1991 and 2005. By the time the I.M.O. formally recognised 
the intensification in serious incidents of piracy and armed robbery off the coast of 
Somalia in November 2005, it was a case of ‘too little too late’. Somali pirates had 
already established an organised criminal business model and acquired the assets, 
weaponry and expertise to perpetrate attacks hundreds of miles from the coast. Regional 
and international governments needed to evolve and formulate an innovative approach 
to counter-piracy operations in response to this rapidly evolving form of violent and 
organised maritime crime. 
 
Although the escalation in piracy off the coast of Somalia after 2005 was largely 
unprecedented, the failure of regional and international states to confront effectively the 
problem either politically or militarily before then undoubtedly facilitated this upsurge. 
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The strategic importance of the sea-lanes through the Gulf of Aden and western Indian 
Ocean and the inability of Somalia to police its own territorial waters combined with the 
threat to the lives and safety of seafarers necessitated an exceptional response by 
international and regional governments after 2005. This culminated in one of the largest 
multinational expeditionary naval coalitions put to sea in peacetime. 
 
 
Fig. 4.19 
Number of piracy attacks vs. number of hostages taken: Indonesia & Somalia/ Gulf of 
Aden, 2004-05 
 
Indonesia Somalia/ Gulf of Aden 
 No. of piracy  
attacks 
No. of  
hostages 
No. of piracy  
attacks 
No. of  
hostages 
2004 93 72 10 31 
2005 79 76 45 241 
Source: I.C.C. I.M.B., Piracy report 2005 & 2006, p. 10.
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CHAPTER V 
 
Hostis humani generis – a threat to global trade? 
 
What started as a series of local hijacks and ransom demands against commercial fishing 
vessels has spiralled into an international threat to the basic freedom of the seas upon 
which the global economy depends.
1
 
 
Introduction 
Decades of political and humanitarian turmoil ashore in Somalia resulted in the first 
major upsurge of maritime piracy in the twenty-first-century. A combination of 
favourable geography and financial incentive alongside extreme poverty, lawlessness 
and jurisdictional ambiguity contributed to the creation of an organised maritime 
criminal network along the coast of Somalia after 2005. By 2008, these criminal 
networks had expanded their reach hundreds of miles from the shore by utilising mother 
ships and high-speed skiffs. Together with an abundance of heavy calibre weaponry, 
maritime expertise and modern radar and radio equipment, these groups targeted 
susceptible vessels transiting some of the world’s busiest shipping lanes in the Gulf of 
Aden and western Indian Ocean.  
 
While incidents of piracy and armed robbery began to appear and escalate after the 
collapse of the state structure in Somalia between 1991 and 2004, it was only after 2005 
that attacks evolved into a serious threat to global shipping transiting the region. Somali 
pirate groups targeted and hijacked a multitude of international vessels and held 
thousands of crewmembers of various nationalities hostage for ransom. Aside from the 
obvious threat to the passage of international commerce through this vital sea-lane, the 
threat to the lives of seafarers was significant. The International Maritime Bureau 
(I.M.B.) estimated that Somali pirates were responsible for killing at least thirty 
seafarers between 2005 and 2012 and holding some 3,947 hostage for varying lengths of 
time, usually until a ransom had been secured for their release.
2
 This figure was not 
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surprising given that firearms were used in almost 100 percent of Somali pirate attacks. 
Given the lack of any naval or law enforcement capability in Somalia, an international 
response was needed to counteract this regional threat to the movement of global trade. 
 
In 2004, almost 47 percent of all incidents of maritime piracy worldwide occurred in 
Southeast Asian waters while less than five percent of the global total occurred off 
Somalia.
3
 Within just four years, this situation was reversed (see fig. 5.1). By 2008, 
Somali pirates were responsible for around 44 percent of all incidents of maritime piracy 
worldwide.
4
 This equated to approximately 111 actual and attempted attacks in 2008 
alone. This huge upsurge in ship hijackings and kidnap-for-ransom of crews initiated an 
unprecedented response from the international community, which culminated in one of 
the largest multinational expeditionary naval forces put to sea in peacetime. Aside from 
the proactive response at sea, several innovative counter-piracy initiatives were 
undertaken ashore by both regional and international states. The role of the shipping 
industry was also critical in raising awareness of piracy and implementing Best 
Management Practice (B.M.P.) to protect against and deter attacks. These efforts 
resulted in a substantial decline in piracy and armed robbery in Northeast African waters 
by 2013. This chapter, therefore, explores chiefly non-military counter-piracy efforts 
between 2005 and 2013 focussing on the political context ashore, the issue of ransom 
payments, victims of piracy, proliferation of Private Maritime Security Companies 
(P.M.S.C.) and finally legal and jurisdictional issues. International political and military 
counter-piracy initiatives are analysed in chapter VI. 
 
Somalia’s precarious political balance and lack of state infrastructure presented a unique 
set of problems legally. International statutory norms were not applicable to Somalia as 
it lacked the capacity to enforce such laws, especially in the maritime domain. This 
ambiguity initially undermined counter-piracy operations at sea and forced a 
fundamental re-examination of the legal rules of engagement. The unprecedented scale 
of the piracy upsurge and the limitations placed on naval forces also resulted in the 
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propagation of P.M.S.C., largely after 2008, which presented a new set of challenges for 
legislators. Moreover, P.M.S.C.s proved to be a highly effective counter-piracy 
mechanism. By the close of 2013, no vessel that employed Privately Contracted Armed 
Security Personnel (P.C.A.S.P.) had been successfully hijacked by pirates.
5
 Indeed, the 
successful drop in incidents of piracy off the Horn of Africa was widely attributed to, in 
part, the deployment of P.M.S.C.s. 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.1 
Fluctuation of reported piracy attacks: Southeast Asia & Northeast Africa, 2003-13 
 
Source: I.C.C. I.M.B., Piracy and armed robbery against ships, annual reports, 1 Jan. - 31Dec. 2003-
2013 (London, 2004-2014). 
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General context 
Since 1970, global seaborne trade had experienced almost uninterrupted growth (see. fig. 
5.2). This upward trend resulted in a 60 percent increase in seaborne trade worldwide 
between 2000 and 2013 (see fig. 5.3). The Bab-el-Mandeb strait, a narrow chokepoint 
that links the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, is a critical international sea-lane, chiefly for 
the transport of crude oil from the Persian Gulf to Europe and the United States. In 2008, 
a total of 21,415 vessels (northbound and southbound) transited via the Gulf of Aden 
and through the Bab-el-Mandeb toward or from the Suez Canal.
6
 This equated to 
approximately 29 percent of the global total for 2008 or an average of 59 merchant 
vessels per day passing proximal to the Somali coast.
7
 
 
Fig. 5.2 
Increase in global seaborne trade 1970-2010 
 
Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Review of maritime 
transport 2013 (New York, 2013), p. 7. 
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The degenerative security situation in Somalia combined with the abundance of high-
value vessels transiting adjacent to the coast significantly facilitated the upsurge in 
piratical attacks. More targets simply meant more opportunity for a successful hijacking. 
While the majority of attacks before 2005 were directed against commercial vessels or 
small craft, this quickly extended all types of vessel regardless of function. On 26 June 
2005, the M.V. Semlow, a World Food Programme (W.F.P.) vessel, was hijacked 
approximately 40 nautical-miles (nm) off the coast of Hobyo, eastern Somalia with over 
850 metric tons of rice destined for humanitarian distribution in Bossaso to the north.
8
 
While aid convoys were frequent victims of banditry and hijacking ashore during the 
1990s, this was the first time that a W.F.P. ship had been hijacked at sea.
9
 
 
It was reported that the Semlow was seized by the same group of pirates responsible for 
the attack on the M.V. Timbuk two months previous.
10
 Both vessels were eventually 
released after the payment of a ransom despite claims by the group’s leader, Mohamed 
Abdi Hassan, that the vessels were impounded because of improper documentation.
11
 In 
October 2005, roughly one month after the release of the Semlow, Somali pirates 
hijacked a second W.F.P. humanitarian vessel. The M.V. Miltzow was seized by six 
gunmen in the port of Merka while offloading humanitarian provisions, but was released 
just thirty-two hours later.
12
 In response to these armed attacks, shipping companies 
working with the W.F.P. increasingly began to demand armed escorts.
13
 Tactically, 
Somali pirates had also evolved and gradually became more organised after 2005 by 
increasing the use of previously hijacked ships as bases for attacks farther from shore 
and reportedly issuing false distress signals to bait vessels into an ambush.
14
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Fig. 5.3 
Fluctuation of global seaborne trade, 2000-13 
 
Source: UNCTAD, Review of maritime transport 2005 (New York, 2005), p. 5. 
 
While increased attacks on commercial and humanitarian vessels heightened awareness 
among the shipping industry and international governments about the scale of the piracy 
problem, the attack on the Seabourn Spirit on 5 November 2005 conveyed the issue of 
Somali piracy to a broader audience. The Seabourn Spirit, a cruise liner carrying 108 
passengers, was attacked while underway approximately 70nm off the east coast of 
Somalia. This was the first time a passenger ferry had been targeted by Somali pirates. 
The Anti-Shipping Activity Message (ASAM) for the incident reported that six heavily 
armed pirates pursued and attacked the ship with R.P.G.s and machine-guns, which 
inflicted damage to the hull. The attack was reportedly abandoned after the captain 
employed evasive manoeuvres and fled the area.
15
 
 
The audacious and violent attack generated widespread international media coverage 
due to the potential for loss of life. The United States Office of Naval Intelligence 
commented: ‘The only difference between this attack, the numerous other attacks, and 
vessel hijackings in this area is the interest it generated, due to the nature of the 
                                                 
15
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victim’.16  On 23 November, just two weeks after the Seabourn Spirit incident, the 
International Maritime Organization (I.M.O.) adopted Resolution 979, which formally 
recognised Somali piracy as a distinct threat to the safety and security of the shipping 
industry, seafaring community and the citizens of Somalia.
17
 The unique character of 
piracy off the Somali coast required what the I.M.O. termed as an ‘exceptional 
response’.18 
 
By December 2007, there were 51 reported incidents of piracy and armed robbery in 
Northeast African waters, a 50 percent increase from 2006.
19
 The absence of any 
domestic naval or coast guard capability in Somalia meant that pirates and armed 
robbers could attack, hijack and hold for ransom commercial and humanitarian vessels 
with impunity. This resulted in increased calls for new legislation to allow foreign 
navies to undertake counter-piracy operations in Somali territorial waters. The I.M.O. 
formally requested that the United Nations (U.N.) backed Somali Transitional Federal 
Government (T.F.G.) consent to allow identifiable warships or military aircraft access to 
territorial waters when ‘engaging in operations against pirates or suspected pirates and 
armed robbers endangering the safety of life at sea’.20 On 28 October 2007, one month 
prior to the revised I.M.O. resolution, a Panamanian flagged chemical tanker, the M.T. 
Golden Nori was hijacked by Somali pirates while underway in the Gulf of Aden. This 
resulted in one of the first incursions by a foreign navy into Somali territorial waters 
when the U.S.S. Arleigh Burke entered Somali territorial waters at the behest of the 
T.F.G. in pursuit of the hijacked vessel.
21
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In 2008, incidents of Somali piracy had increased by around 200 percent compared to 
figures for 2007 with attacks reported up to 500nm from the coast.
22
 It was reported that 
42 vessels were successfully hijacked and over 800 crewmembers held hostage.
23
 The 
I.M.B. commented: ‘[...] the reward to risk ratio for the Somali pirate is so large that 
only robust measures by international governments and navies will enable the safety and 
security of this major trade route to be restored’.24 The year 2008 proved to be decisive 
in the evolution of contemporary counter-piracy initiatives, due to several high-profile 
hijackings. 
 
The passenger sailing vessel Le Ponant, for example, was hijacked while underway 
approximately 80nm north of Caluula, Somalia on 4 April 2008. Ten pirates armed with 
AK-47s and R.P.G.s approached in two speedboats and successfully boarded the 
vessel.
25
 Thirty crewmembers were taken hostage; however, there were no additional 
passengers on board at the time.
26
 Following the payment of a ransom by the yacht 
owner, the crew of the Le Ponant were released unharmed. French commandos were 
monitoring the situation and subsequently tracked the pirates ashore and apprehended 
six of the twelve hijackers.
27
 The Le Ponant incident expedited the first U.N. Security 
Council resolution on Somali piracy in June 2008, which is discussed in detail later in 
this chapter. Aside from the Le Ponant episode, two other noteworthy hijackings 
occurred in 2008, which further illustrated the threat to global commerce from Somali 
pirates. 
 
The first of these high profile hijackings occurred on 25 September 2008 when a 
Ukrainian vessel the M.V. Faina, was attacked approximately 280nm east of Mogadishu. 
The Faina was loaded with a cargo of 33 Russian manufactured T-72 battle tanks 
alongside significant quantities of ammunition and other armaments reportedly destined 
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for Kenya.
28
 Despite the obvious danger of such high-grade weaponry being acquired by 
criminals, a representative for the Somali pirates claimed they were only interested in 
the ransom money.
29
 Aside from this, the Faina incident further highlighted the threat 
posed by Somali pirates. It also hastened Russian naval involvement in the region, as 
three Russian nationals were among the hostages. 
 
A little less than two months later on 15 November, the M.T. Sirius Star a Liberian 
flagged Very Large Crude Carrier (V.L.C.C.) with 23 crewmembers, was hijacked 
approximately 450nm from the Somali coast. This event was significant for two reasons. 
Firstly, the Sirius Star was the largest vessel captured by Somali pirates up to that point 
at deadweight of 319,430 tons and secondly, it was hijacked at a greater distance from 
shore than any vessel previously.
30
 The attack illustrated the capability and tenacity of 
Somali pirates and increased calls for additional P.C.A.S.P. to protect merchant vessels 
beyond the reach of the limited international and regional naval assets. Commander Jane 
Campbell, a spokeswoman for the U.S. Navy Fifth Fleet, commented: ‘In the case of the 
Sirius Star, [hiring private contractors] may have been the only way to prevent this 
particular attack, given its distance from shore, the size of its crew and the size of the 
vessel [...] we absolutely think it would be a good idea to employ such companies’.31 
The hijacking of the Faina and Sirius Star were instrumental in hastening international 
counter-piracy naval operations off the coast of Somalia.
32
 This included the European 
Union’s first naval operation codenamed ‘Atalanta’ in December 2008, which is 
examined in chapter VII. 
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Fig. 5.4 
Suez Canal, Bab-el-Mandeb & the Strait of Hormuz 
 
Source: ‘Middle East’ (U.N. Dept. of Field Support, Cartographic section, Map no. 4102, rev. 5, Nov. 
2011).  
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The violent modus operandi alongside the high profile nature and regularity of Somali 
pirate attacks, particularly after 2008, attracted global media attention. This put further 
pressure on regional and international user-states to counteract the threat to shipping, 
seafarers and regional stability. Claims that these attacks were a legitimate Somali coast 
guard defending territorial waters against illegal encroachment by foreign fishing 
vessels were now essentially redundant. As Hansen highlighted, Somali pirates targeted 
commercial vessels because they attracted higher ransoms despite a lower chance of 
success compared with targeting fishing vessels which ‘undermined the validity of any 
claim that what they are doing is based on their alleged contempt for the foreign fishing 
sector’.33 
 
Despite this rising global awareness and a concerted international and regional effort, 
Somali pirate incidents peaked in 2011. Between January and December there were 236 
actual and attempted attacks reported at distances up to 1000nm from shore.
34
 
According to a report by the World Bank, between 2010 and 2013 Somali pirate 
networks evolved into a more organised enterprise with international membership.
35
 
Despite the increase in the frequency of attacks, the amount of successful hijackings fell 
in 2011 (see fig. 5.5).
36
 This was due to a combination of the increased deployment of 
P.C.A.S.P. on merchant vessels, wider implementation of B.M.P. and multinational 
naval counter-piracy efforts. These high profile attacks combined with other incidents, 
such as the first attack on a U.S. merchant vessel the M.V. Maersk Alabama in 2009, 
resulted in an unprecedented international and regional counter-piracy response, which 
extensively suppressed attacks in Northeast African waters by 2013. 
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Fig. 5.5 
Fluctuation of successful maritime hijackings Northeast Africa, 2005-13 
 
Source: I.C.C. I.M.B., Piracy reports 2005-2013. 
 
Transitional Federal Government 
Piracy is a crime that is committed at sea, but is rooted ashore. Political and economic 
instability was perhaps the single biggest driving force behind the escalation of maritime 
crime off the coast of Somali after the collapse of centralised government in 1991. 
Following several unsuccessful attempts at reconstituting an administration in Somalia, 
a Transitional Federal Charter was contracted in Nairobi in February 2004 following the 
dissolution of the Transitional National Government. The charter set out the terms for 
the creation of a Transitional Federal Government (T.F.G.) and a Transitional Federal 
Parliament, which elected Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed as president in October 2004. 
Despite the chronic instability ashore, the new T.F.G. Minister for Internal Affairs, 
Hussein Farah Aidid, acknowledged that maritime piracy was one of the greatest 
challenges facing the fledging administration.
37
 Much like previous administrations, the 
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T.F.G. had no national coastal patrol capability and was further constrained by its initial 
inability to establish authority in the capital Mogadishu. The T.F.G. was therefore, 
forced to assemble in Jowhar and later in Baidoa, where the parliament was convened in 
February 2006. 
 
Union of Islamic Courts (May-Dec. 2006) 
Just four months later, the Union of Islamic Courts (U.I.C.)
38
, which was an assortment 
of Islamist organisations centred on a system of autonomous courts in the south, 
expanded its reach and seized control of the capital Mogadishu from the various militias 
and warlords. The U.I.C., which was not represented in the new T.F.G., aimed to 
introduce an alternative system of governance for Somalia through the enforcement of 
sharia law.
39
 This brought the U.I.C. into direct conflict with the internationally 
recognised Transitional Federal Institutions in Baidoa. By late 2006, the U.I.C. had 
extended its reach beyond Mogadishu as far the Kenyan border to the west and the 
autonomous region of Puntland to the northeast.
40
 Diplomatic attempts to subdue 
hostilities between the T.F.G. and the U.I.C. such as the ‘Khartoum peace process’, 
initiated by the League of Arab States, ultimately failed. 
 
On 6 December 2006, the U.N. authorised the Intergovernmental Authority for 
Development in Eastern Africa and the African Union (A.U.) to establish a protection 
and training mission in Somalia in support the T.F.G. and its institutions. The U.N. 
Resolution was rejected by the U.I.C., which claimed that the deployment of foreign 
forces equated to an invasion.
41
 The rapid consolidation of much of southern Somalia by 
the U.I.C. alarmed the T.F.G.’s closest regional ally Ethiopia. On 24 December 2006, 
Ethiopian ground and air forces, in support of T.F.G. forces, launched an extensive 
military offensive against the U.I.C. between the lower Juba Valley to the south and 
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Galkayo in central Somalia. Within nine days, the U.I.C. was defeated and Mogadishu 
capitulated. 
 
Aside from the lack of international recognition, the U.I.C. addressed some off the 
fundamental causative factors that precipitated the escalation of piracy off the Somali 
coast during its brief reign. Problems such as lawlessness, insecurity and political and 
economic instability were temporarily quelled by the governance of the U.I.C. Prior to 
the U.I.C. acquiring control of Mogadishu and southern Somalia, local clan leaders were 
incapable of preventing acts of maritime piracy aside from assisting in negotiations for 
the release of crew, vessels and equipment.
42
 Following the reunification of Mogadishu 
under the authority of the U.I.C., incidents of maritime piracy and armed robbery 
against ships off the southern coast dissipated significantly. The I.M.B. recorded just ten 
attacks against ships in Somali waters (excluding the Gulf of Aden to the north) in 2006 
compared to 35 in 2005.
43
 The U.I.C. achieved this through a series of concrete and 
symbolic initiatives. These included unifying the capital, disarming and ousting the 
warlords, reopening Mogadishu airport and seaport, clearing roadblocks and removing 
litter, establishing courts to deal with claims for the restitution of property, stopping 
illegal land grabs and removing illegal squatters from government buildings.
44
   
 
Following the collapse of the U.I.C. in December 2006, maritime piracy resurged, with 
51 attacks reported in 2007. In terms of law enforcement, the U.I.C. had a documented 
history of suppressing criminality in areas it controlled. Between 1999 and 2000, for 
example, the sharia courts and associated militia reportedly kept the seaport town of 
Merka secure from theft prior to the establishment of the Transitional National 
Government.
45
 Clan and religious leaders both actively encouraged young Somalis not 
to become involved in piracy, as it was seen to undermine their respective secular and 
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spiritual authority.
46
 Even more extreme elements within the wider Islamic network, 
such as Al-Shabaab, openly condemned piracy and other forms of criminality although 
there was speculation that they may have benefitted from the proceeds of ransom 
payments.
47
 Aside from condemning piracy, the U.I.C. reportedly launched a military 
operation against pirate groups in the port of Harardheere in August 2006 to retrieve 
supplies the pirates had seized.
48
 According to a U.N. report: 
 
[The] I.C.U. took over Harardheere [...] which has been the pivotal area for 
the main group of Somali pirates - the Somali Marines - which had been the 
principal threat to maritime shipping in Somali coastal waters [...] since the 
elimination of that pirate group, there have been no acts of piracy along the 
central and southern coastal area.
49
 
 
On 7 November 2006, U.I.C. fighters also reportedly liberated the cargo ship M.V. 
Veesham I that had been hijacked by pirates north of Mogadishu.
50
 However, according 
to one commentator: ‘The operation had less to do with any principled opposition to 
piracy and more to do with the fact that the owner of the Veesham I […] was one of the 
key financial backers of the Islamist movement […]’.51 Despite this, there was a direct 
correlation between the temporary enforcement of law and order by the U.I.C. and the 
fluctuation of maritime piracy, which illustrated the fundamental causal connection 
between stability ashore and piracy at sea.  
 
The fall of the U.I.C. resulted in the ‘re-warlordisation’ of Mogadishu and a return to 
lawlessness exacerbated by the announcement of a three day deadline for armed groups 
to hand over weapons by T.F.G. Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Gedi.
52
 The deteriorating 
security situation ashore once more channelled itself into the maritime domain. Acts of 
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piracy and armed robbery against ships escalated exponentially in 2008 with 111 
reported attacks in Northeast African waters compared to just 51 in 2007.
53
 In August 
2007, the T.F.G. held a multi-party National Reconciliation Conference in Mogadishu. 
However, remnants of the ousted U.I.C. and opposition leaders convened a separate 
conference in Eritrea where they agreed to fight the T.F.G. under the banner of the 
Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia. 
 
By August the following year, a cessation of armed confrontation between the T.F.G. 
and the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia was signed in Djibouti. The Djibouti 
agreement called upon the U.N. to deploy an international stabilising force that did not 
include neighbouring states.
54
 However, it was decided that the A.U. should be 
responsible for any military or peace support operations within Somalia and as such, the 
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was extended to support the 
implementation of the agreement.
55
 In January 2009, the T.F.G. and the Alliance for the 
Re-liberation of Somalia formed a unity government and elected Sharif Sheikh Ahmed 
as president. 
 
Despite these tenuous political advances, maritime piracy continued to escalate 
uninterruptedly off the Somali coast between 2008 and 2012. Unilaterally, the T.F.G. 
failed to achieve any meaningful progress in tackling maritime crime given the serious 
political and economic instability ashore. The T.F.G. was further constrained and 
undermined by Somaliland’s functioning independence to the north, Puntland’s semi-
autonomous state in the northeast and its own limited influence outside of the capital 
Mogadishu. However, regional and international governments had significantly 
amplified multilateral counter-piracy initiatives and operations in the region. By 2011, 
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the I.M.B. recorded the highest number of attacks by Somali pirates since it began 
collating reports in 1992, at distances up to 1000nm from shore.
56
 
 
On 6 September 2011, a U.N.-backed consultative meeting was held in Mogadishu to 
address critical issues impeding the transition to permanent governmental institutions. 
This resulted in an ‘end of transition roadmap’ that outlined four key benchmarks to be 
addressed before the transition could be completed. These were security, the constitution, 
political outreach and reconciliation and good governance. The guidelines were a 
product of the Kampala Accord of June 2011 that outlined the need to establish a 
‘roadmap’ with ‘benchmarks, timelines and compliance mechanisms for the 
implementation of the priority task’.57 The section on security was divided between 
security in Mogadishu and greater Somalia and maritime security including counter 
piracy policy and strategy. The inclusion of a counter-piracy strategy illustrated the 
scale of the problem and the negative effect it was having on Somali’s fragile political 
institutions and international reputation. Key counter-piracy tasks included the 
formation of an operational Somali maritime police and coastal monitoring capability, a 
wider regional maritime security strategy, anti-piracy community engagement and the 
enactment of anti-piracy legislation.
58
 
 
By August 2012, a provisional constitution was created in conjunction with the course 
set out in the roadmap, which included provisions for tackling illegal dumping, 
establishing a judiciary, promoting peace and security and an anti-corruption 
commission to freeze, seize, confiscate or return any gains from criminal activity.
59
 
However, there was frequent criticism from elements within the international 
community that the T.F.G. was not doing enough to tackle piracy directly. The Russian 
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Federation, for example, expressed its disappointment over the T.F.G. rejection of an 
international proposal to establish an extraterritorial court to prosecute Somali pirates in 
2011.
60
 There were also more serious allegations of shielding suspected pirates, 
corruption and mismanagement of funds.
61
 Despite this, these stabilising political efforts 
ashore were an important element in bolstering wider regional and international counter-
piracy and maritime security efforts initiated during this period. 
 
Ransom Payments 
Prior to analysing humanitarian and legal programmes, it is important to briefly 
highlight the issue of ransom payments. As fig. 5.6 illustrates, payments for the return of 
hijacked vessels and kidnapped crews escalated significantly from an average of 
US$150,000 per crew/vessel in 2005 to an estimated US$5.2 million per crew/vessel in 
2010.
62
 However, ransom payments were often significantly higher, such as the 
estimated US$13.5 million reportedly paid for the release of the M.V. Irene SL in April 
2011.
63
 Piracy off the coast of Somalia was fuelled by this formalised hostage-for-
ransom model which, created so called ‘pirate-economies’ in certain towns where the 
proceeds of piracy became the chief source of revenue.
64
 This even reportedly extended 
to the formation of a piracy ‘stock exchange’ in the coastal town of Harardheere in 
2010.
65
 Considering that in 2011 proceeds from piracy equated to approximately 15 
percent of Somalia’s Gross Domestic Product (G.D.P.), it is unsurprising that systems 
developed to manage and invest in this revenue flow.
66
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Fig. 5.6 
Estimated average cost of ransom payments to Somali pirates [for the release of 
hijacked vessel & crew] 2005-13 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
US$2.2 
million 
US$1.5 
million 
US$6.5 
million 
US$38 
million 
US$117 
million 
US$238 
million 
US$160 
million 
US$31.7 
million 
US$21.6 
million 
Sources: Averages extrapolated from: Anna Bowden (ed.), ‘The economic cost of maritime piracy’ in 
One Earth Future Foundation Working Paper (Dec. 2010), pp 9-10; Anna Bowden and Shikha Basnet, 
‘The economic cost of Somali piracy 2011’ in One Earth Future Foundation Working Paper (2012), pp 
11-13; Jonathan Bellish, ‘The economic cost of Somali piracy 2012’ in One Earth Future Foundation 
Working Paper (2013), pp 10-13; Jens Vestergaard Madsen, Conor Seyle, Kellie Brandt, Ben Purser, 
Heather Randall, Kellie Roy, ‘ The state of maritime piracy 2013’ in One Earth Future Foundation 
Report (2014), p. 10; Roger Middleton, ‘Trends in piracy: a global problem with Somalia at the core’ in 
Global Challenge, Regional Responses: Forging a Common Approach to Maritime Piracy (Dubai, 2011), 
p. 22; I.C.C. I.M.B., Piracy reports 2005-2013. 
 
A report compiled by the World Bank and INTERPOL in 2013, outlined the typical 
dissemination of ransom payments between a network of sponsors and local supporters 
(see fig. 5.7). According to a U.N. report on transnational organised crime, this typically 
equated to 30 percent of the proceeds paid directly to the Pirate Action Group (P.A.G.), 
10 percent to the supportive infrastructure ashore, 10 percent in bribes or taxation to 
local community officials and elders with the remaining 50 percent to the financiers and 
sponsors of the operation.
67
 In some areas, as much as 20 percent of the proceeds were 
reportedly paid to local militias in control of seaports, such as an arrangement between 
pirates and Al-Shabaab in Harardheere around 2011.
68
 Despite only receiving an 
estimated 0.01 percent to 0.025 percent of an average ransom payment, an individual 
Somali pirate could still earn on average the equivalent of two to three years’ worth of 
salary for an armed guard at a humanitarian agency.
69
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Fig. 5.7 
Dispersion of ransom payments 
 
 
 
 
Source: Stuart Yikona, Clement Gorrissen, George Kisaka, Kevin Stephenson, David Lamair & Francisca 
Fernando, Pirate trails: tracking the illicit financial flows from pirate activities off the Horn of Africa 
(Washington D.C., 2013), p. 1. 
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Between 2005 and 2010, the average length of time a hostage was held by Somali 
pirates increased from 38 days to 152 days.
70
 In 2011, this had increased to an average 
of 177 days.
71
 While the potential proceeds from ransom payments were undoubtedly a 
driver of piratical activity off the Horn of Africa, the expense in detaining and sustaining 
hostages during protracted ransom negotiations significantly depleted the financial 
return. This may have been a contributory factor in the decline in attacks by 2013. 
According to the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (U.N.O.D.C.): ‘Since investors get 
paid first, and pirate expenses during negotiation are deducted from their share, some 
pirates may wind up barely breaking even’.72 
 
The ethical dilemma for shipping companies and governments in paying ransoms for the 
return of hostages was both a divisive and complex issue. While the payment of ransoms 
to pirates for the return of crew and vessel undoubtedly encouraged the spread of the 
activity, non-payment directly endangered the lives of seafarers.
73
 The United States 
government, for example, had long adopted a policy of the non-payment of ransoms. 
Thomas Kelly of the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs commented in relation to 
Somali piracy in 2012: ‘While some may consider ransoms a cost of doing business, 
every ransom paid further institutionalises the practice of hostage-taking for profit and 
promotes its expansion as a criminal enterprise’. 74  While most international 
governments subscribed to this theory of non-payment, several European nations such as 
France, Spain and Switzerland reportedly paid a combined US$81.5 million in ransom 
payments to Al-Qaeda and affiliate organisations for the release of hostages between 
2008 and 2014.
75
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In the case of pirate hijackings off the Somali coast, it was shipping companies; chiefly 
via a third party and not national governments that normally paid a ransom for the safe 
return of a crew, vessel and cargo as the preferred method of settlement. The I.M.B., for 
example, claimed paying ransoms to pirates promoted the humane treatment of hostages, 
limited the risk of environmental disasters and was a cost-effective and proven tool for 
conflict resolution.
76
 Contentious issues like ransom payments highlighted how Somali 
piracy had evolved into a regional phenomenon with global ramifications that required a 
global response. Moreover, the payment of a ransom, for example, could be avoided by 
addressing and countering the threat before a vessel was boarded. 
 
Humanitarian initiatives 
The foremost victims of piracy were the crewmembers that endured armed attacks and 
in some case prolonged periods of captivity under highly stressful conditions as ransom 
negotiations were taking place. As fig. 5.8 illustrates, 3,452 seafarers were held hostage 
by Somali pirates between 2008 and 2013 with others enduring various degrees of 
violence. The duration of captivity during ransom negotiations fluctuated from several 
weeks to three years, with an average detainment of eleven months in 2011.
77
 The 
twenty-two crewmembers of the M.V. Iceberg I, for example, were released in 
December 2012 after more than 1,000 days in captivity. Crewmembers held hostage 
ashore without a ship-owner or insurance company actively negotiating their release 
were designated ‘high-risk hostages’.78 The hijacking of the M.V. Albedo by Somali 
pirates in November 2010, illustrated a high-risk scenario. Following the hijacking, one 
crewmember was shot and killed and the remaining crew were eventually transferred 
ashore. The crewmembers had been held hostage for 1,131 days as of 31 December 
2013 and were reportedly subjected to ‘inhumane treatment in both psychological and 
physical forms’.79  
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Aside from the obvious trauma of long-term confinement there was, mostly after 2011, 
evidence of abuse of captured seafarers tantamount to torture. According to the former 
operational commander of EUNAVFOR, Major General Buster Howes, there were 
‘regular manifestations of systematic torture’ inflicted on hostages by Somali pirates.80 
Indeed, a surviving crewmember of the Iceberg I recounted that ‘they [Somali pirates] 
would tie our legs and turn us upside down […] they hit us with wooden planks and 
long wires and they never let us sleep at night […] they hurt us a lot’.81 To support 
seafarers and their dependents with the humanitarian aspects of trauma caused by a 
pirate attack or hostage-taking, a pan-industry Maritime Piracy Humanitarian Response 
Programme was launched in 2011.
82
 
 
The programme was created by an alliance of ship-owners, unions, managers, operating 
agents, insurers and welfare associations that offered humanitarian assistance, including 
psychological and financial support, to seafarers and their families following a piracy 
incident. Key initiatives launched by the programme included the establishment of a 
‘piracy helpline’, a professional aftercare network and ‘good practice’ guides for 
management of victims from pre-deployment, during the crisis and post release/post 
incident.
83
 The programme also established a fund in collaboration with supporters in 
the insurance and maritime industry to provide financial assistance to victims of piracy 
in relation to medical care, post-incident counselling and travel costs.
84
 
 
In March 2011, a similar campaign was launched to pressure international governments 
to address maritime piracy more proactively. The ‘Save Our Seafarers’ campaign aimed 
to eradicate maritime piracy by (i) working with industry to ensure the maintenance of 
naval forces involved in counter-piracy activity; (ii) ensuring pirates faced trial, 
sentencing and punishment; (iii) endorsing the U.N. principle of financing, building and 
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operating courts and jails in the cooperating autonomous regions of Somalia and 
neighbouring states; (iv) seeking a sustainable political solution; and (v) supporting the 
introduction of a criminal information database.
85
 The very existence of such 
programmes reflected the unprecedented volume of hostages and the need for 
subsequent psychological and financial support on a large scale. Moreover, they 
reflected a lack of provision and oversight for such incidents in the 2006 Maritime 
Labour Convention. These humanitarian missions also reflected the global reach of 
Somali-based piracy and an evolution in counter-piracy initiatives. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.8 
Types of violence perpetrated against seafarers: Somalia v. rest of the world 2008-13 
(inclusive) 
Type of violence Somalia/Horn of Africa Rest of the World TOTAL 
Hostage 3,452 1,352 4,804 
Injured 29 200 229 
Kidnap/ ransom 13 140 153 
Killed 26 18 44 
Missing (presumed dead) 15 15 30 
Threatened 0 91 91 
Source: I.C.C. I.M.B. Piracy report 2008 – 2013, pp 11-14. 
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Private Maritime Security Companies & Privately Contracted Armed 
Security Personnel  
P.M.S.C.s played an important role in reducing the number of successful Somali piracy 
attacks by 2013. The deployment of multinational naval counter-piracy patrols in 2008 
had the latent effect of displacing attacks from the relatively narrow shipping lanes of 
the Gulf of Aden farther into the western Indian Ocean. Somali pirates adapted and 
evolved their modus operandi by employing mother ships to exploit this vast sea-space 
and sustain P.A.G.s hundreds of miles from the shore. To mitigate this threat, shipping 
companies began to rely increasingly on the services of P.M.S.C.s in areas outside the 
remit of coalition naval forces. The growth of P.M.S.C.s was also influenced by 
increased insurance premiums for transit through the High Risk Area (H.R.A.) alongside 
a reticence to arm seafarers.
86
 
 
According to a report in the Wall Street Journal in 2010, insurance premium reductions 
of up to 50 percent were offered to shipping companies employing armed security on 
vessels transiting through the Gulf of Aden.
87
 Indeed, the employment of P.C.A.S.P. 
increased dramatically between 2008 and 2013. ‘EoS Risk Management’, a London 
based P.M.S.C., described how deployment on-board vessels transiting the H.R.A. had 
‘tripled’ in 2009 alone.88 By 2011, it was estimated that between 25 and 50 percent of all 
ships transiting the H.R.A. employed P.C.A.S.P.
89
 This figure increased to an estimated 
38-60 percent of all vessels by the end of 2012 or approximately 33,306 ships.
90
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On 9 November 2010, an ‘International code of conduct for private security service 
providers (I.C.O.C.)’ was created as a follow up to the 2008 ‘Montreux document on 
pertinent international legal obligations and good practices for States related to 
operations of private military and security companies during armed conflict’. The 
I.C.O.C. was a Swiss government-led multi-stakeholder initiative designed, in the first 
instance, to clarify international standards for the regulation of Private Security 
Companies; secondly, to establish rules of engagement consistent with international law 
and human rights principles; and, lastly, to establish specific principles for compliance, 
accreditation, weapons handling, vetting of contractors and overall accountability.
91
 
 
The I.C.O.C. was signed by 58 private security companies from fifteen countries at the 
inaugural signing in Geneva in November 2010. By 1 September 2013, this had risen to 
708 signatory companies from over seventy countries. Approximately 400 of these 
companies either specialised exclusively in counter-piracy and maritime security 
services or at the very least offered maritime security services.
92
 This illustrated a direct 
link between the escalation of piracy off the northeast coast of Africa and the 
proliferation of P.M.S.C.s., but more importantly, the increased demand for armed 
escort services. Such demand was unsurprising, perhaps, given that, as of 31 December 
2013, no vessel that employed P.C.A.S.P. had been successfully hijacked by Somali 
pirates.
93
 Aside from the obvious deterrent factor, P.M.S.C.s also represented a force 
multiplier and unburdened to some extent the already overextended counter-piracy naval 
assets in the region.  
 
Challenges 
While the advantages for contracting P.M.S.C.s while transiting the H.R.A. were 
obvious, there were related difficulties concerning legality, accountability, rules of 
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engagement and jurisdiction. These legal matters and attempts to standardise and 
regulate the industry are examined in more detail later in the chapter. Aside from this 
legal ambiguity, there was apprehension in certain quarters that the rise of P.M.S.C.s 
might generate an escalation in violence or simply displace attacks to unprotected 
vessels. However, in relation to facilitating higher levels of violence, the opposite 
appeared to hold true. Rather than engaging with P.C.A.S.P., Somali pirates tended to 
abandon an attack when embarked armed security was identified. The P.A.G. could 
simply wait for an unescorted and more vulnerable vessel to pass. According to Alex 
Shapiro, Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Bureau of Political-Military Affairs: ‘In most 
cases, as pirates approach a ship the armed security teams will use flares or loudspeakers 
to warn the pirates […] If the pirates keep coming, they will fire warning shots […] That 
is usually when the interaction ends’.94 This was not always the case however. A report 
in the New York Times dated 24 March 2010, for example, detailed an engagement 
between a P.A.G. and a P.M.S.C. detachment in which a pirate was killed. In relation to 
this incident, Royal Navy Cmdr. John Harbour commented: ‘Normally, the private 
security firms fire warning shots [in this case] the pirates came for a second time firing 
their guns, and the security team fired back’.95 
 
Fig. 5.9 
Total yearly estimated average cost of P.C.A.S.P. and other security provisions for 
transit through H.R.A. 2010-13 
 P.C.A.S.P. Security equipment Total 
2010 US$849 million US$578 million US$1.4 billion 
2011 US$581 million US$531 million US$1.1 billion 
2012 US$1.37 billion US$514 million US$1.9 billion 
2013 US$821 million US$273 million US$1.0 billion 
Source: Averages extrapolated from: Anna Bowden (ed.), ‘The economic cost of maritime piracy’ in One 
Earth Future Foundation Working Paper (Dec. 2010), pp 9-10; Anna Bowden and Shikha Basnet, ‘The 
economic cost of Somali piracy 2011’ in One Earth Future Foundation Working Paper (2012), pp 11-13; 
Jonathan Bellish, ‘The economic cost of Somali piracy 2012’ in One Earth Future Foundation Working 
Paper (2013), pp 10-13; Jens Vestergaard Madsen, Conor Seyle, Kellie Brandt, Ben Purser, Heather 
Randall, Kellie Roy, ‘ The state of maritime piracy 2013’ in One Earth Future Foundation Report (2014). 
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In terms of cost, as fig. 5.9 illustrates, significant financial resources were invested in 
P.C.A.S.P. alongside additional security equipment for transit through the H.R.A. In 
2012 alone, shipping companies spent an estimated US$1.37 billion on P.C.A.S.P.
96
 
This resulted in an average of US$34,000 per transit for a three-guard team and 
US$46,000 per transit for a four-guard team in 2012.
97
 Despite the expense, employing 
P.M.S.C.s was generally a more cost effective strategy than re-routing around the Cape 
of Good Hope, absorbing increased insurance premiums or paying a ransom for the 
return of a hijacked vessel and crew. 
 
There was, however, concern expressed in government circles that some shipping 
companies were neglecting implementation of B.M.P. while employing P.M.S.C.s. 
According to B.M.P. guidelines: ‘If armed Private Maritime Security Contractors are to 
be used they must be as an additional layer of protection and not as an alternative to 
B.M.P.’.98 The United States, for example, highlighted additional problems with the 
abstruse international regulatory regime regarding P.M.S.C.s such as the undesirable use 
of force or a successful attack by pirates against a vessel protected by substandard 
P.C.A.S.P.
99
 The Enrica Lexie incident, in which two Indian fishermen were reportedly 
mistaken for pirates and shot dead by Italian Marines as part of a six man anti-piracy 
marine detachment, highlighted the related dangers associated with the widespread, 
unregulated deployment of P.M.S.C.s. The Enrica Lexie incident called into question 
international piracy law, territorial jurisdiction and prompted a diplomatic incident 
between India and Italy. The legal ramifications of the case are addressed in more detail 
later in this chapter. 
 
Aside from P.M.S.C.s, which were essentially exploiting the disorder at sea for profit, 
private military and security companies were also active ashore in Somalia. A U.N. 
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report from 2013 detailed how foreign contractors, such as the London based ‘Saracen 
Security’, were providing military training and equipment to the Puntland Maritime 
Police Force in violation of the Security Council arms embargo and therefore 
represented a threat to stability in Somalia.
100
 Moreover, the report identified that 
without appropriate regulation and oversight, entities such as the Puntland Maritime 
Police Force had been utilised, for example, for internal political activity outside the 
remit of anti-piracy operations.
101
 Despite the challenges and impediments discussed 
here, in terms of reducing the number of successful hijackings and attacks off the coast 
of Somalia, P.M.S.C.s were, in conjunction with the various other counter-piracy 
initiatives, a key contributory factor. 
 
Legal issues 
Clarifying the rules of engagement for counter-piracy operations off the coast of 
Somalia and legislating for the deployment and operation of P.M.S.C.s, presented an 
exceptional and challenging set of problems for lawmakers. Somalia’s unique position 
as a failed state void of any indigenous maritime security capability or enforcement 
capacity challenged traditional maritime legal norms. The U.N. and the I.M.O. alongside 
other international organisations such as INTERPOL attempted to address the legal 
strictures for counteracting Somali piracy and actively encouraged and supported 
regional states such as Kenya and the Seychelles in enhancing regional judicial capacity 
to assist in the prosecution and detention of suspects. Unilaterally, several international 
and regional states also initiated domestic counter-piracy reform, particularly in relation 
to legislating for the crime of piracy to enable more effective prosecution, sentencing 
and imprisonment. 
 
While the limitations of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as a 
counter-piracy mechanism have been addressed in chapter II, Professor Robert Beckman 
argued that international law was not the problem. He suggested instead that ‘states did 
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not have the political will to exercise the rights they had or fulfil their obligations [...] 
the law just provided the framework, what you need then is the political will to enforce 
that’.102 Regional and international states appeared reluctant to prosecute piracy suspects 
under alternative legislation such as the convention for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Acts against the Safety Maritime Navigation (SUA) (1988) or the convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (1971). These conventions were considered 
counter-terrorism legislation and therefore seemingly did not satisfy the ‘private gain’ 
condition for piracy under UNCLOS. However, according to Beckman, ‘every attack by 
Somali pirates is also an offence under SUA and an offence under the hostage taking 
convention […] if you hijack a ship you are an international criminal […] if you enter 
anyone’s territory they must arrest you and they must either prosecute you or extradite 
you, the obligation is clear’.103 Unlike UNCLOS, which outlined that every state may 
detain and arrest pirates and decide upon penalties to be imposed, the SUA convention 
obliged signatories to, regardless of whether or not the act was committed in its territory, 
either to prosecute offenders or to extradite them to another state with jurisdiction 
without exception.
104
 
 
Evolution of U.N. Security Council Resolutions 
The ambiguity surrounding the ‘high seas’ stipulation for piracy under UNCLOS and 
the rules of engagement for counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia was 
addressed by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1816 in 2008. It authorised for the first 
time, all states in accordance with international law and the T.F.G. of Somalia, to secure 
the territorial and international waters off the coast of Somalia for the safe conduct of 
shipping and navigation.
105
 Significantly, Resolution 1816 stipulated that states 
cooperating with the T.F.G. of Somalia could enter Somali territorial waters and use all 
necessary means to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea in a manner 
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consistent with such action permitted on the high seas with respect to piracy under 
relevant international law.
106
 This essentially meant that piracy under UNCLOS, i.e. ‘an 
act committed outside the jurisdiction of any state’, was now applicable to the territorial 
sea of Somalia. Indeed, the U.N. Security Council produced over twenty resolutions that 
directly and indirectly addressed Somali piracy between 2005 and 2013. This was a 
clear indication of how the issue had evolved into a global, strategic concern. It is 
important to note that the U.N. Resolution 1816 did not create new legal paradigms for 
suppressing piracy. Instead, it simply extended the high-seas piracy provision in 
UNCLOS to include the territorial waters of Somalia with the consent of the T.F.G.  
 
By December 2008, this had evolved to include land-based counter-piracy operations 
with an emphasis on investigation and prosecution through U.N. Security Council 
Resolution 1851. This authorised states and regional organisations cooperating in the 
fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia for which 
‘advance notification’ had been provided by the T.F.G. to the Secretary-General to 
‘undertake all necessary measures that are appropriate in Somalia, for the purpose of 
suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea’.107 By 2013, the U.N. Security 
Council had evolved its counter-piracy mandate into a more holistic strategy that 
included calls for the accreditation and standardisation of P.M.S.C.s, judicial capacity 
building, combating illicit international financial flows and enhancing domestic piracy 
legislation.
108
 
 
Indeed, the U.N. highlighted how disharmony between domestic piracy legislation and 
international conventions had hampered more robust international counter-piracy efforts, 
often resulting in the premature release of suspects despite strong evidence of guilt.
109
 
U.N. Resolution 2025 (2013) reiterated how international conventions like UNCLOS 
and the SUA Convention obliged parties to ‘create criminal offences, establish 
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jurisdiction, and accept delivery of persons responsible for or suspected of seizing or 
exercising control over a ship by force or threat thereof or any other form of 
intimidation’.110 However, it is also likely that, as previously highlighted, there was a 
dearth of political resolve to extradite Somali pirates for prosecution given the logistical, 
legal and financial corollaries of such action. 
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Fig. 5.10 
United Nations Security Council Resolutions concerning piracy in Somalia 2006-13 
Source: U.N.S.C., Resolution 1676 (2006); 1772 (2007); 1801 (2008); 1816 (2008); 1838 (2008); 1844 
(2008); 1846 (2008); 1851 (2008); 1872 (2009); 1897 (2009); 1910 (2010); 1918 (2010); 1950 (2010); 
1976 (2011); 2015 (2011); 2020 (2011); 2036 (2012); 2067 (2012); 2077 (2012); 2125 (2013). 
U.N.S.C. Date Principal measure 
Resolution 1676 10 May 2006 Expressed concern over increase in incidents of piracy 
Resolution 1772 20 Aug. 2007 Noted the joint communiqué of the I.M.O. & W.F.P. of 10 July 2007 
Resolution 1801 20 Feb. 2008 Stressed concern over upsurge following Secretary-General’s report 
Resolution 1816 02 June 2008 Authorised naval forces to enter Somali territorial waters 
Resolution 1838 07 Oct. 2008 Called upon states to deploy military assets to combat piracy 
Resolution 1844 20 Nov. 2008 Noted role of piracy in financing embargo violations 
Resolution 1846 02 Dec. 2008 Called on states to implement obligations under SUA Convention 
Resolution 1851 16 Dec. 2008 Authorised land-based counter-piracy operations in Somalia 
Resolution 1872 26 May 2009 Requested international adherence to Djibouti Agreement 
Resolution 1897 30 Nov. 2009 Urged states to facilitate investigation & prosecution 
Resolution 1910 28 Jan. 2010 Renewed AMISOM mandate 
Resolution 1918 27 Apr. 2010 Called on states to prosecute and imprison pirates 
Resolution 1950 23 Nov. 2010 Investigate international networks financing and facilitating piracy  
Resolution 1976 11 Apr. 2011 Called for extraterritorial specialised anti-piracy court 
Resolution 2015 24 Oct. 2011 Called for construction of prisons to hold pirates 
Resolution 2020 22 Nov. 2011 Expressed concern over low number of prosecutions for piracy 
Resolution 2036 22 Feb. 2012 Called for comprehensive counter-piracy strategy 
Resolution 2067 18 Sept. 2012 Consolidate security in areas secured by AMISOM and S.N.S.F. 
Resolution 2077 21 Nov. 2012 Strengthening of Somali maritime capacity 
Resolution 2125 18 Nov. 2013 Standardisation of certification for P.M.S.C.s 
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United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime: Counter-Piracy Programme 
Aside from an abundance of counter-piracy resolutions and recommendations, the 
U.N.O.D.C. initiated its own Counter-Piracy Programme in 2009, which was 
fundamental in the establishment of a regional ‘piracy prosecution model’. This model 
facilitated the transfer of suspected pirates apprehended by international naval assets to 
regional states such as Kenya, Mauritius and the Seychelles for prosecution and 
imprisonment. This was complemented by a U.N.O.D.C. ‘piracy prisoner transfer 
programme’ that facilitated the transfer of convicted pirates to serve their sentence in 
prisons in greater Somalia to enhance prospects for rehabilitation and reintegration. For 
the programme to be effective, regional states and entities had to create domestic 
legislation consistent with the fundamental tenets of criminal law and existing 
international practice with the assistance of the Counter-Piracy Programme. In this 
regard, both Somaliland and Puntland passed several laws in 2012 that facilitated the 
transfer of prisoners convicted of piracy (see fig. 5.11). 
 
In Kenya, for example, by January 2013 there were 64 piracy suspects remanded, 74 
convicted, 17 acquitted and 10 repatriated to Somalia.
111
 Similarly, in the Seychelles 
there were 21 piracy suspects remanded, 102 convicted and 34 transferred back to 
Somalia to complete their sentences.
112
 The Counter-Piracy Programme also provided 
training for regional prosecutors, learning exchanges for regional judges, criminal 
analyst training for intelligence officers, witness protection facilities, courtroom 
refurbishment alongside handover guidance for international navies on how to present 
piracy cases for prosecution in regional courts.
113
 By the close of 2013, the ‘piracy 
prisoner transfer programme’ had implemented infrastructural updates and vocational 
training programmes in three Somali prisons: Hargeysa Central, Mandhera and Bosasso 
alongside the construction of sixty-bed prison block in Seychelles. U.N.O.D.C. 
                                                 
111
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complemented these efforts with the publication of model laws in mutual assistance in 
criminal matters, witness protection, money laundering and the financing of terrorism.114 
 
Fig. 5.11 
Counter-piracy and prisoner extradition legislation passed by Somaliland & Puntland, 2012 
Somaliland Puntland 
1. The Law for Combating Piracy Law (or the 
Piracy Law) -  Law No. 52 (2012) 
1. Puntland Piracy Law – No. 18 (19 Nov. 
2012) 
2. Somaliland Transfer of Prisoners Law - Law 
No. 53 (2012) 
2. Law on Transfer of Convicted Prisoners of 
the State of Puntland (15 Nov. 2012) 
 
3. Amendment of Law on Transfer of 
Convicted Prisoners of the State of Puntland 
(17 Nov. 2012) 
 4. Puntland Prison Law (20 Sept. 2012) 
Source: U.N.O.D.C., ‘Piracy prisoner transfer programme’, available at 
(http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/piracy/piracy-prisoner-transfer-programme.html) (30 Jan. 2015). 
 
International Maritime Organization 
The I.M.O. council elected ‘piracy: orchestrating the response’ as the theme for the 
thirty-fourth World Maritime Day in December 2011. Former I.M.O. Secretary General 
Efthimios E. Mitropoulos outlined several key priorities for the long-term suppression of 
piracy off the coast of Somalia including the capture, prosecution and punishment of 
those involved in piracy, the tracing of ransom money and the confiscation of proceeds 
of crime derived from hijacked ships.
115
 Aside from disseminating legal guidance to 
ship owners and operators,
116
 the I.M.O. was instrumental in the convening of the 
Djibouti meeting and subsequent ‘Code of conduct’ in 2009. A fundamental aim of the 
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meeting was to strengthen the judicial capacity of participant states, article 4 (a) of the 
‘Code of conduct’, for example, obliged participants to cooperate in ‘arresting, 
investigating, and prosecuting persons who have committed piracy or are reasonably 
suspected of committing piracy’.117 The code also obliged signatories to review national 
legislation towards ensuring that domestic law criminalised piracy and armed robbery 
against ships, and that adequate guidelines were in place for the exercise of jurisdiction, 
conduct of investigations, and prosecutions of alleged offenders.
118
 
 
In furtherance of these goals, I.M.O. Resolution A.1025 outlined the code of practice for 
the investigation of crimes of piracy and armed robbery against ships. The resolution 
highlighted the importance of actionable domestic legislation and outlined how 
inefficient legislative frameworks and investigative guidelines hampered conviction 
rates. In terms of investigating acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea, the code 
highlighted four key areas: training of investigators, investigative strategy, dealing with 
an initial report and proportional subsequent investigation.
119
 Correct investigation of 
maritime piracy was accomplished by establishing and recording all relevant facts, 
recording individual witness accounts, detailed forensic examination of scenes, 
searching intelligence databases and distribution of intelligence to appropriate 
agencies.
120
 
 
In addition, the I.M.O. attempted to strengthen Somali judicial capability by collating a 
list of Somali laws relevant to maritime law enforcement within the different Somali 
entities including Puntland and Somaliland in March 2013. In terms of strengthening 
industry counter-piracy defensive measures, the I.M.O. published guidance on the 
implementation of B.M.P. through Resolution 324 in May 2011 alongside a 
comprehensive counter-piracy Resolution A.1044 in December that year. The I.M.O.’s 
Global Integrated Shipping Information System also helped circulate important 
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legislation and guidance to ship owners, operators and members of the public on local 
regulations, the Safety Of Life At Sea (SOLAS) convention, I.S.P.S. code, the 
International maritime dangerous goods code and surveys and certification.
121
 
 
Legislating for Private Maritime Security Companies 
The escalation in the deployment of P.C.A.S.P. following the upsurge in piracy off the 
coast of Somalia around 2008 resulted in an urgent need to regulate and standardise the 
industry. Key issues included certification to agreed international standards, rules of 
engagement for the use of force and the movement and use of firearms transiting the 
territorial waters of a sovereign state. The lack of an accepted international legal 
standard for the deployment of P.M.S.C. under UNCLOS meant that the domestic law 
of the flag state governed their use. This adhered to article 94 of UNCLOS, which 
outlined that every state must ‘assume jurisdiction under its internal law over each ship 
flying its flag and its master, officers and crew in respect of administrative, technical 
and social matters concerning the ship’.122 This meant that there were several different 
international legal frameworks governing the use of P.M.S.C. on board vessels.  
 
The I.C.O.C., as previously discussed, was a follow up to the 2008 ‘Montreux 
document’, and represented the first multi-stakeholder led attempt to standardise the 
private security industry through the creation of an independent oversight mechanism 
alongside certification, auditing, monitoring and reporting.
123
 However, it was not until 
May 2012 that the I.M.O., in conjunction with the C.G.P.C.S. adopted four sets of 
interim ‘soft law’ guidelines on the use of P.C.A.S.P on board ships in the High Risk 
Area. These quasi-legal guidelines were directed at, in the first instance, ship-owners, 
ship-operators and shipmasters followed by P.M.S.C.s and their personnel and finally 
port, coastal and flag states. Together the documents outlined detailed requirements and 
guidance on the regulations and minimum standards for the selection, deployment and 
disembarkation of P.C.A.S.P. For example, MSC.1/Circ.1443 for ship-owners, ship-
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operators and shipmasters, outlined P.M.S.C. selection criteria and risk assessment, 
service provision considerations alongside rules for the use of force and management of 
firearms and ammunition from embarkation to disembarkation.
124
 Similarly, 
MSC.1/Circ.1443 provided interim guidelines for P.M.S.C.s providing P.C.A.S.P. that 
included standards for professional certification, applicable laws of flag, port and coastal 
states with respect to the transport, carriage, storage and use of firearms, operational 
competence alongside legal documentation requirements, selection, vetting and rules for 
the use of force.
125
 
 
These guidelines provided the foundation for the development of the International 
Organization for Standardization/ Publicly Available Specification (I.S.O/P.A.S.) 28007 
on guidelines for P.M.S.C.s providing P.C.A.S.P. on board ships, published in 
December 2012. The guidelines published under I.S.O/P.A.S. 28007 differentiated from 
the 2010 I.C.O.C. as it specifically addressed maritime private security regulation as 
opposed to land-based private security. Indeed, it was the only published international 
standard regulating for the deployment of armed guards on ships. Moreover, 
I.S.O/P.A.S. 28007 was drafted at the request of the I.M.O. and endorsed by various 
international governments and law enforcement agencies such as INTERPOL, the 
European Commission and the C.G.P.C.S. Key components of the specification 
included security management systems for pre-transit planning and training, legal and 
regulatory requirements including rules for the use of force, incident investigation and 
crime scene management alongside performance evaluation including internal audits 
and monitoring.
126
 According to Giles Noakes, BIMCO’s Chief Maritime Security 
Officer: ‘There are other standards being claimed as being suitable recognition of 
competence [e.g. I.C.O.C.] but in the view of BIMCO, these very much lack the depth 
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of detail and relevance that a certified I.S.O/P.A.S. 28007 P.M.S.C. will provide to 
members’.127 This view was endorsed by I.M.O. Secretary–General Koji Sekimizu, who 
stated that the regulation would be ‘particularly useful to flag states and [would] in turn 
help ship owners who urgently need practical as well as legally acceptable solutions’.128 
 
Other organisations and individuals also contributed to regulatory discourse on the 
deployment of P.C.A.S.P on board ships. In 2013, following almost two years of 
consultation with marine industry stakeholders, an international model set of maritime 
Rules for the Use of Force (R.U.F.) were published. The ‘100 Series Rules’ were drafted 
to compliment existing legislation including the SOLAS Convention, I.S.O/P.A.S. 
28007, I.M.O. Maritime Safety Committee outputs and applicable national and 
international law.
129
 The R.U.F. did not bind flag states to their use, but instead provided 
a template for optional incorporation into domestic regulation. According to the lead 
author David Hammond: ‘This objective international legal test is deemed to be of a 
higher legal standard than that of subjective national legislative provisions for self-
defence’.130 In addition, the U.N. Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, 
developed a soft law instrument including guidelines and standards regarding the use of 
P.C.A.S.P. on-board merchant vessels aimed at private sector companies and 
international governments in 2013. 
 
Despite a lack of a universally accepted legal foundation for the deployment of private 
maritime security personnel, by the end of 2013 substantial efforts had been made to 
regulate the private maritime security industry. According to the Chief Executive of the 
Nautical Institute, Philip Wake: ‘they are much better organised now […] there is a 
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proper industry association helping to regulate it and proper contracts have been put in 
place […] proper assessment and scrutiny of employees is largely in place […]’.131 
 
Enrica Lexie case 
The case of the M.V. Enrica Lexie highlighted a ‘grey area’ in terms of maritime 
jurisdiction and the legal rights applicable in zones under UNCLOS, chiefly in relation 
to armed security detachments on board commercial vessels. As previously highlighted, 
the incident involved the shooting dead of two Indian fishermen by two Italian marines 
as part of a six-man Vessel Protection Detachment (V.P.D.) on board the Italian flagged 
Enrica Lexie. V.P.D.s consisted of small teams of naval or military personnel placed on 
board commercial vessels in an almost identical role to P.C.A.S.P., but with formal 
government authorisation. This had traditionally been the preferred method of close-
protection by the shipping industry. Nautilus International, for example, stated in a 2011 
U.K. Foreign Affairs Committee report for parliament that V.P.D.s ‘would ensure there 
are no concerns regarding training and authority and we believe this would be cost-
effective and provide direct protection to merchant vessels’.132 
 
The case of the Enrica Lexie highlighted several legal difficulties surrounding the 
deployment of armed guards on commercial vessels, illustrated by the various 
arguments made by the defence council for the Italian marines and the Indian 
prosecutorial staff. Legal representatives for the Italian marines argued that the incident 
occurred within international waters as per article 97 of UNCLOS; i.e. outside the 12 nm 
territorial limit of Indian sovereign waters and therefore the flag state (i.e. Italy) had sole 
jurisdiction to try the offence.
133
 Whereas Indian prosecutors argued under the 
provisions of the SUA Convention and the ‘Territorial waters, continental shelf, 
Exclusive Economic Zone and other maritime zones act’ (1976), that India had criminal 
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jurisdiction over both the contiguous zone and the E.E.Z. (i.e. 200 nm from baseline) 
given that it was a criminal case involving Indian citizens in an Indian registered boat.
134
  
 
The case highlighted several important legal issues pertaining to broader maritime 
security and counter-piracy and the deployment of armed security such as the ambiguity 
of UNCLOS in terms of the extent of jurisdictional scope over maritime zones, rules of 
engagement, sovereign immunity and authorisation for military personnel aboard 
commercial vessels. While there had been several reported incidents in which fishermen 
have been mistakenly killed by anti-piracy forces, such as the 2008 case where an Indian 
navy vessel fire upon a Thai trawler after mistaken it for a pirate mother-ship, the Enrica 
Lexie incident was unique as it had been brought under judicial scrutiny.
135
 
 
Prosecutions 
Prosecuting piracy suspects emerged as an early impediment to counter-piracy efforts 
off the coast of Somalia given the lack of regional judicial capacity, outmoded or non-
existent domestic legislation among the extra-regional states engaged in naval counter-
piracy operations and an apparent lack of political will to exercise universal jurisdiction 
to prosecute cases. Indeed, prior to the upsurge of piracy attacks in Northeast Africa, 
piracy legislation was predominately abstract and very rarely utilised in criminal 
proceedings. There was also some apprehension in western states that imprisoned pirates 
would, on release, claim asylum.
136
 
 
In 2009, U.N. Resolution 1897 highlighted how limited domestic legislation in relation 
to facilitating the extradition and prosecution of suspected pirates after capture by 
nations engaged in counter-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa had resulted in the 
premature release of suspects.
137
 This so called ‘catch and release’ policy largely 
consisted of boarding a suspect skiff, destroying weaponry and related equipment, 
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gathering biometric data from suspects followed by the release of suspects and vessel.
138
 
This resulted in calls by the U.N. for the creation of provisions under domestic law for 
criminalising piracy and procedural provisions for the effective criminal prosecution of 
suspected pirates under, for example, the SUA Convention. One possible solution 
proposed by Jack Lang, former U.N. special advisor to the Secretary General on legal 
issues related to piracy off the coast of Somalia, was the creation of specialised Somali 
and extraterritorial piracy courts.
139
 However, such an initiative failed to materialise 
primarily due to substantial legal, constitutional and political impediments. According to 
Douglas Guilfoyle:  
 
All other factors aside, the need for extensive law reform to support a 
Somalia extra-territorial court underlines that this would be a novel 
experiment in terms of substantive law, thus making no use of the existing 
regional experience of prosecuting pirates in national systems.
140
 
 
A more effective apparatus appeared to be the U.N.O.D.C. Counter-Piracy Programme’s 
regional ‘piracy prosecution model’ that utilised existing domestic legislation to 
prosecute pirates in national courts. This proved to be a comparatively successful 
initiative. Between January 2006 and January 2012, twenty regional and international 
states had detained 1063 suspects with approximately 612 cases resulting in convictions 
for piracy (see figs 5.12 & 5.13).
141
 By December 2013, this figure had increased to over 
1,200 suspects either convicted or detained for the crime of piracy in twenty-one 
countries, including several E.U. Member States.
142
 Regionally, Kenya was the first 
state to accept Somali pirates for prosecution in 2006. By late 2013, Kenya had secured 
83 piracy convictions whereas Seychelles had secured 70.
143
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The U.N. recognised the comparative success of regional piracy prosecutions and 
commended Kenya, Mauritius, Seychelles and Tanzania for their efforts in both 
prosecuting suspected pirates in their national courts and incarcerating convicted pirates 
in a third state after trial elsewhere.
144
 Despite the outward success of the regional piracy 
prosecution model, there was acknowledgment by Alan Cole, the Regional Coordinator 
of the U.N.O.D.C. Counter-Piracy Programme, that the organisers and facilitators of 
piracy remained relatively untouched. He stated: ‘While the young men in boats have 
been investigated, prosecuted and imprisoned in large numbers, those behind the crime 
have been left largely unscathed’.145 Cole identified less than six successful prosecutions 
of pirate financiers and organisers as of June 2013 primarily due to the complexities of 
identifying, investigating and arresting such suspects.
146
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
144
 U.N. Security Council, ‘Resolution 2125’, 18 Nov. 2013 (U.N., D.H.L., S/RES/2125/2013, p. 4). 
145
 Alan Cole, ‘Large-scale prosecution of Somali piracy suspects: what have we learned?’, 11 Sept. 2013, 
p. 4, available at (http://www.counterpiracy.ae/upload/2013briefing/Cole%20Alan%20Sec1Ch3%20 
Final%20Briefing%20Paper-En-Website.pdf) (06 Feb. 2015). 
146
 Cole, ‘Large-scale prosecution of Somali piracy suspects […]’, p. 4. 
 -297- 
Fig. 5.12 
Global piracy prosecutions 2006-12 
 
Country No. held Additional information 
Belgium 1 1 convicted 
Comoros 6 n/a 
France 15 5 convicted 
Germany 10 n/a 
India 119 n/a 
Japan 4 n/a 
Kenya 143 50 convicted 
Madagascar 12 n/a 
Malaysia 7 n/a 
Maldives  37 Awaiting deportation 
Netherlands 29 10 convicted 
Oman 22 All convicted 
Seychelles 70 63 convicted 
Rep. of Korea 5 5 convicted 
Spain 2 Both convicted 
United Arab Emirates 10 n/a 
United Rep. of Tanzania 12 6 convicted 
United States of America 28 17 convicted 
Yemen 129 123 convicted / 6 acquitted 
Total 661  
 
Source: ‘Report of the Secretary-General on specialised anti-piracy courts in Somalia and other States in 
the region’, 20 Jan. 2012 (U.N., D.H.L., S/2012/50, p. 5). 
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Criminalisation of piracy under domestic law 
Internationally, there were substantial steps taken in several countries to comply with 
U.N. requests to criminalise piracy under domestic law to expedite the extradition and 
prosecution of Somali piracy suspects. The U.N. Division for Ocean Affairs and the 
Law of the Sea compiled a database on national legislation on piracy in October 2011 
from fifty nations.
147
 There had been several incidents of Somali pirates tried in extra-
regional courts. Japan, for example, enacted legislation entitled ‘Penalisation of acts of 
piracy and measures against acts of piracy’ in July 2009. Subsequently, in February 
2013, the Tokyo District Court sentenced three Somali defendants to between five and 
ten years imprisonment for the crime of piracy.
148
 
 
Similarly, several European nations accepted Somali piracy suspects for judicial 
proceedings between 2008 and 2013. The first piracy case to be tried in Europe in living 
memory occurred in the Netherlands in June 2010. A Rotterdam court sentenced five 
Somali nationals to five years imprisonment each for the attack upon Dutch flagged 
cargo ship the M.V. Samanyolu in the Gulf of Aden in 2009.
149
 In December 2011, a 
Paris court sentenced five of the six Somali nationals accused of pirating the French 
yacht Carre d'As IV and holding her crew hostage off the coast of Somalia in 2008 to 
between four and eight years imprisonment.
150
 More recently in October 2012, a court in 
Hamburg found ten Somali nationals guilty on charges of kidnapping and conducting an 
attack on maritime traffic. In one of the longest trials in post-war German history, judges 
sentenced the men to prison terms ranging from two to seven years for the April 2010 
hijacking of a German-flagged container ship, the M.V. Taipan.
151
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The relative success in prosecuting Somali pirates in regional and international courts 
was facilitated in several ways. The widespread ratification of UNCLOS and the SUA 
Convention by international states following requests from the U.N. enhanced the 
judicial scope to prosecute for piracy. By 2012, 162 nations had ratified UNCLOS 
whereas 156 had ratified the SUA Convention.
152
 A smaller number of states also 
adapted domestic law to criminalise piracy and facilitate prosecution in national courts. 
These processes were streamlined by the U.N.O.D.C. Counter-Piracy Programme’s 
regional 'piracy prosecution model' alongside assistance from international criminal 
investigative bodies such as Europol and INTERPOL. Despite this, it should be noted 
that just one case of prosecution was attained under the SUA Convention since its 
ratification. Moreover, the 2008 case of the ‘United States v. Shi’ was the first time in 
almost two hundred years that a U.S. court invoked the doctrine of universal jurisdiction 
over piracy.
153
  
 
In January 2010, INTERPOL created a Maritime Piracy Task Force that focussed on 
improving evidence collection for effective prosecution, facilitating data exchange and 
building regional judiciary capabilities.
154
 The effectiveness of the task force was 
amplified by the ‘Global database on maritime piracy’ that comprised of over 4,000 
records of personal details of pirates and financiers, phone records, hijacking incidents 
and bank accounts used in ransom payments.
155
 In January 2012, Europol in conjunction 
with INTERPOL, under the auspices of the European Union’s judicial cooperation unit 
‘Eurojust’, created a ‘joint investigation team’ to collect admissible evidence for legal 
action against major piracy financiers, negotiators and organisers.
156
 Notwithstanding 
these efforts, the U.N. Security Council Resolution 2125 of November 2013 reiterated 
earlier concerns that limited domestic legislation continued to hamper the effective 
                                                 
152
 See: I.M.O., ‘Status of conventions’ (http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/StatusOfConventions 
/Pages/Default.aspx). 
153
 Eugene Kontorovich, ‘Unites States v. Shi – international decisions’ in American Journal of 
International Law, ciii, no. 4 (Oct. 2009), p. 734. 
154
 INTERPOL, ‘Maritime piracy’, available at (http://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Maritime-piracy/ 
Maritime-piracy) (09 Feb. 2015). 
155
 INTERPOL, ‘Intelligence’, available at (http://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Maritime-piracy/ 
Intelligence) (09 Feb. 2015). 
156
 E.E.A.S., ‘Factsheet […]’, p. 4. 
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prosecution of pirates and suspected pirates continued to be released ‘without facing 
justice’.157 
 
Fig. 5.13 
Somalia piracy prosecutions 2006-12 
Somalia No. held Additional information 
Puntland 290 Approximately 240 convicted 
Somaliland 94 
68 convicted (60 subsequently 
released) 
South Central 18 Status of trial unclear 
Total 402  
Source: U.N., S/2012/50, p. 5. 
 
Conclusion 
The escalation of piracy off the Horn of Africa after 2005 was unprecedented. By 2008, 
the international community was forced to intervene and respond to what had evolved 
into a regional crisis with global ramifications. The chronic instability ashore in Somalia 
not only precipitated maritime criminality but also meant that there was no indigenous 
capability to counteract it unilaterally. Despite this, by 2013 a provisional constitution 
had been created for Somalia alongside several regional and internationally led 
programmes aimed at increasing domestic security capability on land and at sea, judicial 
capacity and political stability. The upsurge in piracy was largely facilitated by the 
substantial revenue streams available through ransom payments, which emerged as a 
fundamental obstacle to counteracting the problem. 
 
The rise of P.M.S.C.s emerged as a critical force-multiplier in countering Somali piracy 
in the western Indian Ocean particularly as attacks were frequently reported at distances 
over 1,000nm miles from the coast and therefore outside the remit of limited 
multinational naval patrols.
158
 Regulating for the emergent industry posed a significant 
                                                 
157
 U.N., S/RES/2125, p. 3. 
158
 I.C.C. I.M.B., Piracy report 2013, p. 22. 
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challenge for legislators and the shipping industry. Moreover, ‘Rules for the Use of 
Force’ for P.C.A.S.P. did not become standardised in any material way until 2013. 
Indeed, the broader legal framework for navies involved in counter-piracy operations off 
the coast of Somalia resulted in a re-evaluation, primarily in academic and legal circles, 
on the practical application of international law and ‘universal jurisdiction’ to prosecute 
for the crime of piracy. This was further complicated by outdated, disharmonious or 
non-existent domestic legislation alongside an apparent lack of political will, which 
initially hampered the extradition and prosecution of suspected pirates. International 
efforts to address the escalation of piracy off the coast of Somali had to frequently adapt 
and evolve toward a more holistic, multi-sectoral and multi-faceted counter-piracy 
strategy. These non-military, diplomatic and jurisdictional efforts formed an important 
foundation for the comprehensive international and regional military, industry and 
political response to countering Somali piracy after 2008. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
A global response to a regional threat? 2005-13 
 
 
All maritime nations are affected by these challenges, and all of us must bear a hand in 
taking them on. The future of maritime security depends like never before on international 
cooperation and understanding. Frankly, we need each other.
1
 
 
Introduction 
Between 2005 and 2008, aside from the brief rule of the Union of Islamic Courts 
(U.I.C.), Somali pirates could hijack and hold ships and crew for ransom without any 
real danger of interdiction or reprisal. More troubling, perhaps, were several attacks on 
World Food Programme (W.F.P.) vessels delivering vital humanitarian aid to the region 
between 2005 and 2007. These incidents, alongside an upsurge in violent attacks and 
hijackings against merchant shipping transiting the region in 2008, necessitated a more 
proactive international and regional response. United Nations (U.N.) Security Council 
Resolution 1816 of 2 June 2008 was the first of its kind to directly address Somali 
piracy. It authorised states to enter the territorial waters of Somalia and use ‘all 
necessary means’ to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea in a manner 
consistent with such action permitted on the high seas with respect to piracy under 
relevant international law.
2
 This culminated in an unprecedented multinational naval 
response complemented by robust efforts from the shipping industry through the 
creation and widespread implementation of Best Management Practice (B.M.P.). Non-
state entities, specifically private military and security companies, also became 
significant force multipliers to counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and 
western Indian Ocean after 2008. 
 
This chapter will firstly analyse the unprecedented international military response to the 
escalation of piracy off the coast of Somalia after 2005, exploring how these initiatives 
                                                 
1
 Commentary by Adm. Mike Mullen former U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, Honolulu Advertiser, 29 
Oct. 2006.  
2
 U.N. Security Council ‘Resolution 1816’, 02 June 2008 (U.N., Dag Hammarskjöld Library (D.H.L.), 
S/RES/1816/2008, p. 3). 
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had evolved by 2013. This is followed by an examination of several political counter-
piracy strategies initiated ashore by regional and international governments. These 
ranged from political and financial support for the Transitional Federal Government 
(T.F.G.) to humanitarian assistance, cooperative and information sharing mechanisms, 
judicial enhancement and reform, maritime capacity building alongside rehabilitation 
and reintegration initiatives. Collectively, these measures resulted in a substantial 
decline in incidents of piracy and armed robbery in Northeast African waters from 236 
reports in 2011 to just 15 reported incidents in 2013.
3
 
 
The sharp escalation in hijackings of merchant vessels and kidnapping of mariners in the 
Gulf of Aden and the western Indian Ocean around 2008 necessitated a robust response 
by the international community. The need for an extra-regional response was accelerated 
by the inability of Somalia and its neighbouring states to tackle the issue. According to 
Cyrus Moody, Deputy Director of the International Maritime Bureau (I.M.B): 
 
Somalia needed an international response for the simple reason that it was a 
failed state […] it had absolutely no capability within itself to do anything in 
terms of addressing the crime and its neighbours did not have the capability 
of responding to this crime in naval and coast guard terms – they didn’t have 
the boats, the capability or the capacity.
4
 
 
There were several multilateral counter-piracy initiatives launched by various 
international governments and organisations including the U.N., the European Union 
(E.U.), the International Maritime Organization (I.M.O.) and the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO). These included naval operations, maritime transit corridors, 
cooperative mechanisms, maritime security capacity building, guidance for shipping, 
political and financial support for the T.F.G. alongside the promotion and 
implementation of judicial reform. Non-governmental bodies such as the I.M.B. and the 
shipping industry were also actively involved in raising awareness and publishing 
guidelines for transit through the High Risk Area (H.R.A.), through the formation of 
                                                 
3
 International Chamber of Commerce (I.C.C.), International Maritime Bureau (I.M.B.), Piracy and armed 
robbery against ships, annual reports, 1 Jan. – 31 Dec. 2013 (London, 2014), pp 5-6. 
4
 Interview with Mr. Cyrus Moody, Deputy Director of the I.C.C. I.M.B. at the I.C.C. I.M.B headquarters, 
Cinnabar Wharf, London (22 Oct. 2013). 
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B.M.P. for deterring piracy. These efforts were complemented by a number of unilateral 
counter-piracy deployments and initiatives by international user-states including Britain, 
China, Russia and the United States. 
 
Multilateral international initiatives 
United Nations 
The U.N. was the key international body for promulgating agreement on regulation for 
counter-piracy operations in the Somali Basin and promoting awareness of the threat, 
particularly after 2008. Indeed, the U.N. had maintained an almost uninterrupted 
presence in Somalia since 1992. Between 2005 and 2013, the U.N. Security Council 
produced over twenty resolutions that addressed Somali piracy, an indication of the 
global relevance of the issue. The U.N. Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) was 
established in 1995 to extend assistance and mediation to peace and reconciliation 
initiatives ashore in Somalia. By 2009, UNPOS received a new mandate to implement 
the Djibouti peace agreement and to facilitate coordination of international support to 
these efforts under U.N. Security Council Resolution 1863.
5
 While UNPOS did not 
operate an explicit counter-piracy programme, it played an important role in 
coordinating the various international and regional counter-piracy initiatives in Somalia. 
 
Comparable U.N. strategic missions included the ‘Development Programme’ in 
Somalia, which was involved in a wide range of stabilising and capacity-building 
initiatives throughout the region. This ranged from promoting accountable and human 
rights based Somali federal security institutions to revitalising the Somali economy and 
generating employment. It also initiated programmes to tackle unemployment and social 
exclusion, factors described as ‘gateways to terrorism, crime, and piracy’, while 
simultaneously enhancing the capacity to prosecute suspects for serious crimes such as 
piracy.
6
 
                                                 
5
 U.N. Security Council, ‘Resolution 1863’, 16 Jan. 2009 (U.N., D.H.L., S/RES/1863/2009, p. 5). 
6
 United Nations Development Program (U.N.D.P.), ‘Somalia annual report 2013’, pp 7-9, available at 
U.N.D.P., ‘Research and publications’ (http://www.so.undp.org/content/somalia/en/home/library/human_ 
development/publication_22/) (11 Nov. 2014). 
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On 3 June 2013, the U.N. Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) was established as 
a strategic initiative to support the T.F.G. in state-building, governance and security 
sector reform.
7
 UNSOM superseded UNPOS, which had officially completed its 
mandate in June that year. One of four key areas of focus under the new UNSOM 
mandate was rule of law and security-sector reform, which included maritime security, 
disengagement of combatants, disarmament and reintegration.
8
 The evolution from 
UNPOS to UNSOM illustrated the comparative achievement of international capacity-
building efforts ashore in Somalia following the escalation of maritime piracy in 
2007/08. The election of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud as president of the Federal Republic 
of Somalia in September 2012, the first legitimate election since the fall of Siad Barre in 
1991, alongside the creation of an interim constitution and a representative parliament, 
was widely heralded by the international community as a positive step toward long-term 
stabilisation ashore.
9
 However, the process was reportedly marred by allegations of 
corruption and tension over enduring issues such as maritime piracy.
10
  
 
Aside from supporting strategic political development ashore, the U.N. was also 
concerned with humanitarian assistance, not only for disparate Somalis, but also for the 
immediate victims of piracy – seafarers. In this regard, the U.N.O.D.C. and the UNPOS 
implemented, in conjunction with the ‘Trust Fund to support the initiatives of states to 
counter piracy off the coast of Somalia’, the creation of a ‘Hostage Support Programme’ 
in November 2012. This initiative acknowledged the physical and psychological impact 
on seafarers held hostage by Somali pirates and provided material support during release 
and repatriation alongside debriefings of hostages in conjunction with INTERPOL to 
bolster prosecution and to develop best practices.
11
 
 
                                                 
7
 U.N. Security Council, ‘Resolution 2102’, 02 May 2013 (U.N., D.H.L., S/RES/2102/2013, pp 2-3). 
8
 Ibid, p. 2. 
9
 See: United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS), ‘International community reactions on the 
10 September Somali presidential elections outcome’, 12 Sept. 2012, available at 
(http://unpos.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=8D7NTUAxyE%3D&tabid=9705&mid=12667&l
anguage=en-US) (11 Nov. 2014). 
10
 See for example: The Guardian, 10 Sept. 2012. 
11
 U.N. Security Council, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the situation with respect to piracy and 
armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia’, 21 Oct. 2013 (U.N., D.H.L., S/2013/623, pp 2-3). 
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International Maritime Bureau 
The non-governmental, non-commercial organisation the I.C.C. I.M.B. emerged as the 
leading body for the collation and dissemination of statistics on incidents of maritime 
piracy worldwide between 2005 and 2013. This was reflected in the broad user-base of 
I.M.B. data among national governments, industry policy makers, researchers and 
academics. Despite inherent difficulties with under-reporting, the I.M.B.’s statistical 
resources were also utilised in the creation of software to identify predictive patterns of 
piratical activity. The I.M.B. published comprehensive quarterly and annual reports that 
became the primary source of statistical information pertaining to maritime piracy and 
illustrated how, Somali piracy in particular, had evolved into a global threat after 2008. 
Data attained via the I.M.B. Piracy Reporting Centre (P.R.C.) was shared with the 
I.M.O., shipping industry bodies and various governmental, non-governmental and law 
enforcement agencies to enhance understanding of the problem and reduce its effects.
12
 
 
In terms of countering piracy off the coast of Somalia, the I.M.B. was fundamental in 
raising awareness within the wider shipping industry and international community on 
the threat. In 2005, following an upsurge in pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia and in 
the Gulf of Aden, I.M.B. Director Pottengal Mukundan appealed to naval forces 
operating in the region to assist merchant vessels under attack by, at the very least, 
‘prevent[ing] potential hijackers taking these ships into Somali waters’.13 The I.M.B.’s 
annual piracy report was an important counter-piracy resource throughout this period. 
The reports detailed actual and attempted attacks by geographical location, status of ship, 
type of weapons used, type of violence used, nationality and flag state of vessel 
alongside monthly comparisons of incidents, piracy prone areas, warnings, trends, 
observations and narrations of attacks.
14
 
 
Perhaps the most significant I.M.B. led counter-piracy initiative was the creation of the 
24-hour P.R.C. in Kuala Lumpur as a first point of contact for shipmasters to report 
                                                 
12
 I.C.C. Commercial Crime Services, ‘I.M.B. Piracy Reporting Centre’ (https://www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-
reporting-centre) (13 Nov. 2014). 
13
 The Independent, 12 Nov. 2005. 
14
 See for example, I.C.C. I.M.B., Piracy report 2013, pp 5-71. 
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actual or attempted pirate attacks regardless of geographic position. The P.R.C. had 
evolved from just four staff members in the early 1990s to a staff of twenty-two by 
2013.
15
 This was some indication of the growth in maritime piracy, mainly off the 
northeast coast of Africa, and the importance of the P.R.C. as a focal point. In terms of 
counter-piracy, the P.R.C. broadcasted daily status reports on piracy and armed robbery 
against ships on the Inmarsat-C SafetyNET service and assisted regional and 
international law enforcement bodies in apprehending and prosecuting pirates.
16
 
Furthermore, all verified reports of actual or attempted pirate attacks were relayed to the 
nearest Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (M.R.C.C.). 
 
This contributed to countering-piracy in two ways. Firstly, if the incident was ongoing, 
the M.R.C.C. could deploy an asset to help and assist the victim and, secondly, it 
informed the M.R.C.C., Coast Guard or littoral government that there was criminal 
activity occurring within their waters that needed to be addressed.
17
 Moreover, the I.M.B. 
relayed this warning to all shipping in the vicinity of an incident, which enabled vessels 
to heighten defensive measures or bypass the area of high-risk at a particular time. The 
I.M.B. further expanded its counter-piracy efficacy by employing satellite imagery to 
forecast and advise on patterns of piratical movement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15
 Meeting with Mr. Noel Choong, Head of I.C.C. I.M.B. Piracy Reporting Centre (P.R.C.) at the I.M.B. 
P.R.C., Asia regional office, Jalan Sultan Ismail, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (26 Mar. 2014). 
16
 I.C.C. I.M.B., Piracy report 2008, p. 2. 
17
 Interview with Mr. Cyrus Moody (22 Oct. 2013). 
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Fig. 6.1 
Evolution of distance warnings in comparison to attack locations, Somalia 2005-11 
Year Farthest reported attack from coast Advised distance from coast 
2005 165nm 200nm 
2006 200nm 250nm 
2007 200nm 250nm 
2008 445nm 250nm + 
2009 1,000nm 600nm + 
2010 1,300nm n/a 
2011 1,750nm n/a 
Source(s): I.C.C. I.M.B., Piracy report 2005-2011; ‘Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security 
Council resolution 1950’, 25 Oct. 2011 (U.N., D.H.L., S/2011/662, p. 2); B.B.C. News Africa, ‘The 
losing battle against Somali piracy’, 10 Feb. 2011 (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-12412565) 
(29 Oct. 2014). 
 
European Union 
The European Union launched its first naval operation in response to the upsurge of 
piracy off the coast of Somalia in December 2008 as part of its wider ‘comprehensive’ 
approach to Somali piracy. This integrated approach, within the framework of the 
European Common Security and Defence Policy (C.S.D.P.), also included the E.U. 
Training Mission in Somalia (E.U.T.M) and the E.U. Maritime Capacity Building 
Mission in the Horn of Africa (EUCAP NESTOR). Since November 2011, these multi-
sectoral initiatives came under the umbrella of the E.U.’s ‘strategic framework for the 
Horn of Africa’, which was finalised in January 2013. The framework outlined the 
various security and humanitarian issues that contributed to criminality and disorder in 
Somalia such as the lack of stable democratic and economic prospects for the population 
alongside the absence of democracy, rule of law, governance and human security.
18
 In 
terms of the E.U.’s counter-piracy approach, the strategy noted the importance of 
tackling piracy on land by enhancing judicial capacities to arrest, transfer, detain and 
prosecute piracy suspects alongside enhancing the coastal security capabilities of 
                                                 
18
 E.U. Parliament, ‘European Parliament Resolution on E.U. strategy for the Horn of Africa’, 15 Jan. 
2013 (E.U. Parliament Resolution, P7_TA/2013/0006, p. 4). (http://www.europarl.europa.eu/portal/en) 
(17 Nov. 2014). 
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riparian countries, encouraging adherence to B.M.P. and improving standards for the 
maritime security industry.
19
 
 
European Union Naval Force - Operation Atalanta 
Central to this strategy was the European Union Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) Operation 
Atalanta, which was deployed under the auspices of U.N. Security Council Resolutions 
1814, 1816 and 1838 in December 2008. Operation Atalanta was mandated to (i) 
provide protection to vessels chartered by the W.F.P. and other vulnerable vessels off 
the coast of Somalia; (ii) deter, prevent and repress acts of piracy and armed robbery off 
the Somali coast; (iii) arrest, detain and transfer persons who had committed, or were 
suspected of having committed, acts of piracy or armed robbery; and, (iv) seize the 
vessels of the pirates or armed robbers.
20
 The typical composition of Operation 
Atalanta’s physical assets in its ‘area of operation’21 consisted of between four and 
seven surface combat vessels including embarked helicopters, one and two auxiliary 
ships, three to four military patrol and reconnaissance aircraft alongside a number of 
Vessel Protection Detachment (V.P.D.) teams, making it the largest multinational 
counter-piracy deployment operating in the region.
22
 EUNAVFOR’s budget amounted 
to EUR8.4 million in 2010, EUR8.05 million in 2011 and EUR8.3 million in 2012. In 
March 2012, the Council of the E.U. extended the mandate of Operation Atalanta until 
December 2014 with a budget of EUR14.9 million for common costs.
23
  
 
Aside from deterring and interdicting pirates at sea, EUNAVFOR, under the mandate of 
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1851, actively disrupted and targeted pirate logistic 
dumps ashore. On 15 May 2012, it was reported that EUNAVFOR deployed a number 
                                                 
19
 ‘European Parliament Resolution on E.U. strategy for the Horn of Africa’, p. 11. 
20
 E.U. Council, ‘European Council joint action on a European Union military operation to contribute to 
the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast’, 05 
Nov. 2008 (European Council (E.C.), Official Journal of the E.U. (O.J.), 13989/08, p. 7). 
21
 EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta’s area of operation extended from the territorial and internal waters of 
Somalia and the Southern Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the western Indian Ocean, including the 
Seychelles. This equated to an area of approximately 2,000,000 square nautical miles or 1.5 times the size 
of mainland Europe (See: E.U. external action, EUNAVFOR mission (http://eunavfor.eu/mission/) (17 
Nov. 2014)). 
22
 European Union Naval Force – Operation Atalanta, ‘Information booklet’ (Northwood, 2014), p. 7. 
23
 Ibid., pp 1-12. 
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of maritime patrol aircraft and helicopters to target and destroy several pirate attack 
skiffs in the Galmudug region on Somalia's central southern coastline.24 According to a 
representative of EUNAVFOR Somalia, the operation was carried out following a 
lengthy reconnaissance mission, which made ‘absolutely clear’ that the skiffs belonged 
to pirates and not legitimate fishermen.
25
 Indeed, identifying pirate skiffs was one of 
several ‘day to day’ challenges encountered during the operation. According the former 
Operation Commander Rear Admiral Philip Jones: ‘a pirate is only a pirate when he is 
committing an act of piracy […] he may be a people smuggler overnight […] he may 
then turn into a fisherman the next morning and then, in the afternoon, go out to do 
some piracy […]’.26 Notwithstanding its primary mission of escorting vessels of the 
W.F.P. and other vulnerable shipping, EUNAVFOR was also instrumental in the 
formation of the Maritime Security Centre - Horn of Africa (M.S.C.H.O.A.) and the 
Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (I.R.T.C.) in the Gulf of Aden. 
 
The M.S.C.H.O.A. provided an important interface between naval assets and the 
shipping industry in the Gulf of Aden by monitoring registered vessels on a 24-hour 
basis while transiting the High Risk Area and relaying the latest counter-piracy guidance. 
By 2010, the importance of the service provided by the M.S.C.H.O.A. was evident by 
the some 4,000 subscribers to its website, 2,700 of which were shipping companies.
27
 
The M.S.C.H.O.A. facilitated the creation of the I.R.T.C. (see fig. 6.2), which was an 
enhanced version of the 2008 U.S. led Maritime Security Patrol Area. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24
 Kate Tringham, ‘EUNAVFOR destroys pirate land base on shoreline’ in I.H.S. Jane’s Defence Weekly 
(16 May 2012), p. 1.  
25
 Ibid. 
26
 Combating Somali piracy: the E.U.s naval Operation Atalanta: report with evidence, minutes of 
evidence taken before the select committee on the European Union p. 3, H.L. 2010 (103), xii. 
27
 Combating Somali piracy […], p. 21. 
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Fig. 6.2 
Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (I.R.T.C.) in the Gulf of Aden 
Source: NATO Shipping Centre, (http://www.shipping.nato.int/operations/OS/Pages/GroupTransit.aspx) 
(17 Nov. 2014). 
 
All shipping transiting the Gulf of Aden was advised to use the I.R.T.C. and the group 
transit system, which afforded vessels a higher level of protection by placing them 
proximal to international naval assets patrolling in the corridor and by the relative 
security of travelling in clusters. The provision of a designated corridor also allowed 
naval vessels to monitor and secure the sea area ahead of merchant ships. These 
initiatives significantly reduced the number of successful pirate attacks in the Gulf of 
Aden from a peak of 117 in 2009 to 59 in 2010 and just six in 2013.
28
 However, the 
relative success in suppressing piracy in the Gulf of Aden displaced attacks farther into 
the western Indian Ocean. Indeed, attacks off the eastern seaboard of Somalia increased 
significantly from 80 in 2009 to 139 in 2010 and peaked at 160 by 2011.
29
  
 
Critical Maritime Routes programme & Training Mission in Somalia  
Aside from military operations like Atalanta, the E.U. launched a Critical Maritime 
Routes (E.U.C.M.R.) programme in 2009. The western Indian Ocean programme aimed 
to secure the safety of critical sea-lanes in three ways. Firstly, through education and 
                                                 
28
 I.C.C. I.M.B. Piracy report 2010, p. 5. 
29
 I.C.C. I.M.B. Piracy report 2013, p. 5. 
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training in support of the regional-led ‘Djibouti Code of Conduct’ concerning the 
repression of piracy and armed robbery against ships; secondly, through information 
sharing via regional sharing centres and M.R.C.C.s; and, finally, by building the 
maritime capacity of coastal states to respond to piracy threats.
30
 A further key element 
in the E.U.’s holistic approach toward the problem of Somali piracy was the E.U.T.M. in 
Somalia, which was established in 2010. The E.U.T.M. was tasked with strengthening 
the institutions of the Somali T.F.G. by training Somali military forces in cooperation 
with other international actors like the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) 
and the U.N. By December 2012, the E.U.T.M. completed two consecutive training 
periods of six months that contributed to the training of approximately 3,600 Somali 
soldiers alongside specialist training in the areas of military police, civilian-military 
cooperation, intelligence, company commander and combat engineering.
31
 In January 
2013, E.U.T.M.’s mandate was extended for a further two years with a shift to strategic 
advisory and mentoring activities in addition to training.
32
  
 
Regional Maritime Security Programme 
In October 2010, a ‘regional strategy’ and ‘plan of action’ was agreed at the second 
regional ministerial meeting on piracy and maritime security in the eastern and southern 
Africa and Indian Ocean region. In support of this agreement, the E.U. created the 
Regional Maritime Security Programme in January 2012 with an initial budget of 
EUR37.5 million. The programme aimed to contribute to the regional strategy by firstly, 
enhancing the infrastructural capability for arrest, transfer, detention and prosecution of 
pirates; secondly, strengthening regional capacity to disrupt the financial networks of 
pirate leaders and their financiers; thirdly, enhancing regional maritime capacity; and, 
lastly, improving regional coordination and information exchange.
33
 Collectively, these 
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 E.U. Critical Maritime Routes information portal, ‘C.M.R. Western Indian Ocean (MARSIC)’ 
(http://www.crimson.eu.com/projects/cmr-western-indian-ocean-marsic-3/) (18 Nov. 2014). 
31
 European External Action Service (E.E.A.S.), E.U.T.M. Somalia: mission description 
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32
 E.E.A.S., ‘E.U.T.M. Somalia: mission description’. 
33
 Pantelis Vassiliou, ‘Maritime Security in ESA-IO region in the framework of the Horn of Africa 
strategy, MASE Programme’ (2014), available at European Commission, Joint Research Centre 
(https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/sites/default/files/EC_DEVCO_presentation_on_MASE.pdf) (18 Nov. 2014). 
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approaches contributed to wider international efforts to establish stability and security 
ashore in the context of strategic solutions to maritime piracy. 
 
EUCAP NESTOR 
The final key initiative under the E.U.’s strategic counter-piracy framework was 
launched in July 2012 under the C.D.S.P. EUCAP NESTOR was a wider regional 
civilian-led mission in partnership with the A.U., I.M.O. and the U.N. that aimed to 
strengthen and enhance the maritime security capacities of Somalia and its littoral states 
including Djibouti, Kenya, Tanzania and the Seychelles. EUCAP NESTOR’s mission 
can be divided into three key areas – operations in Somalia, operations in littoral states 
(Djibouti, Kenya and the Seychelles), and wider regional engagement. In Somalia, the 
mission aimed to support the creation of a land-based coastal police capability alongside 
a comprehensive regulatory framework in the field of counter-piracy and maritime 
governance.
34
 In regards to littoral states, EUCAP NESTOR aimed to bolster existing 
maritime security agencies such as coast guards, by assisting authorities through training 
courses and dissemination of expertise.
35
 These efforts were conducted alongside 
broader expert driven regional networks to promote maritime security awareness. 
 
Financial & other 
The E.U. augmented the initiatives discussed here by attempting to tackle some of the 
wider causative factors that precipitated maritime piracy such as Illegal, Unreported and 
Unregulated (I.U.U.) fishing in the western Indian Ocean. This approach included a 
EUR10 million ‘regional surveillance plan’ for fisheries in the south-west Indian Ocean 
between 2007 and 2011. The Council of the European Union also enacted 
comprehensive legislation establishing a community system to prevent, deter and 
eliminate I.U.U. fishing in September 2008.
36
 At the developmental level, the E.U. 
committed almost EUR500 million between 2008 and 2013 toward governance, security 
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and economic growth, which made it the largest extra-regional donor to Somalia.
37
 In 
2012 alone, over EUR15 million per month in financial support was provided for 
AMISOM.
38
 The E.U. was also the largest contributor to the U.N.O.D.C. counter-piracy 
programme.
39
 
 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NATO was a key contributor to counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and 
Somali basin in the period after 2008. In 2006, NATO published the Naval Cooperation 
and Guidance for Shipping manual for owners, operators, masters and officers to act as 
an interface between naval forces and merchant shipping. This interaction became 
critical in relation to counter-piracy operations off the north and east coast of Africa. 
The manual outlined guidance for naval cooperation, guidance on threats, navigational 
warnings and assistance to, or naval supervision of, merchant shipping in high-risk 
areas, such as the Gulf of Aden.
40
 
 
Operation Allied Provider & Protector 
In October 2008, NATO initiated Operation Allied Provider following a request by the 
U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon after a sharp escalation in piratical attacks in the 
Gulf of Aden. Allied Provider was launched in support of U.N. Security Council 
Resolutions 1814, 1816 and 1838 with a primary responsibility for escorting vessels of 
W.F.P. and deterring acts of piracy by patrolling waters off the Somali coast. Three 
ships, I.T.S. Durand de la Penne, the H.S. Temistokles and the H.M.S. Cumberland, 
from Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 (S.N.M.G. 2), were redirected for counter-
piracy duties in the Gulf of Aden.
41
 Operation Allied Provider was replaced by 
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Operation Allied Protector in March 2009. Allied Protector’s mission was an extension 
of Allied Provider and aimed to defend against, deter, and disrupt pirate activities in the 
Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa with a focus on merchant shipping.
42
 Between 
March and June 2009, counter-piracy operations were undertaken by five vessels from 
S.N.M.G. 1, which were replaced by five vessels from S.N.M.G. 2 from June to 
August.
43
 
 
Operation Ocean Shield 
Since August 2009, NATO expanded on its two previous counter-piracy missions with 
the formation of the more comprehensive Operation Ocean Shield. Both S.N.M.G. 1 and 
S.N.M.G. 2 were tasked with undertaking operations on a six-month rotating basis. The 
maritime groups were typically composed of between six and ten naval vessels 
complemented by a number of maritime patrol aircraft. The mission of Ocean Shield 
had evolved from NATO’s previous counter-piracy efforts beyond simply deterring and 
disrupting pirate activities at sea. Firstly, naval and air assets operating under Ocean 
Shield regularly conducted intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions to 
verify shipping activity off the coast of Somalia. Secondly, NATO ships escorted supply 
vessels of the U.N. Support Office for AMISOM to the harbour entrance of Mogadishu. 
Finally, Operation Ocean Shield assisted in regional capacity building efforts through 
training, educational courses, participation in military exercises and advice on security 
sector reform.
44
 
 
Cooperation between the various regional and international counter-piracy operations in 
the region was imperative for NATO given that it operated with minimal assets, 
particularly during the Operation Allied Provider and Allied Protector phase. In an 
interview with the former head of S.N.M.G. 2, Commodore Steve Chick, the absence of 
air assets was a clear shortcoming. He stated: ‘The key weapons that you need for an 
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operation like this are air assets, so a Maritime Patrol Aircraft (M.P.A.), helicopter, a 
sea boat and a boarding party […] I don’t care who owns the M.P.A., whether it’s 
French, German or Japanese; all I need is an M.P.A.’.45 This deficiency was rectified 
under Ocean Shield. However, assets were still generally deemed insufficient for 
purpose. According to Commodore Ben Bekkering, former commander of S.N.M.G. 1, 
Operation Ocean Shield was under-resourced, with just eight warships to cover a 
maritime operating area the size of Western Europe.
46
 Despite these challenges, by the 
end of 2013, Operation Ocean Shield had arguably completed its mandate, given the 
decrease in piracy and armed robbery incidents in the Gulf of Aden and western Indian 
Ocean. 
 
NATO Shipping Centre 
The NATO Shipping Centre bolstered counter-piracy efforts through the publication of 
a ‘dhow and skiff recognition guide’ and chart in 2011 to enhance understanding of 
regional maritime trade in the Gulf of Aden, Arabian Gulf and Indian Ocean and thereby, 
prevent pirates hijacking and utilising local vessels for illicit activities. The guide 
identified five main categories of dhow operating in the Indian Ocean (see fig. 6.3) and 
pertinent details such as specific sailing routes, physical characteristics and typical crew 
composition. Such knowledge was important in distinguishing pirate skiffs from 
legitimate fishermen and acquiring data on ownership, registration, trade routes, fishing, 
communications procedures and other normal activities to assist regional and 
international states in counter-piracy operations.
47
 
 
Indeed, the guide was an important tool in disrupting attacks. In 2012, for example, a 
helicopter from the NATO counter-piracy task force flagship, the T.C.G. Giresun, 
positively identified a suspect Yemeni-style dhow and directed it to stop. It was 
discovered the dhow had been hijacked by pirates and was being employed as a mother 
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ship. On board were fourteen suspected Somali pirates and seven Yemeni hostages.
48
 
The NATO Shipping Centre augmented the dhow and skiff recognition guide and chart 
with regular standing guidance and advice on piracy threats including a daily updated 
‘pirate action map’.49 Such initiatives illustrated the evolving diversity of counter-piracy 
efforts in Northeast Africa. 
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Fig. 6.3 
Categories of dhows operating in H.R.A. 
 
Type of Dhow Structure 
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Source: NATO Shipping Centre, ‘The dhow project: identification guide for dhows, skiffs and whalers in 
the High Risk Area’, pp 8-13 (http://www.shipping.nato.int/operations/OS/Pages/Guidance-and-
advice.aspx) (25 Nov. 2014). 
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Combined Maritime Forces 
Prior to the escalation of piracy off the coast of Somalia in 2008, the multinational 
Combined Task Force 150 (C.T.F. 150), as part of U.S.-led Combined Maritime Forces, 
was engaged in a maritime security mission that covered the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, 
Indian Ocean and Gulf of Oman. An ancillary multilateral task force C.T.F. 152 was 
operating in a similar capacity in the Arabian Gulf. Both task forces were chiefly 
concerned with counter-terrorism activities including deterring and disrupting the 
movement of personnel, weapons and income-generating narcotics and as such maritime 
piracy was not a central mission objective.
50
 However, the escalation in attacks against 
merchant shipping by pirates in the Gulf of Aden and Somali basin in 2008 positioned 
piracy as the foremost maritime security threat in the region. 
 
In this regard, the Combined Maritime Force created a third force tasked explicitly with 
counter-piracy operations in January 2009 under the auspices of U.N. Security Council 
Resolutions 1816, 1838, 1846, 1851 and 1897. According to U.S. Vice-Admiral William 
Gortney, former commander of U.S. Central Command: ‘To lessen the ambiguities 
about operational mandate, a combined coalition task force, C.T.F. 151, was created […] 
It has a counter-piracy mandate, making it easier for states to participate, given C.T.F. 
150’s narrow counter-terrorist focus’.51 
 
By 2011, C.T.F. 151 consisted of approximately two dozen ships from twenty-five 
countries including France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Saudi 
Arabia, Spain, South Korea, Turkey, the United States, the United Kingdom and 
Yemen.
52
 The mission-based mandate of the counter-piracy task force was to ‘deter, 
disrupt and suppress piracy in order to protect global maritime security and secure 
                                                 
50
 See: Combined Maritime Forces (C.M.F.), ‘C.T.F. 150: maritime security’ 
(http://combinedmaritimeforces.com/ctf-150-maritime-security) (27 Nov. 2014); C.M.F., ‘C.T.F. 152: 
Gulf maritime security’ (http://combinedmaritimeforces.com/ctf-152-gulf-security-cooperation/) (27 Nov. 
2014). 
51
 Alex Vatanka, ‘Million mile patrol - Vice-Admiral William Gortney, commander of U.S. forces Central 
Command’ in I.H.S. Jane’s Intelligence Review (26 Mar. 2009). 
52
 Lauren Ploch, Christopher M. Blanchard, Ronald O'Rourke, R. Chuck Mason & Rawle O. King, ‘Piracy 
off the Horn of Africa’ in C.R.S. Report for Congress (27 Apr. 2011), p. 25. 
 -320- 
freedom of navigation for the benefit of all nations’.53 Strategically, the mission was 
divided into three phases. The first phase focussed on closer international naval 
cooperation and expansion; the second phase focussed on closer coordination with the 
shipping industry to enhance self-defensive measures such as B.M.P. and, finally, to 
streamline the transfer of pirates ashore for prosecution.
54
 The anti-piracy task force was 
augmented by the U.S. Coast Guard’s ‘Law Enforcement Detachment 405’ alongside 
the navy’s ‘Visit, Board, Search and Seizure’ teams for advice on specialised tasks such 
as boarding policies and procedures and evidence collection and preparation.
55
 Much 
like the other multinational counter-piracy operations mentioned, C.T.F. 151 had a 
limited number of deployable assets in comparison to the large theatre of operations and, 
therefore, coordinated its efforts closely with international maritime forces in the region. 
Despite these challenges, according to a report by the U.N. Secretary General in 2011, 
C.T.F. 151 had successfully deterred multiple pirate attacks, liberated a hijacked vessel, 
responded to vessel distress calls and seized large quantities of weapons, drugs and 
related materials.
56
 
 
Coordinating mechanisms 
Given the assortment of multistate naval assets engaged in counter-piracy activity off 
the Horn of Africa between 2008 and 2013, it was essential that mechanisms were 
created to coordinate patrols and information sharing to streamline operations and avoid 
overlap. Aside from EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta, NATO Operation Ocean Shield 
and C.T.F. 151 there were several individual nations that contributed naval assets 
including China, India, Iran, Japan, Malaysia, the Republic of Korea, Russia, Saudi 
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Arabia and Yemen.
57
 Indeed, the presence of such an array of naval forces illustrated the 
truly global nature of the response to piracy off the northeast coast of Africa alongside a 
unique opportunity for foreign navies to demonstrate blue water capability and project 
soft power on an international stage. Moreover, these coordinating mechanisms 
facilitated collaboration between traditional enemies against a common threat or ‘Hostis 
humani generis’, which also illustrated the unique diplomatic utility of naval forces. 
This demonstrated to some extent the activities of, what Geoffrey Till termed, ‘post-
modern navies’ that focus on international rather than traditional security. He stated that 
post modern navies are ‘acutely aware of the centrality of general maritime security to 
the efficient operation of a globalised sea-based trading system [...] they put a premium 
on developing good, enduring and constructive maritime relationships with other 
[navies]’.58 
 
China’s counter-piracy deployment, the first blue-water expeditionary maritime 
operation in modern Chinese history, strengthened Beijing’s overseas soft-power 
projection by ‘facilitating interaction and dialogue between China and the many 
countries whose ports and geographic locations heighten the strategic value of these 
relationships’.59 Russia’s decision to deploy naval assets to tackle piracy off the coast of 
Somalia re-established a naval presence in the region for the first time since the 1970s. 
The NATO-Russian Council published a ‘Russian-English English-Russian glossary on 
counter-piracy’ in 2012 as a practical tool to facilitate communication and cooperation 
between NATO and Russia in relation to counter-piracy activities off the coast of 
Somalia.
60
 Traditional adversaries such as China and Japan also established common 
ground through counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and, along with India and 
later South Korea, established ‘Escort convoy coordination’ in 2012. Indeed, these 
countries had engaged in joint air and naval drills, reciprocal aircraft landings and 
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officer visits to naval vessels, mechanisms for sharing best practices and joint 
participation in the Shared Awareness and De-confliction (SHADE) forum.
61
  
 
Shared Awareness and De-confliction mechanism 
The SHADE initiative was created in December 2008 as a mechanism to coordinate and 
synthesize the various counter-piracy activities of multinational naval coalition forces 
and later, independent naval deployers, in the Gulf of Aden. On an operational level, this 
involved monthly workshop meetings between representatives of the various navies that 
addressed, for example, coordination of assets along the I.R.T.C., Somali Basin 
operations in a particular weather-transition window, campaign analysis, air 
coordination and updates on B.M.P. from the shipping industry.
62
 Despite these 
cooperative efforts, by 2011 pirate attacks peaked around the Horn of Africa, which 
raised questions over the effectiveness of mechanisms like SHADE and the paucity of 
resources available to counteract Somali piracy. 
 
I.M.O. Secretary-General Efthimios Mitropoulos commented in May 2011: ‘I am not 
convinced SHADE is the right answer […] I know [the navies] communicate, but I am 
not sure to what extent this kind of established co-ordination produces the optimum 
results’. 63  Despite criticisms, the U.N. Secretary-General in his report pursuant to 
Security Council resolution 1950 stated that SHADE ‘continued to improve military 
coordination’.64 SHADE also served as an initial focal point for multinational tactical 
and operational commanders to provide feedback to the primary cooperative mechanism, 
the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (C.G.P.C.S.). 
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Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia 
The C.G.P.C.S. was the primary cooperative body for countering piracy off the coast of 
Somalia, which was established shortly after SHADE in January 2009. The mechanism 
was created in response to U.N. Security Council Resolution 1851, which called upon 
international states and regional organisations fighting piracy and armed robbery at sea 
off the coast of Somalia to ‘establish an international cooperation mechanism to act as a 
common point of contact between and among states, regional and international 
organisations on all aspects of combating piracy […]’.65 The C.G.P.C.S. was initially 
divided into four thematic ‘working groups’ (see fig. 6.4), chaired on a rotating basis by 
a contributing member state. A fifth working group was subsequently created at the 
ninth plenary session of the contact group in July 2011, which reflected the holistic 
approach to counter-piracy adopted by the contact group. By 2013, the C.G.P.C.S. 
comprised of over sixty nations and around twenty international organisations, an 
indication of the magnitude of the global response to maritime piracy off the northeast 
coast of Africa. Indeed, according to James Kraska, the C.G.P.C.S. was ‘the broadest 
coalition of nations ever gathered to develop and coordinate practical solutions to the 
scourge of maritime piracy’.66 
 
Trust Fund 
Perhaps the most significant contribution of the C.G.P.C.S., aside from the collaborative 
efforts of the working groups, was the creation of a ‘trust fund’ in January 2010 to 
support the initiatives of states engaged in counter-piracy activity off the coast of 
Somalia. Between January 2010 and October 2013, the trust fund received 
approximately US$17.5 million in contributions from participating states and the 
maritime industry, which funded thirty-one counter-piracy projects.
67
 On a practical 
level, this included supporting regional prisons in meeting the U.N. ‘Standard minimum 
rules for the treatment of prisoners’, creation of a biometric based fishermen database 
system in Puntland, educative programmes for detained pirates and vulnerable youth in 
                                                 
65
 U.N. Security Council, ‘Resolution 1851’, 16 Dec. 2008 (U.N., D.H.L., S/RES/1851/2008, p. 3). 
66
 James Kraska, Contemporary maritime piracy: international law, strategy, and diplomacy (Oxford, 
2011), p. 160. 
67
 U.N., S/2013/623, p. 7. 
 -324- 
Somalia and the repatriation of forty Somali nationals suspected of piracy previously 
detained by the Maldives.
68
 Aside from this, the trust fund contributed to expenses 
associated with prosecution and detention of suspected pirates and the reimbursement of 
short-term prosecution related expenses.
69
 
 
The relatively ad-hoc nature of the C.G.P.C.S., outside the direct remit of the I.M.O. and 
the U.N., contributed to the success of multinational counter-piracy cooperation in the 
region, as the group was not restricted in terms of bureaucracy and procedure.
70
 This 
flexibility also allowed non-naval contributory nations such as the Philippines to 
participate in the contact group. Moreover, according to Christian Bueger: ‘The growing 
experimentalism was also supported by the confidence to formally invite representatives 
other than states [...] shipping associations, industry associations, humanitarian 
organisations and even academics were formally invited to feed their ideas and 
proposals into the process’. 71  Despite the obvious utility of C.G.P.C.S., there were 
associated challenges. A ‘One Earth Future Foundation’ report on the group identified 
resources, sustainability, equitable partnership and strategic vision as four key 
challenges that faced the organisation in 2013.
72
 However, the report concluded that: 
‘the C.G.P.C.S., which provided political support to SHADE, may have positive 
spillover for international relations beyond counter-piracy’.73 
 
This illustrated the unique global nature of the Somali piracy threat and, moreover, the 
unique global response. Despite this, there were calls for a single command structure to 
coordinate counter-piracy operations in the region. According to Nautilus International, 
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in a written submission to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee in 2011: 
‘whilst the level of coordination amongst military forces providing protection to 
shipping is extremely good, it falls short of what could be achieved under a single 
unitary command structure’.74 
 
Fig. 6.4 
C.G.P.C.S. working groups’ overview 
Working group Function 
I Naval operational coordination and regional maritime capacity building 
II Legal & judicial issues 
III Self-protection measures for shipping industry 
IV Strategic diplomacy  
V 
International information sharing  to identity and disrupt financial 
networks of pirate leaders and their financiers ashore 
Source: See: Contact Group for Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (C.G.P.C.S.) (http://www.thecgpcs.org/). 
 
Shipping industry 
Best Management Practice 
The shipping industry created a key counter-piracy instrument in the form of B.M.P. in 
response to the escalation in piratical attacks and hijackings in 2008. Despite the 
presence of multinational naval counter-piracy forces operating in the region, merchant 
shipping was inherently vulnerable to an attack given the vast sea-space in which 
Somali pirates were active. B.M.P. was one example in a series of short-term reactive 
preventative measures such as the deployment of warships and the creation of the 
I.R.T.C. to protect merchant vessels while transiting the H.R.A. Given the rapidly 
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changing maritime security environment in the Gulf of Aden and the Somali Basin, 
B.M.P. was forced to evolve alongside the threat. This resulted in four separate B.M.P. 
documents between 2009 and 2011. 
 
B.M.P. outlined a series of practical preparatory and defensive measures that could be 
employed prior to, during or following a pirate attack with the basic aim to deter and 
deny pirates access to the vessel, or failing that, to deny pirates the ability to control the 
vessel. Preparatory measures such as watch-keeping and enhanced vigilance alongside 
the installation of intruder detection equipment such as Closed Circuit Television, alarm 
systems and upper deck lighting was recommended in order to pre-empt an attack.
75
 
Physical barriers were also recommended such as electrified fences and razor wire to 
deny access to the bridge, accommodation and machinery spaces alongside the 
deployment of water spray and/or foam monitors. 
 
In terms of evasive manoeuvres, B.M.P. advised that the Master should increase speed 
and commence small alterations of helm to restrict approaching skiffs from coming 
alongside in preparation for a boarding attempt.
76
 Captain Amol Deshmukh of the M.T. 
Kasugta described how he successfully countered a pirate attack on his vessel in 2008 
by employing this technique: ‘[I] increased speed to maximum and started manoeuvring 
in a zigzag fashion in order to use the wake to successfully throw the [pirate] skiffs 
off’.77 
 
If defensive measures failed and pirates boarded a vessel, a further passive defence 
option was mustering to a pre-arranged ‘citadel’. B.M.P. IV defined a citadel as a 
‘designated pre-planned area purpose built into the ship where, in the event of imminent 
boarding by pirates, all crew will seek protection’.78 By congregating the crew in a 
secured area, with access to the command and control capability of the vessel including 
external communication, pirates could be denied access to potential hostages and control 
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of the ship long enough for military assistance to arrive or for an attack to be abandoned. 
The first engineer of the Maersk Alabama, for example, emphasised the importance of 
having a ‘well-fortified location with food and water supply’ during the hijacking.79 
 
Despite endorsement by over twenty marine industry, insurance and governing bodies, 
B.M.P. was not universally implemented by vessels transiting the H.R.A. According to 
Capt. Richard Farrington, former EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta Chief of Staff: ‘a 
blinkered minority of owners continue to claim that commercial pressures prevent them 
from taking any self-protection measures that are not mandated by law’.80 The rate of 
non-compliance was estimated to be somewhere in the region of 20-40 percent of the 
world fleet by summer 2011.
81
 The relative expensive of implementation for smaller 
shipping companies and the lack of legal obligation for ship-owners to adhere to its 
provisions might account for these figures. However, non-compliance greatly increased 
the likelihood of a successful hijacking. Capt. Harry Gale of the Nautical Institute 
reaffirmed this point: ‘the ships that are being captured are the ships that are not 
operating B.M.P. or reporting in’.82 By the beginning of 2013, it was estimated that non-
compliance had dropped to around 15 percent, which was a likely contributor to the 
reduction in successful hijackings that year.
83
 
 
Evolution of B.M.P. 
The first set of guidelines was published by Oil Companies International Marine Forum 
in January 2009 in conjunction with other industry stakeholders under the title ‘Practical 
measures to avoid, deter or delay piracy attacks’. This was superseded in February 2009 
by a more comprehensive set of measures, this time in collaboration with the I.M.O. and 
the C.G.P.C.S., entitled ‘Best Management Practices to deter piracy in the Gulf of Aden 
and off the coast of Somalia’ (B.M.P. I). The first guide covered company planning 
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prior to transit, ship’s master planning, voyage planning, pre-transit and mid-transit 
defensive measures, actions if attacked/boarded by pirates and guidance in the event of 
military action.
84
 The I.M.O. stressed that nothing in the measures outlined in B.M.P. I 
should be considered contradictory to the I.M.O.’s universal guidance on piracy 
contained in ‘Guidance to ship owners and ship operators, shipmasters and crews on 
preventing and suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships’ of June 2009. 
 
By August 2009, a revised version of B.M.P. was created that expanded and clarified the 
original guidelines mostly in relation to defensive measures, which included securing 
potential access points, ship contingency planning, ‘remotely operated’ search lights and 
zigzag manoeuvring.
85
 B.M.P. II also emphasised the importance of regular contact with 
M.S.C.H.O.A., expanded on best practice for the use of ‘citadels’ and included a new 
section on post incident reporting. The subsequent two iterations of B.M.P. were 
published for the first time in booklet form, which enabled wider dissemination among 
the shipping industry. B.M.P. III, entitled ‘Best Management Practices to deter piracy 
off the coast of Somalia and in the Arabian Sea area’ was published in June 2010. This 
revised edition replaced B.M.P. II and expanded the limits of the H.R.A., heightened 
ship protection measures, encouraged post-incident reporting in addition to a vessel 
position reporting form template, anti-piracy planning chart and additional guidance for 
fishing vessels alongside several colour images.
86
   
 
In August 2011, B.M.P. III was replaced by the final B.M.P. document produced 
between 2008 and 2013. B.M.P. IV included several updates from the previous version, 
most notably the inclusion of a section dedicated to Private Maritime Security 
Companies (P.M.S.C.s) and the deployment of Privately Contracted Armed Security 
Personnel (P.C.A.S.P.), despite an initial reluctance to endorse such measures.
87
 A new 
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section on how a shipping company and crew could assist law enforcement authorities 
with the prosecution of pirates was also included which not only illustrated the evolution 
of B.M.P., but also broader counter-piracy efforts in the region. Other specific changes 
included in B.M.P. IV were a recommendation to keep A.I.S. active throughout a 
voyage, enhanced information of the use of citadels, clarification on reporting 
requirements and a practical visual ‘aide memoire’ to help facilitate wider application of 
best practice (see fig. 6.5). In addition to B.M.P., the shipping industry initially worked 
with a number of companies on the development of more elaborate non-lethal counter-
piracy technologies. Several devices were developed for merchant shipping companies 
after 2008 such as the Long-Range Acoustic Device or L-Rad that reportedly created 
‘safety zones’ and influenced the behaviour of an intruder through ‘powerful voice 
commands’ and ‘deterrent tones’.88 However, the use of such non-lethal devices never 
became extensive and they were superseded by the deployment of P.C.A.S.P., which 
proved to be a far more effective piracy deterrent. 
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Fig. 6.5 
Best Management Practices for protection against Somali based piracy: ‘Aide memoire’ 
 
 
Source: U.K.M.T.O., Best Management Practices for protection against Somalia based piracy: suggested 
planning and operational practices for ship operators and masters of ships transiting the High Risk Area 
(Edinburgh, 2011), p. vi. 
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Unilateral international initiatives 
United States 
As previously highlighted, several individual nations contributed naval assets to 
counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and Somali Basin predominantly after 
2008. This section briefly highlights the unilateral counter-piracy activity of the United 
States, Britain and India at a national level between 2005 and 2013. The 2005 U.S. 
National Strategy for Maritime Security identified piracy as a threat to security in areas 
of heavy commercial maritime activity. Moreover, the modus operandi of Somali pirates 
demonstrated a potential conduit for terrorist activity: ‘The capabilities to board and 
commandeer large underway vessels - demonstrated in numerous piracy incidents - 
could also be employed to facilitate terrorist acts’. 89  These concerns alongside the 
escalation of attacks against shipping off the coast of Somalia from 22 reported 
incidents in 2006 to 51 in 2007, promoted the creation of a general U.S. ‘Policy for the 
repression of piracy and other criminal acts of violence at sea’ in June 2007.90 The 
policy outlined several ways in which the U.S. government would, in collaboration with 
coalition partners and consistent with domestic and international law, address 
contemporary piracy. This included prevention, interruption and termination of acts of 
piracy, reducing the vulnerability of the maritime domain, prosecution of pirates and 
leading international efforts to preserve freedom of the seas.
91
  
 
The 2007 policy led to a more geo-specific counter-piracy action strategy for the Horn 
of Africa following the upsurge of attacks in 2008. The ‘National strategy for countering 
piracy off the Horn of Africa: partnership and action plan’ consisted of several concrete 
operational measures designed to ‘prevent, disrupt, and punish acts of Somali pirate 
organisations’. 92  The strategy aimed to prevent, interrupt and, ultimately, terminate 
Somali piracy by (i) supporting and contributing to a regionally based counter-piracy 
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coordination centre; (ii) seizing and destroying vessels outfitted for piracy and related 
equipment; (iii) persistently interdicting suspect vessels; (iv) maintaining a capable 
presence; (v) supporting shiprider programs and regional counter-piracy agreements; (vi) 
disrupting and dismantling pirate bases ashore; and, (vii) disrupting pirate revenue.
93
 
The partnership and action plan culminated in the creation of the U.S. led counter-piracy 
force C.T.F. 151 in January 2009 (see pp 51-2). 
 
U.S. counter-piracy policy evolved following the first Somali pirate attack on a U.S. 
registered vessel the Maersk Alabama in April 2009. In the aftermath of the hijacking, 
the U.S. State Department adopted a more holistic approach toward Somali piracy and 
immediately despatched an envoy to attend the international Somali peacekeeping and 
development meeting in Brussels, followed by meetings with the International Contact 
Group on Piracy to develop and expanded the multinational response.
94
 This was 
followed by the deployment of a diplomatic task force to engage with the T.F.G. and 
leaders in Puntland to take action against pirates operating from bases within their 
territories and finally, a team was directed to work with the shipping and insurance 
industry to address breaches in self-defence measures.
95
 In relation to self-protection, an 
‘anti-piracy assistance team’ was created in March 2009 to inspect U.S. flagged 
merchant ships prior to transiting the H.R.A. to assess and advise on physical security 
vulnerabilities and to provide information on B.M.P. This was augmented by weekly 
piracy analysis and mariner warning information regarding worldwide threats to 
shipping issued by the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence alongside port security 
advisories issued by the U.S. Coast Guard. 
 
The United States’ ability to disrupt pirate revenue as outlined in the ‘partnership and 
action plan’ was bolstered in April 2010 with the creation of presidential ‘Executive 
Order 13536’. This essentially enabled the United States treasury to disrupt and block 
known pirate financiers’ property and interests. The directive applied to those who had 
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materially assisted, sponsored or provided financial, logistical or technical support to 
pirate operations in Somalia.
96
 Despite this, the legislation had not been formally applied 
as of 31 December 2013. The U.S. State Department also advocated and encouraged 
countries to allow merchant vessels to carry P.C.A.S.P. under the command of the ships 
master as it acknowledged in 2012 that ‘[…] not a single ship with Privately Contracted 
Armed Security Personnel aboard has been pirated […] not a single one’.97 
 
By 2013, U.S. counter-piracy strategy had evolved from a predominantly military 
focused intervention to a more multi-dimensional approach that incorporated long-term 
stabilising initiatives ashore with an emphasis on prosecuting pirates and disrupting their 
sources of revenue. Between 2009 and 2013, the United States government provided 
over US$1.5 billion in assistance to Somalia in the areas of security sector reform, 
developmental and humanitarian assistance including mentoring, training, logistical 
support, and provision of equipment for the Somali National Security Forces.
98
 These 
efforts were a clear indication of U.S. strategic interest in a stable Somalia as a criterion 
for regional security and accessibility.  
 
Britain 
In response to the ‘disturbing increase’ in maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia in 
2005, the U.K. Department for Transport issued Marine Guidance Note (M.G.N.) 298, 
which replaced M.G.N. 241 of 2002.
99
 The guide outlined several protective measures to 
reduce the risk of a successful pirate attack and highlighted potential responses and the 
importance of reporting incidents.
100
 The marked escalation in attacks off the Horn of 
Africa in 2008 precipitated the need for a revised set of counter-piracy measures. M.G.N. 
420 was subsequently published in August 2010, which superseded M.G.N. 298. While 
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M.G.N. 298 adopted a broad outlook that encompassed counter-piracy guidance in 
Southeast Asia and Somalia, M.G.N. 420 identified Somali piracy as the dominant 
manifestation of a ‘global problem’.101 M.G.N. 420’s key messages included planning, 
risk assessment, training, vigilance, high speed and evasive manoeuvring in H.R.A., 
communication with relevant authorities and implementation of the shipping industry’s 
B.M.P.
102
  
 
As counter-piracy initiatives evolved in Gulf of Aden/ western Indian Ocean, a new 
M.G.N. was issued in November 2011 that provided more accessible online links to 
counter-piracy guidance. This included a revised Department for Transport ‘Guidance to 
U.K. flagged shipping on measures to counter piracy, armed robbery and other acts of 
violence against merchant shipping’ alongside ‘Interim guidance to U.K. flagged 
shipping on the use of armed guards to defend against the threat of piracy in exceptional 
circumstances’ and the latest edition of B.M.P. The inclusion of government policy on 
the use of P.C.A.S.P. was significant and illustrated the evolution of the U.K.s counter-
piracy approach given that prior to October 2011 private armed security was prohibited 
on British flagged vessels. 
 
The interim guidelines outlined three ‘exceptional circumstances’ in which P.C.A.S.P. 
may be deployed on U.K. flagged ships. These were (i) when transiting the H.R.A. 
(bounded by Suez and the Straits of Hormuz to the north, 10°S and 78°E); (ii) the latest 
B.M.P. is implanted but is not deemed sufficient to protect against acts of piracy and (iii) 
the use of armed guards is assessed to reduce the threat to crewmembers.
103
 In reality, 
given Britain’s ‘wide-ranging extant and enduring military commitments’, the Royal 
Navy was not enthusiastic or indeed capable of providing V.P.D.s on board     
vulnerable commercial shipping.
104
 This, alongside the obvious deterrent function, likely 
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encouraged the British government to endorse the deployment of P.M.S.C.s, which 
could essentially offset this deficiency. 
 
While the U.K. was active in naval counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and 
western Indian Ocean, the government stressed its leadership role in bolstering maritime 
security. The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State Henry Bellingham M.P. stressed 
that ‘the role the U.K. is taking is not only a matter of the vessels that we have deployed, 
but the leadership role that we are supplying, the lead that we have provided on strategy 
and the thinking behind a number of the different strands’ (see fig. 6.6).105 This direction 
was illustrated at the ‘London Conference’ on Somalia in February 2012, which was 
hosted by the U.K. government and attended by key international representatives.
106
 
Maritime piracy was identified as one of the fundamental destabilising issues in Somalia 
alongside famine, terrorism and weak political and security structures.
107
 A second U.K. 
led international conference on Somalia was held in London in May 2013 that expressed 
support for the T.F.G. of Somalia’s efforts to establish internationally recognised Somali 
waters alongside international efforts to support the development of Somali maritime 
security capacities.
108
 
 
In a more applied sense, the U.K. Maritime Trade Operations (U.K.M.T.O.) office in 
Dubai acted as the primary point of contact for merchant vessels transiting the Gulf of 
Aden/ Somali Basin. Under the U.K.M.T.O. Voluntary Reporting Scheme, merchant 
vessels were encouraged to register details including position, course, passage speed, 
freeboard, cargo, destination and estimated time of arrival.
109
 Vessels could then be 
tracked and monitored through the H.R.A. using A.I.S. and Long Range Identification 
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and Tracking (LRIT). The U.K.M.T.O office then transmitted these details to the 
multinational military coalitions operating in the region thereby generating an accurate 
picture of transitory merchant traffic and allowing counter-piracy forces to position 
warships accordingly. Aside from piracy, the U.K.M.T.O. also provided general 
guidance on other maritime security issues in the Gulf of Aden, Straits of Hormuz and 
Gulf of Oman including forthcoming naval operations, exercises and possible 
interaction between them and transiting vessels. 
 
 
Fig. 6.6 
Royal Navy vessels dedicated to counter-piracy operations in Northeast Africa 2007-11 
Date Unit Force assigned to 
08 Jan. – 27 July 2007 H.M.S. Montrose (NATO) S.N.M.G. 2 
22 Aug. – 21 Dec. 2007 H.M.S. Northumberland (NATO) S.N.M.G. 2 
21 Jan. – 01 Aug. 2008 H.M.S. Somerset (NATO) S.N.M.G. 2 
23 Oct. – 05 Dec. 2008 H.M.S. Cumberland (NATO) Op. Allied Protector 
08 Dec. – 28 Feb. 2009 H.M.S. Northumberland (E.U.) Op. Atalanta 
25 June – 20 Aug. 2009 H.M.S. Cornwall (NATO) Op. Allied Protector 
21 Aug. – 08 Nov. 2009 H.M.S. Cornwall (NATO) Op. Ocean Shield 
26 Jan. – 02 July 2010 H.M.S. Chatham (NATO) Op. Ocean Shield 
29 Aug. – 03 Dec. 2010 H.M.S. Montrose (NATO) Op. Ocean Shield 
25 Sep. – 06 Dec. 2010 R.F.A. Fort Victoria (U.K.) Op. Capri 
05 Jan. – 15 Apr. 2011 
& 11 June – 10 July 2011 
H.M.S. Richmond (E.U.) Op. Atalanta 
Source: Piracy off the coast of Somalia, Foreign Affairs Select Committee, tenth report with formal 
minutes and written evidence, p. 35, H.C. 2011 (1318), x. 
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India 
By 2008, Somali pirates had extended their area of operation over 1000nm into the 
western Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea. It was little surprise then that India, owner of 
the largest proximal naval force in the region, launched counter-piracy patrols in the 
Gulf of Aden in October 2008. Indeed, India had experienced 55 incidences of domestic 
piracy between 2008 and 2013 and a further 86 incidents during the same period in 
neighbouring Bangladeshi waters, more specifically the anchorages and approaches      
to Chittagong harbour.
110
 To address this, in 2009 the Indian navy assumed central 
authority over all maritime and coastal security agencies and invested in Fast Interceptor 
Craft for security operations in the littoral. This resulted in closer inter-agency 
cooperation and fifteen coastal security operations and exercises in 2012.
111
 
 
In 2011, India had forged an anti-piracy operational agreement with China and Japan to 
share information on warship dispersal to achieve a greater economy of force in the Gulf 
of Aden. According to Indian Navy Assistant Chief of Naval Staff Rear Adm. Monty 
Khanna, this was an ‘evolved a mechanism under which it will be ensured that there is 
enough gap between the Indian, Chinese and the Japanese convoys and they are well-
displaced’.112 India also collaborated closely with EUNAVFOR and escorted not only 
Indian flagged but also international merchant vessels through the I.R.T.C. 
 
Regional initiatives 
General context 
Regional states were for the most part incapable of addressing Somali piracy in any 
meaningful way without international led collaboration and financial assistance. Indeed, 
several neighbouring countries also struggled with socio-economic problems, although 
to a lesser extent than Somalia. This meant that resources available for counter-piracy 
operations were limited, predominantly in relation to naval capacity and capability. The 
notable absence of African navies in multinational counter-piracy patrols in the Gulf of 
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Aden and Somali Basin testified to this. Moreover, there was likely a reluctance and 
lack of desire to commit already limited resources to a long-term failed state. Indeed, 
most regional countries lacked the capability to provide effective maritime security 
within their own territorial waters. According to one study in 2010: 
 
[…] the region lacks capabilities such as intelligence, early warning, 
maritime air surveillance and reconnaissance […] No credible indigenous 
maritime forces with sufficient mobility, flexibility and the firepower 
necessary for sustainable operations and deterrence exist; coastguards and 
civilian maritime agencies are wanting, while no single agency […] exists 
that cooperates on maritime security issues in the region.
113
 
 
The escalation in piracy between 2005 and 2008 changed this regional apathy somewhat 
given the wider repercussions of Somali piracy to the economic prospects of littoral 
states. While most regional countries were limited in what they could contribute to 
maritime security unilaterally, the A.U. framework became an important element in 
regional efforts to enhance long-term political stability ashore. Despite this, the 
international community remained a significant contributor to regional counter-piracy 
efforts. According to one study: ‘Until a sufficient level of capacity is reached, or the 
region shows it has the leadership and funds to develop capacity themselves, the 
international community will have to keep playing a large role in combating piracy and 
other transnational threats’.114  
 
African Union Mission in Somalia 
On 6 December 2006, U.N. Security Council Resolution 1725 authorised the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development in Eastern Africa and member states of 
the African Union to establish a protection and training mission in Somalia. The 
initiative, named IGASOM, was never deployed. A little over one year later on 19 
January 2007, the A.U. authorised a peace-support mission in Somalia dubbed 
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AMISOM that consisted of nine infantry battalions each consisting of 850 personnel 
supported by maritime coastal and air components. One month later, the operation was 
formerly authorised by the U.N. under Security Council Resolution 1744. The aim of 
AMISOM was, in the first instance, to support stabilising efforts in Somalia through 
dialogue and reconciliation; secondly, to facilitate the provision of humanitarian 
assistance and finally to create the conditions for long-term stabilisation, reconstruction 
and development ashore.
115
 While the January 2007 A.U. communiqué did not make 
any explicit reference to maritime piracy as a destabilising factor, a follow-up document 
in January 2008 expressed concern at the ‘persistence of the phenomenon of piracy off 
the coast of Somalia and its serious implications for security and delivery of 
humanitarian assistance.’116  
 
Though not a counter-piracy mission, AMISOM’s stabilising efforts ashore likely 
contributed to suppressing piracy at sea. International governments were reticent to 
commit troops to Somalia in support of the T.F.G. given the unsuccessful history of 
such operations, despite acknowledging the importance of stability and security ashore 
in tackling the roots of maritime piracy. Therefore, an ‘African ownership of an African 
problem’ approach was adopted and supported by international community. Initially the 
mission was hampered by understaffing and a lack of tactical equipment. The troop 
contingent between 2006 and 2008 consisted primarily of the remnants of the Ethiopian 
invasion force and a small number of Ugandan troops.
 117
 However, by 2010 a battalion 
from Burundi joined the force, which elevated troop numbers to 9,000.
118
 By 2012, the 
troop numbers stood at approximately 12,000.
119
 In terms of counter-piracy, AMISOM 
force Commander Fredrick Mugisha commented in 2011: ‘We are still concentrating 
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with phase one of our operations. It is only after this phase that we might move near the 
marauding pirates in Southern Somalia near Kismayu and also Central Somalia’.120 
 
Despite this, AMISOM did contribute to wider regional counter-piracy efforts. In 
December 2011, for example, the A.U. Peace and Security Council authorised the 
training and deployment of V.P.D.s on board supply vessels for AMISOM. The V.P.D.s 
worked closely with EUNAVFOR assets through specialised anti-piracy drills alongside 
training in pirate modus operandi, tactics, rules of engagement, unarmed combat and 
detention of suspects.
121
 In practical terms AMISOM, in conjunction with Somali T.F.G. 
forces, managed to secure key strategic sites in the capital Mogadishu including the 
seaport, which enabled AMISOM forces to escort shipping and more importantly deny 
use of the littoral maritime space as a potential springboard for piratical attacks.
122
 
 
U.N. Security Council Resolution 2036 of December 2012 expanded the mandate of 
AMISOM to include a ceiling of over 17,000 troops alongside reimbursement of 
contingent owned equipment including force enablers and multipliers.
123
 However, the 
resolution stopped short of supplying essential marine vessels which AMISOM claimed 
were needed not only deny Al-Shabaab the opportunity to benefit from piracy and 
illegal maritime trade but contribute to the international counter-piracy mission off the 
coast.
124
 
 
By 2013, AMISOM had achieved a significant operational success against Al-Shabaab 
in Mogadishu and in areas of central and southern Somalia despite limited resources and 
troops. Material insufficiencies aside, according to one commentator: ‘AMISOM […] 
liberated over one million Somali citizens from Al-Shabaab’s tyrannous social control 
[…] provided increased safety and security in liberated territories; and has taken the first 
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steps toward terminating the country’s decades-long civil war’.125 In terms of countering 
maritime piracy, AMISOM’s efforts contributed to tackling the root causes of the crime 
ashore, specifically political instability and lack of law enforcement. 
 
Djibouti Code of Conduct  
The most significant regional centred counter-piracy initiative during this period was the 
creation and ratification of the ‘Code of Conduct concerning the repression of piracy 
and armed robbery against ships in the western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden’ 
referred to as the ‘Djibouti Code of Conduct’ in January 2009. The ‘code of conduct’ 
was convened by the I.M.O. and initially signed by Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Maldives, Seychelles, Somalia, United Republic of Tanzania and Yemen. 
By 2013, it had been ratified by twenty eligible states including Egypt, Saudi Arabia and 
South Africa. Although not legally binding, the Djibouti Code of Conduct established a 
comprehensive regional maritime security framework that included measures to repress 
piracy, protections measures for ships, coordination and information sharing, review of 
national counter-piracy legislation and a dispute settlement mechanism.
126
 The code was 
loosely modelled on the 2004 Regional Co-operation Agreement on combating Piracy 
and Armed robbery Against ships in Asia (ReCAAP) that proved to be a highly effective 
regional based cooperative counter-piracy framework. 
 
A key achievement under the Djibouti Code of Conduct was the creation of three 
regional maritime information-sharing centres that acted as focal points for reports of 
pirate activity and dhow movements (see fig. 6.7). The centres were strategically located 
in Mombasa to cover the central area, Dar-es-Salaam to receive reports from member 
states in the southern region and Sana’a in Yemen to cover information received in the 
north. This information was then disseminated to assist international naval forces in 
identifying mother ships and patterns of piratical movement.
127
 By April 2010, the 
Djibouti Code of Conduct had evolved to include a ‘project implementation unit’ tasked 
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with assisting signatory states in implementing the agreement. The implementation unit 
consisted of several specialists in various fields such as operational training and 
maritime law and was financially sustained through a donor state trust fund. 
 
In 2013, the I.M.O. trained over 600 regional officials in counter-piracy through the 
regional training centre in Djibouti, which illustrated some measure of the relative 
success of the initiative. Despite functioning as a regional based counter-piracy 
framework, the formation of the Djibouti Code of Conduct was truly an international 
effort. The Djibouti meeting, for example, was attended by delegations from eighteen 
nations, observers from a further twelve nations,
128
 U.N. bodies alongside observers 
from the European Commission, INTERPOL, the League of Arab States, ReCAAP, 
NATO, the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, BIMCO and INTERTANKO. In 
June 2009, a pan-Arab anti-piracy task force was created separate from the Djibouti 
Code of Conduct to bolster regional maritime security and enhance cooperation with 
multinational naval patrols by several Gulf States including Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.  
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Fig. 6.7 
Djibouti Code of Conduct information sharing network and national focal points  
 
Source: I.M.O., ‘Djibouti Code of Conduct: Project Implementation Unit’, no. 3 (Sept. 2012-Mar. 2013), p. 6. 
 
Somaliland & Puntland 
In 2009, Somaliland was described by one analyst as ‘the only pirate-free area in 
Somalia’.129 This remained consistent throughout the period covered in this analysis 
despite a lack of international recognition and a limited maritime enforcement capacity. 
Indeed, Somaliland’s efforts to suppress piracy after 2008 were likely motivated by 
claims of statehood, as successes would strengthen its case for international recognition. 
The Somaliland Coast Guard reportedly operated a fleet of between five and seven 
functional boats to patrol some 860 kilometres of coastline between Djibouti to the north 
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and Puntland to the South with an annual budget of just US$200,000.
130
 Other analysis 
suggested Somaliland’s maritime capacity was even more restricted. A 2011 report 
observed that the Somaliland coast-guard comprised of ‘two large, nine-meter boats, 
which can be fitted with heavy machine guns and look fit for rough seas […] but most 
of the other vessels seem to be battered plastic hulls without engines or seats’.131 Despite 
these constraints, the purported 600-strong Somaliland Coast Guard detained over 94 
pirates between 2006 and 2012 alongside ‘countless’ illegal fisherman, smugglers, 
human and arms traffickers.
132
 This illustrated the relative effectiveness of countering 
pirates ashore thereby denying them the opportunity to commit criminal acts at sea. 
 
These counter-piracy achievements were marred by allegations of corruption, 
particularly surrounding the reported release of 60 convicted pirates from a Somaliland 
prison in 2011 following the payment of bribes to court and prison officials.
133
 The 
long-term effectiveness of local counter-piracy efforts were further hampered by 
ongoing issues surrounding the campaign for international recognition as an independent 
state. In June 2013, for example, Somaliland authorities denied UNSOM permission to 
operate in Somaliland territory on the basis that UNSOM was only mandated to work in 
the Federal Republic of Somalia from which Somaliland was independent.
134
 
Notwithstanding these diplomatic difficulties, in March 2013 Puntland and Somaliland 
agreed to jointly share information and collaborate on a series of security cooperation 
measures relating to terrorism, piracy and other forms of organised crime.  
 
In contrast to Somaliland, Puntland and to a lesser extent the state of Galmudug to the 
south, emerged as the primary operating bases for Somali pirates after 2008. By 2011, it 
was estimated that pirates held over 300 kidnapped crewmembers hostage ashore in 
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Puntland during the course of ransom negotiations.
135
 Despite this, the U.N. highlighted 
how the Puntland authorities assisted in securing the hostages eventual release.
136
 
Puntland had previously formed a small Coast Guard contingent in 2000 with the 
assistance of the U.K. based private military company the HART group. According to a 
report by the U.N. Monitoring Group on Somalia, since mid-2008 ‘the Puntland Coast 
Guard [had] begun to demonstrate limited but growing effectiveness in its operations 
against pirate groups operating in Puntland coastal water’.137 
 
In 2009, the Puntland administration under President Abdirahman Mohamud Farole was 
credited with ejecting pirate groups from the principal town of Garowe through a 
combination of negotiation and use of force that was bolstered by a strong local anti-
piracy sentiment.
138
 The most significant practical counter-piracy measure initiated by 
the Puntland administration was the creation of the Puntland Maritime Police Force 
(P.M.P.F.) in 2010. Between December 2010 and February 2012, the P.M.P.F. were 
reportedly responsible for the arrest of over 700 pirates.
139
 In terms of equipment, the 
P.M.P.F. was limited to Kalashnikov rifles alongside several skiffs for maritime 
operations and 4x4 vehicles for operations ashore. The force also claimed to operate an 
‘AN-26’ aircraft as a ‘maritime surveillance platform’ but this was likely a chartered 
plane with no specialised surveillance equipment.
140
 
 
In 2012, the P.M.P.F. launched a counter-piracy operation ashore in the former pirate 
stronghold of Eyl in southern Puntland that included the construction a small airstrip, 
water drilling facilities and a base to support counter-piracy operations off the coast.
141
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An additional 400 personnel were reportedly recruited by the P.M.P.F. for the mission in 
March 2012.
142
 At sea, the P.M.P.F. demonstrated an ability to disrupt and force pirates 
from a particular area of operation albeit with limited resources. In May 2012, for 
example, the P.M.P.F. launched a major operation along the Bari coastline that forced 
pirates operating in the area, including alleged pirate leader Isse Yuluh, to flee from 
littoral waters toward open-ocean aboard the hijacked vessels M.V. Royal Grace and 
M.T. Smyrni.
143
 
 
Despite these relative successes and support from the T.F.G. of Somalia, the P.M.P.F. 
was heavily criticised in a report by the U.N. Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea 
in 2012. The report labelled the P.M.P.F. a ‘private army disingenuously labelled a 
“counter-piracy” force’ and alleged that it was funded by contributions from high-
ranking officials from the United Arab Emirates and supported by a private military 
company Sterling Corporate Services (formerly Saracen International).
144
 According to 
the P.M.P.F.s official website: ‘The land-based P.M.P.F. […] plays no role in border 
disputes […] [it] furthers the restoration and sustainability of security in Somalia 
generally, a key pillar of the larger reconciliation efforts supported by the international 
community’.145 
 
Kenya 
The ramifications of piracy off the coast of Somali spread throughout littoral states and 
inhibited already struggling regional economies while exacerbating pre-existing political 
tensions. In 2008, for example, a total of 35 cruise liners called at ports in Kenya with an 
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estimated revenue stream of US$300,000 per vessel.
146
 As a direct result of the 
escalation in piracy in the Gulf of Aden and western Indian Ocean, this figure had 
dropped to zero by 2012. As early as 2005, Kenya had offered support to address the 
increasingly frequent reports of piracy off the coast of Somalia following an escalation 
in international attention, however; the Kenyan navy was ill equipped, especially in 
relation to patrol craft, to combat the ‘well-armed’ pirates.147 By 2009, Kenya adopted a 
more proactive role and became the first regional state to accept Somali pirates for 
prosecution and detention following several bilateral agreements with the United States 
and European Union. This resulted in the conviction of over 50 Somali nationals in 
Kenyan courts for the crime of piracy by 2013.
148
 
 
In terms of sea-based counter-piracy initiatives, Kenya launched a navy patrolled 
maritime ‘security corridor’ in November 2010 aimed at deterring Somali based 
pirates.
149
 Indeed, the Kenyan navy received delivery of two newly refurbished fast 
attack patrol craft in August 2011 complemented by the donation of a patrol boat for 
counter-piracy duties by France in June that year. The United Kingdom also donated a 
rigid-hulled inflatable boat to Kenya in June 2013 to bolster the navy's ability to tackle 
piracy threats and other illegal maritime activity.
150
 Notwithstanding these capability 
enhancements and an apparent willingness to engage with internationally led counter-
piracy initiatives, the head of the EUCAP NESTOR mission Etienne de Poncins, 
commented in 2013 that ‘the political situation in Kenya is not so favourable for the 
moment’.151 Indeed, criticism that Kenya was not proactively addressing the root causes 
of piracy had previously been highlighted. According to Andrew Mwangura of the East 
African Seafarers Assistance Programme: ‘We need to address the root causes of piracy 
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and follow the money where it goes […] a lot of the [piracy] money comes to Kenya 
why is the government not concerned about that?’.152 
 
Apart from Kenya, the Seychelles was the first regional nation to contribute to military 
counter-piracy operations after 2008. Indeed, the Seychelles participated in several 
multilateral counter-piracy operations between 2009 and 2013 including a joint mission 
involving a French Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft in which a pirated 
fishing vessel was recaptured approximately 240nm northwest of Port Victoria.
153
 Other 
regional states such as Maldives, Mauritius and Tanzania also launched limited maritime 
security operations. Tanzania, for example, despite a limited naval capacity and no 
patrol aircraft, reportedly prevented four separate pirate attacks between 2010 and 
2011.
154
 
 
South Africa 
Given the limited maritime capacity of southeast African coastal states such as 
Madagascar, Mozambique and Tanzania, pressure mounted on South Africa to address 
this regional maritime security deficiency. During the 1990s, South Africa emerged as a 
leader in regional maritime security cooperation and development, however, the 
continent’s largest and most functional naval force resisted requests to join international 
efforts following the upsurge in piracy attacks off the coast of Somalia around 2008. 
The European Union formally requested that South Africa participate in the 
international counter-piracy operation off the Somali coast in September 2009, mostly as 
it was one of the best-equipped navies on the African continent.
155
 Similarly, W.F.P. 
requests to serve as an escort to humanitarian vessels to Somalia were reportedly 
disregarded despite an offer by France to reimburse refuelling costs for South African 
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Navy ships.
156
 Internal political opposition to expeditionary counter-piracy patrols 
seemed to emanate from budgetary constraints alongside an unwillingness to commit 
assets outside of the Southern African Development Community waters.
157
 
 
It was not until Somali pirate attacks extended far enough south to threaten South 
Africa’s extended maritime domain that the government recognised the need to respond. 
Indeed, it was feared that South African waters were becoming an ‘attractive alternative’ 
for Somali pirates attempting to avoid the various maritime task forces in the Somali 
Basin and the Gulf of Aden.
158
 Operation Copper was South Africa’s first counter-
piracy operation, which was initiated following the hijacking of a fishing vessel Vega 5 
by Somali pirates off the coast of Mozambique in December 2010. The counter-piracy 
deployment included South African Navy frigates, a C47TP maritime patrol aircraft, a 
Super Lynx maritime surveillance helicopter and 377 military personnel.
159
 
 
By February 2012, South Africa signed a trilateral counter-piracy Memorandum of 
Understanding with Mozambique and Tanzania under the auspices of the Southern 
African Development Community. As per the terms of the agreement, South Africa 
supplied two frigates; Mozambique provided a naval base at Pemba alongside twelve 
inland patrol vessels, while Tanzania contributed three additional patrol vessels.
160
 
South Africa expanded its engagement with regional counter-piracy efforts by becoming 
the nineteenth state to sign the Djibouti Code of Conduct in May 2012. In October 2013, 
the South African Navy ship the S.A.S. Spioenkop visited Angola, Ghana, Namibia, 
Nigeria and Senegal for the purposes of counter-piracy training exercises.
161
 
                                                 
156
 Helmoed-Römer Heitman, ‘EU requests that South Africa join anti-piracy effort’ in I.H.S. Jane’s 
Defence Weekly (17 Sept. 2009). 
157
 Lauren Gelfand & Helmoed-Römer Heitman, ‘South Africa could join Gulf of Aden anti-piracy 
patrols’ in I.H.S. Jane’s Defence Weekly (23 Apr. 2010). 
158
 ‘Address by L. N. Sisulu, M.P., Minister of Defence and Military Veterans at the S.A.D.C. 
Extraordinary Meeting on Regional Anti-Piracy Strategy’, 25 July 2011, available at Rep. of South Africa, 
Dept. of Defence (http://www.dod.mil.za/speeches/July2011/Anti-Piracy%20Strategy.htm) (17 Feb. 2015). 
159
 Republic of South Africa, Dept. of Defence, ‘Operation Copper - maritime security on the 
Mozambican channel’ (http://www.dod.mil.za/operations/international/operation_copper.htm) (16 Feb. 
2015). 
160
 Lisa Otto, ‘South-Africa and anti-piracy: pragmatic foreign policy or misguided intervention?’ in 
African Armed Forces Journal (Nov. 2014), p. 20. 
161
 Ibid. p. 20. 
 -350- 
Conclusion 
Between January and December 2013, reports of pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden and 
the western Indian Ocean had reached its lowest levels since 2006 with just fifteen 
incidents reported the I.M.B. (see fig. 6.8).
162
 A combination of internationally led naval 
patrols, widespread compliance with industry B.M.P., proliferation of P.C.A.S.P. and 
increased prosecutions alongside progressive political normalisation and military efforts 
ashore contributed to the reduction in attacks. Indeed, the global response to piracy off 
the coast of Somalia after 2008 was unprecedented in modern times. Naval efforts 
witnessed traditional enemies cooperating against a common enemy to all or ‘Hostis 
Humani Generis’. In relation to the People’s Liberation Army Navy of China, for 
example, one commentator suggested that the impact of counter-piracy operations off 
the coast of Somalia was such that first decade of the twenty-first-century should be 
divided into a ‘pre-anti-piracy’ operations period and a ‘post-anti-piracy’ operations 
period.
163
 This global response was necessitated, not only due to the inherent 
international nature of the crime, but moreover the inability of Somalia and its 
neighbouring states to counter-act the threat in any meaningful way. 
 
Early international counter-piracy efforts off Somalia were chiefly reactionary and 
focussed primarily on military measures to interdict and deter piracy at sea. By 2013, 
anti-piracy strategy had evolved into a more comprehensive and holistic framework that 
aimed to tackle the root causes of the crime ashore while simultaneously suppressing the 
threat at sea. The E.U.’s counter-piracy efforts, for example, evolved from a 
predominately naval based response via Operation Atalanta to strengthening Somali 
judicial capability ashore through the Regional Maritime Security Programme and 
maritime infrastructural capacity through EUCAP NESTOR. Similarly, several regional 
states, in collaboration with international user states, convened the Djibouti Code of 
Conduct in 2012 that established a comprehensive framework for regional maritime 
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security for the first time including information sharing centres in Kenya, Tanzania and 
Yemen. 
 
Despite the substantial decline in piracy incidents off the northeast coast of Africa by 
2013, the issue remained at the ‘macro’ or policy level among international 
governments. It was widely recognised that transitory counter-piracy measures, such as 
coalition naval patrols, had only a palliative effect on the crime and that without a long 
term stabilising strategy ashore, attacks could easily resurge. The U.N. Security Council 
emphasised that ‘Somalia’s long-term security rests with the effective development by 
Somali authorities of the Somali National Security Forces’.164 However, improving the 
economic, political, social and security environment of Somalia would take significant 
time and resources. This meant that international and regional counter-piracy initiatives 
had to endure because, as the I.M.B. highlighted in its 2013 piracy report: ‘any change 
or complacency, at this stage, could rekindle the pirate activity’.165 
 
Fig. 6.8 
Fluctuation of reported actual and attempted pirate attacks Northeast Africa 2003-13 
 
Source: I.C.C. I.M.B., Piracy report 2004-2013.
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CHAPTER VII 
 
The effectiveness of suppression: 
A multi-level comparative analysis of contemporary counter-piracy 
initiatives 
 
A destroyer: even the brave fear its might. 
It inspires horror in the harbour and in the open sea. 
She sails into the waves 
Flanked by arrogance, haughtiness and false power. 
To her doom she moves slowly  
A dinghy awaits her, riding the waves.
1
 
 
Introduction 
Southeast Asia and Northeast Africa both experienced distinct manifestations of 
maritime piracy and armed robbery at sea at various times during the course of this 
study. While several comparisons can be drawn between the broader counter-piracy 
responses in both regions, the contrasts are perhaps most striking. Indeed, while the term 
‘piracy’ is applied to incidents in both regions, the categories, modus operandi and 
severity of attacks committed varied considerably. Whereas high-profile hijacking of 
vessels and kidnapping of crews for ransom was the primary modus operandi of Somali 
pirates after 2005, attacks in Southeast Asia generally constituted more ‘low-level’ 
armed robberies and petty thefts (see fig. 7.1). This is an important distinction to note. 
 
Furthermore, there was a fundamental contrast between the failed state of Somalia and 
the functioning albeit ‘fragile state’ status of several Southeast Asian nations during the 
course of this research. This resulted in considerably different strategic approaches and 
operational intricacies and impediments in counteracting maritime criminality. Despite 
these issues, by 2013 maritime piracy had been substantially suppressed off the coast of 
Somalia in a manner comparable to the successes experienced in Southeast Asia 
between 2006 and 2008. While it remains to be seen if the decrease in attacks due to the 
multifaceted efforts to combat piracy off the coast of Somalia will endure, Southeast 
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Asia, chiefly Indonesian waters, experienced a resurgence in maritime piracy and armed 
robbery against ships between 2009 and 2013 (see fig. 7.2). 
 
Fig. 7.1 
Rate and severity of piratical incidents: Southeast Asia 2009-13 
 
Source: Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in 
Asia (ReCAAP), Information Sharing Centre (I.S.C.), Piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia: 
Annual report Jan. – Dec. 2013 (Singapore, 2013), p. 10. 
 
This chapter will firstly briefly highlight the comparable historical context to maritime 
piracy in both regions alongside an outline of the most recent manifestations in 2014. 
Next, a comparative analysis is presented of counter-piracy initiatives in Southeast Asia 
and Northeast Africa as outlined in the case studies at the strategic/policy level, the 
operational level and the tactical level.
2
 The comparative analytical framework is 
divided into three distinct areas for clarity. The strategic analysis explores policy-level 
counter-piracy activity in both regions focussing on political engagement and 
multilateral diplomacy, the role of international organisations and governments 
alongside the utility and influence of international law. Analysis at the operational level 
examines naval and maritime law enforcement, military initiatives such as the European 
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Union Naval Force’s (EUNAVFOR) ‘Operation Atalanta’ and the Malacca Strait Patrols 
(M.S.P.) alongside the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (I.R.T.C.), 
implementation of the International Ship and Port-facility Security Code (I.S.P.S.) and 
the role of Private Maritime Security Companies (P.M.S.C.). Finally, the tactical 
analysis compares and contrasts engagements between authorities and maritime 
criminals in both Southeast Asia and off the coast of Somalia alongside practical 
compliance with industry Best Management Practice (B.M.P.), joint and coordinated 
patrols, interdicting pirates at sea and the utility of reporting mechanisms. This is 
followed by an analysis of the fluctuations and responses to maritime piracy in West 
African waters between 1980 and 2013 to provide a deeper understanding of how 
national intricacies and socio-political context ashore create diverse manifestations of 
piracy that are regionally unique. 
 
Fig. 7.2 
Fluctuation of reported piracy attacks: Southeast Asia & Northeast Africa, 2003-13 
 
Source: International Chamber of Commerce (I.C.C.), International Maritime Bureau (I.M.B.), Piracy 
and armed robbery against ships, annual reports, 1 Jan. - 31Dec. 2003-2013 (London, 2004-2014). 
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Analogous historical & causal factors 
While Southeast Asia played host to the initial ‘palingenesis’ of contemporary maritime 
piracy in the late 1970s and early 1980s, piracy off the Horn of Africa did not become a 
material threat to merchant shipping until after 2005. Nevertheless, this study has 
identified several analogous historical and causal factors that precipitated the rise of 
maritime criminality in both regions. While it is important to highlight the broader 
historical causes of maritime piracy across the geographic divide, regional and cultural 
specificities and political context must always be considered. The regression of 
colonialism in the decades after the Second World War was a precursor to later 
manifestations of maritime piracy in both regions. The process of decolonisation left 
behind fragile systems of self-governance that were strained economically and 
susceptible to internal divisions precipitated by colonial boundaries that disrupted 
traditional ethnic dispersal. Moreover, this departure left behind a vulnerable maritime 
environment that no longer benefited from the relative security and stability that the 
colonial naval presence maintained. 
 
This post-colonial instability culminated in armed conflict in both regions between 1950 
and 1980 including the Ogaden War between Somalia and Ethiopia and the Vietnam 
War in Southeast Asia. Aside from fuelling political instability ashore, these conflicts 
increased the proliferation of military grade weaponry, which not only enhanced the 
capabilities of pirates but also encouraged the spread of criminality on land and at sea. 
Despite internal divisions and conflict ashore, the waterways of Southeast Asia and 
around the Horn of Africa still witnessed abundant extra-regional naval activity during 
the period of the Cold War. By 1991, however, these naval assets had declined and this 
positioned against the growth in global sea-borne trade during the 1980s, was a driver of 
maritime piracy. Moreover, the 1990s witnessed the collapse of central government and 
a violent civil war in Somalia alongside a financial crisis in Asia. The ensuing economic 
hardship gave rise to widespread poverty in coastal areas and famine in Somalia. 
 
The combination of poverty and inefficient or, in the case of Somalia, non-existent 
coastal law enforcement, political dissonance and jurisdictional weakness alongside 
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geographic proximity to safe havens ashore and major shipping lanes in the Gulf of 
Aden and the Malacca Strait fuelled maritime piracy and armed robbery at sea in both 
Southeast Asia and Northeast Africa. While attacks had been extensively suppressed in 
Southeast Asian waters by 2007, incidents off the coast of Somalia escalated 
considerably. However, given the apparent cyclical nature of maritime piracy in 
susceptible regions, incidents in the Gulf of Aden and western Indian Ocean decreased 
dramatically by 2013 whereas armed robberies against ships in Southeast Asia escalated 
once again after 2009.  
 
Recent manifestations 
As figs 7.3 and 7.4 illustrate, rates of maritime piracy shifted from Northeast Africa in 
2009 to Southeast Asia by 2014, illustrating to some extent the regionally cyclic nature 
of maritime criminality. Indeed, attacks in Southeast Asia reached a four-year high in 
2014, an increase of 22 percent from 2013 including a significant upsurge of attacks in 
the regions’ principal sea-lanes of the Malacca and Singapore Straits. The Regional 
Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia 
(ReCAAP) annual report highlighted a total of 183 actual and attempted attacks in 2014, 
including 48 incidents in the Malacca and Singapore Straits compared to just 12 in 
2013.
3
 
 
Despite the high rates of occurrence, an estimated 62 percent of attacks were categorised 
as low-level petty or opportunistic armed or unarmed robberies according to the 
ReCAAP report.
4
 Statistically, the majority of incidents involved between one and six 
pirates armed with knives or unarmed, boarding vessels at anchorage or at berth under 
the cover of darkness and pilfering general ship stores and other manifest items. There 
were also several reported armed hijackings of small coastal tankers explicitly for the 
purposes of siphoning marine gas oil and ship diesel to sell on the black market. 
 
                                                 
3
 Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia 
(ReCAAP) Information Sharing Centre (I.S.C.), Piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia: annual 
report Jan. – Dec. 2014 (Singapore, 2015), pp 3-12. 
4
 ReCAAP, I.S.C., Annual report 2014, p. 10. 
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This was in sharp contrast to the modus operandi employed by Somali pirates between 
2008 and 2013, who engaged in armed hijacking of vessels and kidnapping of crew for 
ransom. Despite this, rates of attacks continued to decline in the Gulf of Aden and 
western Indian Ocean in 2014 with just eleven reported occurrences.
5
 However, 
suspected Somali pirates still held 33 crewmembers for ransom as of 31 December 
2014.
6
 While statistically, Southeast Asia dominated piracy reports for 2014, according 
to Pottengal Mukundan, Director of the International Maritime Bureau (I.M.B.): ‘the 
most serious attacks today remain in the Gulf of Guinea in the West Coast of Africa’.7 
 
Despite officially accounting for just 17 percent of the global total for 2014, maritime 
piracy and armed robbery attacks of the West Coast of Africa are likely to be 
significantly higher due to considerable underreporting of incidents.
8
 Moreover, the 
propensity for violence, kidnapping and injury to crew further highlights the seriousness 
of the crime in the Gulf of Guinea in particular.
9
 In comparison to piracy off the coast of 
Somalia where crewmembers are kidnapped and held for ransom, attacks off West 
Africa tend to target diesel fuel or ship’s equipment and cargo therefore little incentive 
exists to manage or maintain the welfare of the crew.
10
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 International Chamber of Commerce (I.C.C.), International Maritime Bureau (I.M.B.), Piracy and armed 
robbery against ships, annual report, 1 Jan. – 31 Dec. 2014 (London, 2015), p. 5. 
6
 I.C.C. I.M.B., Piracy report 2014, p. 19. 
7
 Sofia Diogo Mateus, ‘Worrying rise in piracy attacks around Malacca Strait’, 11July 2014, available at 
Deutsche Welle (D.W.) (http://www.dw.de/worrying-rise-in-piracy-attacks-around-malacca-strait/a-
17780275) (19 Mar. 2015). 
8
 I.C.C. I.M.B., Piracy report 2014, p. 29; Oceans Beyond Piracy (O.B.P.), ‘The state of maritime piracy 
2014: assessing the economic and human cost - executive summary’ (2015), p. 6, available at 
(http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/attachments/SoP2014ExecutiveSummary.pdf) (11 June 
2015). 
9
 See for example: I.C.C. I.M.B., Piracy report 2014, pp 20-1. 
10
 See for example: The Economist, 29 Nov. 2014. 
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Fig. 7.3 
Fluctuation of actual and attempted pirate attacks worldwide, 2009 
 
Source: I.C.C. I.M.B., Piracy report 2009, pp 5-7. 
 
 
Fig. 7.4 
Actual and attempted pirate attacks worldwide, 2014 
 
Source: I.C.C. I.M.B., Piracy report 2014, pp 5-7. 
Strategic/policy level analysis 
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Counter-piracy efforts in Southeast Asia between 1997 and 2007 can be described as 
regionally-led strategic-engagement enhanced by the international community, whereas 
approaches to the problem in the Gulf of Aden and western Indian Ocean after 2005 
were entirely an internationally-led strategic-engagement reinforced by regional states. 
In both regions, maritime piracy was a manifestation of wider political and economic 
instability ashore. Piracy therefore was not an obvious initial strategic priority for the 
majority of Southeast Asian or Northeast African governments, considered more a 
symptom of instability rather than a cause. However, given the transnational character of 
piracy, its victims and wider economic and security implications, international pressure 
eventually necessitated a policy level response in both regions. 
 
Indeed, there was little unanimity across Southeast Asian administrations in particular, 
that piracy was a policy issue in any sense, chiefly in the period before the Asian 
financial crisis of 1997-99. According to Ian Storey: ‘Indonesia did not care about 
piracy in the Malacca Straits, Singapore was concerned with maritime terrorism, 
Malaysia’s main concern was illegal migration from Indonesia, so the three of them had 
different perceptions of what the problem was’.11 This lack of multilateral continuity 
infused with a historical mistrust and sensitivity over sovereignty was a critical initial 
weakness in mounting an effective strategic response. 
 
Similarly, addressing Somalia’s chronic instability ashore emerged as a strategic priority 
for the international community during the 1990s illustrated by the United Nations 
Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I & II). No functioning centralised government 
existed to address criminality either ashore or at sea. This was combined with a wider 
regional apathy toward maritime security as littoral states also suffered from a paucity of 
resources and maritime enforcement assets alongside a lack of political will to tackle 
crimes like piracy. Indeed, both regions lacked a modern indigenous naval history as a 
by-product of colonialism, which may explain the neglect of investment in maritime 
enforcement assets and early deficiencies in regional responses. 
                                                 
11
 Interview with Dr Ian Storey, Senior Fellow - Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (I.S.E.A.S.) and 
Editor - Contemporary Southeast Asia at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Pasir Panjang, 
Singapore (20 Mar. 2013). 
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While there were a number of African-led peace and reconciliation initiatives launched 
in Somalia after the outbreak of the civil war, maritime security was rarely prioritised 
given the scale of the humanitarian and political crisis ashore. The escalation in attacks 
after 2005 and the inability of Somalia or its neighbouring states to address the threat 
saw maritime piracy emerge as a significant international policy level concern 
particularly given the importance of the Gulf of Aden and western Indian Ocean as a 
strategic conduit for international trade. 
 
Political engagement and multilateral diplomacy 
Geoffrey Till postulated that ‘the ocean need to be thought of as a global system 
characterised by countless interconnections in which a disturbance in any one 
component may well effect all the others’.12 Manifestations of maritime piracy in both 
Southeast Asia and Northeast Africa during the period of this research illustrated this 
concept well. Piracy and armed robbery against ships affected not only the crew and 
shipping company but also wider regional and international maritime trade and stability. 
In Southeast Asia, this was demonstrated in June 2005 when Lloyd’s marine insurers 
included the Malacca Strait in its ‘war, strikes, terrorism and related perils’ risk list. This 
designation combined with pressure from international user states and the importance of 
seaborne trade to regional economies, precipitated multilateral diplomatic engagement 
and a concerted counter-piracy effort by the littoral states of Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Singapore. 
 
Similarly, the escalation in maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia after 2007 
exacerbated existing regional economic hardship, curtailing, for example, visits by 
international cruise liners to Kenyan ports and negatively affecting fisheries and tourism 
                                                 
12
 Geoffrey Till, Seapower: a guide for the twenty-first century (3
rd
 ed., Oxford, 2013), p. 308. 
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that constituted some 65 percent of the G.D.P. of the Seychelles.
13
 This was a likely 
driver of the Kenyan and Seychelles administrations alongside those of Madagascar, 
Mauritius, Oman, Tanzania and Yemen, in accepting hundreds of Somali pirate suspects 
for prosecution and imprisonment between 2008 and 2013. This multilateral political 
engagement and diplomacy in both regions, which was influenced to different degrees 
by international states, culminated in the signing of the ReCAAP agreement in 2007 and 
the Djibouti Code of Conduct in 2009, which emulated the ReCAAP model. 
 
Despite establishing a multilateral government-to-government framework for 
counteracting piracy, both agreements were intrinsically limited by the unique political, 
historical and economic context of each region. In Southeast Asia, for example, neither 
Malaysia nor Indonesia ratified ReCAAP. Moreover, enduring issues surrounding 
territorial integrity and sensitivities over sovereignty dominated not only maritime 
security policy, but also wider strategic political engagement under the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) framework.
14
 In contrast, Somalia as a failed state 
lacked any functioning administration or indigenous maritime enforcement capability. In 
addition, a wider lack of regional political will, national rivalries and a paucity of 
maritime security resources hampered effective implementation of the Djibouti Code of 
Conduct illustrated by the financial and material reliance on the I.M.O.’s Project 
Implementation Unit and Trust Fund. 
 
Despite contextual contrasts, agreement was reached in November 2011 between 
representatives of the three Djibouti Code of Conduct Information Sharing Centres 
(I.S.C.) and ReCAAP I.S.C. on standard operating procedures for communicating      
                                                 
13
 See: Lisa Otto, ‘Kenya and the pest of piracy: a prospective partner for peace’ in Institute for Security 
Studies: Situation Report (Feb. 2012), p. 2, available at (http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/22Feb12 
Kenya.pdf) (16 Feb. 2015); The Independent, 08 Feb. 2010; Lt. Col. Michael Rosette (Deputy Chief of 
Staff, Seychelles People’s Defence Forces), ‘Piracy in the Seychelles’, 03 Feb. 2012, available at The 
Royal Institute of International Affairs: Chatham House (http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/ 
chathamhouse/public/Research/Energy,%20Environment %20and% 20 Development/020212rosette.pdf) 
(21 Apr. 2015). 
14
 Interview with Ms. Jane Chan Git Yin, Coordinator - Maritime Security Programme, Institute of 
Defence & Strategic Studies (I.D.S.S.), S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (R.S.I.S.) at 
Nanyang Technological University, Singapore (21 Mar. 2014). 
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and exchanging piracy related information.
15
 Aside from this, comparable strategic 
coordinating mechanisms and inter-governmental organisations facilitated the 
development of maritime security cooperation and engagement in both regions. In 
Southeast Asia, the ASEAN Regional Forum (A.R.F.) and the Council for Security 
Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, for example, helped to promote multilateral regional 
collaboration in combating piracy and armed robbery at sea.
16
 While these organisations 
attempted to strengthen regionally-led maritime security cooperation, the Contact Group 
on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (C.G.P.C.S.) existed as an internationally-led 
cooperative mechanism to act as a common point of contact between both regional and 
international states engaged in counter-piracy operations.
17
 
 
Role of international community 
Effective multilateral counter-piracy engagement was frequently hampered by a lack of 
will to address maritime piracy at policy level. International pressure was therefore a 
critical driver in the promotion of maritime security and piracy as a strategic concern for 
both Southeast Asian and Northeast African governments. Nevertheless, the extent of 
international involvement varied significantly in each region. According to Jane Chan, 
Coordinator of the Maritime Security Programme at the Institute of Defence & Strategic 
Studies in Singapore: ‘as much as littoral states didn’t want external countries patrolling 
their waters for good reasons, they have always welcomed external contribution’.18 In 
contrast, the fledging Somali Transitional Federal Government (T.F.G.) directly 
requested international naval patrols in its territorial waters in 2008 to tackle the 
indigenous piracy crisis, given its complete inability to confront the issue.  
 
                                                 
15
 Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia 
(ReCAAP), Press release, 11 Nov. 2011 (http://www.recaap.org/Portals/0/docs/News%20and%20Press% 
20Releases/2011-11-11%20Press%20Release.pdf) (21 Apr. 2015). 
16
 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), ‘Declaration on the conduct of parties in the South 
China Sea’ 04 Nov. 2002, available at (http://www.asean.org/asean/external-relations/china/item/ 
declaration-on-the-conduct-of-parties-in-the-south-china-sea) (07 Nov. 2013). 
17
 U.N. Security Council, ‘Resolution 1851’, 16 Dec. 2008 (U.N., Dag Hammarskjöld Library (D.H.L.), 
S/RES/1851/2008, p. 3). 
18
 Interview with Ms. Jane Chan Git Yin (21 Mar. 2014). 
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In Southeast Asia the perceived possibility of infringement of maritime sovereignty or 
loss of influence to the United States under the proposed Regional Maritime Security 
Initiative (R.M.S.I.) in 2004, for example, stimulated strategic engagement amongst 
littoral states and accelerated the creation of a regionally based multilateral maritime 
security regime. Despite reservations, extra-regional powers such as China, India, Japan 
and the United States enhanced these regional led counter-piracy efforts through training 
programmes and funding for maritime law enforcement. Indeed, ReCAAP was an 
initiative conceived by Japan and finalised in Tokyo in November 2004. 
 
In contrast, efforts to suppress piracy off the coast of Somalia after 2005 were entirely 
commanded by the wider international community of user states and extra-regional 
entities. The Somali piracy crisis propelled maritime security to the forefront of global 
policy. This appeared to be part of a wider evolution in approaches to security after 2001 
that recognised not only the importance of the unhindered movement of maritime trade 
to the global economy, but also the intrinsic susceptibility of the maritime domain as a 
conduit for all types of criminal and terrorist activity. This recognition manifested in the 
promotion of the Maritime Domain Awareness concept
19
 alongside the publication of 
the U.S. ‘National maritime security strategy’ in 2005, the ‘Cooperative strategy for 21st 
century seapower’ in 2007 and the U.K. ‘National strategy for maritime security’ in 
2014. Moreover, maritime security now appeared as a distinct military dimension of 
maritime power in the doctrine of several navies including the Australian Navy, Royal 
Navy, U.S. Navy and the Russian Federation Navy. Indeed, the Australian government 
launched a multi-agency ‘waterfront task-force’ known as Operation Polaris in 2010 to 
address organised crime in the maritime port environment.
20
 In addition, the U.N. 
Security Council produced over twenty resolutions that directly and indirectly addressed 
                                                 
19
 The United States’ ‘National strategy for maritime security: national Maritime Domain Awareness 
(M.D.A.) plan’ defined M.D.A. as ‘the effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime 
domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of the United States’; The 
Maritime Domain is defined as ‘all areas and things of, on, under, relating to, adjacent to, or bordering on 
a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway, including all maritime-related activities, infrastructure, people, 
cargo, vessels, and other conveyances’; See: ‘National Maritime Domain Awareness plan for the National 
Strategy for Maritime Security’, Dec. 2013, p. iv, available at Homeland Security Digital Library 
(H.S.D.L.), Policy & strategy documents (https://www.hsdl.org) (14 June 2014). 
20
 Australian Crime Commission (A.C.C.), Organised crime, ‘Waterfront task forces’ 
(https://www.crimecommission.gov.au/organised-crime/joint-task-forces-and-initiatives/waterfront-task-
forces) (02 June, 2015). 
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Somali piracy between 2005 and 2013, a clear indication of how the issue had evolved 
from a localised coastal criminal enterprise into a global, strategic concern. 
 
Such policy-level counter-piracy engagement was unsurprising perhaps, considering the 
inability of any solitary nation or navy to address transnational maritime threats such as 
piracy. International involvement in counter-piracy operations exemplified what Till 
termed as a maritime security ‘away-game’.21 In terms of Somali piracy this constituted 
‘the world community coming together in order to provide integrated, over-arching and 
global responses to […] threats to good order at sea […]’.22 Whereas, in the case of 
Southeast Asia, the ‘away-game’ approach consisted of internationally led maritime 
capacity building through financial donations, material assistance, intelligence and 
bilateral training exercises such as the Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training 
(CARAT) and the associated Southeast Asia Cooperation Against Terrorism (SEACAT). 
The fundamental difference in both approaches was the deployment of physical naval 
assets. No extra-regional navies were granted permission to unilaterally patrol sovereign 
waters in Southeast Asia consistent with international law, whereas the international 
legal regime was expanded to allow international naval assets to enter Somali territorial 
waters whilst engaged in counter-piracy operations.
23
 
 
International legal regime 
International law affected approaches to counter-piracy strategy in diverse, though not 
unrelated ways, in Southeast Asia and Northeast Africa during the period of this study. 
While the criminalisation of piracy and armed robbery at sea had been manifest under 
international law for centuries, procedures for punishment and dispensation fell under 
the authority of domestic legislation. Inefficient or obsolete national laws combined in 
many cases with little political will to pursue prosecution led to a so-called ‘catch and 
release’ policy that saw suspected Somali pirates apprehended and subsequently 
released. This was somewhat rectified with the U.N. office on Drugs and Crime) 
(U.N.O.D.C.) Counter Piracy Programme’s ‘piracy prosecution model’ that utilised and 
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 Till, Seapower […], p. 312. 
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 Ibid. 
23
 See: U.N. Security Council ‘Resolution 1816’, 02 June 2008 (U.N., D.H.L., S/RES/1816/2008, p. 2). 
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expanded existing regional domestic legislation to prosecute pirates in neighbouring 
jurisdictions. By December 2013, over 1,200 suspects had been convicted or detained 
for the crime of piracy in 21 countries including several E.U. member states.
24
 
According to Capt. Brian Wilson: ‘Whole-of-government processes have proved 
instrumental in national-level responses to Somali piracy […] as actions on the water – 
evidence collection, obtaining statements, duration of detention at sea, and chain of 
custody – are being addressed by civilian agencies in courtrooms and diplomatically’.25 
Similarly, in Southeast Asia states typically favoured deportation of suspected pirates 
rather than prosecution in national courts, with just four examples of prosecutions 
secured using universal jurisdiction for the crime of piracy between 1998 and 2007.
26
  
 
The formative United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of 1982 
significantly influenced approaches to maritime security and counter-piracy in both 
regions during the course of this study. The codification of legal limits to state’s 
maritime boundaries under UNCLOS heightened pre-existing territorial sensitivities in 
parts of Southeast Asia and resulted in an erosion of regional maritime relations. During 
the 1990s and 2000s, when incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships 
escalated considerably in Indonesian territorial waters, the provisions in UNCLOS 
designated such attacks as ‘armed robbery’ and therefore exclusively under Indonesian 
jurisdiction. Indonesia was unable to tackle the problem unilaterally due in part to a 
paucity of naval assets and financial resources. This contributed to undermining and 
eroding potential multilateral counter-piracy collaboration by intensifying maritime 
territorial rivalries and allowing pirates the opportunity to evade capture by traversing 
from one national maritime jurisdiction to another. 
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Given the lack of a functional state apparatus in Somalia between 2005 and 2012, 
UNCLOS became a useful tool in legitimising international counter-piracy operations in 
the Gulf of Aden and western Indian Ocean. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1816 of 
2008 extended Article 101 of UNCLOS to encompass the territorial waters of Somalia. 
This formally permitted foreign navies to apply the high seas rule for piracy in Somali 
waters.
27
 Critically Indonesia, given sensitivities over maritime sovereignty and piracy 
in Southeast Asia, insisted that a paragraph was added to the resolution emphasising that 
this was a unique extension that applied exclusively and explicitly to Somalia. The 
‘Indonesian paragraph’ affirmed that the resolution applied only with respect to the 
situation in Somalia and did not affect the rights of member states under international 
law with respect to any other situation and furthermore was authorised only following a 
formal request from the permanent representative of the Somalia Republic to the United 
Nations.
28
 According to Prof. Robert Beckman: ‘[Indonesia] used the law of the sea as a 
shield in that sense against foreign powers, whether it’s Australia, India, Japan or the 
United States to keep them at bay […] if you want to help us give us more patrol vessels 
and aid, but don’t tell us you want to patrol in our waters’.29 This highlighted how 
international law played an important role in influencing policy level decision making 
regarding maritime security enforcement in both regions. 
 
In a broader sense, despite some of the political impediments mentioned here, there was 
a wider diplomatic benefit to the multinational expeditionary counter-piracy operations 
off the coast of Somalia and the multilateral regional counter-piracy operations in, for 
example, the Strait of Malacca. In both cases traditional adversaries combined to address 
a common security threat toward a mutually advantageous situation. This cooperation 
opened avenues for further political and diplomatic engagement on a range of maritime 
security issues given the inherently global and interconnected nature of maritime trade. 
Such engagement, especially off the coast of Somalia, not only illustrated the deterrent 
capability of navies, but moreover their unique diplomatic utility. According to David 
                                                 
27
 U.N., S/RES/1816/2008, p. 2. 
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Slogget: ‘[…] a blend of bilateral and multilateral agreements provides an approach that 
allows a wider catchment of nations to be involved from a strategic viewpoint, and for 
practical tactical measures to be implemented at the bilateral level to combat criminality 
and other threats’.30 
 
Operational level analysis  
Maritime piracy steadily evolved into a policy level concern for Southeast Asian 
governments during the late 1990s and 2000s and far more rapidly for the wider 
international community following the upsurge in attacks off the coast of Somalia after 
2005. This section will compare and contrast several operational responses to maritime 
piracy in Southeast Asia and Northeast Africa including naval operations, issues with 
law enforcement at an operational level, deployment of Privately Contracted Armed 
Security Personnel (P.C.A.S.P.) and implementation of initiatives such as the I.S.P.S. 
Code. Governments in both regions struggled to various extents with capacity and 
resource issues at an operational level. Individually the majority of coastal Northeast 
African states lacked the capacity to enforce maritime security in their own territorial 
waters let alone contribute to enforcement further afield. In that capacity, international 
naval involvement was essential. In Southeast Asia, governments such as Indonesia 
struggled to maintain a maritime enforcement capacity capable of patrolling some 
50,000km of archipelagic coastline. Expeditionary counter-piracy operations off the 
coast of Somalia reflected in some ways the so called ‘gunboat policy’ during interwar 
years that Herbert Richmond described as an ‘expression of the policy of maintaining 
order where a foreign nation cannot or will not maintain it itself’.31 This as previously 
suggested was easier to implement operationally off the coast of Somalia than in 
Southeast Asia owing to pre-existing sensitivities over sovereignty. 
 
Naval counter-piracy operations 
Predictably, naval operations were launched in both Southeast Asia and Northeast 
Africa in response to upsurges in maritime piracy in 2004 and 2008 respectively. 
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Despite some innate similarities due to the operating environment, they were 
fundamentally different in terms of context. While counter-piracy naval operations such 
as the Malacca Strait Sea Patrol (M.S.S.P.) were coordinated patrols initiated by littoral 
states, EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta, for example, was a multinational expeditionary 
operation led entirely by extra-regional states. Both initiatives, however, shared a similar 
operational model based on sea, air and intelligence platforms. The M.S.S.P. was 
complemented by the Eyes in the Sky (EiS) joint air patrol and an ‘intelligence 
exchange group’ while Operation Atalanta was supported by embarked helicopters 
alongside military patrol and reconnaissance aircraft that disseminated intelligence with 
other multinational naval coalitions through the Shared Awareness and De-confliction 
mechanism (SHADE) and the C.G.P.C.S. 
 
In terms of countering piracy, each operation had a calculable deterrent effect. Incidents 
in Gulf of Aden, for example, dropped substantially following the deployment of 
international naval assets from 117 attacks in 2009 to just six in 2013.
32
 Similarly in the 
Malacca Strait, according to Jane Chan: ‘[…] even though the number of arrests were 
not that high […] there has been anecdotal evidence by researchers on the ground that 
naval patrols were a real deterrent factor’.33 This deterrent factor was a likely dynamic 
in a progressive decline in incidents in the Malacca Strait and Singapore Strait following 
the launch of the Malacca Straits Patrol from 60 in 2004 to just two in 2008.
34
  
 
In addition to the M.S.S.P., the Indonesian Navy launched a unilateral counter-piracy 
effort named ‘Operation Octopus’ (Operasi Gurita) in June 2005, which intensified anti-
piracy air and sea patrols along the Malacca Strait and intelligence gathering operations 
in communities along the coast of Sumatra and on the Riau Islands.
35
 One report 
suggested the operation comprised of twenty warships, seven Rigid-Hulled Inflatable 
Boats, four ‘frogmen’ teams, three amphibious reconnaissance teams and a joint 
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intelligence team.
36
 Despite a restricted period of just three months due in part to fuel 
costs, the operation yielded some positive results. According to the Indonesian Navy, an 
estimated 127 suspect vessels were boarded and twelve individuals were arrested during 
the course of the operation.
37
 In the Gulf of Aden and western Indian Ocean, 
EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta was similarly complemented by two additional 
international naval counter-piracy coalitions - the U.S. led Combined Task Force 151 
(C.T.F. 151) and NATO Operation Ocean Shield - alongside several independent naval 
deployments including China, India and Russia.  
 
Despite the relative success of these naval counter-piracy operations in terms of 
suppressing attacks, there were significant limitations to their wider efficacy. Counter-
piracy operations in both regions were compromised to some extent by an imbalance 
between physical naval and military assets and a large uncontested sea space. In the 
Gulf of Aden, this resulted in displacement of attacks from the I.R.T.C. farther into the 
western Indian Ocean with a resultant rise in the deployment of P.M.S.C.s to fill the 
vacuum. Similarly, the EiS joint aerial patrol in the Strait of Malacca flew just six 
daytime sorties per week in 2011, which fell short of the estimated 70 sorties needed to 
provide twenty-four hour coverage.
38
 
 
Such physical limitations were amplified by the difficulty in harmonising multiple 
national navies at an operational level. As Till observed: ‘Multinationality is a force 
multiplier, but it does add a level of complexity to every aspect of an expeditionary 
operation’.39 Surprisingly perhaps, this complexity hindered littoral naval patrols in the 
Malacca and Singapore Strait more than multinational naval operations off the coast of 
Somalia. The expeditionary nature of counter-piracy operations off the Somali coast 
combined with the expanded legal remit under U.N. Security Council Resolution 1816 
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facilitated closer operational cooperation and cohesion among the majority of 
international navies. 
 
Moreover, the operations occurred far from the territorial waters of participating states, 
thereby negating conflict of interest in terms of sovereignty and fewer restrictions on 
movement. This afforded multinational naval assets operating in the Gulf of Aden and 
western Indian Ocean the opportunity to engage in broader diplomatic activities and 
joint counter-piracy drills and exercises that arguably would have been implausible a 
decade previous. Examples of such engagement included two bilateral Chinese and U.S. 
naval exercises off the Horn of Africa in August 2013 and December 2014, which, 
according to Capt. Doug Stuffle, Commander of the U.S. Navy Destroyer Squadron I: 
‘help[ed] establish clear paths for communication […] and allow[ed] us to demonstrate 
cooperative efforts in the international community to help us work together to deal with 
transnational threats’.40 
 
The same operational flexibility could not be applied to the Malacca Strait Patrol for 
example. The principal operational impediment was that the sea patrols were 
coordinated rather than joint due primarily to enduring territorial sensitivities. This 
limited the effectiveness of the operation by restricting patrolling and ‘hot pursuit’ of 
piracy suspects in adjacent maritime jurisdictions. Moreover, such restrictions were not 
observed by maritime criminals engaged in acts of piracy or armed robbery against ships. 
This led to criticism that the M.S.S.P. was ‘little more than an exchange of patrol 
schedules’. 41  However, while the M.S.S.P. remained coordinated, the EiS and the 
‘intelligence exchange group’ were joint initiatives that coordinated information 
exchange through the Information Fusion Centre at the Changi naval base in 
Singapore.
42
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The restrictiveness of ‘hot pursuit’ was somewhat rectified with the agreement of 
standardised operational procedures in April 2006 that facilitated limited pursuit of a 
suspect vessel up to 5nm into the sovereign waters of an participating state.
43
 Gauging 
the material effectiveness of the M.S.P., however, is difficult. According to one 
commentator: ‘the paucity of public data on M.S.P. activities makes an empirical 
judgement about their effectiveness impossible’.44 Despite these limitations, incidents of 
piracy in the Malacca Strait declined following creation of the M.S.P. in 2004. However, 
the available data suggests that attacks have been increasing since 2010, with a notable 
upsurge in 2014 (see fig. 7.5).  
 
 
Fig. 7.5 
Average no. of reported piracy incidences in the Strait of Malacca 2004-14
45
 
 
Source: Averages extrapolated from: I.C.C. I.M.B., Piracy reports 2005-2014; ReCAAP Information 
Sharing Centre (I.S.C.), Piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia: annual reports 2012-2014; 
I.M.O., Reports on acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships: annual reports 2004-2013. 
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Naval counter-piracy operations, regardless of geographical location, were an inherently 
transitory measure and unsustainable in the long term given that the origins of piracy, 
like all forms of criminality, is ashore. This influenced an evolution towards a more 
holistic and sustainable counter-piracy strategy that incorporated legal, political and 
stabilising economic initiatives on shore. The E.U., for example, launched a regional 
maritime capacity-building programme called EUCAP NESTOR in 2013. This 
complemented other E.U. initiatives such as the Training Mission in Somalia (E.U.T.M.) 
that aimed to strengthen the institutions of the Somali T.F.G. by providing training to 
Somali military forces in support of wider regional initiatives such as the African Union 
Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). 
 
Similarly, in Southeast Asia after 2011 further steps towards a more comprehensive 
maritime security regime under the ASEAN framework were instigated at both policy 
and operational level. This included the first ASEAN Maritime Security Information-
Sharing Exercise in July 2012 co-hosted by the Singapore and Indonesian navies that 
addressed various maritime security scenarios such as piracy, sea robbery and maritime 
terrorism.
46
 In addition, the ASEAN Maritime Forum was formally expanded in October 
2012 to enhance maritime connectivity by looking at strategies for capacity building, 
including infrastructure and equipment.
47
 
 
Law-enforcement operations 
Disharmony between domestic maritime criminal law and UNCLOS frequently 
hampered the arrest of suspects for piracy or armed robbery at sea in both Southeast 
Asia and Northeast Africa during the course of this study. In the Gulf of Aden and 
western Indian Ocean, this evolved into a ‘catch and release’ policy whereas in 
Southeast Asia, with the exception of Thailand, neither Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore nor Vietnam had enacted domestic legislation for universal 
                                                 
46
 Singapore Ministry of Defence, Official releases, ‘Singapore and Indonesia Navies co-host inaugural 
ASEAN maritime security information-sharing exercise’, 09 July 2012 (http://www.mindef.gov.sg/ 
imindef/press_room/official_releases/nr/2012/jul/09jul12_nr.html#.VT5xq2P_k5o) (26 Apr. 2015). 
47
 ‘Chairman's statement, 1st expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum Manila’, 09 Oct. 2012, available at 
ASEAN, Statements & communiques (http://www.asean.org/news/asean-statement-communiques/ 
item/1st-expanded-asean-maritime-forum-manila) (18 Apr. 2015). 
 -373- 
jurisdiction over acts of piracy or over such acts in the Exclusive Economic Zone 
(E.E.Z.).
48
 It is difficult therefore to ascertain a figure for the number of maritime 
criminals arrested or prosecuted for piracy or armed robbery at sea in Southeast Asian 
jurisdictions in particular. The Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency, for example, 
which was established in 2005, only made its first successful arrest and prosecution of 
seven maritime armed robbers in March 2011.
49
 
 
This legal deficiency extended beyond piracy in littoral waters. A Malaysian court, for 
example, prosecuted Somali pirates for firearms offences against Malaysian armed 
forces in the Gulf of Aden, as no provision existed in Malaysian national law for the 
crime of piracy.
50
 In the case of Somali piracy as previously mentioned, this problem 
was partially solved by bolstering the capacity of regional judiciaries to prosecute and 
imprison Somali pirates. For Southeast Asian states, Robert Beckman suggested one 
solution might be to ratify and effectively implement the 1988 ‘Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation’ (SUA) and 
the 1979 ‘International convention against the taking of hostages’ to enable prosecution 
of cases of hijacking of ships and hostage taking of crew members.
51
 As of December 
2014, Indonesia, Malaysia or Thailand had not ratified the 1988 SUA Convention or 
2005 SUA protocols.
52
 
 
Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor & safe anchorages 
Law-enforcement operations were supported by additional counter-piracy measures such 
as the introduction of the I.R.T.C. in the Gulf of Aden in 2008 and the designation of 
patrolled ‘safe anchorages’ near designated high-risk Indonesian ports in 2014 (see fig. 
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7.6). Both initiatives afforded vessels a higher level of protection by placing them 
proximal to naval assets patrolling in the vicinity and by the relative security of 
amalgamating in groups. By identifying ‘hot spots’, limited naval assets could be more 
economically deployed given the large sea area in which pirates operated in both regions 
and, in the case of Indonesia, 68 out of 100 vessels boarded in 2014 were at anchor or 
berthed.
53
  
 
Fig. 7.6 
Designated safe anchorages, Indonesia (2014) 
 
Source: Coordinates available at: I.C.C. I.M.B. Piracy report 2014, p. 20. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
53
 I.C.C. I.M.B., Piracy report 2014, p. 29. 
 -375- 
Utilisation of Private Maritime Security Companies 
P.M.S.C.s played a role in counter-piracy operations in both regions. The deployment of 
P.C.A.S.P. was one of the central ‘pillars’ to the successful suppression of piracy off the 
coast of Somalia by 2013. Somali pirates, in contrast to maritime criminals in Southeast 
Asia, developed the capacity to operate well over 1,000nm from the shore. P.C.A.S.P. 
were therefore an effective force-multiplier in repelling attacks in areas outside the remit 
of coalition naval forces. While there was a history of private security operating in 
Southeast Asian waterways, especially since the end of the Cold War, their deployment 
was far less prolific than the lucrative industry that sprang up in response to the 
escalation of piracy off the Horn of Africa. According to Benny Low, Company 
Security Officer for Thome Ship Management: ‘there was an expectation among the 
ship-owners and operators that piracy was a military problem […] so the anti-thievery 
measures were basically traditional ones of lock your cabin and have deck patrols – the 
Somali situation changed that’.54  
 
The majority of P.M.S.C.s operating in Southeast Asia were based in the U.K. or U.S.A. 
with regional offices in Singapore and were chiefly deployed in the Malacca Strait.
55
 
Carolyn Liss identified two primary roles of P.M.S.C.s in the Malacca Strait. Firstly, 
they carried out shore-based advisory services such risk assessments and secondly, in a 
similar manner in the western Indian Ocean, they provided armed guards on board 
merchant vessels as well as armed escort ships to protect tankers passing through the 
strait.
56
 However, in comparison to Somalia, the demand for P.M.S.C. was limited. 
According to Kevin Doherty, President of Nexus Consulting P.M.S.C. based in 
Southeast Asia: ‘the “high risk” zones are only a day or two of transit, not like the 7-10 
days in the [western] Indian Ocean or a week at anchorage in West Africa’.57 
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Moreover, Indonesia and Malaysia prohibited private security providers escorting 
vessels transiting their sovereign waters along the Malacca Strait, presumably as most 
providers were extra-regional companies. An Indonesian foreign ministry representative 
stated in 2005 that ‘responsibility for maintaining security should remain in the hands of 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore’. 58  Thome Ship Management, for example, had 
removed P.C.A.S.P. from its ships between Asia and the Far East by 2013 but 
maintained armed guards for vessels transiting the Gulf of Aden and advised a 400nm 
transiting distance from the Somali coast.
59
 
 
The proximity to territorial seas in the Malacca and Singapore Strait as opposed to the 
anarchic waters off the failed state of Somalia combined with a functional regional naval 
and coast guard capacity likely accounted for diminished reliance on private security in 
the Malacca Strait after 2005. In contrast to Somalia, the role of P.M.S.C. in Southeast 
Asia extended in some cases to port-side security as opposed to exclusively escorting 
vessels underway. In the Indonesian port of Belawan, for example, one study identified 
members of a private company named ‘Pemudan Pancasila’ that controlled access to the 
port, patrolled the vicinity and had direct access to ships and cargoes.
60
 
 
International Ship and Port-facility Security Code 
Universal regulatory initiatives such as the 2004 I.S.P.S. Code illustrated how maritime 
security legislation had evolved since the drafting of the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) 
convention in 1974. The code was the first internationally agreed regulatory framework 
addressing the issue of maritime security and provided a standardised system of 
assessing threats against ships and port facilities. Moreover, it provided a foundation for 
more practical defensive counter-piracy measures such as B.M.P. Operationally, the 
I.S.P.S. code was enforced by Company and Ship Security Officers and Port Facility 
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Security Officers that were expected to maintain compliance with minimal standards 
subject to inspection by contracting governments and I.M.O. authorities. 
 
Port security was a far more pressing issue in Southeast Asia in terms of piracy and 
armed robbery than in Somalia. In 2013, for example, 80 percent of armed robbery 
incidents in Southeast Asian waters involved a ship at anchor or at berth.
61
 While attacks 
on ships unloading humanitarian aid were reported during the 1990s in Mogadishu port, 
for example, the overwhelming majority of attacks by Somali pirates were targeted 
against ships while underway on the high seas after 2005. In that regard, concrete 
measures such as vessel hardening under B.M.P. were far more operationally relevant 
than compliance with the I.S.P.S. in terms of countering or deterring a pirate attack off 
the coast of Somalia. 
 
In 2008, the United States Coast Guard issued a Port Security Advisory for sixteen 
major Indonesian ports that were not I.S.P.S.-compliant, including the main Jakarta 
international container terminal and the Belawan multi-purpose terminal. By December 
2012, following implementation of improved port security measures, Indonesian port 
facilities became I.S.P.S.-compliant resulting in a significant reduction in delays.
62
 
Despite this, of the 65 incidents of piracy and armed robbery reported in Indonesia in 
2012, 52 occurred at ports and anchorages (see fig. 7.7).
63
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Fig. 7.7 
Location of incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships in Indonesia (2012) 
 
Source: ReCAAP, I.S.C., Annual report 2012, p. 17. 
 
Tactical level analysis 
Meteorological tactical considerations 
Given the environment in which pirates and maritime criminals operated, 
meteorological conditions had a significant bearing on both the fluctuation of attacks 
and tactical responses. Both Southeast Asia and the Horn of Africa experience two 
annual periods of monsoon weather patterns lasting from approximately late November 
to early April and late May to early October. As fig. 7.8 illustrates, the manifestations of 
monsoon weather conditions had a direct bearing on the fluctuation of maritime piracy. 
According to Karsten Von Hoesslin: ‘while there is a relative degree of consistency 
concerning theft at anchor [in Southeast Asia], in-transit attacks such as those off the 
 -379- 
Anambas Islands are clearly seasonal and commonly occur during the transitional 
monsoon period between March and the end of October’.64 
 
Fig. 7.8 
Monthly breakdown of piracy incidents vs. monsoon season fluctuations, 2009-12 
 
Source: Information extrapolated from: I.C.C. I.M.B. Piracy reports 2009-2012; U.S. Naval Research 
Laboratory: Marine Meteorology Division, ‘Arabian Sea/Gulf of Aden winds – S.W. Monsoon Somalia 
Low Level Jet (L.L.J.) tutorial’ (http://www.nrlmry.navy.mil/sat_training/ 
world_wind_regimes/GulfOfAden/sw_monsoon_lljet/) (05 May 2015). 
 
In a similar manner to attempted hijackings off the Somali coast, strong winds and 
increased wave heights made boarding, particularly during the hours of darkness when 
most attacks occurred in Southeast Asian waters, significantly more challenging to 
complete. In terms of Somali piracy, when the majority of attacks took place during 
daylight hours, the U.S. Maritime Administration calculated that Somali pirate skiffs 
would be severely hindered when weather conditions precipitated winds greater than 
fifteen-knots and wave heights greater than seven-feet.
65
 Such knowledge was an 
important tool in formulating tactical responses to piracy and an economic division of 
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labour and assets given restricted resources. The U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, for 
example, issued an unclassified maritime OPINTEL report that forecasted weekly 
weather conditions including wave height and wind speed and the probability therefore 
of a pirate attack in such conditions (see fig. 7.9). 
 
Aside from influencing tactical responses at sea, meteorological events such as the 2004 
Indian Ocean tsunami had a direct impact, at least temporarily, on the fluctuation of 
piracy and maritime criminality in affected coastal areas. In the Northern Indonesian 
region of Aceh, piracy was essentially eradicated following the devastating effects of the 
tsunami with fatality rates as high as 75 percent in some parts of the province.
66
 
Moreover, the tsunami also damaged the capacity and infrastructure of some Southeast 
Asian navies, chiefly Thailand and Indonesia. This resulted in fewer resources for naval 
force expansion and delays in acquisition programmes, which limited physical patrols 
and engagement of maritime criminals.
67
 In Somalia, the tsunami ultimately resulted in 
an intensification of piracy due to the destruction of an estimated 75 percent of fishing 
equipment along the northeast coast.
68
 This aggravated an already challenging economic 
and humanitarian condition and was a likely driver of impoverished former fishermen 
toward subsistence crime, illustrated by an increase in attacks from 17 in 2004 to 55 in 
2005.
69
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Fig. 7.9 
Ten-day piracy small boat operations weather forecast: May 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, Maritime OPINTEL report (U), Somalia: Piracy Analysis and 
Warning Weekly (P.A.W.W.), Report (Horn of Africa) for 06–12 Dec. 2012, p. 4. 
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Naval and aerial tactical responses 
Counter-piracy tactics employed by naval assets off the coast of Somalia and in 
Southeast Asia varied significantly owing to the particular context of each region. One 
initial problem for naval forces operating in the Gulf of Aden and along the eastern 
Somali seaboard was distinguishing between legitimate fishermen and Pirate Action 
Groups (P.A.G.s). Unique identifiers (in both regions) included excess quantities of fuel 
and more powerful engines than were needed for fishing alongside non-fishing related 
equipment such as ladders and weaponry.
70
 In terms of engaging Somali pirates and 
interdicting suspect skiffs at sea, tactics typically involved destroying or confiscating the 
pirate skiff, weapons and related illicit equipment and releasing the pirates with enough 
food and fuel to return to shore.
71
 This emerged as a common counter-piracy tactic for 
most multinational naval coalitions operating around the Horn of Africa. Between 
September 2008 and January 2009, for example, of the 177 pirates encountered by 
C.T.F. 151, 63 were handed over to authorities, 107 were released after disarming and 
two were killed.
72
 
 
The so-called ‘catch and release’ approach altered somewhat after 2010 following 
agreements with Kenya and the Seychelles, which resulted in more suspected pirates 
being arrested alongside a more tailored appropriation of evidence including gathering 
of biometric data and the transport of suspected pirates for prosecution in regional courts. 
By 2012, these tactics evolved into Disrupting Pirate Logistic Dumps (D.P.L.D.) ashore 
following an E.U. Council extension of Operation Atalanta’s area of operation. This 
facilitated intelligence driven disruptive action against pirate boats, equipment and fuel 
dumps along the coast aimed at ‘denying pirates impunity ashore and a secure base to 
launch attacks at sea, thus increasing costs and decreasing their capability’.73 
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In both regions, air surveillance was a key tactical element in countering piracy. Given 
the extended maritime domain in which pirates operated in the Somali Basin and the 
Malay Archipelago alongside the congested littoral waters of the Malacca Strait, air 
surveillance was crucial in identifying patterns of piratical movement at range. As 
previously mentioned air assets were utilised in both the M.S.P. and the multinational 
naval coalition forces in the Somali Basin. In both cases, however, air surveillance 
assets were deficient for purpose. According to Major General Buster Howes, former 
Operation Commander of EUNAVFOR: 
 
We seek to optimise those scarce assets through clever use of surveillance 
and the maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft. The P3, in particular, 
which is the most sophisticated form, is able to interrogate 360,000 square 
miles of ocean in an hour. Partly through intelligence analysis, which gives 
us an idea of where the pirate will operate, we cue our assets accordingly 
and, partly through careful use of our surveillance devices, we can position 
our ships to best effect.
74
 
 
Similarly, along the Malacca and Singapore Straits the multilateral EiS programme had 
an insufficient number of patrol aircraft to survey the entire length of the waterway, 
even after the accession of Thailand to the programme in 2008. To compensate for this, 
advanced radar and electro-optic sensor systems of the S-70B naval helicopter, for 
example, were utilised that allowed for a more accurate detection of illicit maritime 
activity and surveillance of the Strait.
75
 This was bolstered by a Singaporean air force F-
50 maritime patrol aircraft that could fly for up to eight hours without refuelling.
76
 
 
The idea of navies escorting or facilitating a convoy of vulnerable merchant vessels had 
long existed, primarily during times of protracted conflict. The tactic of ‘group transit’ 
was advanced in the Gulf of Aden following the escalation in hijackings around 2008 
and evolved into the I.R.T.C. initiative. Given the vast amount of merchant traffic 
                                                 
74
 Piracy off the coast of Somalia, Foreign Affairs Select Committee, tenth report with formal minutes and 
written evidence, ev. 13-4, H.C. 2011 (1318), ii. 
75
 Ong Hong Tat, ‘Prowling the pirate alley’ in Cyber Pioneer (Dec. 2012), available at Singapore 
Ministry of Defence, Resource library (http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/resourcelibrary/cyberpioneer/ 
topics/articles/features/2012/dec12_cs.html#.VVIEy2P_k5o) (13 May 2015). 
76
 Singapore Ministry of Defence, Navy, ‘Fokker 50 Maritime Patrol Aircraft’ 
(http://www.mindef.gov.sg/navy/ careers/our-assets/maritime-patrol-aircraft.html) (13 May 2015). 
 -384- 
transiting the Gulf, it was impossible for the limited naval assets to escort individual 
merchant vessels. Instead, coalition naval forces systemically established a series of 
‘boxes picketed by warships’, which meant that a naval asset could theoretically respond 
to a pirate attack along the corridor within thirty minutes.
77
 While a group transit 
scheme was a viable counter-piracy tactic in the Gulf of Aden, a similar initiative was 
not practical along the Strait of Malacca. 
 
Enduring issues of territorial sensitivity, overlapping jurisdictions and a pre-existing 
contracted and congested waterway negated the feasibility of a patrolled transit corridor. 
Despite this, it is likely that the presence of navies in the Gulf of Aden/ Somali Basin 
and the Malacca/ Singapore Strait alone had a deterrent effect on rates of piracy and 
armed robbery against ships. Nautilus International trade union highlighted in 2011 that 
the presence of naval forces in the high-risk areas of the Gulf of Aden and Somali Basin 
had ‘done much to deter and disrupt the threat of attacks on merchant ships’.78 NATO 
also supported the idea of presence as deterrence: ‘the very presence of this international 
naval force, composed of vessels from NATO and other entities, is deterring pirates 
from pursuing their activities to the point of completely suppressing piracy in the 
region’.79 Similarly, according to an Indonesian Coast Guard officer based in the port of 
Tanjung Priok: ‘once we are on patrol, our presence will automatically scare the small 
(pirate/ armed robber) boats and it will prevent them from approaching the big ships’.80 
 
Best Management Practice 
While naval assets played a crucial role in counter-piracy operations in both regions, 
measures enacted on board the target vessels themselves were arguably a more effective 
deterrent tactic. Hardening of vessels emerged as a key defensive approach while 
transiting high-risk waterways. This was standardised in 2008 following the escalation 
in attacks off the coast of Somalia in the form of B.M.P. guidelines. The universality of 
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B.M.P. made it a potent and effective tactic to deter or repel a pirate attack. Analogous 
B.M.P. methods included the construction of citadels, tactical placement of razor wire 
and water/foam spray, increased watch keeping and use of C.C.T.V. alongside increased 
upper deck lighting and alarm systems.
81
 However, given contrasts in manifestations of 
piracy in terms of targeting and modus operandi, certain approaches had to be tailored 
with regional particularities in mind. In this regard, the ReCAAP I.S.C. published a Tug 
boats and barges against piracy and sea robbery guide in December 2012 following an 
escalation in attacks against these vessel types in Southeast Asia around 2008.
82
 The 
guide included risk assessment guidelines, physical protection measures, voyage 
planning and incident reporting.
83
  
 
In contrast to slow moving tug-boats and barges in the confines of the Malacca and 
Singapore Strait, the large sea space of the Somali Basin and the modus operandi 
employed by Somali pirates (targeting large vessels with heavy weaponry) meant 
alternative tactics were needed. These included enhanced bridge protection to repel a 
R.P.G. attack and use of evasive manoeuvring at high speed to create wash to disrupt the 
approach of a pirate skiff alongside (a tactic that would be redundant in a narrow and 
congested sea-lane such as the Malacca Strait).
84
 Under reporting was an issue that 
affected responses and management of piracy and armed robbery against ships 
worldwide. B.M.P. highlighted the importance of accurate and timely reporting of an 
incident. In this regard, the I.M.B. aided at the tactical level through the dissemination 
of a detailed piracy reporting form template (see appendix: fig. A.1). This enhanced and 
streamlined the accuracy of piracy and armed robbery against ships reports but did not 
resolve the endemic problem of underreporting. 
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Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel 
These vessel self-protection measures were frequently amplified by the deployment of 
P.C.A.S.P. This became far more prevalent on vessels transiting through the High Risk 
Area (H.R.A.) of the Gulf of Aden and western Indian Ocean than Southeast Asia as 
previously discussed. Marine representative bodies such as BIMCO typically 
recommended a minimum of four armed guards per transit.
85
 Despite this, some smaller 
companies reportedly utilised just one or two armed guards due to cost restrictions with 
larger ship management companies such as THOME, using a minimum of three armed 
guards when transiting the H.R.A. in 2014.
86
 In terms of tactics, much like a naval asset, 
presence was often enough to deter an attack. Failing this, model rules for engagement 
recommended a ‘graduated deterrent approach including non-lethal methods and 
warning shots’.87 Under the ‘100 Series Rules’ model for the use of force of 2013, 
tactical responses initiated with non-kinetic warnings followed by warning shots and 
finally, when an attack is imminent, use of force including ‘as a last resort’ lethal 
force.
88
 Regardless of these guidelines, tactics appeared to vary extensively from reports 
of targeting an approaching skiffs engine and/or crew to designating skiff free 
perimeters where deadly force was authorised by proxy.
89
 
 
With relation to firearms, hunting rifles combined with semi-automatic rifles were 
typically favoured as the best combination as they offered both range and cover fire as 
opposed to shotguns that were only effective at close-range.
90
 Lax regulation and 
tactical oversight for P.M.S.C. led to several high profile incidents, notably the case of 
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the M.V. Enrica Lexie that resulted in the shooting dead of two Indian fishermen by an 
Italian Vessel Protection Detachment in February 2012. Operating P.M.S.C.s was a far 
more complicated affair in the Malacca Strait and the South China Sea. Whereas Somali 
territorial waters were essentially anarchic with no indigenous judicial or enforcement 
capability, most Southeast Asian waterways were heavily contested and at the forefront 
of regional tensions over territorial assertions. According to marine Protection & 
Indemnity insurers Skuld: ‘The littoral states in [Southeast Asia] take matters of security 
very seriously and at present there are no arrangements or regulations in place that 
would allow armed P.M.C.s to be on board vessels in the same way as in the GoA [Gulf 
of Aden] area’.91  
 
West African piracy 
While this research has predominantly focussed on manifestations and responses to 
piracy in Southeast Asia and Northeast Africa, it is important to note that acts of piracy 
were not exclusive to these regions. Several West African ports and anchorages were hit 
by a relatively short lived but intensive wave of maritime piracy and armed robberies 
between 1980 and 1987. The conditions that precipitated this upsurge were contextually 
unique compared with Southeast Asia and, later Northeast Africa, and therefore required 
regionally tailored responses. In 1981, there were 94 reported pirate attacks in West 
African waters.
92
 This figure dwindled to just three significant attacks on cargoes by 
1987.
93
 This decline can be attributed to three factors. Firstly, investment in maritime 
security capabilities by the Nigerian government, including the acquisition of fifteen 
inland patrol craft, for the specific duties of combating smuggling and piracy and the 
creation of a maritime security task force.
94
 Secondly, the reduction in seaborne trade 
                                                 
91
 Skuld, ‘South and South East Asia: piracy’, 10 Feb. 2015 (http://www.skuld.com/topics/voyage--port-
risks/piracy/south-asia/south-and-south-east-asia-piracy/) (12 May 2015). 
92
 ‘I.M.B. chronology of pirate attacks on merchant vessels 1981-87’ in Eric Ellen (ed.) Piracy at sea 
(London, 1989), pp 241-71. 
93
 Ian R. Hyslop, ‘Contemporary piracy’ in Ellen (ed.) Piracy at sea, p. 9. 
94
 Office of the defence attaché, Permanent mission of Nigeria to the United Nations, ‘Piracy control in 
Nigeria’s territorial seas’ in Ellen (ed.) Piracy at sea, pp 219-23. 
 -388- 
transiting the region meant pirates had less access to potential targets.
95
 Finally, 
authorities initiated a concerted effort to disrupt pirate operations ashore and interrupt 
the movement of the illicit proceeds of piracy.  
 
From around 1996, piracy and armed robbery against ships again resurged as a 
significant issue in the Gulf of Guinea with 31 reports of attacks against shipping in the 
region in 1997.
96
 By 2003, this had escalated to 64 reported piracy and armed robbery 
incidents, over half of which occurred in Nigerian territorial waters.
97
 Despite closer 
regional maritime security cooperation and some policy level efforts by the Nigerian 
government, there were 424 incidents of actual and attempted acts of piracy and armed 
robberies reported in West African waters between 2005 and 2013.
98
 Approximately 
half of all incidents occurred in Nigerian territorial waters in the Gulf of Guinea, which 
was a major conduit for the shipment of crude oil.  
 
While the motivation for attacks by Somali pirates, for example, was almost exclusively 
financial, a large percentage of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea was at least partly 
politically motivated.
99
 Militant groups, such as the Movement for the Emancipation of 
the Niger Delta (MEND), were reportedly responsible for several high-profile acts of 
piracy and armed robberies, maritime hijackings, oil pilferage, kidnapping of seafarers 
for ransom and killing of Nigerian security forces.
100
 According to the U.N.O.D.C: ‘[...] 
what had been a funding source for insurgency [...] quickly [...] converted into an 
organised crime activity, with new commodities dealt to existing crime connections or 
along existing channels’.101 An article in The Economist highlighted how, during the 
height of the insurgency, militant groups extended their reach beyond Nigerian waters: 
                                                 
95
 Imports to the Economic Community of West African States fell from US$23,821 million in 1980 to 
just US$11,204 million in 1987 (U.N. Department of economic and social development statistical office, 
1992 International trade statistics yearbook, i (New York, 1993), p. 1050). 
96
 I.C.C. I.M.B., Piracy report 2005, p. 5. 
97
 Ibid. 
98
 I.C.C. I.M.B., Piracy reports 2006-2013. 
99
 I.C.C. I.M.B., Piracy report 2008, p. 26. 
100
 See for example: Tom O’Neill, ‘Curse of the black gold: hope and betrayal on the Niger Delta’ in 
National Geographic, no. 2 (Feb. 2007), pp 89-95; The Telegraph, 15 Sept. 2008; Jeremy Binnie, 
‘Nigerian military rejects MEND claim for attack’ in I.H.S. Jane’s Defence Weekly (01 Feb. 2012). 
101
 U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (U.N.O.D.C.), Crime and development in Africa (June 2005), p. 25. 
 -389- 
‘since then, ships across the length of the gulf - from Gabon in the south to Liberia in 
the west - have been targeted’.102 
 
Fig. 7.10 
Reports of actual and attempted piracy attacks: West Africa 1995-2013 
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Source: I.C.C. I.M.B., Piracy report 2004; 2006; 2013; 2014; p. 5. 
 
Grievances over the mismanagement of the regional oil industry and the ensuing 
political unrest was one reason for the increased likelihood of violence in acts of piracy 
and armed robberies in West African waters. There were 158 injuries and 10 deaths 
attributed to pirates and armed robbers in West African waters between 2005 and 2013. 
However, as with maritime crime elsewhere, numerous incidents went unreported. For 
example, there were 50 attacks and at least 10 murders reported by the Nigerian 
Trawlers Owners Association in January 2008 alone, whereas the I.M.B. recorded just 
19 attacks worldwide during the same period.
103
 The I.M.B. acknowledged in its 2011 
report that underreporting was a cause for concern in Nigeria and highlighted an 
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additional 34 incidents of piracy and armed robbery, provided by Bergen Risk Solutions 
that went unreported in 2011.
104
 
 
The location of attacks was also significant and hampered the international community’s 
ability to assist in counter-piracy operations. Between 2002 and 2012, there were 108 
attacks reported in international waters, 173 in territorial waters and 270 in port areas.
105
 
Jurisdictionally therefore, the responsibility for almost 80 percent of these attacks fell on 
the coastal states. While the majority of littoral states struggled with weak maritime 
governance, none was devoid of central authority or classifiable as a ‘failed state’. This 
meant that, unlike Somalia where no functional government existed, the international 
community could not undertake unilateral counter-piracy action in sovereign waters. 
 
An upsurge in attacks on shipping in the Gulf of Guinea in 2012 resulted in increased 
international calls for a comprehensive regional anti-piracy strategy. U.N. Resolution 
2039, pursuant to Resolution 2018 (2011), urged regional states to develop and 
implement national maritime security strategies for the prevention and repression of 
piracy and armed robbery at sea and to establish a legal framework for the prosecution 
and punishment of persons engaging in those crimes.
106
 This international pressure 
resulted in a major regional summit on maritime safety and security in the Gulf of 
Guinea in June 2013, which resulted in several multilateral regional counter-piracy 
policies in the context of the wider ‘2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy’.107 
 
The problem of piracy in West Africa, therefore, largely evolved as a symptom of the 
turmoil created by the negligence of the regional oil industry alongside the issue of 
ethnic and political ‘ownership’ of resources in a post-conflict environment.108 In 2005 
alone, an estimated US$1 billion in Nigerian oil pilfered from pipelines along the 
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coast.
109
 This activity extended further out to sea to the tankers shipping oil from the 
region alongside various merchant and fishing vessels. These robberies were facilitated 
by a largely ungoverned maritime domain and corrupt and under resourced regional 
naval and law enforcement assets. According to one analysis, littoral navies had 
minimum capability, little air assets and negligible communications and technical 
support.
110
 The context differed considerably from the situation in Somalia at that time 
given the existence of a functioning government ashore with a coast guard and naval 
capability, albeit a limited one. Indeed, as previously highlighted, while there are often 
analogous factors, maritime crime arises in different regions due to the unique political 
and socio-economic context of that particular region at a specific period in time. 
 
Conclusion 
While, Southeast Asia and Northeast Africa experienced the most significant upsurges 
of maritime piracy in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, West Africa experienced a 
series of violent, though less frequent, episodes of maritime criminality during the same 
period. While comparisons can be drawn between the inherent use of the sea as a 
conduit for criminal activity in all three regions, the unique context of each region’s 
political, socio-economic and cultural circumstances, created distinct manifestations of 
piracy and therefore required tailored political, military and tactical responses. 
 
At the strategic level, states were initially slow to address maritime piracy; however, 
when a concerted policy-level effort was eventually initiated significant advances were 
made in suppressing attacks. Given the inability of any single nation to address 
transnational threats such as piracy comprehensively, multilateral diplomacy and 
implementation of international law were key components in formulating strategic 
approaches to countering contemporary piracy. At the operational level, counter-piracy 
evolved off the Horn of Africa from a military dominated response to a more holistic 
and comprehensive effort that addressed the root causes of the problem ashore alongside 
issues such as judicial weakness and maritime security capacity building. In Southeast 
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Asia, recent upsurges in piracy and armed robbery against ships suggest the need for a 
renewed focus on multilateral counter-piracy operational engagement that extends 
beyond piracy to a more holistic regional maritime security strategy. Tactical 
approaches also evolved from ‘catch and release’ policies to utilising meteorological 
date for an economic dispersion of force, deployment of P.C.A.S.P., more streamlined 
arrest and prosecution processes and widespread compliance with B.M.P. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Piracy has been the principal manifestation of maritime criminality since the earliest 
days of using platforms to transport people and goods at sea. The palingenesis of piracy 
in Southeast Asia during the late 1970s and early 1980s witnessed a contextually unique 
albeit innately connected wave of maritime criminality that evolved into a more 
sophisticated threat during the 1990s and 2000s. In a similar manner, the upsurge of 
maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia after 2005 was inimitable in terms of context 
and modus operandi, but comparable given the inherent use of the sea as a space to 
conduct criminal activity. With this in mind, there are a number of conclusions, 
predictions and wider implications that can be extrapolated from this analysis of the 
multifaceted attempts to counteract these various contemporary upsurges of piracy and 
armed robbery at sea in both Southeast Asia and Northeast Africa.  
 
Given the inherent attributes of the marine environment combined with the 
interconnectedness of the global economy of the late twentieth and early twenty-first 
centuries, crimes like piracy could not be tackled by the unilateral efforts of any one 
nation or navy. As this research has illustrated, piracy and armed robbery at sea may be 
perpetrated by nationals of one state in the territorial waters of an adjacent state against 
crew-members hailing from a third state on board a vessel registered in a fourth state 
and owned by a company based in a fifth state while transporting goods to a sixth state. 
This scenario illustrates, to some degree, the extensive transnational corollaries of a 
relatively localised criminal activity and the latent effect on the movement of regional 
and international marine trade. This highlights a relatively rudimentary lesson, that 
multilateral engagement and regional wide cooperation is necessary to successfully 
secure shipping lanes and counteract piracy. 
 
In both Southeast Asia and Northeast Africa multilateral engagement at both the 
strategic and operational level resulted in a decline in successful incidents of piracy and 
maritime armed robbery. This multilateral approach evolved off the coast of Somalia 
into a ‘multi-stakeholder’ approach under the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of 
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Somalia (C.G.P.C.S.) that incorporated not just regional and international states but non-
state actors and international organisations.
1
  
 
In a broader sense, contemporary counter-piracy efforts resulted in a realisation that 
maritime security threats, frequently underrepresented at policy level, could be just as 
destabilising as shore-based threats and therefore merited investment and strategic 
consideration. Suppressing piracy, therefore, and maritime criminality in general, 
benefited not only littoral states but also regional and international user states. This 
emergent maritime multilateralism illustrated to some extent the post-Cold War shift 
from a state centric approach to a mutually beneficial cooperative approach in 
addressing transnational criminality.
2
 According to Slogget: ‘[…] this land centric short-
sighted viewpoint fails to grasp a key essence of that landscape; the sea not only 
provides the highway for the world’s nations to trade, it also provides transnational 
criminals with a space in which, in the absence of any coherent maritime security, they 
can operate’.3 
 
With multilateralism as a foundation, the need for a more holistic and inclusive 
approach to maritime security that extended beyond piracy and armed robbery at sea 
emerged as a central lesson. While piracy has been the primary focus of this research, it 
is only one aspect of a broad collection of threats to security that exist in and from the 
maritime domain. This research has highlighted emerging and existing interconnections 
between piracy and other manifestations of maritime criminality from narcotic and 
human trafficking to acts of terrorism at sea. What connects these different criminal acts 
together is they all use the sea as a conduit for illicit activity. In Southeast Asia, several 
diverse but often overlapping maritime security threats existed alongside piracy such as 
illegal smuggling, marine pollution, narcotic trafficking and territorial disputes. While 
the international community of user states argued that piracy and armed robbery against 
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ships was the most pressing maritime security threat, regional states such as Indonesia 
prioritised alternative threats such as maritime ‘food sovereignty’. 4  A more holistic 
approach toward maritime security therefore, might encourage states such as Indonesia 
to play a more active leading role in regional maritime security engagement by 
‘benefiting from the cooperation as opposed to being targeted by it’. 5  There were 
suggestions that the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed 
Robbery against ships in Asia (ReCAAP), for example, might expand its operational 
mandate and geographical scope to encompass broader maritime security concerns in 
alternative regions, however, given the escalation of piracy between 2010 and 2014 this 
was not sanctioned.
6
  
 
Similarly, in Somalia, piracy existed alongside other maritime criminal enterprises, 
chiefly smuggling. According to Philip Holihead, International Maritime Organization’s 
(I.M.O.) head of the Project Implementation Unit of the Djibouti Code of Conduct: 
 
[we] need to address the broader endemic issues such as the smuggling, 
whether that be arms, charcoal or people […] are we just going to focus on 
the one crime and try to contain it […] whilst addressing the regional basis 
in the extent of the other criminalities […] Does our capacity building 
address the bigger problems, while the containment addresses the specific 
crime.
7
 
 
In relation to Somali piracy, the holistic approach incorporated international and 
regional states, international organisations and non-state actors such as Private Maritime 
Security Companies (P.M.S.C.s) that not only addressed the maritime manifestations of 
piracy but also the long-term foundational issues ashore. The central lesson that 
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emerged was that naval and military counter-piracy efforts alone were palliative and that 
long-term suppression rested with creating effective central governance and law 
enforcement, socio-political stability alongside economic and humanitarian security 
ashore. The decrease of piracy during the brief rule of the Union of Islamic Courts 
(U.I.C.) in 2006, for example, illustrated the correlation between security enforcement 
and central authority ashore and suppression of piracy at sea. Moreover, the stabilising 
effect of the fledgling Somali federal government institutions is generally considered 
one of the reasons for the decline in successful pirate attacks off the coast in 2013.
8
 
Much like Southeast Asia, maritime governance off the coast of Somalia must evolve 
into an integrated, regionally led affair for a permanent solution to the problem. The 
deployment of the African Union’s Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in 2007, for 
example, was an important step toward this end.  
 
This idea of maritime multilateralism was a central element of the 2007 U.S. 
‘Cooperative strategy for 21st century seapower’, which highlighted the idea of a ‘global 
maritime partnership’ as a ‘catalyst for increased international interoperability in support 
of cooperative maritime security’.9 The fact that the largest, best equipped navy was 
emphasising soft-power multilateral engagement with an emphasis on maritime security 
and asymmetric threats was an indication of a relatively sedate maritime threat 
environment at the time of publication. However, the revised 2015 strategy statement 
revealed a shift to more traditional hard-power strategic concerns such as China’s naval 
expansion into the Indian and Pacific Oceans and Russian military modernisation and 
annexation of the Crimea.
10
 This demonstrated an earlier argument in this research that, 
much as it did during the early decades of the twentieth-century, ‘micro-maritime’ 
security threats such as piracy fade in terms of strategic importance as ‘macro-maritime’ 
concerns, such as belligerent navies expanding anti access/area denial (A2/AD) 
activities, evolve. 
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Given the innate connections between different maritime security concerns, lessons 
learned from contemporary counter-piracy operations can have a wider applicability to 
other security challenges such as the recent surge of illegal migration from North Africa 
across the Mediterranean Sea to Southern Europe in 2015. By potentially replicating the 
EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta ‘Disruption of Pirate Logistic Dumps’ (D.P.L.D.) 
tactic, for example, smugglers boats, fuel dumps and embarkation stations could be 
targeted and destroyed thereby denying them impunity and security ashore and 
accordingly increasing costs and decreasing their capability.
11
 
 
Impediments in prosecuting pirates in both Southeast Asia and Northeast Africa resulted 
in a clear need for harmonisation between the international legal framework and 
domestic legislation for the crime of piracy and armed robbery at sea. This will involve 
strengthening rule of law and expediting prosecution of international criminal acts by re-
examining obstacles to this process in particular legal distinctions between maritime 
piracy and other maritime criminal acts including armed robbery against ships and acts 
of terrorism at or from the sea. 
 
In terms of prosecution, the vast majority of Somali pirates convicted were low-level 
members of Pirate Action Groups (P.A.G.s) far removed from the organisational and 
financial leadership ashore. This illustrated the need to formulate a ‘top-down’ 
prosecution model of pirate financiers and directors for enduring solutions. With the 
exception of Mohammad Saaili Shibin and Ali Mohamed Ali, both pirate ransom 
negotiators convicted in the United States for the crime of piracy under the law of 
nations amongst other violations, and Mohamed Abdi Hassan who was arrested in 
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Belgium in October 2013, no leadership-level Somali pirate benefactors, investors or 
architects have been prosecuted.
12
 According to Kenneth Scott: 
 
The international community’s law-enforcement model was, and remains, a 
predominantly reactive, decentralised, horizontal model, involving a group 
of roughly equal national and organisational peers, relying largely on 
regional States and consisting entirely of ‘volunteers’, with no entity 
providing central direction, structure, or processes other than a common goal 
of ‘fighting piracy’.13 
 
The rapid evolution of P.M.S.C. in response to the upsurge of Somali piracy resulted in 
chiefly reactive attempts to legislate and regulate for their deployment. This resulted in 
the need for a clearly defined and uniform set of rules of engagement for the use of force 
with international consensus and within the framework of international law. According 
to a 2015 International Chamber of Shipping (I.C.S.) report: ‘[…] their deployment [was] 
an exceptional response and neither normal nor permanent and a number of legal issues 
remain with respect to their use on the ships of many flags […]’.14  The document 
subsequently acknowledged, however, that ‘in view of the likely future use of armed 
guards in some circumstances it will be important for the international community to 
finalise the development of Rules for the Use of Force by the International Organization 
for Standardization (I.S.O.), alongside the new I.S.O. standards for the regulation of 
Private Maritime Security Companies which were adopted in 2012 […]’.15 
 
Despite these enduring legislative difficulties, the success of Privately Contracted 
Armed Security Personnel (P.C.A.S.P.) in countering and deterring piracy, 
                                                 
12
 See: ‘United States Court of Appeals for the fourth circuit, no.12-4652: United States of America, 
(plaintiff – appellee) v. Mohammad Saaili Shibin, a/k/a Khalif Ahmed Shibin, a/k/a Mohammad Ali, a/k/a 
Ali Jama (defendant – appellant)’, 12 July 2013, pp 9-10, available at United States Court of Appeals for 
the fourth court (http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/Published/124652.p.pdf) (09 June 2015); United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia circuit, no. 12-3056: United States of America 
(appellant) v. Ali Mohamed Ali, a/k/a Ahmed Ali Adan, a/k/a Ismail Ali (appellee), 11 June 2013, 
available at United States Court of Appeals: District of Columbia circuit (http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov) 
(09 June 2015). 
13
 Kenneth Scott, ‘Prosecuting pirates: lessons learned and continuing challenges’ in One Earth Future 
and Oceans Beyond Piracy (O.B.P.) Research Report (2014), p. 15. 
14
 International Chamber of Shipping (I.C.S.), ‘Lessons identified from Somali piracy’, 18 July 2013, pp 
5-6, available at (http://www.ics-shipping.org/docs/default-source/Piracy-Docs/lessons-identified-from-
somali-piracy.pdf) (05 June 2015). 
15
 I.C.S., ‘Lessons identified from Somali piracy’, pp 5-6. 
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predominantly in the western Indian Ocean, meant that they would likely be a feature of 
maritime security in high-risk maritime zones for the foreseeable future. Moreover, it is 
likely that seafarers, after experiencing several years of armed guard protection, will 
increasingly demand armed escorts during high-risk transits, which may lead to some 
level of standardisation of P.M.S.C.s despite traditional resistance from the shipping 
industry. 
 
In terms of fluctuation, this research has found that manifestations of contemporary 
maritime piracy tended to be regionally cyclical, experiencing periods of escalation and 
de-escalation typically in conjunction with political, socio-cultural and economic 
vicissitudes ashore. In Somalia, and to a lesser extent Southeast Asia, piracy not only 
displayed a cyclic pattern in terms of occurrence, but also by further destabilising the 
conditions ashore that created the problem in the first place. In almost all regions where 
piracy is pervasive, rates of occurrence peaked and waned depending on the level of 
political engagement with the problem by governments ashore. In Southeast Asia, for 
example, incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships declined significantly in 
the Malacca Strait after 2005 following a concerted strategic effort by littoral states to 
tackle the problem. 
 
In both regions, a key tactical lesson that emerged was the importance of intelligence 
driven maritime situational and domain awareness. Given the +1,000nm range of Somali 
pirates’ area of operation juxtaposed to the limited number of naval and air assets 
available to patrol such a vast sea space, early warning and identifying patterns of 
piratical movement became crucial.
16
 According to a report commissioned by NATO's 
Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre: ‘Sharing accurate and timely situational 
awareness information is essential to counter piracy forces and the mariners (merchant 
and private) they support; sharing decreases the risks to the lives of those at sea’.17 
 
                                                 
16
 I.C.C. I.M.B., Piracy report 2013, p. 22. 
17
 NATO's Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre, ‘External information sharing in support of NATO 
counter-piracy operations’, 15 July 2011, p. 5, available at (http://www.jallc.nato.int/newsmedia/docs/ 
counter-piracy%20non-class%20extract.pdf) (10 June 2015). 
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In contrast to Somalia, the majority of piratical attacks in Southeast Asia were targeted 
against ships at anchor, berthed or transiting littoral sea-lanes. In 2013, this amounted to 
110 reported piracy/armed robbery attacks against ships at anchor or at berth 
predominately in Indonesian waters.
18
 Monitoring and enhancing port security therefore 
emerged as a key lesson in terms of counteracting attacks against shipping. Indeed, the 
International Ship and Port-facility Security Code (I.S.P.S.) highlighted the importance 
of ‘co-operation and understanding between all those involved with, or using, ships and 
port facilities including ships personnel, port personnel, passengers, cargo interests, ship 
and port management and those in national and local authorities with security 
responsibilities’.19 
 
Insecure port facilities not only facilitated armed robberies against ships but also 
operated as a channel for other types of maritime criminality such as merchandise, 
weapons and narcotic smuggling and, more ominously, incidences of terrorism. The 
attack on Mumbai in November 2008 was an extreme example of the potential 
consequences of lax port and coastal security. It was reported that a ten-man terrorist 
cell travelled via a small Pakistani merchant ship from Karachi before commandeering 
an Indian fishing trawler to gain access to Mumbai port then finally boarded inflatable 
rubber boats to gain access inshore, landing at a fishing village at Badhwar Park. From 
there the team dispersed and launched their attack, which resulted in over 100 
fatalities.
20
 The Mumbai attack established a ‘new paradigm’ in maritime security that, 
according to Slogget meant ‘law enforcement and military organisations responsible for 
coastal security have had to go back to the drawing board and reconsider their 
contingency plans’.21 
 
In terms of counter-piracy, central to defensive measures was the formalisation of 
methods for deterring or preventing an attack and/or boarding by merchant vessels 
                                                 
18
 See: Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia 
(ReCAAP) Information Sharing Centre (I.S.C.), Piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia: annual 
report Jan. – Dec. 2012 (Singapore, 2013), p. 17. 
19
 ‘The International Ship and Port-facility Security Code and SOLAS amendments 2002’, 12 Dec. 2002 
(I.M.O., SOLAS/Conf.5/34/Anx.1, p. 3). 
20
 The Telegraph, 28 Nov. 2008; New York Times, 26 Nov. 2008; Slogget, The anarchic sea […], p. 351. 
21
 Slogget, The anarchic sea […], p. 349. 
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themselves through industry Best Management Practice (B.M.P.). The fortifying of 
merchant vessels alongside the deployment of P.C.A.S.P., multinational naval patrols 
and the centralisation of governance in Somalia was responsible for the dramatic decline 
in successful attacks by Somali pirates in 2013. The importance and universality of 
B.M.P. therefore was a key lesson from the experience of combating modern piracy. It 
would appear reasonable then that, given its utility, a minimal level of B.M.P. 
compliance is made a statutory regulation, increasing to full implementation during 
transit through designated high-risk zones. If such a legal requirement were applied to 
all merchant shipping without prejudice, this would negate any competitive edge of one 
company over another as an incentive not to implement, thereby creating a level playing 
field, which should encourage compliance. This process could be aided by timely and 
accurate reporting of attacks by shipping companies, which at present appears to be 
insufficient. Reporting of an actual or attempted piracy/armed robbery attack might also 
be made a statutory requirement, however, this would likely be met with resistance from 
the shipping industry as subsequent investigations and delays might impede normative 
commercial activity. 
 
While much has been written about the consequences of maritime piracy for the 
shipping industry, governments and the global economy, less is written about the impact 
on seafarers and their dependents. According to the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime 
(U.N.O.D.C.): ‘[…] so much international effort was directed at prosecuting the pirates 
themselves and preserving their human rights, whilst none was focused upon assisting 
the hostages - the primary victims of this criminal activity’.22 Indeed, Somali piracy had 
already developed into an organised criminal enterprise before any concerted 
international action was taken. Similarly, it was not until after the Malacca Strait was 
designated a war risk that comprehensive counter-piracy action was initiated by littoral 
states. 
 
                                                 
22
 U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (U.N.O.D.C.), ‘Hostage Support Programme (Project 045) (part of the 
Maritime Crime Programme) lessons learned, after action review and improvement plan’, 11 Apr. 2014, p. 
3, available at (http://www.lessonsfrompiracy.net/files/2014/06/Hostage-Support-Programme-Lessons-
Learned-Report-14-Apr-14.pdf) (10 June 2015). 
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This reflects what appeared to be a disconnect between regional and international 
governments and the plight of ordinary seafarers at the frontline of piracy. The 
experience of the victims of Somali piracy was especially stark. Thousands of seafarers 
were held hostage for extended periods that spanned over 1,000 days in some cases and 
suffered physical and psychological violence that resulted in long-term post-release 
psychosomatic and financial ramifications.
23
 A study on the human cost of piracy 
commission by the Oceans Beyond Piracy (O.B.P.) initiative stated: ‘The decline in 
Somali piracy is a heartening trend, but even if all new instances of piracy were to stop 
tomorrow there would be a large number of seafarers who are still dealing with the 
impact of past pirate attacks’.24 
 
In conclusion, several lessons have been extrapolated from the various efforts to 
counter-act modern piracy in Southeast Asia and Northeast Africa during the period of 
this research. Firstly, the importance of a holistic and multilateral approach toward 
maritime security; secondly, that maritime security threats can be just as destabilising as 
shore based threats; thirdly, the need to strengthen the rule of law to expedite 
prosecution of international criminal acts alongside universal regulation for P.M.S.C; 
fourthly, the universality of B.M.P.; and, finally, that the consequences of piracy are 
extensive, negatively affecting, not only economies and political stability, but seafarers 
and their dependents. According to the I.C.S: ‘the core lesson of responding to illegality 
robustly and without delay will be more easily delivered next time if these basic lessons 
are kept readily to hand’.25 
 
In 2012, the O.B.P. think tank generated a working group to liaise with national 
governments and international organisations to define a strategic end-state for counter-
piracy operations off the coast of Somalia. This was defined as: 
 
‘[A] safe and sustainable environment for merchant vessels and seafarers 
[…] through continued adherence to applicable portions of Best 
                                                 
23
 Kaija Hurlburt & D. Conor Seyle, ‘The human cost of maritime piracy 2012’ in Oceans Beyond Piracy: 
One Earth Future Foundation Working Paper (2013), p. 22. 
24
 Ibid. 
25
 I.C.S., ‘Lessons identified from Somali piracy’, p. 7. 
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Management Practices and a sustained international navy presence, 
facilitating a move towards regional leadership and development ashore.
26
 
 
Indeed, a slightly amended strategy could be applied to an end-state for counter-piracy 
operations in Southeast Asia: 
 
‘[A] safe and sustainable environment for merchant vessels and seafarers 
[…] through continued adherence to applicable portions of Best 
Management Practices and a sustained regional navy presence, facilitating a 
move towards enhanced regional leadership and development ashore.
27
 
 
In this regard, such a state of finality had not been achieved by the termination of this 
research. While significant progress has been made in tackling piracy and maritime 
criminality in both Northeast Africa and Southeast Asia over the last four decades, any 
apathy at policy level or significant downgrading of current maritime security 
operational assets would likely result in an escalation in attacks. Indeed, it appears that 
piracy much like criminality ashore cannot be permanently eradicated. It can, however, 
be suppressed to manageable levels when a multilateral and multifaceted approach is 
adopted.  
 
Recent indications that international naval strategic focus is shifting from ‘micro-
maritime’ and asymmetric security threats, such as piracy, toward more traditional 
‘macro’ concerns, such as the potential for fleet-on-fleet engagement, will likely have an 
impact on fluctuations of maritime crime in the future. Chinese naval expansion and 
assertions in the South China Sea alongside increased A2/AD activities, Russian naval 
modernisation and forward presence deployments, political and humanitarian instability 
in the Middle East and North Africa, proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and 
the increased vulnerability of the cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum have 
contributed to this shift.
28
 As historical analysis has attested, if international and regional 
governments neglect ‘micro-maritime’ security threats entirely in favour of more 
                                                 
26
 Jon Huggins & Liza Kane-Hartnett, ‘Somali piracy – are we at the end game?’ in Oceans Beyond 
Piracy Working Paper (2013), p. 1, available at (http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/ 
attachments/Jon%20 Cleveland%20Document%20_final.pdf) (21 Jan. 2015). 
27
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28
 See for example: U.S. Department of the Navy, ‘A cooperative strategy for 21st century seapower’ 
(2015), pp 3-8. 
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traditional threats or downgrade or dilute current combative efforts, maritime piracy 
may once again experience a ‘palingenesis’ and become the ‘macro’ security concern. 
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APPENDIX 
Fig. A.1 
I.C.C. I.M.B., Piracy reporting Centre, Piracy and armed robbery attack report template 
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Source: I.C.C. I.M.B., Piracy Reporting Centre (https://icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre). 
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